This volume presents a study edition of the lectures delivered by Charles Peirce to the Lowell Institute in Boston in the Fall of 1903. These previously unpublished lectures present a comprehensive and revised statement of his work on the methods of science. Offering mature reflection on a lifetime's thought and work, they represent the culmination of Peirce's research on scientific objectivity. Alongside the Cambridge Conferences Lectures (1898, edited by K. L. Ketner), the Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism (1903, edited (...) by P. A. Turrisi), and the The Logic of Interdisciplinarity (the project of Peirce's Monist Series 1891-1909, edited by E. Bisanz), the Lowell Lectures of 1903 presented here offer significant insights into Peirce's mature phase as an explorer of objective methods in interdisciplinary science. This collection will appeal to anyone interested in the work of this great thinker, the history of science, and the history of American intellectual life. (shrink)

Le philosophe Charles Peirce a accordé un rôle prépondérant à la communauté des enquêteurs, à la fois comme groupe de chercheurs et comme idéal conduisant vers la vérité. Si Peirce parlait pour sa part de « théorie sociale de la réalité », les trois textes qui suivent – inédits en français, et en anglais pour le dernier – justifient d’y voir une véritable épistémologie sociale. Ils montrent dans quelle mesure la connaissance scientifique, et même commune, trouve son fondement (...) dans une composante nécessairement sociale. La rationalité probable n’a pas de sens à l’échelle individuelle (premier texte) ; la science est une entreprise collective (deuxième texte) ; et la vérité se définit en fonction de la communauté (troisième texte). (shrink)

El texto de Peirce que en las páginas siguientes se publica por primera vez en castellano, forma parte de sus Notebook I de 1905, correspondiente a las Adirondack Summer School Lectures. Fue catalo-gado como MS 1334 en el catálogo de Richard R. Robin. En 1986 Kenneth L. Ketner eligió este sugestivo fragmento -hasta entonces prácticamente desconocido- dándole el título "The Nature of Science" para dar a conocer en el volumen de John J. Stuhr Classical American Philosophy. Essential Readings and (...) Interpretative Essays (Oxford University Press, 1987), la concepción que Peirce tenía de la actividad científica. La inclusión de la traducción al castellano de Sara F. Barrena de aquel sugestivo texto resulta un magnífico colofón para este número monográfico sobre las claves del pensamiento de Peirce para la filosofía, la ciencia y la cultura del nuevo siglo (J. N.). (shrink)

In diesen Vorlesungen des Begründers des amerikanischen Pragmatismus, Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914), werden die Verknüpfungen von Logik und Praxis, Denken und Handeln in der Philosophie des "größten amerikanischen Denkers" (K. O. Apel) deutlich. Aus dem Inhalt: Pragmatismus: Die normativen Wissenschaften; Die universalen Kategorien; Weiteres über Kategorien; Die Realität der Drittheit; Die drei Arten des Guten; Drei Typen des Schließens; Pragmatismus und Abduktion; Anmerkungen von Peirce. - Anmerkungen der Herausgeberin; Bibliographie, Namen- und Sachregister.

In this book, T. L. Short corrects widespread misconceptions of Peirce's theory of signs and demonstrates its relevance to contemporary analytic philosophy of language, mind and science. Peirce's theory of mind, naturalistic but nonreductive, bears on debates of Fodor and Millikan, among others. His theory of inquiry avoids foundationalism and subjectivism, while his account of reference anticipated views of Kripke and Putnam. Peirce's realism falls between 'internal' and 'metaphysical' realism and is more satisfactory than either. His pragmatism (...) is not verificationism; rather, it identifies meaning with potential growth of knowledge. Short distinguishes Peirce's mature theory of signs from his better-known but paradoxical early theory. He develops the mature theory systematically on the basis of Peirce's phenomenological categories and concept of final causation. The latter is distinguished from recent and similar views, such as Brandon's, and is shown to be grounded in forms of explanation adopted in modern science. (shrink)

Abstract:This response to a variety of criticisms of Charles Peirce and Modern Science restates and attempts to clarify and explain major themes of the book.

