Preface : consciousness redux -- What is consciousness? -- Who is conscious? -- Animal consciousness -- Consciousness and the rest -- Consciousness and the brain -- Tracking the footprints of consciousness -- Why we need a theory of consciousness -- Of wholes -- Tools to measure consciousness -- The uber-mind and pure consciousness -- Does consciousness have a function? -- Computationalism and experience -- Computers can't simulate experience -- Consciousness : here, there but not everywhere -- Coda : why this (...) matters -- References -- Notes. (shrink)

A philosopher argues that state-sponsored cyberattacks against central military or civilian targets are always acts of war. What is this philosopher doing? According to conceptual analysts, the philosopher is making a claim about our concept of war. According to philosophical realists, the philosopher is making a claim about war per se. In a quickly developing literature, a third option is being explored: the philosopher is engineering the concept of war. On this view, the philosopher is making a proposal about which (...) concept we should have – even if it deviates from the extant concept, and even if it does not capture ‘what war really is’. The activity or method of proposing such revisionary definitions, as well as the metaphilosophical reflection on it, has become known as conceptual engineering. (shrink)

Conceptual engineering concerns the assessment and improvement of our concepts. But how can proposals to engineer concepts be implemented in the real world? This is known as the implementation challenge to conceptual engineering. In this paper, I am concerned with the meta-philosophical implications of the implementation challenge. Specifically, must we overcome the implementation challenge prior to undertaking conceptual engineering? Some critics have recently answered this question affirmatively. I intend to show that they are mistaken. I argue as follows. First, successful (...) implementation is not an integral part of conceptual engineering. Second, the idea that the value of conceptual engineering relies on successful implementation is in tension with widespread assumptions about normative theorizing. (shrink)

English summary: In this work, Anton Friedrich Koch develops a hermeneutical realism using methods of analytic philosophy, i.e. the thesis that although the real is independent from individual beliefs and perceptions, it is, however, not independent of there being beliefs and perceptions at all. We, the finite spatiotemporally embodied subjects, are therefore not a 'cosmic coincidence' but rather necessary for the existence of the material system of space-time, which, on the other hand, encompasses us and is in no way (...) a fiction or construction (subjectivity thesis). This brand of realism is hermeneutical because it treats knowing as a special case of reading and translating - of things into spoken language - (readability thesis), and in giving room to the discovery that completeness and consistency, as in mathematics, are likewise incompatible in the description of the world (antinomy thesis). German description: Anton Friedrich Koch begrundet und entwickelt in diesem Werk mit Mitteln der analytischen Philosophie einen hermeneutischen Realismus: die philosophische Lehre, dass das Reale zwar von einzelnen Meinungen und Wahrnehmungen unabhangig ist, nicht aber davon, dass es uberhaupt Meinungen und Wahrnehmungen gibt. Wir, die endlichen, raumzeitlich verkorperten Subjekte, sind also kein Zufall, sondern notwendig fur die Existenz des materiellen Raum-Zeit-Systems, das uns andererseits weitraumig umgibt und keineswegs unsere Konstruktion oder Fiktion ist (Subjektivitatsthese). Hermeneutisch ist dieser Realismus, weil er das Erkennen als einen Sonderfall des Lesens und Ubersetzens - der Dinge in Wortsprache - begreift (Lesbarkeitsthese) und weil er der Entdeckung Raum gibt, dass Vollstandigkeit und Widerspruchsfreiheit, wie in der Mathematik, so auch in der Weltbeschreibung unvertraglich sind (Antinomiethese). (shrink)

