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Profile: Kenny Easwaran (Texas A&M University)
  1. Regularity and Hyperreal Credences.Kenny Easwaran - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (1):1-41.
    Many philosophers have become worried about the use of standard real numbers for the probability function that represents an agent's credences. They point out that real numbers can't capture the distinction between certain extremely unlikely events and genuinely impossible ones—they are both represented by credence 0, which violates a principle known as “regularity.” Following Skyrms 1980 and Lewis 1980, they recommend that we should instead use a much richer set of numbers, called the “hyperreals.” This essay argues that this popular (...)
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  2. Dr. Truthlove Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Bayesian Probabilities.Kenny Easwaran - 2016 - Noûs 50 (4):816-853.
  3. An 'Evidentialist' Worry About Joyce's Argument for Probabilism.Kenny Easwaran & Branden Fitelson - 2012 - Dialetica 66 (3):425-433.
    To the extent that we have reasons to avoid these “bad B -properties”, these arguments provide reasons not to have an incoherent credence function b — and perhaps even reasons to have a coherent one. But, note that these two traditional arguments for probabilism involve what might be called “pragmatic” reasons (not) to be (in)coherent. In the case of the Dutch Book argument, the “bad” property is pragmatically bad (to the extent that one values money). But, it is not clear (...)
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  4. The Role of Axioms in Mathematics.Kenny Easwaran - 2008 - Erkenntnis 68 (3):381-391.
    To answer the question of whether mathematics needs new axioms, it seems necessary to say what role axioms actually play in mathematics. A first guess is that they are inherently obvious statements that are used to guarantee the truth of theorems proved from them. However, this may neither be possible nor necessary, and it doesn’t seem to fit the historical facts. Instead, I argue that the role of axioms is to systematize uncontroversial facts that mathematicians can accept from a wide (...)
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  5.  17
    Reasons Without Persons: Rationality, Identity, and Time.Kenny Easwaran - 2017 - Journal of Philosophy 114 (2):105-110.
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  6.  79
    Accuracy, Coherence and Evidence.Fitelson Branden & Easwaran Kenny - unknown
    Taking Joyce’s (1998; 2009) recent argument(s) for probabilism as our point of departure, we propose a new way of grounding formal, synchronic, epistemic coherence requirements for (opinionated) full belief. Our approach yields principled alternatives to deductive consistency, sheds new light on the preface and lottery paradoxes, and reveals novel conceptual connections between alethic and evidential epistemic norms.
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  7. Bayesianism I: Introduction and Arguments in Favor.Kenny Easwaran - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (5):312-320.
    Bayesianism is a collection of positions in several related fields, centered on the interpretation of probability as something like degree of belief, as contrasted with relative frequency, or objective chance. However, Bayesianism is far from a unified movement. Bayesians are divided about the nature of the probability functions they discuss; about the normative force of this probability function for ordinary and scientific reasoning and decision making; and about what relation (if any) holds between Bayesian and non-Bayesian concepts.
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  8. Bayesianism II: Applications and Criticisms.Kenny Easwaran - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (5):321-332.
    In the first paper, I discussed the basic claims of Bayesianism (that degrees of belief are important, that they obey the axioms of probability theory, and that they are rationally updated by either standard or Jeffrey conditionalization) and the arguments that are often used to support them. In this paper, I will discuss some applications these ideas have had in confirmation theory, epistemol- ogy, and statistics, and criticisms of these applications.
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  9. Strong and Weak Expectations.Kenny Easwaran - 2008 - Mind 117 (467):633-641.
    Fine has shown that assigning any value to the Pasadena game is consistent with a certain standard set of axioms for decision theory. However, I suggest that it might be reasonable to believe that the value of an individual game is constrained by the long-run payout of repeated plays of the game. Although there is no value that repeated plays of the Pasadena game converges to in the standard strong sense, I show that there is a weaker sort of convergence (...)
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  10.  69
    Expected Accuracy Supports Conditionalization—and Conglomerability and Reflection.Kenny Easwaran - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (1):119-142.
