Results for 'Knowledge-First Epistemology'

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  1. Against Knowledge-First Epistemology.Mikkel Gerken - 2018 - In Gordon and Jarvis Carter (ed.), Knowledge-First Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford University Press. pp. 46-71.
    I begin by criticizing reductionist knowledge-first epistemology according to which knowledge can be used to reductively analyze other epistemic phenomena. My central concern is that proponents of such an approach commit a similar mistake to the one that they charge their opponents with. This is the mistake of seeking to reductively analyze basic epistemic phenomena in terms of other allegedly more fundamental phenomena. I then turn to non-reductionist brands of knowledge-first epistemology. Specifically, I (...)
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  2. Genealogy and Knowledge-First Epistemology: A Mismatch?Matthieu Queloz - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):100-120.
    This paper examines three reasons to think that Craig's genealogy of the concept of knowledge is incompatible with knowledge-first epistemology and finds that far from being incompatible with it, the genealogy lends succour to it. This reconciliation turns on two ideas. First, the genealogy is not history, but a dynamic model of needs. Secondly, by recognizing the continuity of Craig's genealogy with Williams's genealogy of truthfulness, we can see that while both genealogies start out from (...)
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  3. Knowledge First Epistemology.Timothy Williamson - 2011 - In Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. Routledge. pp. 208-218.
  4. No Need for Excuses: Against Knowledge-First Epistemology and the Knowledge Norm of Assertion.Joshua Schechter - 2017 - In J. Adam Carter, Emma Gordon & Benjamin Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge-First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford University Press. pp. 132-159.
    Since the publication of Timothy Williamson’s Knowledge and its Limits, knowledge-first epistemology has become increasingly influential within epistemology. This paper discusses the viability of the knowledge-first program. The paper has two main parts. In the first part, I briefly present knowledge-first epistemology as well as several big picture reasons for concern about this program. While this considerations are pressing, I concede, however, that they are not conclusive. To determine the (...)
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  5. Naturalized knowledgefirst and the epistemology of groups.Alexander Bird - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    This paper commences by making a case for a naturalized approach to knowledgefirst epistemology. On this basis it then goes on to describe and defend a naturalized, functionalist account of group knowledge. It then contrasts this with Jennifer Lackey's (2021) account of the epistemological status of groups.
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  6. Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind.J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & Benjamin W. Jarvis (eds.) - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    'Knowledge-First' constitutes what is widely regarded as one of the most significant innovations in contemporary epistemology in the past 25 years. Knowledge-first epistemology is the idea that knowledge per se should not be analysed in terms of its constituent parts (e.g., justification, belief), but rather that these and other notions should be analysed in terms of the concept of knowledge. This volume features a substantive introduction and 13 original essays from leading and (...)
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  7. Knowledge-First Epistemology and Religious Belief.Christina H. Dietz & John Hawthorne - 2023 - In John Greco, Tyler Dalton McNabb & Jonathan Fuqua (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Religious Epistemology. Cambridge University Press.
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  8. What Is Knowledge-first Epistemology?Trent Dougherty & Patrick Rysiew - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 10.
  9. Putting Knowledge to Work: New Directions for Knowledge-First Epistemology.Artūrs Logins & Jacques Henri Vollet (eds.) - forthcoming - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    During the last 20 years, knowledge-centered approaches have become increasingly popular in analytic epistemology. Rather than trying to account for knowledge in other terms, these approaches take knowledge as the starting point for the elucidation of other epistemic notions (such as belief, justification, rationality, etc.). Knowledge-centered approaches have been so influential that it now looks like epistemology is undergoing a factive turn. However, relatively little has been done to explore how knowledge-centered views fare (...)
     
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  10.  67
    Knowledgefirst perceptual epistemology: A comment on Littlejohn and Millar.David de Bruijn - 2023 - Analytic Philosophy 64 (3):329-345.
    According to epistemological disjunctivism (ED), ordinary perceptual experience ensures an opportunity for perceptual knowledge. In recent years, two distinct models of this idea have been developed. For Duncan Pritchard (Epistemological disjunctivism, 2012, Oxford University Press; Epistemic angst: Radical skepticism and the groundlessness of our believing, 2012, Princeton University Press), perception provides distinctly powerful reasons for belief. By contrast, Clayton Littlejohn (Journal of Philosophical Research, 41, 201; Knowledge first, 2017, Oxford University Press; Normativity: Epistemic and practical, 2018, Oxford (...)
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  11. Knowledge First Virtue Epistemology.Christoph9 Kelp - 2017 - In Adam Carter, Emma Gordon & Benjamin Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford University Press.
