Results for 'Killing and Letting Die'

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  1.  11
    Vital Prostheses: Killing, Letting Die, and the Ethics of de‐Implantation.Sean Aas - forthcoming - Bioethics.
    Disconnecting a patient from artificial life support, on their request, is often if not always a matter of letting them die, not killing them—and sometimes, permissibly doing so. Stopping a patient’s heart on request, by contrast, is a kind of killing, and rarely if ever a permissible one. The difference seems to be that procedures of the first kind remove an unwanted external support for bodily functioning, rather than intervening in the body itself. What should we say, (...)
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  2. Killing and Letting Die.James Rachels - 2001 - In Lawrence C. Becker Mary Becker & Charlotte Becker (eds.), Encyclopedia of Ethics, 2nd Edition. Routledge.
    Is it worse to kill someone than to let someone die? It seems obvious to common sense that it is worse. We allow people to die, for example, when we fail to contribute money to famine-relief efforts; but even if we feel somewhat guilty, we do not consider ourselves murderers. Nor do we feel like accessories to murder when we fail to give blood, sign an organ-donor card, or do any of the other things that could save lives. Common sense (...)
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  3. The Moral Distinction Between Killing and Letting Die in Medical Cases.Joachim Asscher - 2008 - Bioethics 22 (5):278–285.
    In some medical cases there is a moral distinction between killing and letting die, but in others there is not. In this paper I present an original and principled account of the moral distinction between killing and letting die. The account provides both an explanation of the moral distinction and an explanation for why the distinction does not always hold. If these explanations are correct, the moral distinction between killing and letting die must be (...)
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  4.  27
    Drawing a Line Between Killing and Letting Die: The Law, and Law Reform, on Medically Assisted Dying.Lawrence O. Gostin - 1993 - Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 21 (1):94-101.
    Reviews the legal position on the distinction drawn between killing and letting die in medically assisted dying.
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  5. Killing, Letting Die, and the Case for Mildly Punishing Bad Samaritanism.Ken Levy - 2010 - Georgia Law Review 44:607-695.
    For over a century now, American scholars (among others) have been debating the merits of “bad Samaritan” laws — laws punishing people for failing to attempt easy and safe rescues. Unfortunately, the opponents of bad Samaritan laws have mostly prevailed. In the United States, the “no-duty-to-rescue” rule dominates. Only four states have passed bad Samaritan laws, and these laws impose only the most minimal punishment — either sub-$500 fines or short-term imprisonment. -/- This Article argues that every state should criminalize (...)
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  6.  10
    How Do People Use ‘Killing’, ‘Letting Die’ and Related Bioethical Concepts? Contrasting Descriptive and Normative Hypotheses.David Rodríguez‐Arias, Blanca Rodríguez López, Anibal Monasterio‐Astobiza & Ivar R. Hannikainen - 2020 - Bioethics 34 (5):509-518.
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  7. Killing, Letting Die and Preventing People From Being Saved.Matthew Hanser - 1999 - Utilitas 11 (3):277.
    The distinction between killing and letting die is too simple. A third category must also be recognized. Like killing, preventing a person from being saved is a species of doing harm; like killing, it infringes one of the victim's negative rights. Yet preventing a person from being saved is morally on a par with letting die, which infringes one of the victim's positive rights. It follows that we cannot explain the moral inequivalence of killing (...)
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  8. End-of-Life Decisions and Moral Psychology: Killing, Letting Die, Intention and Foresight. [REVIEW]Charles Douglas - 2009 - Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 6 (3):337-347.
    In contemplating any life and death moral dilemma, one is often struck by the possible importance of two distinctions; the distinction between killing and “letting die”, and the distinction between an intentional killing and an action aimed at some other outcome that causes death as a foreseen but unintended “side-effect”. Many feel intuitively that these distinctions are morally significant, but attempts to explain why this might be so have been unconvincing. In this paper, I explore the problem (...)
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  9.  77
    Killing, Letting Die and the Bare Difference Argument.Royw Perrett - 1996 - Bioethics 10 (2):131–139.
