4 found
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  1. A Theory of Rational Choice Under Ignorance.Klaus Nehring - 2000 - Theory and Decision 48 (3):205-240.
    This paper contributes to a theory of rational choice for decision-makers with incomplete preferences due to partial ignorance, whose beliefs are representable as sets of acceptable priors. We focus on the limiting case of `Complete Ignorance' which can be viewed as reduced form of the general case of partial ignorance. Rationality is conceptualized in terms of a `Principle of Preference-Basedness', according to which rational choice should be isomorphic to asserted preference. The main result characterizes axiomatically a new choice-rule called `Simultaneous (...)
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  2.  67
    How to Make Sense of the Com M on P Ri or Assumption Under Incomplete Information.Giacomo Bonanno & Klaus Nehring - 1999 - International Journal of Game Theory 28 (3):409-434.
    The Common Prior Assumption (CPA) plays an important role in game theory and the economics of information. It is the basic assumption behind decision-theoretic justifications of equilibrium reasoning in games (Aumann, 1987, Aumann and Brandenburger, 1995) and no-trade results with asymmetric information (Milgrom and Stokey, 1982). Recently several authors (Dekel and Gul, 1997, Gul, 1996, Lipman, 1995) have questioned whether the CPA is meaningful in situations of incomplete information, where there is no ex ante stage and where the primitives of (...)
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    On Stalnaker's Notion of Strong Rationalizability and Nash Equilibrium in Perfect Information Games.Giacomo Bonanno & Klaus Nehring - 1998 - Theory and Decision 45 (3):291-295.
    Counterexamples to two results by Stalnaker (Theory and Decision, 1994) are given and a corrected version of one of the two results is proved. Stalnaker's proposed results are: (1) if at the true state of an epistemic model of a perfect information game there is common belief in the rationality of every player and common belief that no player has false beliefs (he calls this joint condition ‘strong rationalizability’), then the true (or actual) strategy profile is path equivalent to a (...)
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  4. Diversity.Klaus Nehring & Clemens Puppe - 2009 - In Paul Anand, Prasanta Pattanaik & Clemens Puppe (eds.), Handbook of Rational and Social Choice. Oxford University Press.
     
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