Results for 'Kiverstein Julian'

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  1.  56
    The Anticipating Brain is Not a Scientist: The Free-Energy Principle From an Ecological-Enactive Perspective.Jelle Bruineberg, Julian Kiverstein & Erik Rietveld - 2018 - Synthese 195 (6).
    In this paper, we argue for a theoretical separation of the free-energy principle from Helmholtzian accounts of the predictive brain. The free-energy principle is a theoretical framework capturing the imperative for biological self-organization in information-theoretic terms. The free-energy principle has typically been connected with a Bayesian theory of predictive coding, and the latter is often taken to support a Helmholtzian theory of perception as unconscious inference. If our interpretation is right, however, a Helmholtzian view of perception is incompatible with Bayesian (...)
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  2.  11
    The Embodied Brain: Towards a Radical Embodied Cognitive Neuroscience.Julian Kiverstein & Mark Miller - 2015 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 9.
  3. Introduction: Mind Embodied, Embedded, Enacted: One Church or Many?Julian Kiverstein & Andy Clark - 2009 - Topoi 28 (1):1-7.
  4.  18
    The Primacy of Skilled Intentionality: On Hutto & Satne’s the Natural Origins of Content.Julian Kiverstein & Erik Rietveld - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (3):701-721.
    Following a brief reconstruction of Hutto & Satne’s paper we focus our critical comments on two issues. First we take up H&S’s claim that a non-representational form of ur-intentionality exists that performs essential work in setting the scene for content-involving forms of intentionality. We will take issue with the characterisation that H&S give of this non-representational form of intentionality. Part of our commentary will therefore be aimed at motivating an alternative account of how there can be intentionality without mental content, (...)
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  5. Embraining Culture: Leaky Minds and Spongy Brains.Julian Kiverstein & Mirko Farina - 2011 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy (2).
    We offer an argument for the extended mind based on considerations from brain development. We argue that our brains develop to function in partnership with cognitive resources located in our external environments. Through our cultural upbringing we are trained to use artefacts in problem solving that become factored into the cognitive routines our brains support. Our brains literally grow to work in close partnership with resources we regularly and reliably interact with. We take this argument to be in line with (...)
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  6. Heidegger and Cognitive Science.Julian Kiverstein & Michael Wheeler (eds.) - 2012 - Palgrave-Macmillan.
  7.  14
    Free Energy and the Self: An Ecological–Enactive Interpretation.Julian Kiverstein - forthcoming - Topoi:1-16.
    According to the free energy principle all living systems aim to minimise free energy in their sensory exchanges with the environment. Processes of free energy minimisation are thus ubiquitous in the biological world. Indeed it has been argued that even plants engage in free energy minimisation. Not all living things however feel alive. How then did the feeling of being alive get started? In line with the arguments of the phenomenologists, I will claim that every feeling must be felt by (...)
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  8. Decomposing the Will.Andy Clark, Julian Kiverstein & Tillmann Vierkant (eds.) - 2013 - Oxford University Press USA.
    There is growing evidence from the science of human behavior that our everyday, folk understanding of ourselves as conscious, rational, responsible agents may be mistaken. The new essays in this volume display and explore this radical claim. folk concept of the responsible agent after abandoning the image of a central executive and "decomposing" the notion of the conscious will into multiple interlocking aspects and functions.
     
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  9.  20
    Empathy and the Responsiveness to Social Affordances.Julian Kiverstein - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 36:532-542.
  10. Do Sensory Substitution Extend the Conscious Mind?Julian Kiverstein & Mirko Farina - forthcoming - In Fabio Paglieri (ed.), Consciousness in interaction: the role of the natural and social context in shaping consciousness". Amsterdam: John Benjamins. John Benjamins.
    Is the brain the biological substrate of consciousness? Most naturalistic philosophers of mind have supposed that the answer must obviously be «yes » to this question. However, a growing number of philosophers working in 4e (embodied, embedded, extended, enactive) cognitive science have begun to challenge this assumption, arguing instead that consciousness supervenes on the whole embodied animal in dynamic interaction with the environment. We call views that share this claim dynamic sensorimotor theories of consciousness (DSM). Clark (2009) a founder and (...)