In this paper I examine Peirce's epistemological and ontological theories and indicate their relevance to educational practice. I argue that Peirces conception of Firsts, Seconds and Thirds entails a fundamental ontological realism. I further argue that Peirce does have a theory of truth, that it is a particular non‐traditional ‘correspondence’ theory, consistent with, and implicit in, an over‐arching position of pragmatic realism. Peirce's epistemological position is subject to misinterpretation when the ontological realism on which it rests is (...) overlooked. Finally I suggest that such a re‐consideration of Peirce's pragmatic ontology and epistemology in an educational context is needed. (shrink)

In this paper I examine Peirce's epistemological and ontological theories and indicate their relevance to educational practice. I argue that Peirces conception of Firsts, Seconds and Thirds entails a fundamental ontological realism. I further argue that Peirce does have a theory of truth, that it is a particular non‐traditional ‘correspondence’ theory, consistent with, and implicit in, an over‐arching position of pragmatic realism. Peirce's epistemological position is subject to misinterpretation when the ontological realism on which it rests is (...) overlooked. Finally I suggest that such a re‐consideration of Peirce's pragmatic ontology and epistemology in an educational context is needed. (shrink)

W. B. Gallie's words about Peirce's cosmology—"the black sheep or white elephant of his philosophical progeny" (1952, p. 216)—have often been quoted, usually as a preface to giving a better account of the animal. That he attributed the view to 'contemporary philosophers' and did not assert it himself has usually been ignored. True, Gallie did argue that the "cosmology is a failure, and an inevitable failure" (p. 236), but he also said that Peirce himself "recognized … that his (...) work in this field was imperfect and sketchy" (p. 215), and he concluded the chapter, and his book, with an extremely sympathetic account of all that is nevertheless of enduring value in that failure. After studying Peirce's writings of his.. (shrink)

This book discusses that imagination is as important to thinking and reasoning as it is to making and acting. By reexamining our philosophical and psychological heritage, it traces a framework, a conceptual topology, that underlies the most disparate theories: a framework that presents imagination as founded in the placement of appearances. It shows how this framework was progressively developed by thinkers like Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, and Kant, and how it is reflected in more recent developments in theorists as different as (...) Peirce, Saussure, Wittgenstein, Benjamin, and Bachelard. The conceptual topology of imagination incorporates logic, mathematics, and science as well as production, play, and art. Recognizing this topology can move us past the confusions to a unifying view of imagination for the future. (shrink)

In this book, T. L. Short places the notorious difficulties of Peirce's important writings in a more productive light, arguing that he wrote philosophy as a scientist, by framing conjectures intended to be refined or superseded in the inquiries they initiate. He argues also that Peirce held that the methods and metaphysics of modern science are amended as inquiry progresses, making metaphysics a branch of empirical knowledge. Additionally, Short shows that Peirce's scientific work expanded empiricism on empirical (...) grounds, grounding his phenomenology and subverting the fact/value dichotomy, and that he understood statistical explanations in nineteenth-century science as reintroducing the idea of final causation, now made empirical. Those innovations underlie Peirce's late ideas of a normative science and of philosophy as a branch of science. Short's rich and original study shows us how to read Peirce's writings and why they are worth reading. (shrink)

Peirce persistently proclaimed both idealism and realism, terms that in philosophy's history have had varied meanings, in some of which they designate opposed doctrines; his use of them also varied in meaning. The aim of Robert Lane's important new book is to trace the evolution of Peirce's idealism and realism and to show that, in the end, whatever misadventures occur en route, these doctrines, in Peirce's version of them, are not opposed. Lane explores connections to other Peircean (...) topics: truth, pragmatism, modality, generality, vagueness, continuity. However, he retains his focus, which enables him to examine Peirce's idealism and realism with extraordinary care and thoroughness.Lane's method is, in the first... (shrink)

For Charles Peirce, the project of inquiry is a social one. Though inquiry, the passage from genuine doubt to settled belief, can be described on the individual level, its significance as a human activity is manifested in collective action. For any individual, Truth transcends experience and inquiry. But it does not transcend experience and inquiry altogether: is a fixed limit, an ideal, towards which a properly functioning community converges. What, in principle, makes the cohesion of such a community possible? (...) Why did Peirce believe that convergence towards an ultimate conclusion was the necessary end of unlimited scientific inquiry? This essay examines Peirce's notion of community to answer these questions and suggests that the presence of genuine doubt not only makes convergence possible, but also constitutes the starting point for almost all inquiry. The exception is philosophical inquiry. (shrink)