  11. Probabilistic Proofs and Transferability.Kenny Easwaran - 2008 - Philosophia Mathematica 17 (3):341-362.
    In a series of papers, Don Fallis points out that although mathematicians are generally unwilling to accept merely probabilistic proofs, they do accept proofs that are incomplete, long and complicated, or partly carried out by computers. He argues that there are no epistemic grounds on which probabilistic proofs can be rejected while these other proofs are accepted. I defend the practice by presenting a property I call ‘transferability’, which probabilistic proofs lack and acceptable proofs have. I also consider what this (...)
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  12. Why Countable Additivity?Kenny Easwaran - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):53-61.
    It is sometimes alleged that arguments that probability functions should be countably additive show too much, and that they motivate uncountable additivity as well. I show this is false by giving two naturally motivated arguments for countable additivity that do not motivate uncountable additivity.
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  13.  96
    Why Physics Uses Second Derivatives.Kenny Easwaran - 2014 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 65 (4):845-862.
    I defend a causal reductionist account of the nature of rates of change like velocity and acceleration. This account identifies velocity with the past derivative of position and acceleration with the future derivative of velocity. Unlike most reductionist accounts, it can preserve the role of velocity as a cause of future positions and acceleration as the effect of current forces. I show that this is possible only if all the fundamental laws are expressed by differential equations of the same order. (...)
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  14. Varieties of Conditional Probability.Kenny Easwaran - 2011 - In Prasanta Bandyopadhyay & Malcolm Forster (eds.), Handbook for Philosophy of Statistics. North Holland.
    I consider the notions of logical probability, degree of belief, and objective chance, and argue that a different formalism for conditional probability is appropriate for each.
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  15. Logic and Probability.Kenny Easwaran - 2010 - Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 27 (2):229-253.
    As is clear from the other articles in this volume, logic has applications in a broad range of areas of philosophy. If logic is taken to include the mathematical disciplines of set theory, model theory, proof theory, and recursion theory (as well as first-order logic, second-order logic, and modal logic), then the only other area of mathematics with such wide-ranging applications in philosophy is probability theory.
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  16. Mixed Strategies, Uncountable Times, and Pascal's Wager: A Reply to Robertson.Kenny Easwaran & Bradley Monton - 2012 - Analysis 72 (4):681-685.
    Pascal’s Wager holds that one has pragmatic reason to believe in God, since that course of action has infinite expected utility. The mixed strategy objection holds that one could just as well follow a course of action that has infinite expected utility but is unlikely to end with one believing in God. Monton (2011. Mixed strategies can’t evade Pascal’s Wager. Analysis 71: 642–45.) has argued that mixed strategies can’t evade Pascal’s Wager, while Robertson (2012. Some mixed strategies can evade Pascal’s (...)
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  17. Mathematical and Physical Continuity.Mark Colyvan & Kenny Easwaran - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Logic 6 (7):87-93.
    In his paper [2], Hud Hudson presents an interesting argument to the conclusion that two temporally–continuous, spatially–unextended material objects can travel together for all but the last moment of their existences and yet end up one metre apart. What is surprising about this is that Hudson argues that it can be achieved without either object changing in size or moving discontinuously. This would be quite a trick were it to work, but it is far from clear that it does. The (...)
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  18.  32
    Quitting Certainties: A Bayesian Framework Modeling Degrees of Belief.Kenny Easwaran - 2016 - Philosophical Review 125 (1):143-148.
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  19.  60
    Formal Epistemology.Kenny Easwaran - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):651-662.
    Doxastic TheoriesThe application of formal tools to questions related to epistemology is of course not at all new. However, there has been a surge of interest in the field now known as “formal epistemology” over the past decade, with two annual conference series and an annual summer school at Carnegie Mellon University, in addition to many one-off events devoted to the field. A glance at the programs of these series illustrates the wide-ranging set of topics that have been grouped under (...)
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  20.  3
    The Tripartite Role of Belief.Kenny Easwaran - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (2):189-206.
