Possible worlds have revolutionised philosophy and some related fields. But, in recent years, tools based on possible worlds have been found to be limited in many respects. Impossible worlds have been introduced to overcome these limitations. This Element aims to raise and answer the neglected question of what is characteristically impossible about impossible worlds. The Element sheds new light on the nature of impossible worlds. It also aims to analyse the main features and utility of impossible worlds and examine how (...) impossible worlds can capture distinctions which are unavailable if we limit ourselves to possible world-based tools. (shrink)

Feinberg and Mallatt, in their presentation of neurobiological naturalism, have suggested that visual consciousness was acquired by early vertebrates and inherited by a wide range of descendants, and that its neural basis has shifted to nonhomologous nervous structures during evolution. However, their evolutionary scenario of visual consciousness relies on the assumption that visual consciousness is closely linked with survival, which is not commonly accepted in current consciousness research. We suggest an alternative idea that visual consciousness is linked to a specific (...) class of agency, consequently justifying their phylogenetic claim. We also examine the implication of their phylogenetic claim: visual consciousness is homologous across vertebrates, but its neural basis is not. This apparent incongruence illustrates a general phenomenon of homology, and that the resulting hierarchical view of visual consciousness and its neural basis can be straightforwardly accommodated by neurobiological naturalism. Throughout these discussions, we aim to address the potential theoretical issues in neurobiological naturalism and refine the picture illustrated by Feinberg and Mallatt regarding phylogenetic distribution and trajectories of visual consciousness. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that a distinction ought to be drawn between two ways in which a given world might be logically impossible. First, a world w might be impossible because the laws that hold at w are different from those that hold at some other world (say the actual world). Second, a world w might be impossible because the laws of logic that hold in some world (say the actual world) are violated at w. We develop a novel (...) way of modelling logical possibility that makes room for both kinds of logical impossibility. Doing so has interesting implications for the relationship between logical possibility and other kinds of possibility (for example, metaphysical possibility) and implications for the necessity or contingency of the laws of logic. (shrink)

Proof-theory has traditionally been developed based on linguistic (symbolic) representations of logical proofs. Recently, however, logical reasoning based on diagrammatic or graphical representations has been investigated by logicians. Euler diagrams were introduced in the eighteenth century. But it is quite recent (more precisely, in the 1990s) that logicians started to study them from a formal logical viewpoint. We propose a novel approach to the formalization of Euler diagrammatic reasoning, in which diagrams are defined not in terms of regions as in (...) the standard approach, but in terms of topological relations between diagrammatic objects. We formalize the unification rule, which plays a central role in Euler diagrammatic reasoning, in a style of natural deduction. We prove the soundness and completeness theorems with respect to a formal set-theoretical semantics. We also investigate structure of diagrammatic proofs and prove a normal form theorem. (shrink)

There was a time when 'logic' just meant classical logic. The climate is slowly changing and non-classical logic cannot be dismissed off-hand. However, a metatheory used to study the properties of non-classical logic is often classical. In this paper, we will argue that this practice of relying on classical metatheories is problematic. In particular, we will show that it is a bad practice because the metatheory that is used to study a non-classical logic often rules out the very logic it (...) is designed to study. (shrink)

We propose a new information sharing system, named ``BisNet'', which automatically gathers information about the bookmarks stored in users' web browsers and helps the users exchange URIs of possibly interesting web pages with others who have similar interest with them. Being different from other typical agent services that gather and provide information according to pre-registered user profiles, BisNet is expected to share more relevant information because of its use of web browser bookmarks that are actively selected and ordered by many (...) humans. To enhance the relevance of information being shared, we developed a novel algorithm for directory evaluation. This algorithm only looks at the local referential structure between bookmark directories and URIs and calculates for each directory the ``order index'' that represents how well its content URIs are put in order with a focus on specific areas of interest. Then each directory receives new URIs from other related directories with large order indexes. The repetition of such URI exchanges makes the whole directory-URI networks dynamically form directory groups according to the commonness of the URIs they refer to. Our method is unique in that it pays no attention to the actual contents of web pages, and thus is much simpler and faster than other methods based on the result of content analysis. We carried out a field trial that involved 45 people who used a prototype version of BisNet clients. The result indicated that the relevance of shared URIs positively correlated with the ``order index'' of surrounding related directories, demonstrating the effectiveness of the method we proposed. (shrink)

This paper points out an error of Parigot’s proof of strong normalization of second order classical natural deduction by the CPS-translation, discusses erasing-continuation of the CPS-translation, and corrects that proof by using the notion of augmentations.