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  11. Enactivism and the Unity of Perception and Action.Nivedita Gangopadhyay & Julian Kiverstein - 2009 - Topoi 28 (1):63-73.
    This paper contrasts two enactive theories of visual experience: the sensorimotor theory (O’Regan and Noë, Behav Brain Sci 24(5):939–1031, 2001; Noë and O’Regan, Vision and mind, 2002; Noë, Action in perception, 2004) and Susan Hurley’s (Consciousness in action, 1998, Synthese 129:3–40, 2001) theory of active perception. We criticise the sensorimotor theory for its commitment to a distinction between mere sensorimotor behaviour and cognition. This is a distinction that is firmly rejected by Hurley. Hurley argues that personal level cognitive abilities emerge (...)
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  12. The Meaning of Embodiment.Julian Kiverstein - 2012 - Topics in Cognitive Science 4 (4):740-758.
    There is substantial disagreement among philosophers of embodied cognitive science about the meaning of embodiment. In what follows, I describe three different views that can be found in the current literature. I show how this debate centers around the question of whether the science of embodied cognition can retain the computer theory of mind. One view, which I will label body functionalism, takes the body to play the functional role of linking external resources for problem solving with internal biological machinery. (...)
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  13.  11
    The Feeling of Grip: Novelty, Error Dynamics, and the Predictive Brain.Julian Kiverstein, Mark Miller & Erik Rietveld - forthcoming - Synthese:1-23.
    According to the free energy principle biological agents resist a tendency to disorder in their interactions with a dynamically changing environment by keeping themselves in sensory and physiological states that are expected given their embodiment and the niche they inhabit :127–138, 2010. doi:10.1038/nrn2787). Why would a biological agent that aims at minimising uncertainty in its encounters with the world ever be motivated to seek out novelty? Novelty for such an agent would arrive in the form of sensory and physiological states (...)
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  14. Could a Robot Have a Subjective Point of View?Julian Kiverstein - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (7):127-139.
    Scepticism about the possibility of machine consciousness comes in at least two forms. Some argue that our neurobiology is special, and only something sharing our neurobiology could be a subject of experience. Others argue that a machine couldn't be anything else but a zombie: there could never be something it is like to be a machine. I advance a dynamic sensorimotor account of consciousness which argues against both these varieties of scepticism.
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  15.  5
    Obsessive Compulsive Disorder: A Pathology of Self-Confidence?Julian Kiverstein, Erik Rietveld, Heleen A. Slagter & Damiaan Denys - forthcoming - Trends in Cognitive Sciences.
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  16.  24
    Social Understanding Without Mentalizing.Julian Kiverstein - 2011 - Philosophical Topics 39 (1):41-65.
    The standard view in philosophy and psychology claims that mentalizing is necessary and sufficient for social understanding. Mentalizing (also known as “mindreading”) is the name given to the cognitive capacities humans employ in explaining and predicting their own and other’s actions. The standard view is rejected by philosophers working in the phenomenological tradition. They have argued that mentalizing is neither necessary nor sufficient for social understanding. They suggest instead that most of the time we understand each other through what Shaun (...)
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  17.  4
    The Field and Landscape of Affordances: Koffka’s Two Environments Revisited.Julian Kiverstein, Ludger van Dijk & Erik Rietveld - forthcoming - Synthese:1-18.
    The smooth integration of the natural sciences with everyday lived experience is an important ambition of radical embodied cognitive science. In this paper we start from Koffka’s recommendation in his Principles of Gestalt Psychology that to realize this ambition psychology should be a “science of molar behaviour”. Molar behavior refers to the purposeful behaviour of the whole organism directed at an environment that is meaningfully structured for the animal. Koffka made a sharp distinction between the “behavioural environment” and the “geographical (...)
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  18.  98
    Substituting the Senses.Julian Kiverstein, Mirko Farina & Andy Clark - forthcoming - In Mohan Matthen (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception. Oxford University Press.
    Sensory substitution devices are a type of sensory prosthesis that (typically) convert visual stimuli transduced by a camera into tactile or auditory stimulation. They are designed to be used by people with impaired vision so that they can recover some of the functions normally subserved by vision. In this chapter we will consider what philosophers might learn about the nature of the senses from the neuroscience of sensory substitution. We will show how sensory substitution devices work by exploiting the cross-modal (...)