The continental tradition in philosophy has gotten more "materialistic" over the last two hundred years. This has resulted from a combination of some very specific moves with regard to the epistemological parameters of understanding and the assertion that ideas may have material force in history. Therefore, the materialism within the continental tradition is not a materiality of being, but a materiality of understanding and action. Such an inquiry opens up space between the activities of sensation and the mental faculty of (...) cognition. 'I think, therefore I am,' is not an empirical statement, but a statement of cognition. It is assumed that this distinction is at the core of continental philosophy. Cognition is always interpretive. Experience is the start of cognition, but not its final product. Our cognitions cannot be separated from our experience of the physical, social, and cultural environment around us. The symbolic nature of language reinforces the interpretive nature of our thoughts and ideas. Our language is, therefore, always projecting an implicit image of the world. Language is, therefore, always political. The materiality of these cognitive world-views is manifested in two ways. First, in their formation. They are the products of sensual contact with the world. Second, in their effects. They move people. It is a picture of the world which serves to shape the content and character of human behavior. Whether we want to call these phantoms of the mind, world-view, ideas, thoughts, cognitions, or any other term, the dual character of their materiality is secure. This work examines the threads of materialist ideas running through the efforts of some major authors in the continental tradition in philosophy. A model of materialism is constructed in Chapter One and used to assess the materialist elements in works from Kant, Marx, Weber, Nietzsche, and contemporary poststructuralism. The work demonstrates the evolution of materialist thinking within the tradition and asserts an evolving and developing articulation of materialism in relation to the thoughts and activities of human beings." -- Publisher's description. (shrink)

This paper discusses the logical space of alternative conceptual engineering projects, with a specific focus on (1) the processes, (2) the targets and goals, and (3) the methods of such projects. We present an overview of how these three aspects interact in the contemporary literature and discuss those alternative projects that have yet to be explored based on our suggested typology. We show how choices about each element in a conceptual engineering project constrain the possibilities for the others, thereby giving (...) rise to distinct groupings of possible projects under the banner of conceptual engineering. We conclude with a critical reflection on the potential ethical issues that arise as a result of effectively putting conceptual engineering into practice. (shrink)

Following newer research trends this chapter is underpinned by the thesis that the British Empire, by its gradual disengagement from its former dominions, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia, was seen as a threat by social actors in these respective societies. Concurrently, all these societies had to deal with a (growing) variety of ethnic and social groups. With the emphasis on developments in Canada and in Australia, Sebastian Koch studies two big celebrations of nationhood to question different ways of memoria (...) and anti-memoria: the celebration of Canada’s 100 years’ anniversary of independence in 1967 and the 1967 Expo in Montreal. His analysis of memoria and anti-memoria as knowledge practices shows that indigenous knowledge was still threatened and precarious even if Canada proclaimed the idea of “unity in diversity” during its coming of age party in 1967. Nevertheless, Koch’s chapter shows that formerly marginalized groups used (their) precarious knowledge to win recognition, highlight injustices, and play their part in the development of “new” identity concepts. (shrink)

In den Aufsätzen dieses Bandes präsentiert Anton Friedrich Koch Hegels theoretische Philosophie als diejenige Nichtstandard-Metaphysik, in der sich die Metaphysik, nicht aber die Philosophie vollendet. Jenseits von Hegels Evolutionstheorie des Absoluten gilt es von einem Standpunkt der Endlichkeit aus neu zu philosophieren.

This chapter critically looks at the moral reasons for banning the use of performance‐enhancing drugs in sport. It examines whether a ban can be properly justified from a moral point of view. The chapter sketches how intuitively appealing arguments in support of the ban need modification. It then proposes a framework in which traditional arguments can be combined in a systematic way to justify the ban on doping in sport. Stronger arguments in favor of the ban can be found in (...) the view of doping as a health hazard and as implying a significant risk of harm. A moral standpoint towards doping needs to build on an interpretation of what sports or more precisely what athletic performances are all about. The chapter discusses the implications of the thick theory of athletic performance when it comes to doping in sport. (shrink)

The philosophy of science between the two world wars, 1920s-1930s.

Dans le De fato, Alexandre construit une théorie péripatéticienne du destin et réfute les Stoïciens, partisans dune conception dure du destin. Par là il offre un document majeur sur le déterminisme dans lAntiquité. Louvrage montre comment lexégèse dAristote lui permet de proposer une conception nouvelle de la responsabilité.

