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  1. James Robert Brown: Thought Experiments and Platonism. Part Two.Nancy J. Nersessian, Dunja Jutronic, Ksenija Puskaric, Nenad Miscevic, Andreas K. A. Georgiou & James Robert Brown - 2007 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 7 (20):125-268.
     
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    Crane on Intentionality and Consciousness: A Few Questions.Ksenija Puskaric - 2004 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (11):219-222.
    The paper concentrates on issues of intentionality subdivided into four particular sub-issues. First, is there an intentional object of depression and of states like depression? Second, according to the strong intentionalist view defended by T. Crane, what it is like to be in a mental state is fixed by the mental state’s mode and its content; but mode is not sufficiently well-defined in his analysis. Third, how can the intentionalist explain phenomenological richness of conscious mental states? Crane appeals to non-conceptual (...)
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    Brown and Berkeley.Ksenija Puškarić - 2007 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 7 (2):177-180.
    For J. Brown the essential feature of thought experiments is that they mobilize our intuition; the way they teach positive lessons to cognizers is by means of the intuition mobilized. The paper presents a problem for Brown with the help of a famous TE as counterexample. It argues that Berkeley’s master argument is a philosophical thought experiment that lacks a feature typical of platonic thought experiments -- intuitive grasp. If Berkeley’s argument is a thought experiment,as I’ve attempted to show, then (...)
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    Critical Notice.Ksenija Puškarić - 2007 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):103-112.
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    Rey and the Projectivist Account.Ksenija Puškarić - 2005 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 5 (3):441-445.
    The paper discusses Rey’s projectivism. It offers an argument against it and in favor of the reliability of introspection. In short, if it is fallible, then at least sometimes it has to be veridical. Therefore, introspection can’t be systematically deceptive. But then, some introspective beliefs are true and at least some phenomenal conscious states exist.
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    Crane on Intentionality and Consciousness.Ksenija Puškarić - 2004 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):219-222.
    The paper concentrates on issues of intentionality subdivided into four particular sub-issues. First, is there an intentional object of depression and of states like depression? Second, according to the strong intentionalist view defended by T. Crane, what it is like to be in a mental state is fixed by the mental state’s mode and its content; but mode is not sufficiently well-defined in his analysis. Third, how can the intentionalist explain phenomenological richness of conscious mental states? Crane appeals to non-conceptual (...)
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    Cartesian Idea of God as the Infinite.Ksenija Puškarić - 2012 - Filozofia 67 (4):282.
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  8. Duncan Pritchard, Epistemic Luck.Ksenija Puškarić - 2007 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 19:103-112.
     
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