    ABSTRACTI believe that there is no intrinsic moral difference between killing and letting die. That is, there is no difference that depends solely on the distinction between an act and an omission. I also believe that we can reasonably establish this thesis by appeal to the Bare Difference Argument. The form of this argument involves considering two imaginary cases in which there are no morally relevant differences present, save the bare difference that one is a case of (...) and one a case of letting die. But in the pair of cases under consideration this bare difference makes no moral difference. Hence it cannot be that the bare difference between killing and letting die is in itself a morally important difference.Winston Nesbitt has recently argued that the Bare Difference Argument fails because “the examples produced typically possess a feature which makes their use in this context illegitimate, and that when modified to remove this feature, they provide support for the view which they were designed to undermine”. I argue that Nesbitt misunderstands the logic of the Bare Difference Argument and that accordingly his objections are mistaken. (shrink)
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  10.  38
    Killing, Letting Die and Moral Perception.Grant Gillett - 1994 - Bioethics 8 (4):312–328.
    ABSTRACTThere are a number of arguments that purport to show, in general terms, that there is no difference between killing and letting die. These are used to justify active euthanasia on the basis of the reasons given for allowing patients to die. I argue that the general and abstract arguments fail to take account of the complex and particular situations which are found in the care of those with terminal illness. When in such situations, there are perceptions and (...)
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  11.  45
    Killing, Letting Die and Euthanasia.D. N. Husak - 1979 - Journal of Medical Ethics 5 (4):200-202.
    Medical ethicists debate whether or not the moral assessment of cases of euthanasia should depend on whether the patient is 'killed' or 'allowed to die'. The usual presupposition is that a clear distinction between killing and letting die can be drawn so that this substantive question is not begged. I contend that the categorisation of cases of instances of killing rather than as instances of letting die depends in part on a prior moral assessment of the (...)
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  12.  6
    Killing, Letting Die and Moral Perception.Grant Gillett - 1994 - Bioethics 8 (4):312-328.
    ABSTRACTThere are a number of arguments that purport to show, in general terms, that there is no difference between killing and letting die. These are used to justify active euthanasia on the basis of the reasons given for allowing patients to die. I argue that the general and abstract arguments fail to take account of the complex and particular situations which are found in the care of those with terminal illness. When in such situations, there are perceptions and (...)
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  13. Why Letting Die Instead of Killing? Choosing Active Euthanasia on Moral Grounds.Evangelos D. Protopapadakis - 2018 - Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy.
    Ever since the debate concerning euthanasia was ignited, the distinction between active and passive euthanasia – or, letting die and killing – has been marked as one of its key issues. In this paper I will argue that a) the borderline between act and omission is an altogether blurry one, and it gets even vaguer when it comes to euthanasia, b) there is no morally significant difference between active and passive euthanasia, and c) if there is any, it (...)
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  14. Killing and Letting Die.Bonnie Steinbock & Alastair Norcross (eds.) - 1994 - Fordham University Press.
    This collection contains twenty-one thought-provoking essays on the controversies surrounding the moral and legal distinctions between euthanasia and "letting die." Since public awareness of this issue has increased this second edition includes nine entirely new essays which bring the treatment of the subject up-to-date. The urgency of this issue can be gauged in recent developments such as the legalization of physician-assisted suicide in the Netherlands, "how-to" manuals topping the bestseller charts in the United States, and the many headlines devoted (...)
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  15. The Ethics of Killing and Letting Die: Active and Passive Euthanasia.H. V. McLachlan - 2008 - Journal of Medical Ethics 34 (8):636-638.
    In their account of passive euthanasia, Garrard and Wilkinson present arguments that might lead one to overlook significant moral differences between killing and letting die. To kill is not the same as to let die. Similarly, there are significant differences between active and passive euthanasia. Our moral duties differ with regard to them. We are, in general, obliged to refrain from killing each and everyone. We do not have a similar obligation to try to prevent each and (...)
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  16. Killing John to Save Mary: A Defence of the Distinction Between Killing and Letting Die.Helen Frowe - 2013 - In J. Campbell, M. O’Rourke & H. Silverstein (eds.), Action, Ethics and Responsibility. MIT Press.
    Introduction This paper defends the moral significance of the distinction between killing and letting die. In the first part of the paper, I consider and reject Michael Tooley’s argument that initiating a causal process is morally equivalent to refraining from interfering in that process. The second part disputes Tooley’s suggestion it is merely external factors that make killing appear to be worse than letting die, when in reality the distinction is morally neutral. Tooley is mistaken to (...)
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  17. Why Are Killing and Letting Die Wrong?Matthew Hanser - 1995 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 24 (3):175-201.