  12.  28
    Good Thinking: A Knowledge First Virtue Epistemology.Christoph Kelp - 2018 - London, UK: Routledge.
    Process reliabilism -- Virtue reliabilism: justified belief -- Virtue reliabilism: knowledge -- Knowledge first virtue reliabilism -- The competition -- The safety dilemma -- Lottery cases.
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  13. Knowledge First Approaches to Epistemology and Mind.A. Carter, E. Gordon & B. Jarvis (eds.) - 2017 - Oxford University Press.
     
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  14. Knowledge First?Aidan McGlynn - 2014 - New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillian.
    According to a tradition reaching back to Plato, questions about the nature of knowledge are to be answered by offering an analysis in terms of truth, belief, justification, and other factors presumed to be in some sense more basic than knowledge itself. In light of the apparent failure of this approach, knowledge first philosophy instead takes knowledge as the starting point in epistemology and related areas of the philosophies of language and mind. Knowledge (...)
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  15.  91
    Testimonial contractarianism: A knowledgefirst social epistemology.Mona Simion - 2021 - Noûs 55 (4):891-916.
    According to anti‐reductionism in the epistemology of testimony, testimonial entitlement is easy to come by: all you need to do is listen to what you are being told. Say you like anti‐reductionism; one question that you will need to answer is how come testimonial entitlement comes so cheap; after all, people are free to lie.This paper has two aims: first, it looks at the main anti‐reductionist answers to this question and argues that they remain unsatisfactory. Second, it goes (...)
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  16. "Knowledge First" and Its Limits.Tammo Lossau - 2022 - Dissertation, Johns Hopkins University
    I discuss three understandings of the idea of “Knowledge First Epistemology”, i.e. Timothy Williamson’s suggestion that we should take knowledge as a starting point, rather than trying to analyze it. Some have taken this to be a suggestion about the role of the concept of knowledge, but Williamson also seems to be concerned with intuition-based metaphysics. As an alternative, I develop the idea that knowledge may be a social kind that can be understood through (...)
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  17. What's the Point of Knowledge? A Function-First Epistemology.Michael Hannon - 2019 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.
    This book is about the nature and value of knowledge. At its core is a simple idea: we can answer many interesting and difficult philosophical questions by reflecting on the role (purpose, function) of epistemic evaluation in human life. I call this approach ‘function-first epistemology’. I use this method to illuminate the nature and value of knowledge, the foundations of epistemic normativity, the epistemology of testimony, and skepticism.
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  18.  51
    Ways and Means: When Sometimes “Knowledge-FirstEpistemology Is Not Epistemology.Brian New - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (3):827-834.
    I will claim that the distinction Craig French describes between “specific realizations of knowledge” and “means of knowing”, after respective theorisations by Timothy Williamson and Quassim Cassam, can be seen as a faultline between epistemology on the one hand, and the analysis of ordinary language use on the other. The possibility of this disjunction, I believe, raises the question as to whether the latter kind of analysis has anything to contribute to epistemology at all. Cassam’s “explanatory” conception (...)
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  19. Putting Knowledge to Work: New Directions for Knowledge-First Epistemology.Artūrs Logins & Jacques-Henri Vollet (eds.) - forthcoming - Oxford University Press.
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  20.  96
    Knowledge-first believing the unknowable.Simon Wimmer - 2021 - Synthese 198 (4):3855-3871.
    I develop a challenge for a widely suggested knowledge-first account of belief that turns, primarily, on unknowable propositions. I consider and reject several responses to my challenge and sketch a new knowledge-first account of belief that avoids it.
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  21. You ought to have known: positive epistemic norms in a knowledge-first framework.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-23.
    There are two central kinds of epistemological mistakes: believing things you shouldn’t, and failing to believe things that you should. The knowledge-first program offers a canonical explanation for the former: if you believe something without knowing it, you violate the norm to believe only that which you know. But the explanation does not extend in any plausible way to a story about what’s wrong with suspending judgment when one ought to believe. In this paper I explore prospects for (...)
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  22. Justified Belief: Knowledge First‐Style.Christoph Kelp - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (1):79-100.
    Recent knowledge first epistemology features a number of different accounts of justified belief, including a knowledge first reductionism according to which to believe justifiably is to know Sutton, Littlejohn, Williamson, a knowledge first version of accessibilism Millar and a knowledge first version of mentalism Bird. This paper offers a knowledge first version of virtue epistemology and argues that it is preferable to its knowledge first epistemological rivals: (...)
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  23.  60
    A Knowledge-First Account of Group Knowledge.Domingos Faria - 2022 - Logos and Episteme 13 (1):37-53.
