28 found
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  1. Perceptual confidence: A Husserlian take.Kristjan Laasik - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy (2):354-364.
    In this paper, I propose a Husserlian account of perceptual confidence, and argue for perceptual confidence by appeal to the self-justification of perceptual experiences. Perceptual confidence is the intriguing view, recently developed by John Morrison, that there are not just doxastic confidences but also perceptual confidences, i.e., confidences as aspect of perceptual experience, enabling us to account, e.g., for the increasing confidence with which we experience an approaching human figure, while telling ourselves, as the viewing distance diminishes, “It looks like (...)
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  2.  75
    Recalcitrant Emotions: A Phenomenological View.Kristjan Laasik - 2020 - Problemos 97.
    In this paper, I sketch an account of emotion that is based on a close analogy with a Husserlian account of perception. I also make use of the approach that I have limned, viz., to articulate a view of the kind of “conflict without contradiction” which may obtain between a recalcitrant emotion and a judgment. My main contention is that CWC can be accounted for by appeal to the rationality of perception and emotion, conceived as responsiveness to experiential evidence. The (...)
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  3. Demystifying mind-independence.Kristjan Laasik - 2023 - Husserl Studies 39 (1):25-45.
    Both John Campbell and Quassim Cassam have argued that we perceptually experience objects as mind-independent (MI), purportedly solving a problem they refer to as “Berkeley’s Puzzle.” In this paper, I will consider the same topic from a Husserlian perspective. In particular, I will clarify the idea of MI and argue that there is, indeed, a sense in which we can perceptually experience objects as MI, while also making objections to Campbell’s and Cassam’s respective arguments to the same effect. In particular, (...)
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  4.  57
    Attitudes and illusions: Herbert Leyendecker’s phenomenology of perception.Kristjan Laasik - 2019 - Continental Philosophy Review 52 (3):279-298.
    In this paper, I discuss aspects of Herbert Leyendecker’s 1913 doctoral dissertation, Towards the Phenomenology of Deceptions, which he defended in 1913 at the University of Munich. Leyendecker was a member of the Munich and Göttingen Phenomenological Circles. In my discussion of his largely neglected views, I explore the connection between his ideas concerning “attitudes”, e.g., of searching for, observing, counting, or working with objects, and the central topic of his text, perceptual illusions, thematized by Leyendecker as a kind of (...)
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  5.  77
    Constitutive strata and the dorsal stream.Kristjan Laasik - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (3):419-435.
    In his paper, “The Dorsal Stream and the Visual Horizon,” Michael Madary argues that “dorsal stream processing plays a main role in the spatiotemporal limits of visual perception, in what Husserl identified as the visual horizon” (Madary 2011, p. 424). Madary regards himself as thereby providing a theoretical framework “sensitive to basic Husserlian phenomenology” (Madary 2011). In particular, Madary draws connections between perceptual anticipations and the experience of the indeterminate spatial margins, on the one hand, and the Husserlian spatiotemporal visual (...)
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  6. Phenomenology and Perceptual Content.Kristjan Laasik - 2019 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 57 (3):402-427.
    Terence Horgan and John Tienson argue that there is phenomenal intentionality, i.e., “a kind of intentionality, pervasive in human mental life, that is constitutively determined by phenomenology alone” (p. 520). However, their arguments are open to two lines of objection. First, Horgan and Tienson are not sufficiently clear as to what kind of content it is that they take to be determined by, or to supervene on, phenomenal character. Second, critics have objected that, for their conclusion to follow, Horgan and (...)
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  7.  90
    Fears as Conscious Perceivings.Kristjan Laasik - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (3):747-760.
    Peter Goldie has argued for the view that the intentionality of emotions is inseparable from their phenomenology, but certain criticisms have revealed his argument as problematic. I will argue that it is possible to address these problems, at least in the case of the emotion of fear, thereby vindicating IPE, by appeal to a Husserlian version of the perceptual account of emotions, centered on the idea that the contents of perceptual experiences are fulfillment conditions. Fulfillment means the achievement of a (...)
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  8.  73
    Visual Field and Empty Space.Kristjan Laasik - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy (published online):403-411.
