This article investigates Hegel's later theory of perception and cognition, identifying and analysing its general assumptions about the relation among the mind's activities. These often unremarked upon assumptions, I claim, continue to underwrite recent interpretive controversies. I demonstrate how a correct understanding of such assumptions points us toward an alternative interpretation of Hegel's model of the mind. I argue that this new model changes how we understand (a) Hegel's later notion of ‘non-conceptual content’ and (b) his distinction between human and (...) animal minds—two areas that constitute the fault line dividing interpretations of late Hegel. To isolate the relevant assumptions, I use Matthew Boyle's influential conceptual distinction between ‘additive’ and ‘transformative’ models of rationality. I demonstrate that Hegel himself addresses the basic issues characterizing this distinction and clarify how approaching his work in these terms presents considerable interpretative and conceptual advantages, including allowing us to defend the position that Hegel adopts a ‘transformative’ framework of mind. To support this argument, this paper closely analyses Hegel's treatment of sensation (Empfindung), which has not yet been systematically addressed by scholars. I show how sensation can be best understood as part of Hegel's later ‘transformative’ framework for cognition. I also show how this framework can be extended to other parts of Hegel's theory. (shrink)

This paper investigates Hegel’s account of the animal organism as it is presented in the Philosophy of Nature, with a special focus on its normative implications. I argue that the notion of “organisation” is fundamental to Hegel’s theory of animal normativity. The paper starts by showing how a Hegelian approach takes up the scientific image of organism and assigns a basic explanatory role to the notion of “organisation” in its understanding living beings. Moving from this premise, the paper turns to (...) the group of accounts in contemporary theoretical biology known as “organisational accounts”, which offer a widely debated strategy for naturalizing teleology and normativity in organisms. As recent scholarship recognizes, these accounts explicitly rely on insights from Kant and Post-Kantianism. I make the historical and conceptual argument that Hegel’s view of the organism shares several basic commitments with OAs, especially regarding the notion of “organisational closure”. I assess the account of normativity that such accounts advance and its implications for how we approach Hegel. Finally, I argue that the notion of “organisation” is more fundamental to Hegel’s theory of animal normativity than the Aristotelian notion of “Gattung” or “species”, which by contrast appears derivative – at least in the Philosophy of Nature and the Lectures – and does not play the central role in his account maintained by some scholars. (shrink)

This edited volume systematically addresses the connection between Wilfrid Sellars and the history of modern philosophy, exploring both the content and method of this relationship. It intends both to analyze Sellars’s position in relation to singular thinkers of the modern tradition, and to inquire into Sellars’s understanding of philosophy as a field in reflective and constructive conversation with its past. The chapters in Part I cover Sellars’s interpretation and use of Descartes, Leibniz, Hume, Kant and Hegel. Part II features essays (...) on his relationship with Peirce, Frege, Carnap, Wittgenstein, American pragmatism, behaviorism and American realism, particularly his father, Roy Wood. Sellars and the History of Modern Philosophy features original contributions by many of the most renowned Sellars scholars throughout the world. It offers an exhaustive survey of Sellars’s views on the historical antecedents and metaphilosophical aspects of his thought. (shrink)

This paper reconstructs and defends a Sellarsian approach to “sensation” that allows us to avoid mythological conceptions of it. Part I reconstructs and isolates Sellars’s argument for “sensation,” situating his adverbial interpretation of the notion within his broader theory of perception. Part II positions Sellars’s views vis-à-vis current conversations on adverbalism. In particular, it focuses on the Many Property Problem, which is traditionally considered the main obstacle to adverbialism. After reconstructing Sellars’s response to this problem, I demonstrate that his position (...) is compatible with some current strategies to solving it and can be developed along similar lines. Finally, part III addresses how a Sellarsian adverbial approach productively accounts for the phenomenal properties of experience often understood to fall under the notion of “sensation”. The paper therefore shows how isolating Sellars’s argument can yield a non-problematic conception of sensation. Indeed, the argument on which I focus offers a form of direct realism compatible with recent forms of “new adverbialism”. Although my view remains Sellarsian, to defend it I maintain that some Sellarsian claims about sensation should be resisted as not logically entailed by his argument. (shrink)

