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Kristina Rolin [27]Kristina Helena Rolin [1]
  1.  56
    Group Justification in Science.Kristina Rolin - 2010 - Episteme 7 (3):215-231.
    An analysis of group justification enables us to understand what it means to say that a research group is justified in making a claim on the basis of evidence. I defend Frederick Schmitt's (1994) joint account of group justification by arguing against a simple summative account of group justification. Also, I respond to two objections to the joint account, one claiming that social epistemologists should always prefer the epistemic value of making true judgments to the epistemic value of maintaining consistency, (...)
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  2.  72
    Values in Science: The Case of Scientific Collaboration.Kristina Rolin - 2015 - Philosophy of Science 82 (2):157-177.
    Much of the literature on values in science is limited in its perspective because it focuses on the role of values in individual scientists’ decision making, thereby ignoring the context of scientific collaboration. I examine the epistemic structure of scientific collaboration and argue that it gives rise to two arguments showing that moral and social values can legitimately play a role in scientists’ decision to accept something as scientific knowledge. In the case of scientific collaboration some moral and social values (...)
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  3. The Bias Paradox in Feminist Standpoint Epistemology.Kristina Rolin - 2006 - Episteme 3 (1-2):125-136.
    Sandra Harding's feminist standpoint epistemology makes two claims. The thesis of epistemic privilege claims that unprivileged social positions are likely to generate perspectives that are “less partial and less distorted” than perspectives generated by other social positions. The situated knowledge thesis claims that all scientific knowledge is socially situated. The bias paradox is the tension between these two claims. Whereas the thesis of epistemic privilege relies on the assumption that a standard of impartiality enables one to judge some perspectives as (...)
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  4.  68
    Gender and Trust in Science.Kristina Rolin - 2002 - Hypatia 17 (4):95-118.
    : It is now recognized that relations of trust play an epistemic role in science. The contested issue is under what conditions trust in scientific testimony is warranted. I argue that John Hardwig's view of trustworthy scientific testimony is inadequate because it does not take into account the possibility that credibility does not reliably reflect trustworthiness, and because it does not appreciate the role communities have in guaranteeing the trustworthiness of scientific testimony.
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  5.  27
    Standpoint Theory as a Methodology for the Study of Power Relations.Kristina Rolin - 2009 - Hypatia 24 (4):218 - 226.
  6.  35
    Values, Standpoints, and Scientific/Intellectual Movements.Kristina Rolin - 2016 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 56:11-19.
  7.  25
    A Feminist Approach to Values in Science.Kristina Rolin - 2012 - Perspectives on Science 20 (3):320-330.
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  8.  4
    Gender and Trust in Science.Kristina Rolin - 2002 - Hypatia 17 (4):95-120.
    It is now recognized that relations of trust play an epistemic role in science. The contested issue is under what conditions trust in scientific testimony is warranted. I argue that John Hardwig's view of trustworthy scientific testimony is inadequate because it does not take into account the possibility that credibility does not reliably reflect trustworthiness, and because it does not appreciate the role communities have in guaranteeing the trustworthiness of scientific testimony.
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  9.  29
    Can Gender Ideologies Influence the Practice of the Physical Sciences?Kristina Rolin - 1999 - Perspectives on Science 7 (4):510-533.
    : As a response to the critics of feminist science studies I argue that it is possible to formulate empirical hypotheses about gender ideology in the practice of the physical sciences without (1) reinforcing stereotypes about women and mathematical sciences or (2) assuming at the outset that the area of physics under investigation is methodologically suspect. I will then critically evaluate two case studies of gender ideology in the practice of the physical sciences. The case studies fail to show that (...)
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  10. Why Gender is a Relevant Factor in the Social Epistemology of Scientific Inquiry.Kristina Rolin - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (5):880-891.
    In recent years, feminist philosophy of science has been subjected to criticism. The debate has focused on the implications of the underdetermination thesis for accounts of the role of social values in scientific reasoning. My aim here is to offer a different approach. I suggest that feminist philosophers of science contribute to our understanding of science by (1) producing gender‐sensitive analyses of the social dimensions of scientific inquiry and (2) examining the relevance of these analyses for normative issues in philosophy (...)