    The aim of this paper is to relate two trending topics in contemporary epistemology: the discussion of group knowledge and the discussion of knowledge-first approach. In social epistemology no one has seriously applied and developed Williamson’s theory of knowledge-first approach to the case of group knowledge yet. For example, scholars of group knowledge typically assume that knowledge is analyzed in terms of more basic concepts, such as group belief or acceptance, (...)
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  24.  67
    A knowledge-first approach to episodic memory.Christoph Hoerl - 2022 - Synthese 200 (376):1-27.
    This paper aims to outline, and argue for, an approach to episodic memory broadly in the spirit of knowledge-first epistemology. I discuss a group of influential views of epsiodic memory that I characterize as ‘two-factor accounts’, which have both proved popular historically and have also seen a resurgence in recent work on the philosophy of memory. What is common to them is that they try to give an account of the nature of episodic memory in which the (...)
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  25. Knowledge-first believing the unknowable.Simon Wimmer - 2021 - Synthese 198 (4):3855-3871.
    I develop a challenge for a widely suggested knowledge-first account of belief that turns, primarily, on unknowable propositions. I consider and reject several responses to my challenge and sketch a new knowledge-first account of belief that avoids it.
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  26.  99
    When Evidence Isn’t Enough: Suspension, Evidentialism, and Knowledge-First Virtue Epistemology.Lisa Miracchi - 2019 - Episteme 16 (4):413-437.
    I motivate and develop a novel account of the epistemic assessability of suspension as a development of my knowledge-first, virtue-epistemological research program. First, I extend an argument of Ernest Sosa's for the claim that evidentialism cannot adequately account for the epistemic assessability of suspension. This includes a kind of knowledge-first evidentialism of the sort advocated by Timothy Williamson. I agree with Sosa that the reasons why evidentialism fails motivate a virtue-epistemological approach, but argue that my (...)
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  27.  69
    Ways to Knowledge-First Believe.Simon Wimmer - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (3):1189-1205.
    On a widely suggested knowledge-first account of belief, to believe p is to phi as if one knew p. I challenge this view by arguing against various regimentations of it. I conclude by generalizing my argument to alternative knowledge-first views suggested by Williamson and Wimmer.
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  28. Knowing how to put knowledge first in the theory of justification.Paul Silva - 2017 - Episteme 14 (4):393-412.
    I provide a novel knowledge-first account of justification that avoids the pitfalls of existing accounts while preserving the underlying insight of knowledge-first epistemologies: that knowledge comes first. The view I propose is, roughly, this: justification is grounded in our practical knowledge (know-how) concerning the acquisition of propositional knowledge (knowledge-that). I first refine my thesis in response to immediate objections. In subsequent sections I explain the various ways in which this thesis (...)
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  29. On Putting Knowledge 'First'.Jonathan Ichikawa & C. S. I. Jenkins - 2017 - In Joseph Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & Benjamin Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford University Press.
    There is a New Idea in epistemology. It goes by the name of ‘knowledge first,’ and it is particularly associated with Timothy Williamson’s book Knowledge and Its Limits. In slogan form, to put knowledge first is to treat knowledge as basic or fundamental, and to explain other states—belief, justification, maybe even content itself—in terms of knowledge, instead of vice versa. The idea has proven enormously interesting, and equally controversial. But deep foundational questions (...)
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  30. Explaining enkratic asymmetries: knowledge-first style.Paul Silva - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (11):2907-2930.
    [This papers explores a novel case for the normativity of knowledge for belief – something that is compatible with the knowledge/factual awareness distinction I've explored elsewhere.] There are two different kinds of enkratic principles for belief: evidential enkratic principles and normative enkratic principles. It’s frequently taken for granted that there’s not an important difference between them. But evidential enkratic principles are undermined by considerations that gain no traction at all against their normative counterparts. The idea that such an (...)
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  31. Delusions and beliefs: a knowledge-first approach.Jakob Ohlhorst - 2022 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):1-7.
    In Delusions and Beliefs, Kengo Miyazono proposes an extended and convincing argument for the thesis that delusions are malfunctional beliefs. One of the key assumptions for this argument is that belief is a biological notion, and that the function of beliefs is a product of evolution. I challenge the thesis that evolutionary accounts can furnish an epistemologically satisfying account of beliefs because evolutionary success does not necessarily track epistemic success. Consequently, also delusions as beliefs cannot be explained in a satisfactory (...)