    In a paper titled “Seeing Empty Space,” Louise Richardson argues for the thesis that seeing empty space involves a certain “structural feature,” namely, “it [s] seeming to one as if some region of space is one in which if some visible object were there, one would see it” (SF; Richardson, 2010, p. 237). I will argue that there is a reason to question whether a structural feature such as SF is needed in order to visually experience empty space. I will (...)
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  9.  15
    Are there irrational perceptual experiences?Kristjan Laasik - 2024 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 23 (4):961-977.
    I argue that there are no irrational visual experiences, if we mean just the experiences that one is having now, but there are irrational visual experiences, if we mean also the experiences that one has had in the past. In other words, I will be arguing that perceptual irrationality is a retrospective phenomenon. So as to further support the first conjunct of my thesis, and to contextualize it among contemporary discussions, I also critique Susanna Siegel’s proposal that one could be (...)
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  10. On perceptual presence.Kristjan Laasik - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (4):439-459.
    In his book Action in Perception, Alva Noë poses what he refers to as the “problem of perceptual presence” and develops his enactive view as solution to the problem. Noë describes the problem of perceptual presence as the problem of how to conceive of the presence of that which, “strictly speaking,” we do not perceive. I argue that the “problem of perceptual presence” is ambiguous between two problems that need to be addressed by invoking very different resources. On the one (...)
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  11.  72
    Visual Contents: Beyond Reach?Kristjan Laasik - 2015 - Philosophical Forum 46 (2):193-204.
    Susanna Siegel argues that visual contents are rich: visual experiences represent a variety of properties, over and above mere colors and shapes, including, notably, kind properties, e.g., the property of being a pine tree. To argue her case, she makes use of the method of phenomenal contrasts, which involves choosing among different explanatory hypotheses to account for phenomenal contrasts between relevant experiences. I will argue that there is reason to question whether the method of phenomenal contrasts is suitable for establishing (...)
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  12. Are there irrational perceptual experiences?Kristjan Laasik - 2024 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 23 (4):961-977.
    I argue that there are no irrational visual experiences, if we mean just the experiences that one is having now, but there are irrational visual experiences, if we mean also the experiences that one has had in the past. In other words, I will be arguing that perceptual irrationality is a retrospective phenomenon. So as to further support the first conjunct of my thesis, and to contextualize it among contemporary discussions, I also critique Susanna Siegel’s proposal that one could be (...)
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  13.  40
    Phenomenological Reflections on Instincts.Kristjan Laasik - 2018 - Studia Phaenomenologica 18:109-128.
    The familiar Husserlian conception of fulfillment involves a contrast between the same content as being represented emptily and then fully, and also the idea that the empty givenness is rightly conceived in terms of anticipations of fullness. Since perceptual experiences provide a paradigmatic case of such fulfillment, I will call it “P-fulfillment.” Additionally, there is also the fulfillment of our wants, wishes, and desires. Taking wants as the paradigmatic case, I will call it “W-fulfillment.” In this paper, I consider the (...)
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  14. Constancy and Constitution.Kristjan Laasik - 2021 - Theoria 87 (3):781-798.
    I argue for the following claims: (1) A core Husserlian account of perceptual constancy needs to be given in terms of indicative future-oriented conditionals but can be complemented by a counterfactual account; (2) thus conceived, constancy is a necessary aspect of content. I speak about a “core Husserlian” account so as to capture certain ideas that Michael Madary has presented as the core of Edmund Husserl's approach to perceptual constancy, viz., that “perception is partly constituted by the continuous interplay of (...)
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  15.  54
    Consciousness and Intentionality: The Face of the Phenomena.Kristjan Laasik - 2016 - Prolegomena 15 (1):5-19.
    In his book The Significance of Consciousness, Charles Siewert argues that some of our phenomenal features are intentional features, because we are assessable for accuracy in virtue of having these phenomenal features. In this paper, I will, first, show that this argument stands in need of disambiguation, and will emerge as problematic on both available readings. Second, I will use Thomas Szanto’s recent ideas to develop a deeper understanding of the difficulties with Siewert’s argument. Szanto emphatically contrasts the Husserlian, constitutive (...)