Over Plato's Academy in ancient Athens, it is said, hung a sign: "Let no one ignorant of geometry enter here." Plato thought no one could do philosophy without also doing mathematics. In The Waltz of Reason, mathematician and philosopher Karl Sigmund shows us why. Charting an epic story spanning millennia and continents, Sigmund shows that philosophy and mathematics are inextricably intertwined, mutual partners in a reeling search for truth. Beginning with-appropriately enough-geometry, Sigmund explores the power and beauty (...) of numbers and logic, and then shows how those ideas laid the ground work for everything from the theory of a fair election, to modern conceptions of governance, cooperation, morality, and even of reason itself. Did you know, for example, that John Locke, author of some of the most important texts in the Western theory of government, was motivated in his work by his study of geometry? Or, that Locke was actually terrible at geometry, a seventeenth-century mathematical laughingstock? He was, a fact that might want us to think again about the logic of his life's work. And Locke wasn't the only one! Sigmund reveals how many of our modern ideas about what is true and what is reasonable are based on similarly shaky grounds. The economists and other thinkers who promulgated game theory, classical economics, and behavioral economics-the basis of so much in modern life-were not necessarily good at either math or philosophy, or both. The result is a remarkable book: accessible, funny, and wise, it tells an engrossing history of ideas that spins as dizzyingly and beautifully as a ballroom full of expert dancers. But it doesn't just celebrate the past. Instead, by making all these great ideas accessible to all, The Waltz of Reason empowers as it entertains, giving each of us the tools to ask, what do we know, how do we know it, and what do we want to do, with all these ideas? (shrink)

Das sinnliche Bewusstsein, abstrakt einzeln betrachtet, bietet ein Sinnesdaten- Konglomerat in einem raumzeitlich ausgedehnten sensorischen Bewusstseinsfeld, welches affektiv in Leib und Gegenwartsbewusstsein des Menschen verankert und so auf dessen „Begehrungsvermögen“ bezogen ist, jedoch kein Bewusstsein von Subjekt und Objekt. Dieses entsteht erst durch die freie begriffliche Synthesis, die mit Fichte als intellektuelle Anschauung unseres eigenen Handelns – des Verbindens und dadurch Objektivierens sowie „Subjektivierens“/Selbstbewusstsein-Erzeugens – verstanden werden kann. In konservativer Projektion der verbindenden Verstandesbegriffe lässt sie uns erkennen, was das sinnliche (...) Bewusstsein – das Epistemische quasi vorzeichnend – zeitlich geordnet lediglich wahrnimmt. (shrink)

In the most inclusive sense, psychological mechanisms offer a type of causal explanation of mental states and behavior, often with reference to underlying processes, systems, activities, or entities. By postulating and investigating such mechanisms, researchers have sought explanations of a wide range of psychological phenomena. However, the concept has been deployed in dramatically different ways, with very different meanings, depending upon the particular school or tradition of psychology (and specific research program therein). In fact, usage has been so diverse as (...) to defy easy categorization or definition. But a historical perspective, even if rather selective, can trace the broad outlines of the significance of psychological mechanisms for the study of the mind. Perhaps most notable is the role they have played in the psychoanalytic tradition; research efforts within behaviorism and cognitive science have also made liberal use of versions of the concept in their explanatory frameworks (for discussion of evolutionary psychology, see the entry “evolved psychological mechanisms”). Cutting across all of these traditions are several key themes relating to psychological mechanisms, including questions concerning the scope of the relevant causal claims, debates about causal determinism and regularity, and the unresolved relation between mind and body. (shrink)

This chapter reviews past and present debates about the therapeutic relationship in order to draw out the ethical implications of relational practices in psychotherapy. The therapeutic relationship has been understood differently across psychotherapeutic approaches, with each tradition responding to the attendant ethical challenges in distinctive ways. Aside from practitioners’ theoretical and practical commitments, the therapeutic relationship has also been, and continues to be, shaped by broader societal influences. The chapter discusses the shifting ethical implications of relational practices, then, as situated (...) in their theoretical and historical contexts. The variability of concerns raised by the therapeutic relationship requires continued ethical analysis in order to confront the diversity and complexity of contemporary clinical practice. (shrink)

Sigmund Freud was an Austrian neurologist and the founder of psychoanalysis, a clinical method for treating psychopathology through dialogue between a patient and a psychoanalyst. Freud was born to Galician Jewish parents in the Moravian town of Freiberg, in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. He qualified as a doctor of medicine in 1881 at the University of Vienna. Upon completing his habilitation in 1885, he was appointed a docent in neuropathology and became an affiliated professor in 1902. Freud lived and worked (...) in Vienna, having set up his clinical practice there in 1886. In 1938 Freud left Austria to escape the Nazis. He died in exile in the United Kingdom in 1939. (shrink)