What does it mean for the laws of logic to fail? My task in this paper is to answer this question. I use the resources that Routley/Sylvan developed with his collaborators for the semantics of relevant logics to explain a world where the laws of logic fail. I claim that the non-normal worlds that Routley/Sylvan introduced are exactly such worlds. To disambiguate different kinds of impossible worlds, I call such worlds logically impossible worlds. At a logically impossible world, the laws (...) of logic fail. In this paper, I provide a definition of logically impossible worlds. I then show that there is nothing strange about admitting such worlds. (shrink)

Neurorights, as “new human rights,” have been increasingly recognized in the literature. In the Neurorights Initiative, these rights are supposed to be directed toward mental privacy, free will, pe...

This paper proves the strong normalization of classical natural deduction with disjunction and permutative conversions, by using CPS-translation and augmentations. Using them, this paper also proves the strong normalization of classical natural deduction with general elimination rules for implication and conjunction, and their permutative conversions. This paper also proves that natural deduction can be embedded into natural deduction with general elimination rules, strictly preserving proof normalization.

Logic in Buddhist Philosophy concerns the systematic study of anumāna (often translated as inference) as developed by Dignāga (480-540 c.e.) and Dharmakīti (600-660 c.e.). Buddhist logicians think of inference as an instrument of knowledge (pramāṇa) and, thus, logic is considered to constitute part of epistemology in the Buddhist tradition. According to the prevalent 20th and early 21st century ‘Western’ conception of logic, however, logical study is the formal study of arguments. If we understand the nature of logic to be formal, (...) it is difficult to see what bearing logic has on knowledge. In this paper, by weaving together the main threads of thought that are salient in Dignāga’s and Dharmakīti’s texts, I shall re-conceive the nature of logic in the context of epistemology and demarcate the logical part of epistemology which can be recognised as logic. I shall demonstrate that we can recognise the logical significance of inference as understood by Buddhist logicians despite the fact that its logical significance lies within the context of knowledge. (shrink)

Priest holds anti-exceptionalism about logic. That is, he holds that logic, as a theory, does not have any exceptional status in relation to the theories of empirical sciences. Crucial to Priest’s anti-exceptionalism is the existence of ‘data’ that can force the revision of logical theory. He claims that classical logic is inadequate to the available data and, thus, needs to be revised. But what kind of data can overturn classical logic? Priest claims that the data is our intuitions about the (...) validity of inferences. In order to make sense of this claim, I will appeal to the Madhyamaka Buddhist philosopher Candrakīrti. I will then pose a problem for Priest’s anti-exceptionalism. Finally, I will suggest a way out of the problem for Priest. Whether or not he accepts my solution, I will let him decide. (shrink)

We introduce a simple inference system based on two primitive relations between terms, namely, inclusion and exclusion relations. We present a normalization theorem, and then provide a characterization of the structure of normal proofs. Based on this, inferences in a syllogistic fragment of natural language are reconstructed within our system. We also show that our system can be embedded into a fragment of propositional minimal logic.

