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  1. A Defence of Epistemic Consequentialism.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij & Jeffrey Dunn - 2014 - Philosophical Quarterly 64 (257):541-551.
    Epistemic consequentialists maintain that the epistemically right (e.g., the justified) is to be understood in terms of conduciveness to the epistemic good (e.g., true belief). Given the wide variety of epistemological approaches that assume some form of epistemic consequentialism, and the controversies surrounding consequentialism in ethics, it is surprising that epistemic consequentialism remains largely uncontested. However, in a recent paper, Selim Berker has provided arguments that allegedly lead to a ‘rejection’ of epistemic consequentialism. In the present paper, it is shown (...)
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  2.  10
    A Defence of Epistemic Consequentialism.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij & J. Dunn - unknown
    Epistemic consequentialists maintain that the epistemically right is to be understood in terms of conduciveness to the epistemic good. Given the wide variety of epistemological approaches that assume some form of epistemic consequentialism, and the controversies surrounding consequentialism in ethics, it is surprising that epistemic consequentialism remains largely uncontested. However, in a recent paper, Selim Berker has provided arguments that allegedly lead to a?rejection? of epistemic consequentialism. In the present paper, it is shown that reliabilism—the most prominent form of epistemic (...)
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  3. In Defense of Veritistic Value Monism.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (1):19-40.
    Recently, veritistic value monism, i.e. the idea that true belief is unique in being of fundamental epistemic value, has come under attack by pluralist philosophers arguing that it cannot account fully for the domain of epistemic value. However, the relevant arguments fail to establish any such thing. For one thing, there is a presumption of monism due to considerations about axiological parsimony. While such a presumption would be defeated by evidence that the relevant kind of monism cannot account fully for (...)
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  4. Is Reliabilism a Form of Consequentialism?Jeffrey Dunn & Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly.
    Reliabilism -- the view that a belief is justified iff it is produced by a reliable process -- is often characterized as a form of consequentialism. Recently, critics of reliabilism have suggested that, since a form of consequentialism, reliabilism condones a variety of problematic trade-offs, involving cases where someone forms an epistemically deficient belief now that will lead her to more epistemic value later. In the present paper, we argue that the relevant argument against reliabilism fails because it equivocates. While (...)
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  5.  70
    Epistemic Paternalism: A Defence.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - 2013 - Palgrave-Macmillan.
    We know that we are fallible creatures, liable to cognitive bias. But we also have a strong and stubborn tendency to overestimate our reasoning capacities. This presents a problem for any attempt to help us reason in more accurate ways: While we might see the point of others heeding intellectual advice and relying on reasoning aids, each and every one of us will tend not to see the point of doing so ourselves. The present book argues that the solution to (...)
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  6.  83
    Why We Cannot Rely on Ourselves for Epistemic Improvement.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):276-296.
    There is something very appealing about the idea that we are epistemic agents. One reason—if not the main reason—is that, while we are undoubtedly fallible creatures, us being epistemic agents that do things means that it might just be within our power to improve and thereby do better. One important way in which we would want to improve is in relation to our well-established tendency for cognitive bias. Still, the proper role of epistemic agency in us avoiding or correcting for (...)
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  7. Getting It Right.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij & Stephen R. Grimm - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (2):329-347.
    Truth monism is the idea that only true beliefs are of fundamental epistemic value. The present paper considers three objections to truth monism, and argues that, while the truth monist has plausible responses to the first two objections, the third objection suggests that truth monism should be reformulated. On this reformulation, which we refer to as accuracy monism, the fundamental epistemic goal is accuracy, where accuracy is a matter of “getting it right.” The idea then developed is that accuracy is (...)
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  8. Moderate Epistemic Expressivism.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):337-357.
    The present paper argues that there are at least two equally plausible yet mutually incompatible answers to the question of what is of non-instrumental epistemic value. The hypothesis invoked to explain how this can be so—moderate epistemic expressivism—holds that (a) claims about epistemic value express nothing but commitments to particular goals of inquiry, and (b) there are at least two viable conceptions of those goals. It is shown that such expressivism survives recent arguments against a more radical form of epistemic (...)
