It is widely supposed that methodological naturalism, understood as a thesis about the methodology of science, is metaphysically neutral, and that this in turn guarantees the value-neutrality of science. In this paper we argue that methodological naturalism is underpinned by certain ontological and epistemological assumptions including evidentialism and the causal closure of the physical, adoption of which necessitates commitment to metaphysical naturalism.

It is widely supposed that methodological naturalism, understood as a thesis about the methodology of science, is metaphysically neutral, and that this in turn guarantees the value-neutrality of science. In this paper we argue that methodological naturalism is underpinned by certain ontological and epistemological assumptions including evidentialism and the causal closure of the physical, adoption of which necessitates commitment to metaphysical naturalism.

Discovering the differences between the various systems of modal logics was one of the advantages of inventing Kripke semantics. One of the most obvious examples is interpreting the necessity of provability in provability logic. According to Boolos in The Logic of Provability, by discovering this logic, we can say that the understanding of new issues in the field of argument was opened. In this paper, with a formal approach and with a descriptive-analytical and comparative method, the axiomatic propositional systems of (...) the GL, Grz, and H, and their possible world semantics based on Kripke semantics are studied, as well as the sequent calculus of GL (in Peano arithmetic) and GLS (in the standard model) were introduced. Finally, the meta-theorems of soundness, consistency, and completeness of the GL were interpreted and proved. (shrink)

Modal Logic’s theorems and rules are valid in possible worlds but Relevant Logic’s theorems and rules are valid, respectively, in logical worlds and situations. Robert Meyer in 1974 removed this asymmetry between the theorems and the rules of Relevant Logic by establishing a logical system, whose theorems and rules are valid in all situations. Introducing a new kind of truth and falsity operators, the authors in this article sketch a logical system defined on the basis of Relevant Logic. Such a (...) system can not only preserve symmetry, but also remove some inconsistency between Modern Classical Logic and Relevant Logic, because the latter, like the former, puts possible worlds as a criterion for validity. (shrink)

Avicenna is undoubtedly one of the outstanding scientists and perhaps the most prominent one in the history of Islamic-Iranian civilization. After a lifetime of trying to describe, explain and complete the Greek intellectual heritage, Avicenna admitted to have achieved a realm of philosophy which he construed as "oriental philosophy''. Avicenna's oriental logic can be defined and explained according to the very oriental philosophy in terms of method and content. The issue is what the characteristics of this oriental philosophy and particularly, (...) oriental logic is. Since there is not direct and abundant evidence in "surface" as documents, we try to reach the conclusion by a range of indirect and limited evidences in "depth". In this paper, two different and yet consistent features of Avicenna's oriental logic are inferenced and introduced. In the first sense, oriental logic can refer to a range of "non-Aristotelian innovative and established systems" in the East, and in the second aspect, it can be an oriental horizon and dawn to establish a "fuzzy logic" which is considered today multi-valued and infinite-valued logic. (shrink)

According to the dominant methodology of contemporary analytic philosophy, philosophical intuitions play evidential roles for or against philosophical theories. However, intuitions can play the supposed role successfully only if they are justified. Phenomenalism, as one of the proposed theories that aims to explain and argue for justifiedness of intuitions, claims that intuitions are justified because they have a certain phenomenal character: Intuitive contents seem to be true. Furthermore, it argues that sensory perception has similar phenomenal character, in virtue of which (...) it is justified. This analogy confirms the justifiedness of intuitions. In this paper, however, we shall argue that there is at least one another epistemological feature of sensory perception which is relevant to its justifiedness, that is self-correction. Although sensory perception is highly self – correcting, intuitions normally resist self – correction, even in the case of further recalcitrant evidences. The disanalogy threatens phenomenalist analogy for justifiedness of intuitions. (shrink)

In this study, we shall assess the claim concerning the negative effect of sin and positive effect of grace on proper function of reason and cognitive faculties through the lens of the Calvinist tradition and the Reformed Epistemology. Although the noetic effect of sin has already been discussed probably by tracing the role of the non-epistemic factors in acquiring knowledge in general, approaching the issue by focusing on ‘scientific knowledge’ is novel and, to the best of my knowledge, has not (...) been attempted before. This study will be developed by means of an evaluation of Stephen Moroney’s project. Through a critical survey of the views of a number of prominent Christian theologian, he tries to develop a model for the cognitive influence of sin. In our review of his work from the canons of Critical Rationalism, we shall try to show that Moroney's conclusions are inconsistent with his explanation of the effect of sin on the natural sciences. Our main arguments are as follows: what Moroney describes as scientific knowledge from a Christian point of view is more a technological awareness rather than scientific knowledge proper. Furthermore, it is the scientist who is affected by sin and not his scientific claim. (shrink)