Results for 'Knowability Paradox'

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  1. The Knowability Paradox.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2006 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press UK.
    The paradox of knowability poses real difficulities to our understanding of truth. It does so by claiming that if we assume a truth is knowable, we can demonstrate that it is known. This demonstration threatens our understanding of truth in two quite different ways, only one of which has been recognized to this point in the literature on the paradox. Jonathan Kvanvig first unearths the ways in which the paradox is threatening, and then delineates an approach (...)
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    The Knowability Paradox in the light of a Logic for Pragmatics.Massimiliano Carrara & Daniele Chiffi - 2014 - In R. Ciuni, H. Wansing & C. Willkommen (eds.), Recent Trends in Philosophical Logic (Proceedings of Trends in Logic XI). Berlin: Springer. pp. 47-58.
    The Knowability Paradox is a logical argument showing that if all truths are knowable in principle, then all truths are, in fact, known. Many strategies have been suggested in order to avoid the paradoxical conclusion. A family of solutions –ncalled logical revision – has been proposed to solve the paradox, revising the logic underneath, with an intuitionistic revision included. In this paper, we focus on so-called revisionary solutions to the paradox – solutions that put the blame (...)
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  3. From the Knowability Paradox to the existence of proofs.W. Dean & H. Kurokawa - 2010 - Synthese 176 (2):177 - 225.
    The Knowability Paradox purports to show that the controversial but not patently absurd hypothesis that all truths are knowable entails the implausible conclusion that all truths are known. The notoriety of this argument owes to the negative light it appears to cast on the view that there can be no verification-transcendent truths. We argue that it is overly simplistic to formalize the views of contemporary verificationists like Dummett, Prawitz or Martin-Löf using the sort of propositional modal operators which (...)
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  4. The knowability paradox and the prospects for anti-realism.Jonathan Kvanvig - 1995 - Noûs 29 (4):481-500.
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  5. How to solve the knowability paradox with transcendental epistemology.Andrew Stephenson - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 13):3253-3278.
    A novel solution to the knowability paradox is proposed based on Kant’s transcendental epistemology. The ‘paradox’ refers to a simple argument from the moderate claim that all truths are knowable to the extreme claim that all truths are known. It is significant because anti-realists have wanted to maintain knowability but reject omniscience. The core of the proposed solution is to concede realism about epistemic statements while maintaining anti-realism about non-epistemic statements. Transcendental epistemology supports such a view (...)
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    Knowability Paradox.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2006 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press UK.
    The paradox of knowability, derived from a proof by Frederic Fitch in 1963, is one of the deepest paradoxes concerning the nature of truth. Jonathan Kvanvig argues that the depth of the paradox has not been adequately appreciated. It has long been known that the paradox threatens antirealist conceptions of truth according to which truth is epistemic. If truth is epistemic, what better way to express that idea than to maintain that all truths are knowable? In (...)
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    The Knowability Paradox and Unsuccessful Updates.Arkadiusz Wójcik - 2020 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 62 (1):53-71.
    In this paper we undertake an analysis of the knowability paradox in the light of modal epistemic logics and of the phenomena of unsuccessful updates. The knowability paradox stems from the Church-Fitch observation that the plausible knowability principle, according to which all truths are knowable, yields the unacceptable conclusion that all truths are known. We show that the phenomenon of an unsuccessful update is the reason for the paradox arising. Based on this diagnosis, we (...)
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  8. New Essays on the Knowability Paradox.Joe Salerno (ed.) - 2008 - Oxford, England and New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.
    This collection assembles Church's referee reports, Fitch's 1963 paper, and nineteen new papers on the knowability paradox.
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    The Knowability Paradox, perfectibility of science and reductionism.Massimiliano Carrara & Davide Fassio - unknown
    A logical argument known as Fitch’s Paradox of Knowability, starting from the assumption that every truth is knowable, leads to the consequence that every truth is also actually known. Then, given the ordinary fact that some true propositions are not actually known, it concludes, by modus tollens, that there are unknowable truths. The main literature on the topic has been focusing on the threat the argument poses to the so called semantic anti-realist theories, which aim to epistemically characterize (...)
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    The knowability paradox – by Jonathan Kvanvig.Fredrik Stjernberg - 2008 - Theoria 74 (3):255-262.
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  11. The Church–Fitch knowability paradox in the light of structural proof theory.Paolo Maffezioli, Alberto Naibo & Sara Negri - 2012 - Synthese 190 (14):2677-2716.
    Anti-realist epistemic conceptions of truth imply what is called the knowability principle: All truths are possibly known. The principle can be formalized in a bimodal propositional logic, with an alethic modality ${\diamondsuit}$ and an epistemic modality ${\mathcal{K}}$, by the axiom scheme ${A \supset \diamondsuit \mathcal{K} A}$. The use of classical logic and minimal assumptions about the two modalities lead to the paradoxical conclusion that all truths are known, ${A \supset \mathcal{K} A}$. A Gentzen-style reconstruction of the Church–Fitch paradox (...)
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  12. The Knowability Paradox, by Jonathan L. Kvanvig. [REVIEW]Igor Douven - 2007 - Ars Disputandi 7.
     
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    The incarnation and the knowability paradox.Jonathan Kvanvig - 2010 - Synthese 173 (1):89 - 105.
    The best defense of the doctrine of the Incarnation implies that traditional Christianity has a special stake in the knowability paradox, a stake not shared by other theistic perspectives or by non-traditional accounts of the Incarnation. Perhaps, this stake is not even shared by antirealism, the view most obviously threatened by the paradox. I argue for these points, concluding that these results put traditional Christianity at a disadvantage compared to other viewpoints, and I close with some comments (...)
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    Perfected Science and the Knowability Paradox.Massimiliano Carrara & Davide Fassio - 2010 - In M. M. D’Agostino, G. Giorello, F. Laudisa, T. Pievani & C. Sinigaglia (eds.), New Essays in Logic and Philosophy of Science. London College Publications.
    In "The Limits of Science" N. Rescher introduces a logical argument known as the Knowability Paradox, according to which, if every true proposition is knowable, then every true proposition is known, i.e. if there are unknown truths, there are unknowable truths. Rescher argues that the Knowability Paradox, giving evidence to a limit of our knowledge (the existence of unknowable truths) could be used for arguing against perfected science. In this article we present two criticisms against Rescher's (...)
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  15. New Essays on the Knowability Paradox.Jens Christian Bjerring - 2012 - History and Philosophy of Logic 33 (1):101 - 104.
    History and Philosophy of Logic, Volume 33, Issue 1, Page 101-104, February 2012.
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  16. Why Knowledge Should Not Be Typed: An Argument against the Type Solution to the Knowability Paradox.Massimiliano Carrara & Davide Fassio - 2011 - Theoria 77 (2):180-193.
    The Knowability Paradox is a logical argument to the effect that, if there are truths not actually known, then there are unknowable truths. Recently, Alexander Paseau and Bernard Linsky have independently suggested a possible way to counter this argument by typing knowledge. In this article, we argue against their proposal that if one abstracts from other possible independent considerations supporting reasons for typing knowledge and considers the motivation for a type-theoretic approach with respect to the Knowability (...) alone, there is no substantive philosophical motivation to type knowledge, except that of solving the paradox. Every attempt to independently justify the typing of knowledge is doomed to failure. (shrink)
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  17. Jonathan Kvanvig, The Knowability Paradox[REVIEW]Manuel Bremer - 2007 - Philosophy in Review 27:415-416.
     