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  9. Why Deliberative Democracy is (Still) Untenable.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - 2012 - Public Affairs Quarterly 26 (3):199-220.
    A common objection to deliberative democracy is that available evidence on public ignorance makes it unlikely that social deliberation among the public is a process likely to yield accurate outputs. The present paper considers—and ultimately rejects—two responses to this objection. The first response is that the correct conclusion to draw from the evidence is simply that we must work harder to ensure that the deliberative process improves the deliberators’ epistemic situation. The main problem for this response is that there are (...)
     
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  10.  68
    The Social Virtue of Blind Deference.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (3):545-582.
    Recently, it has become popular to account for knowledge and other epistemic states in terms of epistemic virtues. The present paper focuses on an epistemic virtue relevant when deferring to others in testimonial contexts. It is argued that, while many virtue epistemologists will accept that epistemic virtue can be exhibited in cases involving epistemically motivated hearers, carefully vetting their testimonial sources for signs of untrustworthiness prior to deferring, anyone who accepts that also has to accept that an agent may exhibit (...)
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  11.  6
    The Case for Modelled Democracy.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - forthcoming - Episteme:1-22.
    The fact that most of us are ignorant on politically relevant matters presents a problem for democracy. In light of this, some have suggested that we should impose epistemic constraints on democratic participation, and specifically that the franchise be restricted along competency lines – a suggestion that in turn runs the risk of violating a long-standing condition on political legitimacy to the effect that legitimate political arrangements cannot be open to reasonable objections. The present paper therefore outlines a way to (...)
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  12.  80
    Judgment and Agency, by Ernest Sosa: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, Pp. Vi + 269, £25. [REVIEW]Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (1):196-199.
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  13.  62
    Epistemic Consequentialism.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij & Jeff Dunn (eds.) - 2018 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    An important issue in epistemology concerns the source of epistemic normativity. Epistemic consequentialism maintains that epistemic norms are genuine norms in virtue of the way in which they are conducive to epistemic value, whatever epistemic value may be. So, for example, the epistemic consequentialist might say that it is a norm that beliefs should be consistent, in that holding consistent beliefs is the best way to achieve the epistemic value of accuracy. Thus epistemic consequentialism is structurally similar to the family (...)
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  14. Procedural Justice and the Problem of Intellectual Deference.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - 2014 - Episteme 11 (4):423-442.
    It is a well-established fact that we tend to underestimate our susceptibility to cognitive bias on account of overconfidence, and thereby often fail to listen to intellectual advice aimed at reducing such bias. This is the problem of intellectual deference. The present paper considers this problem in contexts where educators attempt to teach students how to avoid bias for purposes of instilling epistemic virtues. It is argued that recent research in social psychology suggests that we can come to terms with (...)
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  15. Against The Bifurcation Of Virtue.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):291-301.
    It has become customary in the virtue epistemological literature to distinguish between responsibilist and reliabilist virtue theories. More recently, certain problems affecting the former have prompted epistemologists to suggest that this distinction in virtue theory maps on to a distinction in virtue, specifically between character and faculty virtue. I argue that we lack good reason to bifurcate virtue in this manner, and that this moreover counts in favor of the virtue reliabilist.
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  16. The Epistemic Benefits of Democracy: A Critical Perspective.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - 2016 - In N. J. L. L. Pedersen, M. Fricker, P. Graham & D. Henderson (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology.
  17.  24
    Is Democracy an Option for the Realist?Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - 2018 - Critical Review 30 (1-2):1-12.
    In Democracy for Realists, Christopher Achen and Larry Bartels argue that the depressingly well-established fact that people are woefully ignorant on politically relevant matters renders democratic ideals mere “fairy tales.” However, this iconoclasm stands in deep tension with the prescriptions they themselves end up offer-ing towards the end of the book, which coincide to a surprising extent with those that have been offered by democrats for decades. This is a problem because, if we take seriously the type of data that (...)