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  11. Is 'Science as Social' a Feminist Insight?Kristina Rolin - 2002 - Social Epistemology 16 (3):233 – 249.
  12.  9
    Scientific Community: A Moral Dimension.Kristina Rolin - 2017 - Social Epistemology 31 (5):468-483.
    I argue that in epistemically well-designed scientific communities, scientists are united by mutual epistemic responsibilities, and epistemic responsibilities are understood not merely as epistemic but also as moral duties. Epistemic responsibilities can be understood as moral duties because they contribute to the well-being of other human beings by showing respect for them, especially in their capacity as knowers. A moral account of epistemically responsible behaviour is needed to supplement accounts that appeal to scientists’ self-interests or personal epistemic goals. This is (...)
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  13.  21
    Cassandra L. Pinnick;, Noretta Koertge;, Robert F. Almeder . Scrutinizing Feminist Epistemology: An Examination of Gender in Science. 275 Pp., Bibl., Index. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2003. $60 ; $25. [REVIEW]Kristina Rolin - 2006 - Isis 97 (1):197-198.
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  14.  66
    Three Decades of Feminism in Science: From "Liberal Feminism" and "Difference Feminism" to Gender Analysis of Science. [REVIEW]Kristina Rolin - 2004 - Hypatia 19 (1):292 - 296.
  15.  40
    Philosophies of Science/Feminist Theories.Kristina Rolin - 2003 - International Studies in Philosophy 35 (2):139-141.
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  16.  14
    Gender and Physics: Feminist Philosophy and Science Education.Kristina Rolin - 2008 - Science & Education 17 (10):1111-1125.
  17.  5
    Scrutinizing Feminist Epistemology: An Examination Of Gender In Science. [REVIEW]Kristina Rolin - 2006 - Isis: A Journal of the History of Science 97:197-198.
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  18.  1
    More New Essays on Epistemic Agency.Kristina Rolin - 2017 - Metascience 26 (3):463-466.
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  19.  3
    Three Decades of Feminism in Science: From “Liberal Feminism” and “Difference Feminism” to Gender Analysis of Science.Kristina Rolin - 2004 - Hypatia 19 (1):292-296.
  20.  3
    Feminist Philosophy of Economics.Kristina Rolin - 2012 - In Uskali Mäki, Dov M. Gabbay, Paul Thagard & John Woods (eds.), Philosophy of Economics. North Holland. pp. 199.
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  21.  1
    The Bias Paradox in Feminist Standpoint Epistemology.Kristina Rolin - 2006 - Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 3 (1):125-136.
  22. Oikeus.Kristian Klockars, Ilkka Niiniluoto & Kristina Rolin (eds.) - 2010 - University of Helsinki.
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  23. Economics Imperialism and Epistemic Cosmopolitanism.Kristina Rolin - 2015 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 29 (4):413-429.
    The standard view on economics imperialism is that it should be resisted when it is epistemically or morally harmful. I argue that the moral dimension of economics imperialism is in need of further analysis. In my view, economics imperialism is wrong when imperialists violate the epistemic responsibility they have towards scientists working in the discipline that is the target for imperialist explorations. By epistemic responsibility, I refer to a moral duty to justify one’s knowledge claims to a particular audience so (...)
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  24. Sharon Clough : Siblings Under the Skin: Feminism, Social Justice and Analytic Philosophy. [REVIEW]Kristina Rolin - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (2):224-227.
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  25. Scientific Knowledge : A Stakeholder Theory.Kristina Rolin - 2009 - In Jeroen Van Bouwel (ed.), The Social Sciences and Democracy. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 62--80.
  26. Three Decades of Feminism in Science: From?Liberal Feminism? And?Difference Feminism? To Gender Analysis of Science.Kristina Rolin - 2004 - Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy 19 (1):292-296.