This new critical guide to Hegel’s Philosophy of Spirit aims to orient readers in the text as well as to “present and assess the state of art in understanding and evaluating” it. This is no easy task. One reason why is the multiple meanings Geist takes on in the text and the variety of topics Hegel addresses, which range from embodiment to the unconscious, from cognitive psychology to bodily expressions, from race, madness, and habit to practical philosophy. Indeed, for Hegel (...) morality, the state, art, religion, and philosophy all belong to the spiritual domain, and this makes the Philosophy of Spirit, as Hegel himself acknowledges, “the sublimest and most difficult” part of his system (Encyclopedia of the... (shrink)

This paper explores Sellars’ and Hegel’s treatment of ‘sensation’ – a notion that plays a central role in the reflections of both authors but which has garnered little scholarly attention. To disentangle the issues surrounding the notion and elaborate its role, function, and fate in their thought, I begin with a methodological question: what kind of philosophical argument leads Sellars and Hegel to introduce the concept of ‘sensation’ into their systems? Distinguishing between their two argumentative approaches, I maintain that Hegel (...) offers what I broadly label a ‘transcendental’ argument for ‘sensation,’ which he presents in the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit and in the corresponding Lectures, whereas Sellars introduces the notion of sensation for what I term empirically ‘explanatory’ reasons. Next, I closely analyze Hegel’s and Sellars’ theories of sensation to produce a textually supported and conceptually coherent reading of their views on the notion. To clarify my methodological distinction and its stakes in Hegel’s and Sellars’ I will reference Lewis’ notion of the given. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

Cet article s’interroge sur ce qu’est l’ἀριθμητική τέχνη visée par Sextus dans le Contre les arithméticiens. Après avoir rappelé brièvement le contenu de M IV, on examine la nature de cette discipline. Une fois clarifiée la question de savoir en quoi consistait l’ἀριθμητική τέχνη dans l’Antiquité – et donc ce que visait Sextus dans M IV –, on examine son rapport avec les autres disciplines critiquées par Sextus dans le Contre les Professeurs. Cette enquête mène à mettre en lumière une (...) importante présupposition implicite dans l’attitude de Sextus à l’égard des sciences. (shrink)

The author aim is to explore the role Sellars has played in shaping the current discussion of Hegel.

This interview was carried out on 13 December 2018 as Michael Williams was in Porto for a meeting of the Contextualism Network organised by the MLAG – Mind, Language, and Action Research Group (Institute of Philosophy of the University of Porto). We would like to thank him for his willingness to reply to our questions. -/- .

Dans la première partie de son article « Une morale est-elle compatible avec le scepticisme? », Jules Vuillemin propose une interprétation du scepticisme de Pyrrhon d’Élis et s’interroge sur sa compatibilité avec une vie morale. La présente contribution s’attache à resituer la lecture de Vuillemin dans l’histoire du pyrrhonisme ainsi que dans les débats récents à son sujet, et à la discuter en la comparant au néo-pyrrhonisme de Sextus Empiricus. À suivre Vuillemin, Pyrrhon suspend son jugement par rapport à tout, (...) y compris ses impressions. Cette suspension universelle provoquerait une impassibilité totale et fournirait une ligne de conduite, mais serait assez difficile à adopter. Nous suggérons que suspendre son jugement sur ses propres impressions n’est pas difficile, mais impossible ; que la façon dont, selon Vuillemin, cette suspension fournirait au sceptique une ligne de conduite implique une contradiction ; et qu’il existe une autre façon d’expliquer comment le sceptique peut, dans certaines limites, maintenir une ligne de conduite. (shrink)

In recent years, so-called organizational accounts (OA) have emerged in theoretical biology as a powerful, viable strategy for naturalizing teleology and normativity. In the wake of the theoretical tradition of autopoiesis and biological autonomy, OA notably propose a new meaning for the notion of “organization,” which they claim to be capable, among other things, of grounding objective and observer-independent normative teleological ascriptions. In this paper, I focus on this last claim, asking “How are ‘organization’ and ‘normativity’ conceptually connected?” The basic (...) insight mobilized by the OA framework to answer this question is most often expressed as a counterfactual argument regarding the “conditions of existence” of organized entities. In this paper, I show that careful scrutiny of this core OA argument reveals a substantial shortcoming. To make this point, I first analyze how the OA framework positions the idea of “conditions of existence” via the notions of “dependence”, “constraint,” and “closure.” Second, I consider various possible interpretations of the OA counterfactual argument grounding norms. I conclude that the implications of this argument do not enable OA to deliver what they promise, i.e., a straightforward link between organization and norms. I argue that a different strategy is needed to capture the basic organizational intuition about biological normativitiy and suggest that a stipulative route might be better suitable to that end. (shrink)

After Science and Metaphysics, Sellars’ encounter with Kant was characterized by acknowledging and working out the role played by imagination in perceptual experience. The mediating imaginative function provided him with a somewhat new and more Kantian account of the relationship between concepts and intuitions. After stressing the peculiar theoretical and exegetical background of Sellars’ approach to Kant – his project of “translating” his own ideas in the lingua franca of Kantianism – which has been influential in current normative interpretations of (...) Kant, I will raise the following question: could imagination represent a solution to the Kant-Sellars problem of a «happy medium» between a conceptual-normative and a non-conceptual side of experience? As a mediating device, I will then suggest, imagination can be seen as a third way between two well-known theoretical strategies for facing Sellars’ dichotomy adopted by two prominent left-wing Sellarsians: doing without intuitions (Brandom) or fusing concept and intuitions (McDowell). Both of these strategies have given rise to respective interpretations of Kant. By suggesting a third way, I will also gesture toward a possible role for imagination within a conceptual account of intuition à la McDowell. (shrink)

Le volume offre huit articles sur le scepticisme pyrrhonien. Les essais, de la plume de M. Bonazzi, T. O’Keefe, J. Warren, F. Grgić, H. Thorsrud, S. Marchand, D. E. Machuca et O. Bueno, sont tous en anglais. Précédés d’une préface, d’une notice sur les auteurs et d’une brève introduction, ils sont suivis d’index des noms propres, des passages et des sujets. Chaque contribution est munie d’une bibliographie. Les deux premiers articles sont consacrés à la section des Esquisses Pyrrhoniennes (PH...

Dans la première partie de son article « Une morale est-elle compatible avec le scepticisme? », Jules Vuillemin propose une interprétation du scepticisme de Pyrrhon d’Élis et s’interroge sur sa compatibilité avec une vie morale. La présente contribution s’attache à resituer la lecture de Vuillemin dans l’histoire du pyrrhonisme ainsi que dans les débats récents à son sujet, et à la discuter en la comparant au néo-pyrrhonisme de Sextus Empiricus. À suivre Vuillemin, Pyrrhon suspend son jugement par rapport à tout, (...) y compris ses impressions. Cette suspension universelle provoquerait une impassibilité totale et fournirait une ligne de conduite, mais serait assez difficile à adopter. Nous suggérons que suspendre son jugement sur ses propres impressions n’est pas difficile, mais impossible ; que la façon dont, selon Vuillemin, cette suspension fournirait au sceptique une ligne de conduite implique une contradiction ; et qu’il existe une autre façon d’expliquer comment le sceptique peut, dans certaines limites, maintenir une ligne de conduite. (shrink)

Cet article propose une vue d’ensemble de la doctrine des Intermédiaires mathématiques (τὰ μεταξύ) qu’Aristote attribue à Platon dans sa Métaphysique, des objections qu’Aristote lui adresse et des questions philosophiques qu’elle soulève. Suivant Aristote, Platon avance que les vérités de la géométrie et de l’arithmétique ne peuvent pas porter sur des objets perceptibles ni sur des Formes, mais doivent porter sur une troisième classe d’entités intermédiaires entre les deux. Je soutiens que la critique d’Aristote la plus efficace de cette doctrine (...) montre que les raisons avancées en faveur de l’existence des Intermédiaires par les Platoniciens ne sont pas concluantes, mais ne peut pas montrer qu’ils n’existent pas. En m’appuyant sur quelques remarques de David Ross sur la démarche d’Aristote, je soutiens également que, s’il est vrai que le fait que toute science est caractérisée par des propositions de la forme « Tout F est G » n’implique pas qu’elle porte sur des entités intermédiaires, il peut y avoir des raisons pour accepter leur existence eu égard à une science mathématique en particulier, à savoir la géométrie. (shrink)

