The construct of Cognitive Moral Development (CMD) has drawn much attention in the study of business ethics for over two decades. The Defining Issues Test (DIT) has made a significant contribution to the literature as an easy-to-administer CMD instrument, and the Moral Judgment Test (MJT), an alternative scale, has also been used widely especially in Europe. The two scales differ in their approaches to measuring CMD, focusing on stage preference (DIT) and stage consistency (MJT), yet empirical comparisons have been scarce. (...) The present research empirically compares the two scales in terms of their correspondence with ethical ideology as a reference scale, and it demonstrates a clear distinction between the DIT and the MJT. Although they both aim to measure CMD, their dissimilar approaches lead to distinctly different implications. (shrink)
Sewall Wright and Gustave Malécot developed important theories of isolation by distance. Wright’s theory was statistical and Malécot’s probabilistic. Because of this mathematical difference, they were not clear about the relationship between their theories. In this paper, I make two points to clarify this relationship. First, I argue that Wright’s theory concerns what I call ecological isolation by distance , whereas Malécot’s concerns what I call genetic isolation by distance . Second, I suggest that if Wright’s theory is interpreted appropriately, (...) a previously unnoticed connection between the two theories emerges. †To contact the author, please write to: Yoichi Ishida, Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, 1017 Cathedral of Learning, Pittsburgh, PA 15260; e‐mail: [email protected] (shrink)
Robert MacArthur's mathematical ecology is often regarded as ahistorical and has been criticized by historically oriented ecologists and philosophers for ignoring the importance of history. I clarify and defend his approach, especially his use of simple mathematical models to explain patterns in data and to generate predictions that stimulate empirical research. First I argue that it is misleading to call his approach ahistorical because it is not against historical explanation. Next I distinguish three kinds of criticism of his approach and (...) argue that his approach is compatible with the first two of them. Finally, I argue that the third kind of criticism, advanced by Kim Sterelny and Paul Griffiths, is largely irrelevant to MacArthur's approach. ‡I am especially grateful to Thomas Nickles for encouragement and helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. Thanks also to Guy Hoelzer, Stephen Jenkins, and Jay Odenbaugh for comments on an earlier draft, Kim Sterelny for clarifications of the Tasmania example, Gregory Mikkelson for references, and the audience at PSA 2006 for discussions. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, 1017 Cathedral of Learning, Pittsburgh, PA 15260; e-mail: [email protected] (shrink)
In contrast to temporal asymmetry stressed in process philosophy, symmetry prevails in Mahayana Buddhism and East Asian philosophy formed under its influence. The paper clarifies the meaning of symmetry from the perspectives of Kitaro Nishida and Dogen, it explores similar or overlapping ideas in Whitehead’s philosophy oforganism, and it suggests that the differences among them are much smaller than commonly believed.
Following a science and ontology conference in Barbizon, France, Layla Raïd and Karim Belabas published an article on Peirce and Quine that focuses on truth considered as the convergence of opinions or theories. 2 The article is a productive collaboration between a philosopher and mathematician, identifying two problems that Quine poses: first, the use of numerical analogy in Peirce’s account of truth, and second, the uniqueness of the final opinion, which can presumably be defeated or undermined by arguments from underdetermination (...) of theories. 3 I accept their interpretation insofar as these two problems are considered to constitute main issues for those—including myself—who wish to advocate Peirce’s view, but .. (shrink)
Stein has raised a fundamental problem for any attempt to characterize instrumentalism and realism as substantive alternatives. This is the distinguishability problem, which consists in the problem of developing a form of instrumentalism that is substantially different from a plausible realist alternative and the problem of showing that this form of instrumentalism does justice to actual scientific practice. Using Stein’s own discussion of Maxwell, I formulate instrumentalism and realism as a scientist’s attitudes toward models, where an attitude is understood to (...) be a complex of the scientist’s belief and intention regarding models. Developing a case study of Benzer’s modeling practice, I show that each attitude can structure inquiry differently and argue that to understand certain aspects of scientific practice, such as the practice of genetic mapping in Benzer’s work, we sometimes need to appeal to the coexistence of these attitudes. (shrink)
In the history of Indian Buddhism there existed scholars, who engaged in studying logic and epistemology, and this tradition still survives e.g. in Tibet. This field of study was traditionally called “the study of the logical reason” (hetuvidyā), and this school was named “die logische und erkenntnistheoretische Schule des Buddhismus” (the Buddhist logico-epistemological tradition) by Prof. Erich Frauwallner. These scholars actually developed full-blown theories of logic and epistemology and were actively involved in discussions with Buddhist as well as non-Buddhist philosophers. (...) Nowadays the research of this school forms one of the major fields in the Indian Philosophy and Buddhist studies. However, it is still controversial among the modern scholars, as was the case with the historicalteachers in India and Tibet, whether this study of logic or epistemology is of any relevance for the Buddhist striving for liberation (nirvāna). In this presentation I would like to focus on discussing the status of scriptural authority in this tradition, and especially the interpretations of one statement by Dignāga (ca. 400-480), who is regarded as founder of the Buddhist logico-epistemological tradition, will be re-examined. (shrink)