    This article has two main sections. In Section I, I argue against the skeptic's position. I examine an attempt to see both prima facie objections as arising from features that killing and letting die have in common, and then argue that all such attempts are doomed to failure. In Section II, I explain how even defenders of the distinction's significance have misconstrued the difference between the two objections. In so doing I attempt to develop a better account of (...)
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  18. Critical Notice: Why Killing Is Not Always Worse—and Is Sometimes Better—Than Letting Die.Helga Kuhse - 1998 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 7 (4):371-374.
    The philosophical debate over the moral difference between killing and letting die has obvious relevance for the contemporary public debate over voluntary euthanasia. Winston Nesbitt claims to have shown that killing someone is, other things being equal, always worse than allowing someone to die. But this conclusion is illegitimate. While Nesbitt is correct when he suggests that killing is sometimes worse than letting die, this is not always the case. In this article, I argue that (...)
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  19.  72
    Ambiguities in 'Killing' and 'Letting Die'.Gary M. Atkinson - 1983 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 8 (2):159-168.
    In a recent Article Carla Kary attempts to show that there should be a significant moral difference between instances of killing and letting die. I shall maintain in Section I that Kary's argument is somewhat weakened by the failure to note an important ambiguity in the notion of killing a person. I shall also argue in Section II that a similar ambiguity affects the notion of letting someone die, and that the failure to note this latter (...)
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  20.  1
    Why Letting Die Instead of Killing?Evangelos Protopapadakis - 2018 - Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy 3:85-90.
    Ever since the debate concerning euthanasia was ignited, the distinction between active and passive euthanasia – or, letting die and killing – has been marked as one of its key issues. In this paper I will argue that a) the borderline between act and omission is an altogether blurry one, and it gets even vaguer when it comes to euthanasia, b) there is no morally significant difference between active and passive euthanasia, and c) if there is any, it (...)
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  21.  30
    Killing and Relevantly Similarly Letting Die.Peter Davson-Galle - 1998 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 15 (2):199–201.
    Winston Nesbitt has argued that the usual examples appealed to as supporting the view that killing is no worse than letting die are misleading in that the comparison cases are not set up properly to tap our intuitions. Making various adjustments to the cases he judges killing to be intuitively worse than letting die and suggests that such a result is meta‐ethically appropriate to one view of the point of ethics. I contest each of these claims.
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  22.  5
    Killing and Relevantly Similarly Letting Die.Peter Davson‐Galle - 1998 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 15 (2):199-201.
    Winston Nesbitt has argued that the usual examples appealed to as supporting the view that killing is no worse than letting die are misleading in that the comparison cases are not set up properly to tap our intuitions. Making various adjustments to the cases he judges killing to be intuitively worse than letting die and suggests that such a result is meta‐ethically appropriate to one view of the point of ethics. I contest each of these claims.
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  23. Killing and Letting Die.Matthew Hanser - 1993 - Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles
    Some philosopher argue that the distinction between killing and letting die lacks moral significance, since the prima facie objections to both arise from a feature which killing and letting die share: Either way, an agent chooses a course of action resulting in someone's dying, when he could have chosen a course of action having the opposite result. I find this claim ambiguous. Does it mean that in either case, if the agent had chosen the alternative course (...)
     
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  24.  86
    On "Killing" Versus "Letting Die" in Clinical Practice: Mere Sophistry With Words?Craig Paterson - 2000 - Journal of Nursing Law 6 (4):25-44.
  25. Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem.Judith Jarvis Thomson - 1976 - The Monist 59 (2):204-217.
  26. Killing, Letting Die, and Euthanasia.Holly Smith Goldman - 1980 - Analysis 40 (4):224 -.
    Death is not always an evil for the person who dies. The implication for euthanasia is clear-cut. When death counts as a good for someone, directly killing the person would be no worse, and might be better, than merely allowing her to die.
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  27. Killing, Letting Die, and Withdrawing Aid.Jeff McMahan - 1993 - Ethics 103 (2):250-279.
    Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
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  28.  4
    Killing, Letting Die, and the Morality of Abortion.Anton Tupa - 2009 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 26 (1):1-26.
    abstract David Boonin, in his A Defense of Abortion, argues that abortions that involve killing the foetus are morally permissible, even if granting for the sake of argument that the foetus has a right to life. His primary argument is an argument by analogy to a ‘trolley case’. I offer two lines of counterargument to his argument by analogy. First, I argue that Boonin's analogy between his trolley case and a normal unwanted pregnancy does not hold. I revise his (...)