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  18. Censoring Online Bullshit.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - forthcoming - Iride: Filosofia e Discussione Pubblica.
    Online bullshit consists in online claims offered by speakers misrepresenting themselves as being concerned about the truth or falsity of what they’re saying. I’ll argue that if some practice is epistemically detrimental, we have pro tanto reason to censor it; a practice of OB is epistemically detrimental; and we thereby have pro tanto reason to censor such a practice. After having considered, and rejected, the three most promising arguments to the effect that is either false, or the reasons involved tend (...)
     
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  19. A General Theory of Domination and Justice. By Frank Lovett.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (246):190-192.
    The review argues that Lovett’s theory of domination suffers from a problem. Lovett is aware of the problem and bites a fairly large bullet in response to it. What he does not seem aware of is that the problem can be avoided by opting for an account of welfare that he unfortunately ignores, despite the fact that it would serve his purposes well.
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  20.  84
    Meno and the Monist.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - 2013 - Metaphilosophy 44 (1-2):157-170.
    Recent critiques of veritistic value monism, or the idea that true belief is unique in being of fundamental epistemic value, typically invoke a claim about the surplus value of knowledge over mere true belief, in turn traced back to Plato's Meno. However, to the extent Plato at all defends a surplus claim in the Meno, it differs from that figuring in contemporary discussions with respect to both its scope and the kind of value at issue, and is under closer scrutiny (...)
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  21.  71
    Rational Trust.Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen, Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij & Klemens Kappel - 2014 - Synthese 191 (9):1953-1955.
  22.  40
    People Listen to People Who Listen: Instilling Virtues of Deference.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - 2015 - In Christian Miller (ed.), The Character Project: New Perspectives in Psychology, Philosophy, and Theology. Oxford University Press.
    We often fail to defer to sources who know what they’re talking about. When doing so consistently, we fail to manifest a virtue of deference. This is because epistemic virtues are dispositions that promote epistemic goals, and knowledge is an epistemic goal. The present paper makes two points about how to instill this virtue. First, virtues of deference can be instilled by promoting compliance with requests on the part of good sources to be listened to, since listening is conducive to (...)
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  23.  7
    Esoteric Reliabilism.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - forthcoming - Episteme:1-21.
    Survey data suggest that many philosophers are reliabilists, in believing that beliefs are justified iff produced by a reliable process. This is bad news if reliabilism is true. Empirical results suggest that a commitment to reliable belief-formation leads to overconfident second-guessing of reliable heuristics. Hence, a widespread belief in reliabilism is likely to be epistemically detrimental by the reliabilist's own standard. The solution is a form of two-level epistemic consequentialism, where an esoteric commitment to reliabilism will be appropriate for an (...)
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  24. The Epistemology of Inclusiveness.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij, Klemens Kappel & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2013 - Synthese 190 (7):1185-1188.
  25. What’s so Good About a Wise and Knowledgeable Public?Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (2):199-216.
    Political philosophers have been concerned for some time with the epistemic caliber of the general public, qua the body that is, ultimately, tasked with political decision-making in democratic societies. Unfortunately, the empirical data paints a pretty dismal picture here, indicating that the public tends to be largely ignorant on the issues relevant to governance. To make matters worse, social psychological research on how ignorance tends to breed overconfidence gives us reason to believe that the public will not only lack knowledge (...)
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  26.  80
    Is There a Problem With Cognitive Outsourcing?Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):7-24.
    To what extent can we rely on others for information without such reliance becoming epistemically problematic? In this paper, this question is addressed in terms of a specific form of reliance: cognitive outsourcing. Cognitive outsourcing involves handing over (outsourcing) one’s information collection and processing (the cognitive) to others. The specific question that will be asked about such outsourcing is if there is an epistemic problem about cognitive outsourcing as such. To ask if there is an epistemic problem with x for (...)
