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Klaus Ladstaetter
State University of New York (SUNY)
  1. On Boyd's Rebuttal of Kripke's Argument for Dualism.Klaus Ladstaetter - 2014 - Papers of the 37th International Wittgenstein Symposium 22:175-177.
    The essay presents Saul Kripke's argument for mind/body-dualism and makes the suppositions explicit on which it rests. My claim, inspired by Richard Boyd, is that even if one of Kripke’s central suppositions - the principle of necessity of identities using rigid designators - is shared by the non-traditional identity theorist, it is still possible for her to rebut Kripke’s dualism.
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  2.  96
    On John McClellan’s “Not Skeptical Theism, but Trusting Theism”.Klaus Ladstaetter - 2016 - Southwest Philosophy Review 32 (2):87-94.
    In the paper I voice my dissatisfaction with the author's essay because I think that the proposed “McClellean shift” from skeptical to trusting theism faces serious problems. The troubles are mainly caused by the way in which McClellan suggests to extend and “amend” the theist’s argument via the Moorean shift (which is intended to be a counter-argument to the atheist’s evidential argument from evil). But McClellan's proposal is no amendment at all, as it robs the theist's Moore-inspired argument its entire (...)
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  3.  84
    On Tracy Lupher's “A Logical Choice.Klaus Ladstaetter - 2012 - Southwest Philosophy Review 28 (2):101-106.
    In his essay Tracy Lupher (henceforth, TL) is concerned with Robert Kane's (1984) version of the modal ontological argument (MOA). As he correctly points out, Kane's argument is valid only if the accessibility relation between possible worlds is assumed to be symmetric. TL's remarks pave the way to thinking that the MOA is intended to establish the existence of a perfect being as a matter of logical necessity. Moreover, given TL's undisputed supposition (even shared by Kane) that S5 - in (...)
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  4.  52
    On Maxwell Suffis’s “From the Ground Up: Explaining Category Differences in Ontological Pluralism”.Klaus Ladstaetter - 2014 - Southwest Philosophy Review 30 (2):17-24.
    Maxwell Suffis discusses what he calls the problem of fundamental difference: Why do things belong to different ontological categories? Suffis focuses on two attempts to answer the question: 1. Jonathan Schaffer's Neo-Aristotelian conception of grounding (according to which things belong to different ontological categories because they are grounded by different levels of things), and 2. Kris McDaniel's ontological pluralism, "the doctrine that there are ways of being" (according to which things belong to different ontological categories because things having one mode (...)
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  5.  68
    Liar-Like Paradoxes and Metalanguage Features.Klaus Ladstaetter - 2013 - Southwest Philosophy Review 29 (1):61-70.
    In their (2008) article Liar-Like Paradox and Object Language Features C.S. Jenkins and Daniel Nolan (henceforth, JN) argue that it is possible to construct Liar-like paradox in a metalanguage even though its object language is not semantically closed. I do not take issue with this claim. I find fault though with the following points contained in JN’s article: First, that it is possible to construct Liar-like paradox in a metalanguage, even though this metalanguage is not semantically closed. Second, that the (...)
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  6.  13
    Horwich and the Generalization Problem.Klaus Ladstaetter - 2004 - Papers of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium:187-189.
    In order to be complete, Horwich’s minimalist theory must be able to deal with generalizations about truth. A logical and an epistemic-explanatory level of the generalization problem are distinguished, and Horwich’s responses to both sides of the problem are examined. Finally some persistent problems for minimalism are pointed out.
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  7.  3
    Response to Christopher Tomaszewski’s “Intentionality as Partial Identity”.Klaus Ladstaetter - 2017 - Southwest Philosophy Review 33 (2):1-13.
    Intentionality is a curious notion and so is partial identity; the latter is employed by Christopher Tomaszewski (henceforth, CT) in his paper to afford solutions to a wide array of different philosophical problems. The author’s central thesis is that intentionality is a kind of partial identity; i.e. when the mind is intentionally directed towards an external object, it "takes in" a part of the object – its form, but not its matter. In my essay I first expound Franz Brentano's views (...)
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  8.  3
    On Tracy Lupher’s “A Logical Choice: The Role of Modal Logics in the Modal Ontological Argument”.Klaus Ladstaetter - 2012 - Southwest Philosophy Review 28 (2):101-106.
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