This book is remarkable for what it does not do. It purports to be about Peirce's opposition to nominalism, but it never states clearly what nominalism is and says little about Peirce's realist alternative. It contains no historical discussion of nominalism and thus does not explain the relation of Peirce's idiosyncratic use of that term to its original meaning. It ignores the secondary literature on that topic and does not even list Rosa Mayorga's highly relevant 2007 book, (...) From Realism to Realicism [sic], in its Bibliography. Nor, despite nominalism's alleged 'threat,' does it make reference to such important recent nominalists as Nelson Goodman or W.V.O. Quine. Indeed, after page one, there is hardly any.. (shrink)

Empiricism in philosophy is either a method or a theory. The two are separable: one might hold that all knowledge is empirical but that philosophy does something other than add to our knowledge, e.g., that it clarifies concepts; or one might hold that philosophy’s method is empirical and that one of the things known in that way is that not all knowledge is empirical, e.g., mathematics. And what is the empirical? If it is knowledge based on observation, then what is (...) it that can be observed? If philosophy is in method empirical, the range of the observable must be broad, perhaps including mental processes, human history, social institutions such as language, and even the difference between good and evil.In Peirce’s... (shrink)

But as you know... my style of ‘brilliancy’ consists in a mixture of irony and seriousness,—the same things said ironically and also seriously.Peirce’s philosophical writings are notoriously difficult. The reasons most often cited are the apparent contradictions, the long, inconclusive technical digressions, and the unfinished character of his thought. His champions instead emphasize his originality, arguing that his apparent contradictions often mark traditional dualisms subtly transcended; some discern strands of an uncompleted system. Originality, subtlety, and the need to reconstruct (...) the whole from its fragmentary expressions also pose difficulties, albeit ones rewarding. I think, however, that the problem... (shrink)

The following paragraphs were written not for print publication but for oral delivery on a celebratory occasion; their many unsupported assertions, some commonplace and some controversial, were made not to prove a thesis but to suggest a point of view—a perspective on Peirce's thought that might be taken, or not, as one wishes. The suggestion is that some difficulties are resolved and some things fall into place if we view his philosophy in its several relations to modern science. For (...) that purpose, his idea of science is of central importance and it is that idea only that I discuss here. Although drawn from the historical fact of modern science, Peirce's concept of science is unusual, radical, and difficult. In... (shrink)

Once upon a time a version of positivism prevailed in the philosophy of science. A key assumption made in positivism is that there is a class of observations - I will call them ‘basic observations’ - that are independent of theory. Basic observations are expressed in a non-theoretical or purely descriptive language: they refer to no postulated entities and presuppose no explanatory hypotheses or other logically contingent propositions. Theories, according to this philosophy, are admissible in science only if they are (...) capable of yielding some implications about the basic observations that would be made under various conditions. Theories that provide entirely different accounts of the physical world can be compared by comparing their implications for basic observation. And they are tested by comparing these implications to the basic observations that are actually made. As a general rule, if one theory is replaced by another, then all basic observations that confirmed the first must also confirm the second, but not conversely. Thus, despite revolutions even in our most fundamental theoretical conceptions, there is or can be a cumulative growth of our strictly empirical knowledge. (shrink)

Twenty-three years ago Robert Ayers noticed several brief and intriguing comments on miracles in the Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce. Working with just those scraps of information from the CP, he stitched together a rough but helpful starting point for understanding this aspect of Peirce's religious and scientific thought. In the last few years several more articles on this subject have been written, each filling in a gap left by the others: Ayers' is a theological view, based (...) solely on the CP; later articles fill out Peirce's mathematics and his logic. This paper attempts to fill in a genealogical gap by showing how his thought on miracles is directly related to his dialogues with Plato, Hume, and Lutoslawski. My resources are largely unpublished manuscripts, many of which are fragmentary. I show the relationship between these manuscripts and two key published essays, "Philosophy and the Conduct of Life", and "On the Logic of Drawing History from Ancient Documents, Especially from Testimonies", and then show how Peirce, in dialogue with Plato, exposes and overcomes the nominalistic and anti- miracle prejudices of historiography in his day. The resulting view of history is fallibilistic, realistic and evolutionary, in which miracles are not violations of laws of nature but are to be expected as evolutionary variations that form part of the ongoing self-revelation of the cosmos. Miracles, like all events in history, must not be viewed prejudicially by adherents or detractors, but must be taken into careful account in the grand induction of history and science. (shrink)