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  18. A Multimodal Pragmatic Treatment of the Knowability Paradox.Massimiliano Carrara, Daniele Chiffi & Davide Sergio - 2017 - In Gillman Payette & Rafal Urbaniak (eds.), Applications of Formal Philosophy. The Road Less Travelled. Berlin: Springer International Publishing AG. pp. 195-209.
  19.  63
    Review: The Knowability Paradox[REVIEW]C. S. Jenkins - 2006 - Mind 115 (460):1141-1147.
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    New Essays on the Knowability Paradox.Alexandre Costa-Leite - 2011 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25 (2):194 - 196.
    International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume 25, Issue 2, Page 194-196, June 2011.
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    New Essays on the Knowability Paradox – Edited by Joe Salerno.Hans Van Ditmarsch - 2010 - Theoria 76 (3):270-273.
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  22. Fitch's problem and the knowability paradox: Logical and philosophical remarks'.Concha Martinez, Jose-Miguel SAGüILLO & Javier Vilanova - 1997 - Logica Trianguli 1:73-91.
    Fitch´s problem and the "knowability paradox" involve a couple of argumentations that are to each other in the same relation as Cantor´s uncollected multitudes theorem and Russell´s paradox. The authors exhibit the logical nature of the theorem and of the paradox and show their philosophical import, both from an anti-realist and from a realist perspective. In particular, the authors discuss an anti-realist solution to Fitch´s problem and provide an anti-realist interpretation of the problematic statement "It is (...)
     
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  23.  38
    Phenomenology, anti‐realism, and the knowability paradox.James Kinkaid - 2022 - European Journal of Philosophy 30 (3):1010-1027.
    Husserl endorses ideal verificationism, the claim that there is a necessary correlation between truth and the ideal possibility of experience. This puts him in the company of semantic anti-realists like Dummett, Tennant, and Wright who endorse the knowability thesis that all truths are knowable. Unfortunately, there is a simple, seductive, and troubling argument due to Alonzo Church and Frederic Fitch that the knowability thesis collapses into the omniscience thesis that all truths are known. Phenomenologists should be worried. I (...)
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    Joe Salerno (ed): New essays on the knowability paradox[REVIEW]Mark Jago - 2010 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 19 (3):383-387.
  25.  4
    Phenomenology, anti‐realism, and the knowability paradox.James Kinkaid - 2022 - European Journal of Philosophy 30 (3):1010-1027.
    European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 30, Issue 3, Page 1010-1027, September 2022.
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    Joe Salerno, ed. New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Reviewed by.Sam Cowling - 2010 - Philosophy in Review 30 (3):220-222.
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    Review of Jonathan L. Kvanvig, The Knowability Paradox[REVIEW]Philip Percival - 2007 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (3).
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    Knowability and bivalence: intuitionistic solutions to the Paradox of Knowability.Julien Murzi - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (2):269-281.
    In this paper, I focus on some intuitionistic solutions to the Paradox of Knowability. I first consider the relatively little discussed idea that, on an intuitionistic interpretation of the conditional, there is no paradox to start with. I show that this proposal only works if proofs are thought of as tokens, and suggest that anti-realists themselves have good reasons for thinking of proofs as types. In then turn to more standard intuitionistic treatments, as proposed by Timothy Williamson (...)
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  29. The Paradox of Knowability and Factivity.Michael Shaffer - 2014 - Polish Journal of Philiosophy 8 (1):85-91.
    This paper shows that the knowability paradox isn’t a paradox because the derivation of the paradox is faulty. This is explained by showing that the K operator employed in generating the paradox is used equivocally and when the equivocation is eliminated the derivation fails.
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  30. Knowability, possibility and paradox.Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno - 2008 - In Vincent Hendricks (ed.), New Waves in Epistemology. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    The paradox of knowability threatens to draw a logical equivalence between the believable claim that all truths are knowable and the obviously false claim that all truths are known. In this paper we evaluate prominent proposals for resolving the paradox of knowability. For instance, we argue that Neil Tennant’s restriction strategy, which aims principally to restrict the main quantifier in ‘all truths are knowable’, does not get to the heart of the problem since there are (...) paradoxes that the restriction does nothing to thwart. We argue that Jon Kvanvig’s strategy, which aims to block the paradox by appealing to the special role of quantified epistemic expressions in modal contexts, has grave errors. We offer here a new proposal founded on Kvanvig’s insight that quantified expressions play a special role in modal contexts. On an articulation of this special role provided by Stanley and Szabo, we propose a solution to the knowability paradoxes. Introduction.. (shrink)
     
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  31. Fitchův paradox poznatelnosti a rozvětvená teorie typů [Fitch's Paradox of Knowability and Ramified Theory of Types].Jiri Raclavsky - 2013 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 20:144-165.
    It is already known that Fitch’s knowability paradox can be solved by typing knowledge within ramified theory of types. One of the aims of this paper is to provide a greater defence of the approach against recently raised criticism. My second goal is to make a sufficient support for an assumption which is needed for this particular application of typing knowledge but which is not inherent to ramified theory of types as such.
     