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  27.  35
    A Luxury of the Understanding: On the Value of True Belief. [REVIEW]Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - 2018 - Philosophical Review 127 (2):237-240.
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  28.  24
    Self-Resolving Information Markets: An Experimental Case Study.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij & N. Williams - forthcoming - Journal of Prediction Markets.
    On traditional information markets, rewards are tied to the occurrence of events external to the market, such as some particular candidate winning an election. For that reason, they can only be used when it is possible to wait for some external event to resolve the market. In cases involving long time-horizons or counterfactual events, this is not an option. Hence, the need for a self-resolving information market, resolved with reference to factors internal to the market itself. In the present paper, (...)
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  29.  54
    The Epistemic Virtue of Deference.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - forthcoming - In Heather Battaly (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Virtue Epistemology. Routledge.
    To the consequentialist, virtues are dispositions producing beneficial consequences. After outlining a consequentialist theory of epistemic virtue, I offer an account of an epistemic virtue of deference, manifested to the extent that we are disposed to defer to, and only to, people who speak the truth. I then look at what informed sources can do to instill such virtues of deference, in light of social-psychological evidence on compliance. It turns out that one way of doing so is through a complementary (...)
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  30.  68
    Review of Colin McGinn, Truth by Analysis: Games, Names, and Philosophy (OUP 2012). [REVIEW]Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - 2012 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
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  31.  89
    Review of Robert B. Talisse, Democracy and Moral Conflict (Cambridge UP, 2009). [REVIEW]Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - 2011 - Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):666-668.
    The review argues that Talisse's epistemic defense of democracy in his "Democracy and Moral Conflict," albeit novel and interesting, falls prey to an epistemic analogue of the problem of reasonable moral pluralism that Rawls famously posed for moral justifications of democracy.
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  32.  55
    Epistemic Perfectionism and Liberal Democracy.Jamie T. Kelly & Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - 2013 - Social Philosophy Today 29:49-58.
    Robert Talisse’s recent attempt to justify liberal democracy in epistemic terms is in many ways a breath of fresh air. However, in the present paper we argue that his defense faces two inter-related problems. The first problem pertains to his defense of liberalism, and owes to the fact that a commitment to the folk-epistemological norms in terms of which he makes his case does not commit one to partaking in liberal institutions. Consequently, our (alleged) commitment to the relevant epistemic norms (...)
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  33.  66
    Review of Robert B. Talisse's Democracy and Moral Conflict. [REVIEW]Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - 2011 - Philosophical Quarterly.
  34.  41
    Information Markets.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - 2016 - In D. Coady, K. Lippert-Rasmussen & K. Brownlee (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Applied Philosophy.
  35.  19
    Epistemic Perfectionism and Liberal Democracy.Jamie T. Kelly & Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - 2013 - Social Philosophy Today 29:49-58.
    Robert Talisse’s recent attempt to justify liberal democracy in epistemic terms is in many ways a breath of fresh air. However, in the present paper we argue that his defense faces two inter-related problems. The first problem pertains to his defense of liberalism, and owes to the fact that a commitment to the folk-epistemological norms in terms of which he makes his case does not commit one to partaking in liberal institutions. Consequently, our commitment to the relevant epistemic norms does (...)
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  36. Magkänslans Anatomi.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - 2010 - Bonniers Bokförlag.
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  37.  18
    Post-Brexit Immigration Policy: Reconciling Public Perceptions with Economic Evidence.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij, H. Rolfe, N. Hudson-Sharp & J. Runge - 2018 - National Institute of Social and Economic Research.
    Existing research shows consistently high levels of concern among people in the UK over the scale of immigration and its impact on jobs, wages and services. At the same time, that same body of research does not provide much in the way of detail about the nature of these concerns. This is partly because much of the data is from opinion polls which say little about the priorities and perspectives that underlie the aggregate numbers. Moreover, very little research has been (...)
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