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  19. Could Embodied Simulation Be a by-Product of Emotion Perception?Edoardo Zamuner & Julian Kiverstein - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (6):449 - 449.
    The SIMS model claims that it is by means of an embodied simulation that we determine the meaning of an observed smile. This suggests that crucial interpretative work is done in the mapping that takes us from a perceived smile to the activation of one's own facial musculature. How is this mapping achieved? Might it depend upon a prior interpretation arrived at on the basis of perceptual and contextual information?
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  20.  17
    Experience and Agency: Slipping the Mesh.Andy Clark & Julian Kiverstein - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):502-503.
    Can we really make sense of the idea (implied by Block's treatment) that there can be isolated islets of experience that are not even potentially available as fodder for a creature's conscious choices and decisions? The links between experience and the availability of information to guide conscious choice and inform reasoned action may be deeper than the considerations concerning (mere) reportability suggest.
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  21.  26
    Sensorimotor Knowledge and the Contents of Experience.Julian Kiverstein - 2010 - In N. Gangopadhay, M. Madary & F. Spicer (eds.), Perception, Action, and Consciousness. Oxford University Press. pp. 257--274.
  22.  6
    Minimal Sense of Self, Temporality and the Brain.Julian Kiverstein - 2009 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 15 (1).
    Cognitive neuroscientists are currently busy searching for the neural signatures of conscious experience. I shall argue that the notion of neural correlates of consciousness employed in much of this work is subject to two very different interpretations depending on how one understands the relation between the concepts of “state consciousness” and “creature consciousness”. Localist theories treat the neural correlates of creature consciousness as a kind of background condition that must be in place in order for the brain to realise particular (...)
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  23.  11
    Life is Intrinsically Temporal. [REVIEW]Julian Kiverstein - 2017 - Constructivist Foundations 13 (1):103-105.
    In this commentary I invert Gallagher’s argument and argue that the account he gives of temporality should be applied to enactive cognition across the board. Instead of enactivising phenomenological accounts of time-consciousness, I suggest Gallagher ought also to be read as arguing for a temporalizing of enactive cognition.
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  24.  87
    Making Sense of Phenomenal Unity: An Intentionalist Account of Temporal Experience.Julian Kiverstein - 2010 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 67:155-181.
    Our perceptual experiences stretch across time to present us with movement, persistence and change. How is this possible given that perceptual experiences take place in the present that has no duration? In this paper I argue that this problem is one and the same as the problem of accounting for how our experiences occurring at different times can be phenomenally unified over time so that events occurring at different times can be experienced together. Any adequate account of temporal experience must (...)
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  25.  90
    Bootstrapping the Mind.Julian Kiverstein & Andy Clark - 2008 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (1):41-58.
    After offering a brief account of how we understand the shared circuits model (SCM), we divide our response into four sections. First, in section R1, we assess to what extent SCM is committed to an account of the ontogeny and phylogeny of shared circuits. In section R2, we examine doubts raised by several commentators as to whether SCM might be expanded so as to accommodate the mirroring of emotions, sensations, and intransitive actions more generally. Section R3 responds to various criticisms (...)
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  26.  4
    Could Closed-Loop DBS Enhance a Person's Feeling of Being Free?Julian Kiverstein, Erik Rietveld & Damiaan Denys - 2017 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 8 (2):86-87.
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  27.  27
    Consciousness, the Minimal Self, and Brain.Julian Kiverstein - 2007 - Synthesis Philosophica 22 (2):335-360.
    This paper explores the possibility of a neuroscientific explanation of consciousness, and what such an explanation might look like. More specifically, I will be concerned with the claim that for any given experience there is neural representational system that constitutes the minimal supervenience base of that experience. I will call this hypothesis the minimal supervenience thesis. I argue that the minimal supervenience thesis is subject to two readings, which I call the localist and holist readings. Localist theories seek to identify (...)
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  28.  19
    The Cognitive-Emotional Brain is an Embodied and Social Brain.Julian Kiverstein & Mark Miller - 2015 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 38.
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  29.  52
    Reviews. [REVIEW]Joshua Knobe, Dingmar Van Eck, Susan Blackmore, Henk Bij De Weg, John Barresi, Roblin Meeks, Julian Kiverstein & Drew Rendall - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):785 – 817.