    Belief and credence are often characterized in three different ways—they ought to govern our actions, they ought to be governed by our evidence, and they ought to aim at the truth. If one of these roles is to be central, we need to explain why the others should be features of the same mental state rather than separate ones. If multiple roles are equally central, then this may cause problems for some traditional arguments about what belief and credence must be (...)
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  21.  1
    An ‘Evidentialist’ Worry About Joyce's Argument for Probabilism.Kenny Easwaran & Branden Fitelson - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):425-433.
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  22.  13
    Updating on the Credences of Others: Disagreement, Agreement, and Synergy.Kenny Easwaran, Luke Fenton-Glynn, Christopher Hitchcock & Joel D. Velasco - 2016 - Philosophers' Imprint 16 (11).
    We introduce a family of rules for adjusting one’s credences in response to learning the credences of others. These rules have a number of desirable features. 1. They yield the posterior credences that would result from updating by standard Bayesian conditionalization on one’s peers’ reported credences if one’s likelihood function takes a particular simple form. 2. In the simplest form, they are symmetric among the agents in the group. 3. They map neatly onto the familiar Condorcet voting results. 4. They (...)
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  23. Bayesianism II: Criticisms and Applications.Kenny Easwaran - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6:321-332.
     
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  24.  39
    Decision Theory Without Representation Theorems.Kenny Easwaran - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14 (27).
    Naive versions of decision theory take probabilities and utilities as primitive and use expected value to give norms on rational decision. However, standard decision theory takes rational preference as primitive and uses it to construct probability and utility. This paper shows how to justify a version of the naive theory, by taking dominance as the most basic normatively required preference relation, and then extending it by various conditions under which agents should be indifferent between acts. The resulting theory can make (...)
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  25.  13
    Rebutting and Undercutting in Mathematics.Kenny Easwaran - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):146-162.
    In my () I argued that a central component of mathematical practice is that published proofs must be “transferable” — that is, they must be such that the author's reasons for believing the conclusion are shared directly with the reader, rather than requiring the reader to essentially rely on testimony. The goal of this paper is to explain this requirement of transferability in terms of a more general norm on defeat in mathematical reasoning that I will call “convertibility”. I begin (...)
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  26.  93
    Partial Belief, Full Belief, and Accuracy–Dominance.Branden Fitelson & Kenny Easwaran - manuscript
    Arguments for probabilism aim to undergird/motivate a synchronic probabilistic coherence norm for partial beliefs. Standard arguments for probabilism are all of the form: An agent S has a non-probabilistic partial belief function b iff (⇐⇒) S has some “bad” property B (in virtue of the fact that their p.b.f. b has a certain kind of formal property F). These arguments rest on Theorems (⇒) and Converse Theorems (⇐): b is non-Pr ⇐⇒ b has formal property F.
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  27.  28
    Probability and Logic.Kenny Easwaran - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (12):876-883.
    Probability and logic are two branches of mathematics that have important philosophical applications. This article discusses several areas of intersection between them. Several involve the role for probability in giving semantics for logic or the role of logic in governing assignments of probability. Some involve probability over non-classical logic or self-referential sentences.
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  28.  48
    Tracking Reason: Proof, Consequence, and Truth. [REVIEW]Kenny Easwaran - 2008 - Philosophical Review 117 (2):296-299.
  29. REVIEWS-WD Hart, The Evolution of Logic.Kenny Easwaran - 2011 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 17 (4):533.
  30.  19
    Review of Michael Frauchiger, Wilhelm K. Essler (Eds.), Representation, Evidence, and Justification: Themes From Suppes[REVIEW]Kenny Easwaran - 2009 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (1).
  31.  14
    Review of F. Schick, Ambiguity and Logic[REVIEW]Kenny Easwaran - 2007 - Mind 116 (462):478-482.
  32.  1
    The Evolution of Logic. [REVIEW]Kenny Easwaran - 2011 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 17 (4):533-534.
  33. Review: Ambiguity and Logic. [REVIEW]Kenny Easwaran - 2007 - Mind 116 (462):478-482.
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