7 found
Order:
See also
Kristin Primus
University of California, Berkeley
  1. Spinoza’s ‘Infinite Modes’ Reconsidered.Kristin Primus - 2019 - Journal of Modern Philosophy 1 (1):1-29.
    My two principal aims in this essay are interconnected. One aim is to provide a new interpretation of the ‘infinite modes’ in Spinoza’s Ethics. I argue that for Spinoza, God, conceived as the one infinite and eternal substance, is not to be understood as causing two kinds of modes, some infinite and eternal and the rest finite and non-eternal. That there cannot be such a bifurcation of divine effects is what I take the ‘infinite mode’ propositions, E1p21–23, to establish; E1p21–23 (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  2. Spinoza’s Monism I: Ruling Out Eternal-Durational Causation.Kristin Primus - forthcoming - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie.
    In this essay, I suggest that Spinoza acknowledges a distinction between formal reality that is infinite and timelessly eternal and formal reality that is non-infinite (i. e., finite or indefinite) and non-eternal (i. e., enduring). I also argue that if, in Spinoza’s system, only intelligible causation is genuine causation, then infinite, timelessly eternal formal reality cannot cause non-infinite, non-eternal formal reality. A denial of eternal-durational causation generates a puzzle, however: if no enduring thing – not even the sempiternal, indefinite individual (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  3.  87
    Spinoza’s Monism II: A Proposal.Kristin Primus - forthcoming - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie.
    An old question in Spinoza scholarship is how finite, non-eternal things transitively caused by other finite, non-eternal things (i. e., the entities described in propositions like E1p28) are caused by the infinite, eternal substance, given that what follows either directly or indirectly from the divine nature is infinite and eternal (E1p21–23). In “Spinoza’s Monism I,” I pointed out that most commentators answer this question by invoking entities that are indefinite and sempiternal, but argued that perhaps we should not be so (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  4. Scientia Intuitiva in the Ethics.Kristin Primus - 2017 - In The Critical Guide to Spinoza's Ethics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. pp. 169-186.
    **For my more recent views of the third kind of cognition, see my "Finding Oneself in God"** -/- Abstract: Cognition of the third kind, or scientia intuitiva, is supposed to secure beatitudo, or virtue itself (E5p42). But what is scientia intuitiva, and how is it different from (and superior to) reason? I suggest a new answer to this old and vexing question at the core of Spinoza’s project in the Ethics. On my view, Spinoza’s scientia intuitiva resembles Descartes’s scientia more (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  5.  52
    Reflective Knowledge.Kristin Primus - 2021 - In Yitzhak Melamed (ed.), A Companion to Spinoza. Wiley Blackwell. pp. 265-275.
    In this chapter, I first turn to Spinoza’s obscure “ideas of ideas” doctrine and his claim that “as soon as one knows something, one knows that one knows it, and simultaneously knows that one knows that one knows, and so on, to infinity” (E2p21s). On my view, Spinoza, like Descartes, holds that a given idea can be conceived either in terms of what it represents or as an act of thinking: E2p7 (where Spinoza presents his doctrine of the “parallelism” of (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  6.  14
    Part V of Spinoza's Ethics: Intuitive Knowledge, Contentment of Mind, and Intellectual Love of God.Kristin Primus - forthcoming - Philosophy Compass.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. Spinoza and the Cunning of Imagination by Eugene Garver. [REVIEW]Kristin Primus - 2020 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 58 (3):613-614.
    How the arguments of Spinoza's Ethics work might seem obvious. Even if Spinoza's exposition is not perfect, and some suppressed premises might have to be recovered, it seems clear enough that the demonstrations are supposed to show, in Euclidian fashion, how truths about the basic structure of nature—as well as truths about how to live—follow from axioms and uncontroversial definitions. If readers keep their imagination and emotions from sullying their reasoning, they will see the force of the demonstrations and be (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark