Presenting the first comprehensive, in-depth study of hyperintensionality, this book equips readers with the basic tools needed to appreciate some of current and future debates in the philosophy of language, semantics, and metaphysics. After introducing and explaining the major approaches to hyperintensionality found in the literature, the book tackles its systematic connections to normativity and offers some contributions to the current debates. The book offers undergraduate and graduate students an essential introduction to the topic, while also helping professionals in related (...) fields get up to speed on open research-level problems. (shrink)

A particle of molecular dimensions which can exist in two states is associated with a membrane pore through which molecules of a gas can pass. The gas molecules from two identical phases on either side of the membrane may pass only when the particle is in one particular state. If certain restrictions are imposed on the system, then the particle appears to act like a Maxwell's Demon(1) which “handles” the gas molecules during their passage through the pore.

An extension of the hypothetical experiment of Szilard, which involved the action of a one-molecule gas in an isolated isothermal system, is developed to illustrate how irreversibility may arise out of Brownian motion. As this development requires a consideration of nonmolecular components such as wheels and pistons, the thought-experiment is remodeled in molecular terms and appears to function as a perpetuum mobile.

A new proof of the impossibility of reconciling realism and locality in quantum mechanics is given. Unlike proofs based on Bell's inequality, the present work makes minimal and transparent use of probability theory and proceeds by demonstrating a Kochen-Specker type of paradox based on the value assignments to the spin components of two spatially separated spin-1 systems in the singlet state of their total spin. An essential part of the argument is to distinguish carefully two commonly confused types of contextuality; (...) we call them ontological and environmental contextuality. These in turn are associated with two quite distinct senses of nonlocality. We indicate the relevance of our treatment to other related discussions in recent literature on the philosophy of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

The paper is concerned with explaining some of the principal theoretical developments in elementary particle physics and discussing the associated methodological problems both in respect of heuristics and appraisal. Particular reference is made to relativistic quantum field theory, renormalization, Feynman diagram techniques, the analytic S-matrix and the Chew — Frautschi bootstrap.

In this paper I argue that deontic modals are hyperintensional, i.e. logically equivalent contents cannot be substituted in their scope. I give two arguments, one deductive and the other abductive. First, I show that the contrary thesis leads to falsity; second, I argue that a hyperintensional theory of deontic modals fares better than its rivals in terms of elegance, theoretical simplicity and explanatory power. I then propose a philosophical analysis of this thesis and outline some consequences. In Section 1 I (...) introduce and define deontic modality and hyperintensionality. In Section 2 I give a reductio for the hyperintensionality of deontic modals. If the argument is sound, a useful corollary is that deontic modals are also non-intensional, and therefore possible-world semantics accounts are illfitted for them. I then show how the main result can be strengthened or weakened by varying the definition of logical validity. In Section 3 I give an abductive argument for the hyperintensionality of deontic modals, arguing that with a single move we are able to solve many paradoxes and puzzles traditionally troubling deontic logic. I present a version of a hyperintensional deontic logic in an appendix, which I prove is sound and complete with respect to a version of truthmaker semantics. (shrink)

Co-hyperintensionality, or hyperintensional equivalence, is a relation holding between two or more contents that can be substituted in a hyperintensional context salva veritate. I argue that two strategies used to provide criteria for co-hyperintensionality fail. I argue that there is no generalized notion of co-hyperintensionality that meets plausible desiderata, by showing that the opposite thesis leads to falsity. As a conclusion, I suggest to take co-hyperintensionality as a primitive and I provide a general criterion of co-hyperintensionality whose content depends on (...) each hyperintensional notion we aim to formalize. (shrink)

To solve the probability problem of the Many Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, D. Wallace has presented a formal proof of the Born rule via decision theory, as proposed by D. Deutsch. The idea is to get subjective probabilities from rational decisions related to quantum measurements, showing the non-probabilistic parts of the quantum formalism, plus some rational constraints, ensure the squared modulus of quantum amplitudes play the role of such probabilities. We provide a new presentation of Wallace’s proof, reorganized to (...) simplify some arguments, and analyze it from a formal perspective. Similarities with classical decision theory are made explicit, to clarify its structure and main ideas. A simpler notation is used, and details are filled in, making it easier to follow and verify. Some problems have been identified, and we suggest possible corrections. (shrink)

Thomas Nagel’ın “Hiçbir-Yerden Bakış Açısı” adlı kitabı çok alıntılanmış bir eserdir. Buradaki argümanlar sıklıkla bilincin nesnel-bilimsel bir açıklamasının yapılabilmesinin, en iyi ihtimalle, önündeki büyük ve yapısal sorunların dile getirilişi veya tümüyle imkansız olduğunu gösteren akıl yürütmeler olarak algılanır. Bu iki yanlış algıyı özetlememin ardından her ikisinin de neden hatalı olduğunu gösteriyorum. Bunu yaptıktan sonra her iki hatanın nedenlerini birden yaratan ortak bir neden daha olduğunu gösteriyorum. Bu nedenin Thomas Nagel’ın nesnel fenomenoloji önerisinin ya belirsiz veya saçma bulunarak bir kenara bırakılması (...) ya da hepten reddedilmesi olduğunu savunuyorum. Böylelikle nesnel fenomenoloji projesinin özünde deneyimin öznel boyutunun, nesnel bir açıklamasının verilebilmesini sağlayabilmek için bilinci açıklamakta halihazırda kullandığımız zihinselci terimler setinde kavramsal ve kuramsal yenilenme yapılması yönünde bir çağrı olduğunu gösterebileceğimi düşünüyorum: Nesnel fenomenoloji, öznel fenomenin kavramsal yenilenme aracılığıyla özneler-arası ulaşılabilirliğini sağlama projesidir. (shrink)

Die Frequenzkurven, die die lebendige Substanz charakterisieren, können als eine statische Beschreibung oder als das Ergebnis einer Entwicklung betrachtet werden.Im ersten Falle akzeptiert man ohne weiteres die gegebenen Verteilungen und man versucht, ihnen durch mathematische Gleichungen, die keine unmittelbare Wirklich-keitsbedeutung haben, nahezukommen. Das kausale Denken wird hier ausgeschaltet oder man gibt sich wenigstens mit nur sehr groben Analogien zufrieden.Verschiedene Methoden über die Genese der Frequenzkurven werden besprochen; dabei wird gezeigt, dass die Mehrheit der Fälle auf Hypothesen beruht, die biologisch wenig (...) begründet sind. Eine Ausnahme davon macht die Theorie vonJ. C. Kapteyn, weil er den Vorgang des Wachstums in die Genese einbezieht. Seine Methode weiter ausbauend kann man sich vorstellen, dass die Genese einer Frequenzkurve in erblich homogenem Pflanzenmaterial durch Variation der Wachstumsgeschwindigkeit zustandekommt.Auf solche Weise kann man in einem Koordinatensystem mit Länge und Zeit als Koordinaten ein “Deviationsraster” konstruieren.In einem experimentell untersuchten Fall ergab die graphische Methode mit völlig ausreichender Genauigkeit die schon gefundene Frequenz.Les courbes de fréquence qui caractérisent la matière vivante, peuvent être considérées ou comme une description statique ou bien comme le produit d'un développement.Dans le premier cas on accepte les distributions obtenues et on essaie de s'en rapprocher par des équations mathématiques qui n'ont pas une réalité effective. On ne recherche plus la causalité ou alors on se contente le plus souvent d'analogies très grossières.Les auteurs traitent des diverses méthodes de la genèse des courbes de fréquence et démontrent que la plupart des cas reposent sur des hypothèses qui ont peu de fond biologique. La théorie deM. J. C. Kapteyn fait exception parcequ'il introduit le processus de croissance dans la genèse. En poursuivant plus loin dans sa méthode on peut se figurer que la genèse d'une courbe de fréquence de plantes homogènes par hérédité s'expliquerait par des variations de vitesse de croissance.De cette façon on peut construire une “grille de déviation” dans un système en prenant longueur et temps comme coordonnées.Dans un cas essayé expérimentalement ce graphique donnait avec une exactitude assez grande la distribution de fréquence déjà trouvée. (shrink)

Having analyzed the formal aspects of Wallace’s proof of the Born rule, we now discuss the concepts and axioms upon which it is built. Justification for most axioms is shown to be problematic, and at times contradictory. Some of the problems are caused by ambiguities in the concepts used. We conclude the axioms are not reasonable enough to be taken as mandates of rationality in Everettian Quantum Mechanics. This invalidates the interpretation of Wallace’s result as meaning it would be rational (...) for Everettian agents to decide using the Born rule. (shrink)

These essays use particular issues, thinkers and texts to engage the question of God in early Christianity.

Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) is a method capable of transiently modulating neural excitability. Depending on the stimulation parameters information processing in the brain can be either enhanced or disrupted. This way the contribution of different brain areas involved in mental processes can be studied, allowing a functional decomposition of cognitive behavior both in the temporal and spatial domain, hence providing a functional resolution of brain/mind processes. The aim of the present paper is to argue that TMS with its ability to (...) draw causal inferences on function and its neural representations is a valuable neurophysiological tool for investigating the causal basis of neuronal functions and can provide substantive insight into the modern interdisciplinary and (anti)reductionist neurophilosophical debates concerning the relationships between brain functions and mental abilities. Thus, TMS can serve as a heuristic method for resolving causal issues in an arena where only correlative tools have traditionally been available. (shrink)

Recent accounts on the global workspace theory suggest that consciousness involves transient formations of functional connections in thalamo-cortico-cortical networks. The level of connectivity in these networks is argued to determine the state of consciousness. Emotions are suggested to play a role in shaping consciousness, but their involvement in the global workspace theory remains elusive. In the present study, the role of emotion in the neural workspace theory of consciousness was scrutinized by investigating, whether unconscious and conscious display of emotional compared (...) to neutral facial expressions would differentially modulate EEG coherence. EEG coherence was measured by means of computing an average EEG coherence value between the frontal, parietal, and midline scalp sites. Objective awareness checks evidenced that conscious identification of the masked facial expressions was precluded. Analyses revealed reductions in EEG coherence in the lower frequency range for the masked as compared to unmasked neutral facial expressions. Crucially, a decline in EEG coherence was not observed for the emotional facial expressions. In other words, the level of EEG coherence did apparently vary as a function of awareness, but not when emotion was involved. The current finding suggests that EEG coherence is modulated by unconscious emotional processes, which extends common views on the global workspace architecture of consciousness. (shrink)

The author has constructed a concept of conditionals by synthetizing and developing unconnected insights scattered through the literature. The result is incorporated in a formal deductive system, based on a series of "paradox-free" systems initiated by Alonzo Church and interpreted according to principles suggested chiefly by Everett Nelson and by Anderson and Belnap. The basic concept is the sufficiency relation holding between clauses of a conditional, or rather between the relevant states of affairs asserted by the clauses. The logic of (...) sufficiency is developed by using a phenomenological method, much like that of the ordinary-language linguists, to place restrictions on truth-functional logic. For example, conjunction is replaced by adjunction [ = df. ~ ] and this concept is used to modify modus ponens and simplification. Relevance requirements avoid the paradoxes of material implication. These principles, together with a number of physical modalities and some modifications of the concept of induction, are used to attack Goodman's paradox and the paradoxes of confirmation, and to form a concept of cause. The formal system incorporates the principles judged desirable by the analysis of how conditionals are used in discourse. Mr. Barker is modest in his claims, emphasizing that his material is not original and saying only that some of the famous paradoxes "show signs of yielding." Interested students will be grateful for this monograph. It is a valuable compendium of widely scattered work of a difficult and complicated subject, and should be both helpful and stimulating. Moreover, it is particularly clear and readable.--L. G. (shrink)

This is a beginning text, with an ingenious format. Each of the five sections consists of seven or eight articles or excerpts, of varying difficulty. Each opens with two excerpts from classic philosophers, presenting alternative formulations of major problems in an area of philosophy. The other selections are by contemporary writers. Each section closes with a fictional dialogue between the men who set the problems. The author hopes that students will find the easy selections provocative and so be encouraged to (...) attempt the less readily understandable. The sections are designed to lead into one another, from "Political and Social Philosophy," with which most students have some acquaintance, to other areas, each presupposed by those preceding, that is, to "Ethics and the Moral Life," "Philosophy of Religion," "Theory of Knowledge and Experience," and finally to "Metaphysics." The selections are fresh, varied, and well-chosen to stimulate discussion. For example: Plato and Hobbes introduce "Political and Social Philosophy," followed by Stuart Hampshire, Michael Oakeshott, Jean-Paul Sartre, C. I. Lewis, John Rawls, and Edward Kent. Berkeley and James introduce "Theory of Knowledge and Experience." Contemporary selections are by Bertrand Russell, A. J. Ayer, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Martin Buber, Georg Simmel.--L. G. (shrink)

Although Mach insisted that he was a scientist, not a philosopher, many of his ideas were genuinely philosophical. This collection of essays indicates, among other matters of mathematical and scientific interest, how such ideas grew from Mach's work and something of their philosophical significance. In particular, discussions of Mach's experiments in aerodynamics and psychology show how he made physical phenomena observable and applied "causal" concepts to sensory processes. Having done this, Mach felt that he could hold a phenomenalism of neutral (...) elements which are neither subjective nor objective. He thought that a unified science could be based on such elements and that he would then no longer have to change his conceptual frame in going from one discipline to another, as from "atoms" to "mind" in going from physics to biology. Young Albert Einstein was deeply impressed by Mach's attitude toward fundamental concepts. One essay discusses the influence on Einstein's theory of general relativity of Mach's Principle, i.e., Mach's substitution of the concept of motion with respect to the distant stars for the unobservable Newtonian concept of motion with respect to absolute space. A discussion of Mach's own use of the atomic theory illustrates his attitude toward theories and suggests that he was able to reject the atom because this concept is not particularly useful in the fields with which he was primarily concerned. An essay by editor Cohen on the implications of Mach's theory of knowledge argues that a phenomenalism of neutral elements collapses into mysticism, i.e., into a submergence of the ego in the universal consciousness. Also interesting is Philipp Frank's classification of Mach as an "Enlightment" philosopher, or one who criticizes the abuse of concepts. Just as the men of the eighteenth century Enlightenment opposed theological concepts in physics, so Mach opposed physical concepts in biology, thereby clearing science of old error to make way for new truth. Some biographical data and an extensive bibliography are appended, as well as an index of proper names.--L. G. (shrink)

The aim of this text is to teach beginning students, not about philosophy, but how to philosophize. It presents the enduring problems of Western philosophy through artful selection from the writings of Plato, Descartes, and the British Empiricists, together with analysis and criticism of the positions and their supporting arguments. After a short essay on pre-Socratic contributions, the student is conducted through the Phaedo with frequent halts for recapitulation and examination of the issues. The thesis of the Phaedo is seen (...) to involve problems of the nature and function of value, the sources and validity of knowledge, the nature of reality, the nature of the mind and the self, and the relation of mind and body. The same technique of alternate text and commentary is used with excerpts from Descartes' Meditations on First Philosophy; Books I, II, and from Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book IV; Berkeley's Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous; and Book I of Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature. The focus shifts from problems of value and conduct to those of the nature of the self and of knowledge, and the student learns that old themes have new aspects and that each still involves all the others. A contrast between the complementary doctrines of rationalism and empiricism emerges, with the inadequacies of each clearly exhibited. This leads into a masterly condensation and exposition of Kant's attempted reconciliation in the Critique of Pure Reason. Bertrand Russell's article, Logical Atomism, forms a coda, indicating the assumptions underlying contemporary analytic philosophies and the kinship of logical and linguistic problems with those of earlier philosophical traditions.--L. G. (shrink)

The Normative Structure of Responsibility deals with responsibility in legal, moral, and linguistic contexts. The book builds on conceptual analysis and data from everyday language, ethics, and the law in order to defend the thesis that responsibility is fundamentally normative, that is, it cannot be reduced to purely descriptive factors. The book is divided in three parts: the first part draws a conceptual map of various responsibility concepts, conceptions and conditions and their interaction with different kinds of rules; the second (...) part engages with arguments in favour of a descriptive understanding of responsibility based on ethics, neuroscience, and metaphysics and argues against it; the third part investigates the language of responsibility and its use in formal and informal contexts. (shrink)

Using data from nonwestern, and chiefly nonliterate, groups but relating his material to utopian, revivalistic, and sectarian movements in western societies, the anthropologist author has analyzed over a dozen cases, having in common a group of people under cultural stress who, finding their lives unsatisfactory, form a new ideal of human integrity and combine to create a new man in a new social order. After identifying the key elements of these millenarian situations, the author defines and relates his terms. He (...) discusses various problematic aspects, such as the role of the prophet and the significance of money. Several kinds of explanation are sketched. In one he lays out a typical millenarian pattern, or sequence of events, and finds himself, having glimpsed a kind of millennium, embarked on the first phase of a millenarian movement. In another scheme, four general types of explanation are examined: the psycho-physiological, the ethnographic, the Marxist, and the Hegelian. Finally, four "primary situations" and twelve "oppositions" are suggested as possible components in a millenarian model, no particular case, of course, requiring the full set. At every point the book invites discussion, clarification, amplification. It is coherent and illuminating but always open-ended, admirably fulfilling its stated purpose of posing problems and stimulating thought, rather than providing answers. The current complex of rebellions is never mentioned, but no one could read it without thinking of those who proclaim new values and who feel that, if only they could smash our present social order, a new and perfect one would arise from the ashes. The book would provide an apt conceptual frame for a study of our troubled times.--L. G. (shrink)

This book presents an exposition and criticism of Husserl's essential ideas, explaining what is defective and what meritorious in them and offering a philosophical program based on the merit. The author's aim is to provide a point of entry for the study of phenomenology. In the opening section he states the key concepts of The Idea, following Husserl's summary. These are: the contrasting notions of natural thinking and philosophical thinking; intentional immanence; the "pure seeing" of reflective cognition; and eidetic abstraction. (...) He proceeds to a developmental reconstruction showing how these concepts grow out of one another. Intentionality, the active relatedness of consciousness to its object, is the foundation concept. By being aware of one's own intentionality and abandoning the natural standpoint, phenomenological reduction can be achieved and the universal experienced in eidetic abstraction. According to Pettit, the merit of Husserl's method is that it recalls philosophy to the self and to the evidence, i.e., to man as a conscious subject and to the obvious, incontestable data of consciousness. Phenomenology's defect is that, since every experience implicitly contains a description, the supposed eidetic experience is absurd. Philosophy should aim at explanation, i.e., at a non-reductive account of conscious experience, which makes the experience intelligible. Pettit concludes with a phenomenological program, listing the dimensions and types of human behavior and showing how the traditional divisions of philosophy fit into the classification. There is a bibliography but no index.--L. G. (shrink)

These essays concern what one of the writers calls "the philosophical problems raised by the existence of modern science," distinguishing and relating various ways of knowing, especially the scientific and philosophic. For R. J. Henle in the first and eighth essays, science and philosophy are set off from the humanities as alike in seeking pure intelligibility, but different in that science knows indirectly through a constructional concept while philosophy knows directly the ontological concept. J. Maritain discusses the shortcomings of the (...) Vienna school of philosophy of science and the kinds of knowing proper to theology, philosophy, and science. J. Fitzgerald considers Maritain's inclusion of modern science in the Aristotelian-Thomist concept of scientific knowledge. R. Blackwell sketches four approaches to a theory of discovery in science: logical, psychological, historical, and epistemological. G. P. Klubertanz, discussing modern science in the light of Thomist doctrine, finds it like the philosophy of nature in having as its object the sensible material thing but differing in definitions, principles, and modes of proof. J. Ladrière argues the importance of intentionality in one essay, and later that both science and philosophy are authentic knowing, but that science is a description of regional ontologies while philosophy is the foundation of those ontologies. E. McMullin discusses the change from Aristotelianism to modern scientific "qualified" realism. E. Caldin finds that theological and scientific knowledge have the same structure but answer different questions. The last five essays deal with more specialized topics. F. J. Crosson: Can a machine be conscious? R. J. Henle: How does anthropology contribute to an understanding of man? A. Fisher: Freud and Husserl, and the essential intentionality of psychical life. Two surveys of modern analytic philosophy conclude the volume, E. J. McKinnon: Reflections on a methodology for integrating philosophy and science; and G. P. Klubertanz: A proposal for integrating the schools of philosophy of science.--L. G. (shrink)

The thesis of this book is that there is a philosophy implicit in Plato's dialogues, but philosophers cannot agree about its content because it is the imaginative vision of a way of life, rather than a system. The positions advocated are characters in a dramatic conflict of ideas, written by a poet for an audience of intellectuals and depicting with irony, ambiguity, and consummate artistry the Idea of Talk. Plato's own position is that in an imperfect world we can have (...) a vision of it perfected and, in the light of this vision, can see the really real, that is, what is worthwhile. This is, however, neither metaphysics nor epistemology, but a value statement and an attitude toward life. Plato is saying that knowledge of the Good is knowledge of man's possibilities, and that to know the Good is to love the Good, to make passionate commitment to the object of knowledge. Other points: Immortality is not future life but present life lived in the vision of the Ideal. The Republic is not a program but an ironic picture of the Idea of the Spartan state, warning that, while the search for perfection is the source of all order in life, overemphasis of a single value is the death of the rest. Plato advised the study of mathematics because, since it comes to indisputable conclusions, he hoped it would teach that intellectual rigor which the humanities and social sciences, being matters of opinion do not. Plato's doctrine emerges only from the earlier, "Socratic" dialogues. The later ones are dogmatic, rather than dramatic, and seem to provide starting points for Aristotle.--L. G. (shrink)

This book, the first in the Chicago Series in Biology, is an informal attempt to enrich ecological theory with some useful and general concepts. The author's purpose is to escape the "microscopic" level of analysis, that is, the level of interaction between a predator and its prey and of population response to changes in the environment, and to take a "macroscopic" point of view. He does this by first interpreting ecological relationships in terms of cybernetic theory. For example, he takes (...) "information" to be something brought about within the system by its own operation, which in turn influences its future. "Energy gates" are aspects of the system which involve transfer of information from the less organized sub-system to the more organized. Then he takes a cybernetic look at succession, maturity, and exploitation, illustrating his analysis with examples from his speciality of marine biology. He emphasizes that, since we are dealing with a dynamic system, it is important to work with trends and gradients rather than with point values. Finally, he considers evolution as a process going on in an ecosystem. An intellectual synthesis of the paleontological picture of evolution and the contemporary picture of succession should give us working principles for understanding the history of life. As an illustration, he suggests conditions which might have fostered man and his culture. This is a brilliant little book, simply written and absorbing.--L. G. (shrink)

This volume is third in a series, Monuments of Western Thought, which Cantor and Klein are editing at Colgate. The bulk of this book consists of excerpts from the work of Dante and Machiavelli. Of the Dante material, seventy-five pages is from the Divine Comedy, the rest from De Monarchia. Of the Machiavelli material, thirty pages are from The Prince, the rest excerpted from various works and arranged under such heads as "Warfare" and "Fortune." The text is introduced by a (...) sketch of the intellectual, social, and political context in which Dante and Machiavelli lived, and by brief intellectual biographies. The book closes with short critical selections, assessing and interpreting the source material. On Dante: E. Gilson deals with the ideological frame of the Divine Comedy, social order under divine Authority: J. A. Mazzeo with the hierarchy of light in the Paradiso; G. Santayana with Beatrice as woman and symbol. On Machiavelli: J. W. Allen argues that Machiavelli's originality lies in looking at men and affairs without concerning himself with what they ought to be and do; H. Butterfield that Machiavelli admired ancient Rome and advocated close imitation of her; F. Chabod argues that the theme of The Prince is that society is amorphous, waiting the impress of a dominant individual of supreme virtù; F. Meinecke that virtù, fortuna, and necessità are the basic themes of Machiavelli's thought. Each section is followed by a list of questions designed to challenge the student's understanding of what he has read and to send him back to the text.--L. G. (shrink)