The problem of how to accommodate inconsistencies has attracted quite a number of researchers, in particular, in the area of database theory. The problem is also of concern in the study of belief change. For inconsistent beliefs are ubiquitous. However, comparatively little work has been devoted to discussing the problem in the literature of belief change. In this paper, I examine how adequate the AGM theory is as a logical framework for belief change involving inconsistencies. The technique is to apply (...) to Grove’s sphere system, a semantical representation of the AGM theory, logics that do not infer everything from contradictory premises, viz., paraconsistent logics. I use three paraconsistent logics and discuss three sphere systems that are based on them. I then examine the completeness of the postulates of the AGM theory with respect to the systems. At the end, I discuss some philosophical implications of the examination. (shrink)

Scientific progress in recent neurofeedback research may bring about a new type of moral neuroenhancement, namely, neurofeedback-based moral enhancement; however, this has yet to be examined thoroughly. This paper presents an ethical analysis of the possibility of neurofeedback-based moral enhancement and demonstrates that this type of moral enhancement sheds new light on the moral enhancement debate. First, I survey this debate and extract the typical structural flow of its arguments. Second, by applying structure to the case of neurofeedback-based moral enhancement, (...) I examine the ethical, legal, and social issues to show that this technique is unique and traditionalist, which makes it compatible with almost all our conservative notions, so that it, accordingly, can be seen as an ethically acceptable option. Third, by rejecting the premise in the moral enhancement debate that bio/neuro-enhancement has its unique ELSI that traditional methods would never create, I demonstrate that, by virtue of its traditional or conservative features, neurofeedback-based moral enhancement can be incorporated into the traditional moral education network. Finally, I conclude that, being a part of the traditional moral education network, neurofeedback-based moral enhancement can be a unique and ethically acceptable option of moral neuroenhancement. (shrink)

Max Cresswell and Hilary Putnam seem to hold the view, often shared by classical logicians, that paraconsistent logic has not been made sense of, despite its well-developed mathematics. In this paper, I examine the nature of logic in order to understand what it means to make sense of logic. I then show that, just as one can make sense of non-normal modal logics (as Cresswell demonstrates), we can make `sense' of paraconsistent logic. Finally, I turn the tables on classical logicians (...) and ask what sense can be made of explosive reasoning. While I acknowledge a bias on this issue, it is not clear that even classical logicians can answer this question. (shrink)

CETTE THESE SE VEUT UNE CONTRIBUTION A LA COMPREHENSION DE LA DERNIERE PHILOSOPHIE DE MERLEAU-PONTY, EN PRENANT COMME FIL CONDUCTEUR LA NOTION D'INSTITUTION. NOUS ESSAYONS D'ABORD DE DELIMITER LE CHAMP D'INTERROGATION DE LA NOTION D'INSTITUTION, TELLE QU'ELLE EST PRESENTEE DANS SES DEUX PREMIERS OUVRAGES. DEUXIEMEMENT, LA DESCRIPTION DE QUATRE ORDRES DE L'INSTITUTION SYMBOLIQUE (ANIMALITE ET VIE; STYLE ARTISTIQUE; LANGUE ET IDEALITE; SYSTEME SOCIAL) QUE NOUS NOUS EFFORCONS DE RECONSTITUER A L'AIDE DES MANUSCRITS INEDITS CONDUIT A DEVOILER LES MOTIVATIONS DE LA (...) RADICALISATION DE LA QUESTION PHENOMENOLOGIQUE. ENFIN, NOTRE PROBLEMATIQUE SE PRESENTE DANS LE DERNIER OUVRAGE COMME UN PROJET DE L'INSTITUTION DE LA PHILOSOPHIE ELLE-MEME. CE PROJET A SA PORTEE HISTORIQUE, SE PROPOSANT DE METTRE EN EVIDENCE LES MOMENTS FECONDS DANS L'HISTOIRE DE LA PHILOSOPHIE, DE MANIERE A LEVER LES DIFFICULTES DE L'ONTOLOGIE ACTUELLE. (shrink)

