Rules of inference can be interpreted as rules of (purposive) behavior; in such a case the behaptor consists in accepting a certain statement, called conclusion. The justification of a rule of inference with respect to a given end consists in showing that it is the most efficient method of realizing that end; the meaning of the word “efficient”, and the character of the end, should, of course, be made clear.The article is an attempt at reconstructing a part of the theory (...) of mathematical statistics (the so-called parametric inference) along those lines. It is assumed that the end to be realized by following rules of statistical inference is, broadly speaking, a cognitive one. (shrink)
Decision theory elucidates, in more ways than one, the, concept of rational behavior under imperfect knowledge of the consequences. On the other hand, the generally accepted concept of rationality refers to the end-means relation. This relation is not translatable into the language of decision theory. Consequently, the latter's claim to have defined in a general way rationality of behavior appears not to be valid.
This book grew out of an international symposium, organized in September 1986 by the Austrian Cultural Institute in Warsaw in cooperation with the Polish Philosophical Society. The topic was: The Vienna Circle and the Lvov-Warsaw School. Since the two phil osophical trends existed in roughly the same time and were close ly related, it was one of the purposes of the symposium to investigate both similarities and thp differences. Some thirty people took part in the symposium, nearly twenty contributions were (...) presented and extensively discussed. The sym posium owed much to the excellent organization and warm hospital ity shown by Dr Georg Jankovic, the Director of the Austrian In stitute. As the person in charge of the scientific programme of the symposium, I take pleasure to acknowledge this debt. It so happened that a month later another symposium of a similar character was held. It took place in the University of Manchester, on the occasion of the centenary of the births of Stanislaw Lesniewski, Tadeusz Kotarbiflski and Wladyslaw Tatarkie wicz. Some papers read at the Manchester symposium form a part of the present volume. It was not possible, for technical reasons (the time factor was one of them), to include in this book all the material from the two symposia. Certain contributions have appeared elsewhere (for instance, K. Szaniawski's 'Ajdukiewicz on Non-Deductive Inference' was published in Danish Yearbook of Philosophy, Vol. 23). On the other hand, certain papers have been written special ly for this volume. (shrink)