  30.  6
    Consciousness and the Feeling Body.Julian Kiverstein - 2010 - Radical Philosophy Review of Books 18 (3):607-616.
    In How the Mind Uses the Brain Ralph Ellis and Natika Newton develop a novel embodied, enactive theory of consciousness, according to which consciousness has its basis in neural systems that prepare the system to perform actions of emotional significance to the organism. Consciousness emerges out of self-organising processes which function in such a way as to contribute to, and maintain, the organism's overall wellbeing. I'll begin this review by reconstructing Ellis and Newton's view of consciousness as a self-organising process, (...)
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  31.  10
    Bewusstsein, minimales Selbst und Gehirn.Julian Kiverstein - 2007 - Synthesis Philosophica 22 (2):335-360.
    Dieser Artikel macht von der Möglichkeit Gebrauch, das Phänomen des Bewusstseins neurowissenschaftlich zu erklären, und geht der Frage nach, wie eine solche Erklärung wohl auszusehen hätte. Der Verfasser widmet sich konkret der These, dass jeder Erfahrung ein repräsentatives neurales System zugrunde liegt, das als Supervenienzgrundlage dieser Erfahrung dient. Diese Hypothese wird im weiteren Verlauf als minimale Supervenienz-These bezeichnet. Nach Meinung des Autors kann diese These auf zweierlei Weisen verstanden werden; dementsprechend ist von einer lokalistischen und einer holistischen Lesart die Rede. (...)
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  32.  19
    Concrete Magnitudes: From Numbers to Time.Christine Falter, Valdas Noreika, Julian Kiverstein & Bruno Mölder - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (3-4):335-336.
    Cohen Kadosh & Walsh (CK&W) present convincing evidence indicating the existence of notation-specific numerical representations in parietal cortex. We suggest that the same conclusions can be drawn for a particular type of numerical representation: the representation of time. Notation-dependent representations need not be limited to number but may also be extended to other magnitude-related contents processed in parietal cortex (Walsh 2003).
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  33. Lilian Alweiss, The World Unclaimed: A Challenge to Heidegger's Critique of Husserl Reviewed By.Julian Kiverstein - 2004 - Philosophy in Review 24 (1):3-5.
  34.  12
    No Bootstrapping Without Semantic Inheritance.Julian Kiverstein - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):279-280.
    Anderson's massive redeployment hypothesis (MRH) takes the grounding of meaning in sensorimotor behaviour to be a side effect of neural reuse. I suggest this grounding may play a much more fundamental role in accounting for the bootstrapping of higher-level cognition from sensorimotor behaviour. Thus, the question of when neural reuse delivers semantic inheritance is a pressing one for MRH.
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  35.  6
    La Conscience, le Soi Minimal Et le Cerveau.Julian Kiverstein - 2007 - Synthesis Philosophica 22 (2):335-360.
    L’article cherche à savoir si une explication neuroscientifique de la conscience est possible et à quoi elle pourrait ressembler. Plus particulièrement, je me pencherai sur l’affirmation qu’à chaque expérience donnée correspond un système de représentation neural qui constitue la base de survenance minimale de cette expérience. J’appellerai cette hypothèse « la thèse de survenance minimale ». Je soutiens que cette thèse peut se lire de deux façons que je nommerai lectures localiste et holiste. Les théories localistes cherchent à définir quelle (...)
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  36.  3
    Making Sense of Phenomenal Unity: An Intentionalist Account of Temporal Experience.Julian Kiverstein - 2010 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 67:155-181.
    Our perceptual experiences stretch across time to present us with movement, persistence and change. How is this possible given that perceptual experiences take place in the present that has no duration? In this paper I argue that this problem is one and the same as the problem of accounting for how our experiences occurring at different times can be phenomenally unified over time so that events occurring at different times can be experienced together. Any adequate account of temporal experience must (...)
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  37.  4
    Consciousness and the Feeling Body.Julian Kiverstein - 2010 - Pragmatics and Cognitionpragmatics and Cognition 18 (3):607-616.
    In How the Mind Uses the Brain Ralph Ellis and Natika Newton develop a novel embodied, enactive theory of consciousness, according to which consciousness has its basis in neural systems that prepare the system to perform actions of emotional significance to the organism. Consciousness emerges out of self-organising processes which function in such a way as to contribute to, and maintain, the organism's overall wellbeing. I'll begin this review by reconstructing Ellis and Newton's view of consciousness as a self-organising process, (...)
