This article compares and contrasts three claims published in The Review of Metaphysics in recent decades: that there is, according to Aquinas, a difference between “esse as act” and “existence which is the fact of being” ; that, to the contrary, it is the same “existence” that is conceptualized both as an “actuality” and as a “fact” ; and that there is, indeed, contrary to Owens and as Fabro suggests, a distinction in Aquinas’s writings between “esse as facticity” and “esse (...) as intrinsic actus essendi”. The article attempts to bring the differences between these interpreters on the question into sharp focus. (shrink)

The purpose of this work is to summarize and clarify a centrally important but often neglected theme in the writings of Aquinas. The reason for the neglect, and the justification for presenting the work, lie in the difficulty, even for constant readers of Aquinas, of grasping this complex theme as a whole: on the one hand the texts which explicitly treat of it are widely scattered throughout Aquinas's writings, while on the other hand it may be said to be implicitly (...) present nearly everywhere in his work. The success of the present volume, then, must be measured by the extent to which fidelity to the many texts and to Aquinas's overall intention is combined with a clear and orderly presentation. (shrink)

“Studies on the emotions became popular in the analytically oriented philosophy of mind in the 1980s” , the author begins, but the status of emotion as reason’s rival or complement in the directing of human nature is, of course, of perennial interest to philosophy per se. True, the topic has acquired a certain prominence in recent decades, and this has led to useful historical investigations, although, as the author says, many more of them have been on emotions in ancient than (...) in medieval philosophy . In four chapters, he presents a continuous history of philosophical reflection on emotion from Plato to the fourteenth-century Franciscan Adam Wodeham, and late medieval compendia. Along the way he summarizes and comments on a large number of texts in whole or in part, regularly quotes from them in English translation, and often supplies the more significant Greek and Latin terms. For discussion of ancient theories, he acknowledges reliance on works by Martha Nussbaum and Richard Sorabji, but his scholarship extends to a wide range of primary sources and other historical studies. His recognition of the bearing of both theological and medical works on his subject is noteworthy: it is a mark of the singularity of emotion—or, as it is. (shrink)

Starting from Summa Theologiae 1.2.3.obj.2, I consider some aspects of the term propositum as it occurs in his works. The objection divides “everything thatappears in the world” into what is natural and what is a proposito, and argues that each of these can be accounted for by causes other than God. I suggest that what is a proposito be called “the purposed,” and I try to clarify Aquinas’s understanding of purpose in relation to other notions in his writings, in particular (...) nature, fortune, and above all deliberation or “counsel,” which is the prelude to choice. After some reflection on the theme of “deliberated will” and on the contrast between deliberating and being deliberate, I return to Aquinas’s reply to the objection I began with, then conclude with reference to a recent discussion of the difference between ends and purposes. (shrink)

Starting from Summa Theologiae 1.2.3.obj.2, I consider some aspects of the term propositum as it occurs in his works. The objection divides “everything thatappears in the world” into what is natural and what is a proposito, and argues that each of these can be accounted for by causes other than God. I suggest that what is a proposito be called “the purposed,” and I try to clarify Aquinas’s understanding of purpose in relation to other notions in his writings, in particular (...) nature, fortune, and above all deliberation or “counsel,” which is the prelude to choice. After some reflection on the theme of “deliberated will” and on the contrast between deliberating and being deliberate, I return to Aquinas’s reply to the objection I began with, then conclude with reference to a recent discussion of the difference between ends and purposes. (shrink)

“Studies on the emotions became popular in the analytically oriented philosophy of mind in the 1980s” , the author begins, but the status of emotion as reason’s rival or complement in the directing of human nature is, of course, of perennial interest to philosophy per se. True, the topic has acquired a certain prominence in recent decades, and this has led to useful historical investigations, although, as the author says, many more of them have been on emotions in ancient than (...) in medieval philosophy . In four chapters, he presents a continuous history of philosophical reflection on emotion from Plato to the fourteenth-century Franciscan Adam Wodeham, and late medieval compendia. Along the way he summarizes and comments on a large number of texts in whole or in part, regularly quotes from them in English translation, and often supplies the more significant Greek and Latin terms. For discussion of ancient theories, he acknowledges reliance on works by Martha Nussbaum and Richard Sorabji, but his scholarship extends to a wide range of primary sources and other historical studies. His recognition of the bearing of both theological and medical works on his subject is noteworthy: it is a mark of the singularity of emotion—or, as it is. (shrink)