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    Knowability and Other Onto-theological Paradoxes.Franca D’Agostini - 2019 - Logica Universalis 13 (4):577-586.
    In virtue of Fitch-Church proof, also known as the knowability paradox, we are able to prove that if everything is knowable, then everything is known. I present two ‘onto-theological’ versions of the proof, one concerning collective omniscience and another concerning omnificence. I claim these arguments suggest new ways of exploring the intersection between logical and ontological givens that is a grounding theme of religious thought. What is more, they are good examples of what I call semi-paradoxes: apparently sound (...)
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  33. The Paradox of Knowability and Epistemic Theories of Truth.Boris Rähme - manuscript
    The article suggests a reading of the term ‘epistemic account of truth’ which runs contrary to a widespread consensus with regard to what epistemic accounts are meant to provide, namely a definition of truth in epistemic terms. Section 1. introduces a variety of possible epistemic accounts that differ with regard to the strength of the epistemic constraints they impose on truth. Section 2. introduces the paradox of knowability and presents a slightly reconstructed version of a related argument brought (...)
     
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  34. The Paradox of Knowability from a Russellian Perspective.Pierdaniele Giaretta - 2009 - Prolegomena 8 (2):141-158.
    The paradox of knowability and the debate about it are shortly presented. Some assumptions which appear more or less tacitly involved in its discussion are made explicit. They are embedded and integrated in a Russellian framework, where a formal paradox, very similar to the Russell-Myhill paradox, is derived. Its solution is provided within a Russellian formal logic introduced by A. Church. It follows that knowledge should be typed. Some relevant aspects of the typing of knowledge are (...)
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  35. The paradox of knowability.Dorothy Edgington - 1985 - Mind 94 (376):557-568.
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  36. Fitch's Paradox of Knowability.Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno - 2010 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    The paradox of knowability is a logical result suggesting that, necessarily, if all truths are knowable in principle then all truths are in fact known. The contrapositive of the result says, necessarily, if in fact there is an unknown truth, then there is a truth that couldn't possibly be known. More specifically, if p is a truth that is never known then it is unknowable that p is a truth that is never known. The proof has been used (...)
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  37.  8
    Knowability and a New Paradox of Happiness.Joe Salerno - 2018 - In Hans van Ditmarsch & Gabriel Sandu (eds.), Jaakko Hintikka on Knowledge and Game Theoretical Semantics. Springer. pp. 457-474.
    The paper examines the logic of the knowability paradox and a structural analogue, a new paradox of happiness. We develop a general understanding of what it is to be a Fitch paradox, and follow a natural thread in the literature that attempts to block or resolve Fitch paradoxes. We conclude that, in the case of the attitude of happiness, the new paradox remains even if one finds the knowability analogue non-threatening.
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    Knowability as De Re Modality: A Certain Solution to Fitch Paradox.Tomasz Jarmużek, Krzysztof Krawczyk & Rafał Palczewski - 2020 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 68 (4):291-313.
    Poznawalność jako modalność de re: pewne rozwiązanie paradoksu Fitcha W artykule staramy się znaleźć nowe, intuicyjne rozwiązanie paradoksu Fitcha. Twierdzimy, że tradycyjne wyrażenie zasady poznawalności opiera się na błędnym rozumieniu poznawalności jako modalności de dicto. Zamiast tego proponujemy rozumieć poznawalność jako modalność de re. W artykule przedstawiamy minimalną logikę poznawalności, w której zasada poznawalności jest ważna, ale paradoks Fitcha już nie obowiązuje. Logikę charakteryzujemy semantycznie, a także poprzez podejście aksjomatyczne i tabelaryczne.
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  39. Distributed Knowability and Fitch’s Paradox.Rafał Palczewski - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (3):455-478.
    Recently predominant forms of anti-realism claim that all truths are knowable. We argue that in a logical explanation of the notion of knowability more attention should be paid to its epistemic part. Especially very useful in such explanation are notions of group knowledge. In this paper we examine mainly the notion of distributed knowability and show its effectiveness in the case of Fitch's paradox. Proposed approach raised some philosophical questions to which we try to find responses. We (...)
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  40. Kant, the Paradox of Knowability, and the Meaning of ‘Experience’.Andrew Stephenson - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15 (27):1-19.
    It is often claimed that anti-realism is a form of transcendental idealism or that Kant is an anti-realist. It is also often claimed that anti-realists are committed to some form of knowability principle and that such principles have problematic consequences. It is therefore natural to ask whether Kant is so committed, and if he is, whether this leads him into difficulties. I argue that a standard reading of Kant does indeed have him committed to the claim that all empirical (...)
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  41. ``The Paradox of Knowability".Dorothy Edgington - 1985 - Mind 94:557-568.
     