Some skeptics question the very possibility of moral bioenhancement by arguing that if we lack a widely acceptable notion of morality, we will not be able to accept the use of a biotechnological technique as a tool for moral bioenhancement. I will examine this skepticism and argue that the assessment of moral bioenhancement does not require such a notion of morality. In particular, I will demonstrate that this skepticism can be neutralized in the case of recent neurofeedback techniques. This goal (...) will be accomplished in four steps. First, I will draw an outline of the skepticism against the possibility of moral bioenhancement and point out that a long-lasting dispute among moral philosophers nourishes this skepticism. Second, I will survey recent neurofeedback techniques and outline their three features: the variety of the target human faculties, such as emotion, cognition, and behavior; the flexibility or personalizability of the target brain state; and the nonclinical application of neurofeedback techniques. Third, I will argue that, by virtue of these three unique features, neurofeedback techniques can be a tool for moral bioenhancement without adopting any specific notion of morality. Fourth, I will examine the advantages and threats that neurofeedback-based moral enhancement may have. Finally, I will conclude that neurofeedback-based moral enhancement can become a new and promising tool for moral bioenhancement and requires further ethical investigations on its unique features. (shrink)

In sub-Sect. 3.3, the terms “one-person” and “-person” were incorrectly updated by mistake during the correction stage in the online published article.

In cooperative game theory with transferable utilities, there are two well-established ways of redistributing Shapley value payoffs: using egalitarian Shapley values, and using consensus values. We present parallel characterizations of these classes of solutions. Together with the axioms that characterize the original Shapley value, those that specify the redistribution methods characterize the two classes of values. For the class of egalitarian Shapley values, we focus on redistributions in one-person unanimity games from two perspectives: allowing the worth of coalitions to vary, (...) while keeping the player set fixed; and allowing the player set to change, while keeping the worth of coalitions fixed. This class of values is characterized by efficiency, the balanced contributions property for equal contributors, weak covariance, a proportionately decreasing redistribution in one-person unanimity games, desirability, and null players in unanimity games. For the class of consensus values, we concentrate on redistributions in \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$$$\end{document}-person unanimity games from the same two perspectives. This class of values is characterized by efficiency, the balanced contributions property for equal contributors to social surplus, complement weak covariance, a proportionately decreasing redistribution in \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$$$\end{document}-person unanimity games, desirability, and null players in unanimity games. (shrink)

This paper gives new confluence proofs for several lambda calculi with permutation-like reduction, including lambda calculi corresponding to intuitionistic and classical natural deduction with disjunction and permutative conversions, and a lambda calculus with explicit substitutions. For lambda calculi with permutative conversion, naïve parallel reduction technique does not work, and traditional notion of residuals is required as Ando pointed out. This paper shows that the difficulties can be avoided by extending the technique proposed by Dehornoy and van Oostrom, called the Z (...) theorem: existence of a mapping on terms with the Z property concludes the confluence. Since it is still hard to directly define a mapping with the Z property for the lambda calculi with permutative conversions, this paper extends the Z theorem to compositional functions, called compositional Z, and shows that we can adopt it to the calculi. (shrink)

In the 1958-1959 Collège de France course, Merleau-Ponty expounds a detailed commentary on the last paragraphs of the Einleitung from Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. We examine in what sense this course has developed the notions that he was in the process of defining, notions such as “chiasm,” “reversibility,” “depth,” and “flesh.” What seems crucial in this course is to clearly define good ambiguity as opposed to bad ambiguity, that is, to the simple mixture of finitude and universality, of interiority and (...) exteriority. It is a question then of revealing, even within Hegelian thought, the operation, although unstable, of good ambiguity and of instituting it beyond the distinction between anthropology and logic without a return to naturalism. It should first be noted that consciousness is for Hegel violence against itself, it gives itself its measure, such that the distinction between measuring and measured is internal to it. By insisting on this “reversibility” of the measuring and the measured, Merleau-Ponty comes to emphasize that the self-relation of consciousness is simultaneously its opening onto a transcendent – an opening whereby it learns something. This leads him to define “the new ontological milieu” which is the depth of the life of consciousness. It is within this depth that the interrogative experience winds on itself. Secondly, if there truly must be a moment where the Hegelian Zweideutigkeit becomes good ambiguity, it will not suffice to explore preobjective depth; it would still be necessary to discern “the hinge” which is “solid, unwavering” and which “remains irremediably hidden.” It is this unwavering hinge that supports phenomena and that, in simultaneously decentering and recentering the fields of appearances, opens a place where one can follow the genesis of sense. Finally, we note that this discovery of the new ontological milieu can be considered as the recovery of the notion of institution that Merleau-Ponty had proposed in 1954-1955: on the one hand, the notion of chiasm invites us to reveal the hinge which at once decenters and recenters the fields of appearances. This hinge is free from the alternative of nature and culture, of subjective and objective spirit; it is the rootedness of our interrogative experience in brute being, which is not object but starts an indefinite search of self. But, on the other hand, the notion of institution, which is essentially descriptive and factual, makes us better feel the weight of the instituted that is also irremediably hidden. It makes us feel the inertia of the instituting event, as well as its fecundity and its cumulativity. (shrink)