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  29. Killing, Letting Die, and the Morality of Abortion.Anton Tupa - 2009 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 26 (1):1-26.
    abstract David Boonin, in his A Defense of Abortion, argues that abortions that involve killing the foetus are morally permissible, even if granting for the sake of argument that the foetus has a right to life. His primary argument is an argument by analogy to a 'trolley case'. I offer two lines of counterargument to his argument by analogy. First, I argue that Boonin's analogy between his trolley case and a normal unwanted pregnancy does not hold. I revise his (...)
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  30.  48
    Killing, Letting Die, and Simple Conflicts.H. M. Malm - 1989 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 18 (3):238-258.
  31. Killing, Letting Die, and Euthanasia: A Reply to Holly Smith Goldman.Philippa Foot - 1980 - Analysis 41 (3):159 - 160.
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  32.  29
    Killing, Letting Die, and Euthanasia.Joseph L. Lombardi - 1981 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 55:250.
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  33.  27
    Killing, Letting Die, and Thomson.Raymond A. Belliotti - 1982 - Critica 14 (40):61-74.
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  34.  37
    Killing, Letting Die, and the Death Penalty in Advance.Brian K. Powell - forthcoming - International Journal of Applied Philosophy.
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  35.  42
    Killing, Letting Die, and Justice.Richard O'Neil - 1978 - Analysis 38 (3):124 - 125.
  36.  6
    Killing, Letting Die and Moral Perception: A Reply to Grant Gillett.Jim Thornton - 1999 - Bioethics 13 (5):414-425.
  37.  15
    Is The Killing/Letting-Die Distinction Normatively Neutral?Earl Winkler - 1991 - Dialogue 30 (3):309-.
  38.  5
    “Moral Relevance” in the Killing / Letting Die Debate.Charles R. Pinches - 1987 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):193-205.
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  39.  11
    “Moral Relevance” in the Killing / Letting Die Debate.Charles R. Pinches - 1987 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):193-205.
  40. Is Killing No Worse Than Letting Die?Winston Nesbitt - 1995 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 12 (1):101-106.
    ABSTRACT Those who wish to refute the view that it is worse to kill than to let die sometimes produce examples of cases in which an agent lets someone die but would be generally agreed to be no less reprehensible than if he had killed. It is argued that the examples produced typically possess a feature which makes their use in this context illegitimate, and that when modified to remove this feature, they provide support for the view which they were (...)
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  41. Euthanasia, Intentions, and the Doctrine of Killing and Letting Die.Kai-Yee Wong - 2007 - In A. Yeung & H. Li (eds.), New Essays in Applied Ethics: Animal Rights, Personhood, and the Ethics of Killing. Palgrave McMillan.
    In 1996, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeal of United States ruled that a Washington law banning physician-assisted suicide was unconstitutional. In the same year, the 2nd Circuit found a similar law in New York unconstitutional. One year later, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed both rulings, saying that there was no constitutional right to assisted suicide. However, the Court also made plain that they did not reject such a right in principle and that “citizens are free to press for permissive (...)
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  42.  22
    Withholding and Withdrawing Life-Sustaining Treatment and the Relevance of the Killing Versus Letting Die Distinction.Robert D. Truog & Andrew McGee - 2019 - American Journal of Bioethics 19 (3):34-36.
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  43. Killing by Letting Die.Bart Gruzalski - 1981 - Mind 90:91.
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  44. Killing and Letting Die.Helga Kuhse & Peter Singer - 2001 - In John Harris (ed.), Bioethics. Oxford University Press.
     
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  45. Killing and Letting Die: Methodological and Substantive Issues.Frances Myrna Kamm - 1983 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 64 (4):297.
     
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  46.  19
    Killing or Letting Die? Proposal of a (Somewhat) New Answer to a Perennial Question.Reinhard Merkel - 2016 - Journal of Medical Ethics 42 (6):353-360.
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  47. On Killing and Letting Die.Daniel Dinello - 1971 - Analysis 31 (3):83 - 86.
  48.  94
    Killing and Letting Die: The Similarity Criterion.Joachim Asscher - 2007 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 24 (3):271–282.
  49.  8
    Killing and Letting Die.Bonnie Steinbock - 1982 - Ethics 92 (3):555-558.
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  50. Why Killing is Not Always Worse–and Sometimes Better–Than Letting Die.Helga Kuhse - 2006 - In Helga Kuhse & Peter Singer (eds.), Bioethics: An Anthology. Blackwell. pp. 1--4.
     
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