This collection of essays investigates the notions of life, living organisms, and human nature in Classical German Philosophy from a historical and conceptual perspective. Its 19 chapters move from the peculiarities of organic life to the peculiarities of the distinctly human life form and discuss the strengths and weaknesses of naturalistic accounts of life. In light of the growing interest in nature within current philosophical debates, the book provides an overview of what the philosophical epoch of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Humboldt, (...) the Romantics, Hegel, and others can contribute to our understanding of life today. The collection of essays represents a plurality of approaches that reflects the pluralism of the tradition itself – highlighting the liveliness and polyphonic nature of the issues at stake and the ways in which they were approached in post-Kantian thought.In combining historical and philosophical investigation, the collection constitutes a unique resource for scholars and graduate students working in various areas related to the study of nature in philosophy, contemporary theories of science, and the humanities more generally. (shrink)

This book offers the first comprehensive exploration of the relevance of naturalism and theories of nature in Classical German Philosophy. It presents new readings from internationally renowned scholars on Kant, Jacobi, Goethe, the Romantic tradition, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and Marx that highlight the significance of conceptions of nature and naturalism in Classical German Philosophy for contemporary concerns. The collection presents an inclusive view: it goes beyond the usual restricted focus on single thinkers to encompass the tradition as a whole, prompting (...) dialogue among scholars interested in different authors and areas. It thus illuminates the post-Kantian tradition in a new, wider sense. The chapters also mobilize a productive perspective at the intersection of philosophy and history by combining careful textual and historical analysis with argument-based philosophizing. Overall, the book challenges the stereotypical view that Classical German Philosophy offers at best only an idealistic, one-sided, anachronistic, and theological view of nature. It invites readers to put traditional views in dialogue with current discussions of nature and naturalism. Nature and Naturalism in Classical German Philosophy will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working on Classical German Philosophy, 19th-Century Philosophy, and contemporary perspectives on naturalism. (shrink)

En 2004, la famille de Jules Vuillemin lègue aux Archives Henri-Poincaré un fonds constitué par les ouvrages, les tirés à part et les manuscrits du célèbre philosophe français, décédé aux Fourgs le 16 janvier 2001. Dans le cadre de la conservation et de la valorisation de ce fonds très riche, les Archives Henri-Poincaré organisent chaque année, au mois de décembre, une journée d’études autour d’un texte ou d’un aspect de la pensée de Jules Vuillemin, afin de d...

En 2004, la famille de Jules Vuillemin lègue aux Archives Henri-Poincaré (Université de Lorraine) un fonds constitué par les ouvrages, les tirés à part et les manuscrits du célèbre philosophe français, décédé aux Fourgs (Doubs) le 16 janvier 2001. Dans le cadre de la conservation et de la valorisation de ce fonds très riche, les Archives Henri-Poincaré organisent chaque année, au mois de décembre, une journée d’études autour d’un texte ou d’un aspect de la pensée de Jules Vuillemin, afin de (...) d... (shrink)

Je remercie Stéphane Marchand : ses objections me fournissent l’occasion d’éclaircir certains points capitaux de mon livre et de mon interprétation de Sextus Empiricus. Scepticisme et langage veut affronter la question de savoir si le sceptique pyrrhonien décrit par Sextus peut maîtriser une langue. Après avoir identifié le pyrrhonien à un sceptique radical, un individu dépourvu de croyances, je m’efforce de lui assurer la possibilité de parler en proposant plusieurs façons d’expliquer son co...