The Genesis of the Social and the Carnal Donation of the Non-Presentable. The Range of the Notion of Institution in Merleau-PontyThis article examines the range of the notion of institution that Merleau-Ponty proposes in his course at the Collège de France (1954-55), by notably insisting on the importance of the question of the genesis of the social for the deepening of his thought. By broadening his investigative domains in two complementary directions (that is, lateral passivity and socio-historical institution), Merleau-Ponty aims (...) in this course to grasp in a better way the lateral relations of our Urstiftung (originary institution) and the instituting subject who obliquely goes beyond the institution towards its sense. That leads him to introduce the perceptual field as being essentially lacunary, because it marks a place where the consciousness is present at the divergence in relation to consciousness. It is certain that the Phenomenology of Perception addressed this question by considering the social as a place where “I am given to myself”. However, the psychological starting point of this work, as well as the originary temporal and unilateral character of radical reflection, prevented one from really grasping the institutional junction of the concrete event and the symbolic matrix. One was not able to thematize an auto-articulation which appears suddenly between radical reflection and the unreflective. This is why Lévi-Strauss’ structuralist thought, by considering the social as symbolism, allows for a better understanding of this institutional nexus. But this idea does not lead to the dogmatic positing of the reality and the autonomy of the social. Instead, it encourages us to practice “the perception of history,” which consists in guessing, in the very process of sociological idealization, the carnal and wild donation of the non-presentable. Far from returning to psychologism, this perception aims at actively achieving the movement internal to the symbolic, that is, its incarnation.La genesi del sociale e la donazione carnale del non-presentabile. La portata della nozione di istituzione in Merleau-PontyQuesto articolo esamina la portata della nozione d’istituzione che Merleau-Ponty propone nel suo corso al Collège de France del 1954-1955, insistendo in particolare sull’importanza della questione della genesi del sociale per l’approfondimento del suo pensiero.Estendendo i propri domini di ricerca in due direzioni complementari (la passività laterale e l’istituzione socio-storica), Merleau-Ponty si propone in questo corso di cogliere meglio i rapporti laterali della nostra Urstiftung (l’istituzione originaria) e del soggetto istituente che la supera obliquamente in direzione del suo senso. Ciò induce a presentare il campo percettivo come essenzialmente lacunoso, poiché manca di un luogo dove la coscienza possa assistere allo scarto rispetto a se stessa.È certo che la Fenomenologia della percezione affrontava questa questione considerando il sociale come un luogo dove “io sono donato a me stesso”. I presupposti psicologici di quest’opera, così come il carattere originariamente temporale e unilaterale della riflessione radicale, impedivano tuttavia di cogliere in maniera adeguata il legame istituzionale dell’evento concreto e della matrice simbolica, e di tematizzare un’autoarticolazione che sorgesse tra la riflessione radicale e l’irriflesso.È per questo motivo che il pensiero strutturalista di Lévi-Strauss, che considerava il sociale come simbolismo, permette di comprendere meglio questo nesso istituzionale. Quest’idea non conduce però a porre dogmaticamente la realtà e l’autonomia del sociale, essa incita piuttosto a praticare “la percezione della storia” che consiste nell’individuare, nel processo stesso dell’idealizzazione sociologica, la donazione carnale e selvaggia del non-presentabile. Lungi dal rappresentare un ritorno allo psicologismo, questa nozione di percezione mira a completare attivamente il movimento interno al simbolico, ovvero la sua incarnazione. (shrink)