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  16.  83
    Wilhelm Schapp on Seeing Distant Things.Kristjan Laasik - 2015 - Studia Phaenomenologica 15:395-412.
    In 1909, Wilhelm Schapp, a student of Edmund Husserl’s at Göttingen, defended his doctoral thesis, Beiträge zur Phänomenologie der Wahrnehmung. In this text, Schapp argues that color presents things to the sense of sight by contributing a certain order, or form, that manifests itself in the orderly, predictable variation of perspectives, in the course of experience. He also argues that we do not visually perceive certain distant things, like a house far down in the valley, due to a lack of (...)
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  17.  48
    Perspectivity and Rationality of Perception.Kristjan Laasik - 2021 - Dialectica 75 (1).
    Susanna Schellenberg has presented several arguments for the "situation-dependency thesis" (SDT), i.e. the claim that (visual) perceptual experiences are necessarily situation-dependent, insofar as they represent objects' situation-dependent properties. In my critical response to her paper, I focus on her argument from the "epistemic dependence thesis" (EDT), according to which "perceptual knowledge of intrinsic properties is epistemically dependent on representations of the relevant situation-dependent properties" (Schellenberg 2008, 75). I consider what support she musters for EDT, so as to make an objection (...)
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  18.  15
    Materiaalse looduse konstitutsioon (Katkendid). I. Tlk. Kristjan Laasik.Edmund Husserl & Kristjan Laasik - 2013 - Akadeemia (1):83-102.
    A translation, from German into Estonian, of § 15, and § 18, (a)-(c), of Husserl, E. (1952). Ideen zu einer Reinen Phänomenologie und Phänomenologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch. Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution (Husserliana, Vol. IV). (M. Biemel, Ed.) The Hague, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff. Translated title: “The Constitution of Material Nature.”.
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  19.  19
    Materiaalse looduse konstitutsioon (Katkendid). II. Tlk. Kristjan Laasik.Edmund Husserl & Kristjan Laasik - 2013 - Akadeemia (2):348-357.
    A translation, from German into Estonian, of § 15, and § 18, (a)-(c), of Husserl, E. (1952). Ideen zu einer Reinen Phänomenologie und Phänomenologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch. Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution (Husserliana, Vol. IV). (M. Biemel, Ed.) The Hague, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff. Translated title: “The Constitution of Material Nature.”.
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  20.  15
    Asjade antusest tajus.Kristjan Laasik - 2013 - Akadeemia (1):104-123.
    Edmund Husserl on tuntud kui fenomenoloogia rajaja ning möödunud sajandi ja käesoleva aja mõjukaimaid filosoofe, seda eriti kontinentaalses, kuid viimasel ajal ka analüütilises traditsioonis. Fenomenoloogia on filosoofia suund, mis uurib seda, kuidas esemed on meile kogemuses antud, laskumata metafüüsilistesse spekulatsioonidesse näiteks selle üle, kas materiaalsed asjad on olemas või mitte meie kogemusest sõltumatult. Niisuguse orientatsiooni raames on Husserl andnud panuseid mitmetesse filosoofilistesse teemadesse; käesolevas artiklis keskendun ma tema tajufilosoofiale, visandades tõlgenduse, milles Husserli käsitlus asjade konstitutsioonist ehk antusest tajus on selgitatud (...)
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  21.  56
    Action and Variation in Perception.Kristjan Laasik - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):1364-1375.
    In her paper, ‘Action and Self-location in Perception’, Susanna Schellenberg argues that perceptual experience of an object's intrinsic spatial properties, such as its size and shape, requires a capacity to act. More specifically, Schellenberg argues that, to have a perceptual experience of an object's intrinsic spatial properties, a subject needs to have a certain practical conception of space, or a spatial know-how. That, in turn, requires self-locating representations, which locate the subject, relative to the perceptual object, as a perceiver and (...)
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  22.  50
    Distant Things: A Closer Look.Kristjan Laasik - 2019 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 50 (3):249-263.
    In a discussion of the constitutive role of colour in our visual perceptual experiences, Wilhelm Schapp centrally argues that we cannot visually perceive certain distant things, like a house seen far down in the valley. My main contention is that, in cases relevantly similar to Schapp’s, we do perceptually experience distant things, viz., as drastically “decayed” things, which are part of distant scenes. In doing so, we adopt towards them a kind of conservative “attitude.” The ideas of decay and scenicness (...)