This is the first dedicated commentary to Sextus Empiricus’ treatise _Against the Arithmeticians_, dealing with crucial issues in the history of the sceptical, Platonic and Pythagorean traditions and in the ancient philosophy of mathematics.

The ageing of the population is one of the most significant social transformations that the twenty first century is showcasing and a challenge that impacts society at large. The elderly, inasmuch as everybody else, are confronted with continuous transformations that are induced by technology, although they seldom benefit from the opportunities that technology entails. The digital divide amongst various segments of the population is often age-related and due to different reasons, including biological, psychological, social and financial ones. There is an (...) ongoing reflection pertaining to the factors that hinders the full adoption of ICTs by the elderly and a question regarding what can be done to overcome their poor involvement in technology. This article, based on the results of a recent research, which has been conducted in Italy, aims at highlighting the importance of engaging the elderly in the use of technology as a key to building bridges between generations. (shrink)

Arithmetic deals with numbers: but what is the nature of their existence, of their parts, and of their relationship with countable items? These questions nourished a lively debate between the Platonico-Pythagorean tradition (trying to answer them) and the Pyrrhonian tradition (trying to show that these answers were unsatisfactory). The debate lies at the heart of Sextus Empiricus' Against the Arithmeticians. The present book aims at facing the remarkable historical and philosophical questions raised by Sextus' treatise by offering a new translation (...) of it and the first dedicated commentary to it. (shrink)

The automation of many repetitive or dangerous human activities yields numerous advantages. In order to automate a physical task that requires a finite series of sequential steps, the translation of those steps in terms of a computational procedure is often required. Even apparently menial tasks like following a cooking recipe may involve complex operations that can’t be perfectly described in formal terms. Recently, several studies have explored the possibility to model cooking recipes as a computational procedure based on a set (...) of instructions. This vision is the foundation for the construction of robotics kitchen, as Moley. These kitchen robots have shown promising results. Moley, for instance, is the very first example of a new generation of bioinspired robotics, based on the reproduction of particular movement, cooking, through artificial arms and hands. It is entirely different from the current appliances present in our domestic domain because Moley is able to manipulate ingredients and interact with kitchen equipment in order to prepare a dish autonomously. Nonetheless, they have also shown several limitations. In particular, Moley is an entirely autonomous robot in a structured environment in which it knows precisely the object position and manipulates the ingredients based on a list of instructions and a training phase made by Machine Learning. In this contribution we contend that these limitations arise from an essential mismatch between computational procedures, as originally described by Turing in his seminal 1936 paper, and recipes. Computational procedures have been originally created to observe and modify formal symbols with formal operators. Thus, they are independent from time and they are ideally executed in a closed environment, in which the computer directly produces all the relevant changes required to produce the intended result. Recipes, instead, are followed in an open environment, in which, while time goes by, changes happen independently from the cook’s intervention: the cook puts the butter on the pan, starts the fire and then waits until the butter is melted. To operate effectively in the open environment a kitchen robot must couple computational procedures with sensors, e.g a sensor which provides a time signal. These sensors are de facto oracles for the procedures and yet are required to bridge the gap from the formal to the physical world. (shrink)

Computational models of affect (CMAS), in their most common form, cannot take into account the qualitative (phenomenal) dimension of affect itself. Their expressivity can be extended, thus promoting the much sought-after standardization in the most theory-neutral way, using OWL (Web Ontology Language) and machine learning techniques. OWL is an expressive formal language, as well as an established open standard, and can be used to describe the models, possibly including qualitative entities at the fundamental level. The supervised machine learning techniques allow (...) the direct learning and application of models described as OWL ontologies. Thanks to human supervision (e.g. using datasets labeled by a human user), they can take into account the qualitative dimension of affect when the models warrant it. To further promote the aforementioned standardization, the task of classifying texts according to their affective content (known in computer science as "sentiment analysis") can be recommended as a way to assess the performance of the models. It is a multifaceted task, in which usually divergent fields as philosophy, psychology and computer science meet. Moreover, since it is a very current task in computer science, there are many resources available to facilitate the development of a standard benchmark for CMAS. (shrink)