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  32. Knowledge first?E. J. Coffman - unknown
    The Orthodox View (OV) of the relation between epistemic justification and knowledge has it that justification is conceptually prior to knowledge—and so, can be used to provide a noncircular account of knowledge. OV has come under threat from the increasingly popular “Knowledge First” movement (KFM) in epistemology. I assess several anti-OV arguments due to three of KFM’s most prominent members: Timothy Williamson, Jonathan Sutton, and Alexander Bird. I argue that OV emerges from these attacks (...)
     
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  33.  55
    Knowledge first, stability and value.Barnaby Walker - 2019 - Synthese 198 (4):3833-3854.
    What should knowledge first theorists say about the value of knowledge? In this paper I approach this issue by arguing for a single ‘modest knowledge first claim’ about the value of knowledge. This is that the special value of knowledge isn’t merely instrumental value relative to true belief. I show that MKF is inconsistent with the version of the Platonic stability theory that Williamson defends in Knowledge and its Limits. I then argue (...)
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  34. Practical knowledge first.Carlotta Pavese - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-18.
    This idea that what is distinctive of intentional performances (or at least of those intentional performances that amount to skilled actions) is one’s practical knowledge in it —i.e., knowledge of what one is doing while doing it— famously traces back to Anscombe ([]1963] 2000). While many philosophers have theorized about Anscombe’s notion of practical knowledge (e.g., Setiya (2008), Thompson et al. (2011), Schwenkler (2019), O’Brien (2007)), there is a wide disagreement about how to understand it. This paper (...)
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  35. What the tortoise should do: A knowledgefirst virtue approach to the basing relation.Lisa Miracchi Titus & J. Adam Carter - forthcoming - Noûs.
    What is it to base a belief on reasons? Existing attempts to give an account of the basing relation encounter a dilemma: either one appeals to some kind of neutral process that does not adequately reflect the way basing is a content‐sensitive first‐personal activity, or one appeals to linking or bridge principles that over‐intellectualize and threaten regress. We explain why this dilemma arises, and diagnose the commitments that are key obstacles to providing a satisfactory account. We explain why they (...)
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  36. Knowledge First.Timothy Williamson - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 1-10.
  37.  17
    Evidentialism, justification, and knowledgefirst.Alexander Bird - forthcoming - Noûs.
    This paper examines the relationship between evidentialism, knowledgefirst epistemology, (E=K) in particular, and justification. Evidentialism gives an account of justified belief in terms of evidence but is silent on the nature of evidence. Knowledgefirst tells us what evidence is but stands in need of an agreed account of justification. So each might be able to supply what the other lacks. I argue that the combination of evidentialism, (E=K), and some plausible principles leads to the scepticism (...)
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  38.  18
    Knowledge-First Inferential Evidence: A Response to Dunn.Timothy Williamson - 2023 - The Monist 106 (4):441-445.
    This paper is a response to “Inferential Evidence” by Jeffrey Dunn, in which he argues that my account of evidence is internally inconsistent, and that any form of Bayesian epistemology excludes evidence gained by inductive inference (which my account allows). In response, I show how the alleged inconsistency dissolves once the process of gaining evidence by inductive inference is fully articulated into the relevant stages, with due attention to the potential role of recognitional capacities.
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  39.  73
    In support of the Knowledge-First conception of the normativity of justification.Anne Meylan - 2017 - In Joseph Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & Benjamin Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press. pp. 246-258.
    The knowledge-first solution to the New Evil Demon Problem (NEDP) goes hand in hand with a particular conception of the normativity of justification, one according to which a justified belief is one that satisfies some sort of ought or should (Williamson forthcoming). This claim is incompatible with another, well accepted, view that regards the normativity of justification. According to this established view, a justified belief is rather something that is neither obligatory, nor forbidden (see e.g. Alston 1989, 1993, (...)
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  40. Contextualising Knowledge: Epistemology and Semantics.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    The book develops and synthesises two main ideas: contextualism about knowledge ascriptions and a knowledge-first approach to epistemology. The theme of the book is that these two ideas fit together much better than it's widely thought they do. Not only are they not competitors: they each have something important to offer the other.
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  41.  88
    What’s the Point of Knowledge? A Function-First Epistemology.Jeremy Fantl - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (4):834-834.
    In this excellent and well-argued book, Michael Hannon defends two primary claims: first, the function of knowledge-attributions is primarily that of flagging reliable informants; second, proper ep...
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  42. Meylan, Anne (2017). In support of the Knowledge-First conception of the normativity of justification. In: Carter, J Adam; Gordon, Emma C; Jarvis, Benjamin. Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 246-258.Anne Meylan, J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & Benjamin Jarvis (eds.) - 2017
     
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  43.  81
    What's the point of knowledge?: A function‐first epistemology. Michael Hannon. Oxford University Press, 2019, ix+275 pp., ISBN: 9780190914721. $78.00. [REVIEW]Georgi Gardiner - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 29 (3):674-678.