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  23.  47
    Presence by Degrees.Kristjan Laasik - 2018 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 25 (9-10):125-138.
    In this paper, I argue for two claims. First, Alva Noë’s discussions of perceptual presence contain an ambiguity between what I refer to as ‘presence as absence’ (PA) and ‘virtual presence’ (VP). This ambiguity emerges in Noë’s solution to ‘the problem of perceptual presence’, or the problem of how to account for our perceptual experience of that which we ‘strictly speaking’ are not seeing. Second, his account of presence by degrees, i.e. his radical claim that many distant, out-of-view objects are (...)
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  24.  2
    The Intentionality of Perception: An Updated Husserlian Approach.Kristjan Laasik - 2020 - Hangzhou, China: Zhejiang University Press.
    In my book, I argue that there is reason to adopt a kind of updated Husserlian approach to perceptual intentionality, viz., based on the idea that perceptual contents are fulfillment conditions. Drawing upon the ideas of the renowned German phenomenologist Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), I bring center-stage the notion of perceptual fulfillment, a kind of non-inferential confirmation, which may take place as part the ongoing perceptual experience. Thus, when looking at a red tomato, I may anticipate that if I turn it (...)
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  25. Corijn van Mazijk: Perception and reality in Kant, Husserl, and McDowell, New York: Routledge, 2020, 192 pp., ISBN 978-0-367-44180-7, ISBN 978-1-003-01022-7. [REVIEW]Kristjan Laasik - 2021 - Continental Philosophy Review 55 (1):119-123.
    Corijn van Mazijk’s book is a critical exploration of the relations between Immanuel Kant’s, Edmund Husserl’s, and John McDowell’s transcendental philosophies. His primary aim is not to conduct a historical study, but “to show that history provides us with viable alternatives to McDowell’s theory of our perceptual access to reality.” The book covers a variety of McDowellian themes: the Myth of the Given, the space of reasons vs. the space of nature, conceptualism, disjunctivism, naturalism, and realism—uncovering the roots of McDowell’s (...)
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  26. Review of Michael Madary’s Visual Phenomenology. [REVIEW]Kristjan Laasik - 2021 - Husserl Studies 38 (1):97-105.
    In his remarkable book, Visual Phenomenology, Michael Madary argues for the claim that “visual perception is an ongoing process of anticipation and fulfillment” (Madary 2017, p. 3), by drawing upon lines of evidence from Husserlian phenomenology, philosophy of perception, and the cognitive sciences. While he considers Edmund Husserl as a major influence upon his ideas, he does not aim to adhere to Husserl’s views in every regard, but instead to develop Husserl-inspired views of his own, muster support for them, and (...)
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  27.  79
    Galileo’s Error: Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness London: Rider Books, Penguin Random House, 2019, 256 pp. ISBN: 9781846046018. [REVIEW]Kristjan Laasik - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (9-10):252-257.
    In his new book, Galileo’s Error: Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness, Philip Goff defends panpsychism, the view that ‘consciousness is a fundamental and ubiquitous feature of the physical world’ (2019, p. 23), arguing that the view is superior to the dualist and materialist alternatives. Since Goff regards the study of consciousness as an interdisciplinary project, his panpsychist account is concerned with re-shaping the science of consciousness, and conceived as dependent upon the deliverances of such a reformed science. Goff (...)
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  28.  60
    Norman Sieroka: Leibniz, Husserl, and the Brain. [REVIEW]Kristjan Laasik - 2015 - Phenomenological Reviews.
    Norman Sieroka’s book is about “the systematic, structural relations between phenomenological and (neuro)physiological aspects of perception, consciousness, and time, with a specific focus on hearing” (p. 4), based on Leibniz’s and Husserl’s views. While Sieroka displays a great depth of knowledge in his discussions of these two philosophers, his main aims are not exegetic, but consist, rather, in casting new light on the said philosophical and interdisciplinary issues. However, the scope of his interpretative project is ambitious. There is, on the (...)
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