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  38. The Metaphysics of Consciousness.Pierfrancesco Basile, Julian Kiverstein & Pauline Phemister (eds.) - 2010 - Cambridge University Press.
    What is consciousness? What is the place of consciousness in nature? These and related questions occupy a prominent place in contemporary studies in metaphysics and philosophy of mind, often involving complex interdisciplinary connections between philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence, biology and cognitive neuroscience. At the same time, these questions play a fundamental role in the philosophies of great thinkers of the past such as, among others, Plotinus, Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, William James and Edmund Husserl. This new collection of essays by leading (...)
     
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  39. Extended Consciousness and Predictive Processing: A Third-Wave View.Michael David Kirchhoff & Julian Kiverstein - forthcoming - London, UK: Routledge.
    This book is forthcoming in Routledge. Here is the barest sketch of our aims: -/- We have two aims in this book. First, we aim to persuade you that conscious experience is sometimes realised by cycles of embodied and world-involving engagement. Second, we aim to persuade you that it is possible to develop and defend the thesis of extended consciousness through the increasingly powerful predictive processing theory developed in cognitive neuroscience.
     
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  40. Philosophy of the Social Mind.Julian Kiverstein (ed.) - forthcoming - Routledge.
  41. The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of the Social Mind.Julian Kiverstein (ed.) - 2016 - Routledge.
    The idea that humans are by nature social and political animals can be traced back to Aristotle. More recently, it has also generated great interest and controversy in related disciplines such as anthropology, biology, psychology, neuroscience and even economics. What is it about humans that enabled them to construct a social reality of unrivalled complexity? Is there something distinctive about the human mind that explains how social lives are organised around conventions, norms, and institutions? The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of (...)
     
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  42. The Routledge Handbook of the Social Mind.Julian Kiverstein (ed.) - forthcoming - Routledge.
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  43. The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of the Social Mind.Julian Kiverstein (ed.) - 2017 - Routledge.
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  44. Wittgenstein, Qualia, and the Autonomy of Grammar.Julian Kiverstein - 2008 - In David K. Levy & Edoardo Zamuner (eds.), Wittgenstein’s Enduring Arguments. Routledge.
  45. The Extended Mind Thesis.Kiverstein Julian, Mirko Farina & Andy Clark - forthcoming - Oxford Bibliographies Online.
  46.  22
    Galileans or Gallus?(Julian's Letter to Aetius).Kaiser Julian - 2010 - Classical Quarterly 60:607-609.
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  47.  13
    Kaiser Julian.H. G. Julian - 1973 - In Briefe: Griechisch-Deutsch. De Gruyter. pp. 208-212.
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  48.  5
    Heidegger and Cognitive Science, Edited by Julian Kiverstein and Michael Wheeler.Lee Braver - 2014 - Mind 123 (490):616-619.
  49. What is It Like to Be Nonconscious? A Defense of Julian Jaynes.Gary Williams - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (2):217-239.
    I respond to Ned Block’s claim that it is ridiculous to suppose that consciousness is a cultural construction based on language and learned in childhood. Block is wrong to dismiss social constructivist theories of consciousness on account of it being ludicrous that conscious experience is anything but a biological feature of our animal heritage, characterized by sensory experience, evolved over millions of years. By defending social constructivism in terms of both Julian Jaynes’ behaviorism and J.J. Gibson’s ecological psychology, I (...)
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  50.  16
    ‘Great is Darwin and Bergson His Poet’: Julian Huxley's Other Evolutionary Synthesis.Emily Herring - 2018 - Annals of Science 75 (1):40-54.
    In 1912, Julian Huxley published his first book The Individual in the Animal Kingdom which he dedicated to the then world-famous French philosopher Henri Bergson. Historians have generally adopted one of two attitudes towards Huxley’s early encounter with Bergson. They either dismiss it entirely as unimportant or minimise it, deeming it a youthful indiscretion preceding Huxley’s full conversion to Fisherian Darwinism. Close biographical study and new archive materials demonstrate, however, that neither position is tenable. The Bergsonian elements in play (...)
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