  44. Lying: Knowledge or belief?Neri Marsili - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (5):1445-1460.
    A new definition of lying is gaining traction, according to which you lie only if you say what you know to be false. Drawing inspiration from “New Evil Demon” scenarios, I present a battery of counterexamples against this “Knowledge Account” of lying. Along the way, I comment upon the methodology of conceptual analysis, the moral implications of the Knowledge Account, and its ties with knowledge-first epistemology.
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  45. Know Your Way Out of St. Petersburg: An Exploration of "Knowledge-First" Decision Theory.Frank Hong - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-20.
    This paper explores the consequences of applying two natural ideas from epistemology to decision theory: (1) that knowledge should guide our actions, and (2) that we know a lot of non-trivial things. In particular, we explore the consequences of these ideas as they are applied to standard decision theoretic puzzles such as the St. Petersburg Paradox. In doing so, we develop a “knowledge-first” decision theory and we will see how it can help us avoid fanaticism with (...)
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  46.  45
    Newton's “law-firstepistemology and “matter-first” metaphysics.Caleb Hazelwood - 2023 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 101 (C):40-47.
    Much has been written on Newton’s concept of matter, as well as Newton’s laws. Meanwhile, the metaphysical and epistemological relationships between these two principal features of Newtonian philosophy are relatively unexplored. Among the existing accounts of the relationship between bodies and laws, two are especially compelling: the “law-constitutive” approach from Katherine Brading and the “formal-cause” approach from Zvi Biener and Eric Schliesser. Both accounts argue that Newton’s bodies are (at least partially) metaphysically dependent on the laws. That is, according to (...)
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  47. The Explanatory Merits of Reasons-First Epistemology.Eva Schmidt - 2020 - In Christoph Demmerling & Dirk Schroder (eds.), Concepts in Thought, Action, and Emotion: New Essays. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 75-91.
    I present an explanatory argument for the reasons-first view: It is superior to knowledge-first views in particular in that it can both explain the specific epistemic role of perception and account for the shape and extent of epistemic justification.
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  48.  56
    Scepticism and the Genealogy of Knowledge: Situating Epistemology in Time.Miranda Fricker - 2008 - In Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar & Adrian Haddock (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    My overarching purpose is to illustrate the philosophical fruitfulness of expanding epistemology not only laterally across the social space of other epistemic subjects, but at the same time vertically in the temporal dimension. I set about this by first presenting central strands of Michael Williams' diagnostic engagement with scepticism, in which he crucially employs a Default and Challenge model of justification. I then develop three key aspects of Edward Craig's ‘practical explication' of the concept of knowledge so (...)
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  49. On Folk Epistemology. How we think and talk about knowledge.Mikkel Gerken - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    On Folk Epistemology explores how we ascribe knowledge to ourselves and others. Empirical evidence suggests that we do so early and often in thought as well as in talk. Since knowledge ascriptions are central to how we navigate social life, it is important to understand our basis for making them. -/- A central claim of the book is that factors that have nothing to do with knowledge may lead to systematic mistakes in everyday ascriptions of (...). These mistakes are explained by an empirically informed account of how ordinary knowledge ascriptions are the product of cognitive heuristics that are associated with biases. In developing this account, Mikkel Gerken presents work in cognitive psychology and pragmatics, while also contributing to epistemology. For example, Gerken develops positive epistemic norms of action and assertion and moreover, critically assesses contextualism, knowledge-first methodology, pragmatic encroachment theories and more. Many of these approaches are argued to overestimate the epistemological significance of folk epistemology. In contrast, this volume develops an equilibristic methodology according to which intuitive judgments about knowledge cannot straightforwardly play a role as data for epistemological theorizing. Rather, critical epistemological theorizing is required to interpret empirical findings. Consequently, On Folk Epistemology helps to lay the foundation for an emerging sub-field that intersects philosophy and the cognitive sciences: The empirical study of folk epistemology. (shrink)
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  50. Scepticism and the Genealogy of Knowledge: Situating Epistemology in Time.Miranda Fricker - 2008 - Philosophical Papers 37 (1):27-50.
    My overarching purpose is to illustrate the philosophical fruitfulness of expanding epistemology not only laterally across the social space of other epistemic subjects, but at the same time vertically in the temporal dimension. I set about this by first presenting central strands of Michael Williams' diagnostic engagement with scepticism, in which he crucially employs a Default and Challenge model of justification. I then develop three key aspects of Edward Craig's ‘practical explication' of the concept of knowledge so (...)
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