This collection grew out of a conference held in Uppsala in 2002, at which an international group of scholars met to discuss several texts from between 1100 and 1700 dealing with questions of philosophical psychology. The conference was motivated by the thesis that the history of philosophy in these six centuries should not be divided into a medieval and a modern period, but rather seen as a continuous tradition .Henrik Lagerlund’s introduction traces the origin of issues in contemporary philosophy of (...) mind to an event well before Descartes , namely the Latinizing introduction of Aristotelian Arabic thought in the twelfth century . But there is a difference between contemporary and earlier concerns: “Today we want to explain how phenomena like consciousness and intentionality are possible in a material world. The problem that faced medieval philosophers and Descartes was rather the opposite, that is, how can matter at all have an effect on the mental and how can such a noble thing as a mind be united to a material body” . Moreover, there are in fact several mind-body problems: the interaction problem, the unification problem, the problem of the existence of sensations in the mind, and the problem of combining and reconciling efficient and. (shrink)

This elegant and painstakingly detailed portrait of St. Thomas Aquinas, whose distinctive theme is the unity of his life and work, is an elaboration of the first section of the author's substantial article on Aquinas in the Dictionnaire de spiritualité. The present work consists of the following parts: a foreword; sixteen chapters which narrate and reflect upon the relevant events, including the composition of Aquinas' writings, between his birth in 1224/25 and his canonization on July 18, 1323 and its aftermath; (...) a summary chronology; a catalogue of writings and a bibliography, both established by Gilles Emery; and indexes of Aquinas' writings and of proper names. As this bare enumeration of contents suggests, the work resembles and indeed depends upon James A. Weisheipl's monumental Friar Thomas d'Aquino: His Life, Thought, and Works, which was originally published in 1974 and then reprinted "with addenda and corrigenda" in 1983. However, it also goes beyond Weisheipl's work in two important respects. (shrink)

This reference work on twentieth-century studies of Aristotle’s Metaphysics consists of a “presentation” by Giovanni Reale; an editor’s introduction; tables of the international team of collaborators; the bibliography itself; and indices of concepts, Greek terms, and authors. Reale praises the work for fulfillment, within the limits of the possible, of the four requirements of such a project: completeness, accuracy of reference, clear and useful arrangement of material, and an intelligible account of the various items listed.

“Is there a medieval philosophy?” The work opens with critiques of answers by Gilson, The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, and Alain de Libera, and then, on the basis of first-person singular statements by Bonaventure, Aquinas, Scotus, and Eckhart, each of which concerns a doctrine of prima, communia, or transcendentia, proposes its own. “Over time, my conviction has grown that medieval philosophy can be regarded as a way of transcendental thought, as a scientia transcendens...”. The look back to the (...) middle ages must see through Kant’s erroneous assessment of the doctrine, as well as his influential appropriation of the term “transcendental” to refer to a priori modes of cognition, an appropriation that has infected the very study of medieval transcendental thought ; still, it is striking that, for Aquinas, transcendentals, while not a priori forms, “are the prima of the cognitive order”. The exemplary case of Aquinas is presented both to prove the general conviction and to supply a serious lack in Thomistic studies. (shrink)

Dopo aver considerato i caratteri generali dei prologhi di Tommaso ai commenti aristotelici, ed in particolare i proemi alla Fisica e al De sensu et sensato, l'A. dimostra come Pietro di Alvernia utilizzi queste due fonti tomiste nel suo proemio al De sensu. Del proemio, diviso in sette sezioni esaminate singolarmente, viene data anche una edizione critica in appendice , che si basa sull'unico manoscritto che tramanda il testo, conservato a Oxford, Merton College, 275. Nell'ultima parte del saggio l'A. propone (...) alcune considerazioni finali, ribadendo che la fedeltà di Pietro al testo di Tommaso non può considerarsi «tomismo», ma rivela piuttosto il bisogno avvertito da Pietro di una guida all'interpretazione dei testi aristotelici. (shrink)

With more than 4,200 entries from 143 primary sources, 3,661 secondary sources, and 427 miscellaneous entries), Richard Ingardia has provided an indispensable tool for those interested in Thomistic philosophy and its future development. The focus is on Aquinas's philosophy and international studies of his philosophy from 1977-1990.The book includes author abstracts of books and articles, significant book reviews of secondary sources, dissertations done at American universities, and seven indexes. Entries are grouped by language for ease of reference.