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  42. The paradox of knowability and the mapping objection.Stig Alstrup Rasmussen - 2009 - In Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press.
     
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  43. Discovering knowability: a semantic analysis.Sergei Artemov & Tudor Protopopescu - 2013 - Synthese 190 (16):3349-3376.
    In this paper, we provide a semantic analysis of the well-known knowability paradox stemming from the Church–Fitch observation that the meaningful knowability principle /all truths are knowable/, when expressed as a bi-modal principle F --> K♢F, yields an unacceptable omniscience property /all truths are known/. We offer an alternative semantic proof of this fact independent of the Church–Fitch argument. This shows that the knowability paradox is not intrinsically related to the Church–Fitch proof, nor to the (...)
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  44. On the paradox of knowability.Timothy Williamson - 1987 - Mind 96 (382):256-261.
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    Fitch’s Paradox of Knowability and the Knower Paradox: Against a Proposed Dialetheist Unified Solution.Ricardo Santos - 2017 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 73 (3-4):1001-1020.
    After introducing Fitch’s paradox of knowability and the knower paradox, the paper critically discusses the dialetheist unified solution to both problems that Beall and Priest have proposed. It is first argued that the dialetheist approach to the knower paradox can withstand the main objections against it, these being that the approach entails an understanding of negation that is intolerably weak and that it commits dialetheists to jointly accept and reject the same thing. The lesson of the (...)
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    Fitch's paradox of knowability.Michael Dummett - 2009 - In Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press.
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  47. Clues to the paradoxes of knowability: Reply to Dummett and Tennant.Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno - 2002 - Analysis 62 (2):143–150.
    Tr(A) iff ‡K(A) To remedy the error, Dummett’s proposes the following inductive characterization of truth: (i) Tr(A) iff ‡K(A), if A is a basic statement; (ii) Tr(A and B) iff Tr(A) & Tr(B); (iii) Tr(A or B) iff Tr(A) v Tr(B); (iv) Tr(if A, then B) iff (Tr(A) Æ Tr(B)); (v) Tr(it is not the case that A) iff ¬Tr(A), where the logical constant on the right-hand side of each biconditional clause is understood as subject to the laws of intuitionistic (...)
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    Clues to the paradoxes of knowability: reply to Dummett and Tennant.B. Brogaard & J. Salerno - 2002 - Analysis 62 (2):143-150.
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  49. Situations, Truth and Knowability: A Situation-Theoretic Analysis of a Paradox by Fitch.Sten Lindström - 1997 - In Eva Ejerhed & Sten Lindström (eds.), Logic, Action and Cognition: Essays in Philosophical Logic. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
  50.  15
    ``On the Paradox of Knowability".Timothy Williamson - 1987 - Mind 96:256-261.
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