The Genesis of the Social and the Carnal Donation of the Non-Presentable. The Range of the Notion of Institution in Merleau-PontyThis article examines the range of the notion of institution that Merleau-Ponty proposes in his course at the Collège de France (1954-55), by notably insisting on the importance of the question of the genesis of the social for the deepening of his thought. By broadening his investigative domains in two complementary directions (that is, lateral passivity and socio-historical institution), Merleau-Ponty aims (...) in this course to grasp in a better way the lateral relations of our Urstiftung (originary institution) and the instituting subject who obliquely goes beyond the institution towards its sense. That leads him to introduce the perceptual field as being essentially lacunary, because it marks a place where the consciousness is present at the divergence in relation to consciousness. It is certain that the Phenomenology of Perception addressed this question by considering the social as a place where “I am given to myself”. However, the psychological starting point of this work, as well as the originary temporal and unilateral character of radical reflection, prevented one from really grasping the institutional junction of the concrete event and the symbolic matrix. One was not able to thematize an auto-articulation which appears suddenly between radical reflection and the unreflective. This is why Lévi-Strauss’ structuralist thought, by considering the social as symbolism, allows for a better understanding of this institutional nexus. But this idea does not lead to the dogmatic positing of the reality and the autonomy of the social. Instead, it encourages us to practice “the perception of history,” which consists in guessing, in the very process of sociological idealization, the carnal and wild donation of the non-presentable. Far from returning to psychologism, this perception aims at actively achieving the movement internal to the symbolic, that is, its incarnation.La genesi del sociale e la donazione carnale del non-presentabile. La portata della nozione di istituzione in Merleau-PontyQuesto articolo esamina la portata della nozione d’istituzione che Merleau-Ponty propone nel suo corso al Collège de France del 1954-1955, insistendo in particolare sull’importanza della questione della genesi del sociale per l’approfondimento del suo pensiero.Estendendo i propri domini di ricerca in due direzioni complementari (la passività laterale e l’istituzione socio-storica), Merleau-Ponty si propone in questo corso di cogliere meglio i rapporti laterali della nostra Urstiftung (l’istituzione originaria) e del soggetto istituente che la supera obliquamente in direzione del suo senso. Ciò induce a presentare il campo percettivo come essenzialmente lacunoso, poiché manca di un luogo dove la coscienza possa assistere allo scarto rispetto a se stessa.È certo che la Fenomenologia della percezione affrontava questa questione considerando il sociale come un luogo dove “io sono donato a me stesso”. I presupposti psicologici di quest’opera, così come il carattere originariamente temporale e unilaterale della riflessione radicale, impedivano tuttavia di cogliere in maniera adeguata il legame istituzionale dell’evento concreto e della matrice simbolica, e di tematizzare un’autoarticolazione che sorgesse tra la riflessione radicale e l’irriflesso.È per questo motivo che il pensiero strutturalista di Lévi-Strauss, che considerava il sociale come simbolismo, permette di comprendere meglio questo nesso istituzionale. Quest’idea non conduce però a porre dogmaticamente la realtà e l’autonomia del sociale, essa incita piuttosto a praticare “la percezione della storia” che consiste nell’individuare, nel processo stesso dell’idealizzazione sociologica, la donazione carnale e selvaggia del non-presentabile. Lungi dal rappresentare un ritorno allo psicologismo, questa nozione di percezione mira a completare attivamente il movimento interno al simbolico, ovvero la sua incarnazione. (shrink)

One of the prime characteristics of the increasingly technological and interconnected world is the disappearance of analogue experience in all aspects of life. Due to technological invention, we are exposed to a variety of news and information, checking emails in private and business accounts for a significant amount of time each day. Our information-driven minds are constantly occupied by the desire to seek out more information. The ways we engage in music also have changed. We now download mp3 files and (...) listen to music on iPods. People are used to web-based, digitalized music listening.1 It is in this context that many people in the modern world are turning to indigenous forms of music that allow them to.. (shrink)