L�entrée de la Métaphysique d�Aristote en Europe occidentale a provoqué fascination et embarras. Les lectures nouvelles d�Aristote entrèrent souvent en confrontation avec les exégèses bibliques ; des problématiques spécifiquement médiévales, comme celle de l�être et de l�essence, sont alors apparues. Nous proposons ici la traduction d�une Question appartenant à un cours sur la Métaphysique donné à la fin du XIIIe siècle par Siger de Brabant, maître à la Faculté des arts de l�Université de Paris. La Question 7 propose une solution (...) originale au problème de l�être et de l�essence : le débat est détourné de sa perspective ontologico-théologique et resitué dans le contexte linguistique. (shrink)

Siger conçoit sa critique à l’encontre de la théorie thomasienne de l’intellect en s’appuyant sur les adages tels que « agere sequitur formam » et « potentia non potest esse simplicior aut immaterialior quam eius substantia ». Structurant son argumentation autour de ces deux principes, il tente de démontrer que la position de Thomas d’Aquin se réduit finalement à une position matérialiste ou, se révèle encore être philosophiquement intenable lorsque ce dernier soutientces deux thèses qui, pour Siger, sont contradictoires, à (...) savoir que l’intellect est, d’une part, une des parties de l’âme humaine et d’autre part une puissance indépendante et séparée du corps. Or, Siger semble faire l’économie de l’une de ses arguments les plus puissants qui peut, a priori saper le fondement même de la théorie de l’intellect chez Thomas, à savoir le problème de se séparation du corps. Cependant, une analyse détaillée de la terminologie thomasienne nousrévèle la raison qui a poussé Siger à ne pas utiliser cette critique majeure ; en effet, il était conscient que cet argument qui semblait indiquer un possible incompatibilité entre l’intellect et le corps ne se réduisait en réalité qu’à un problème unsinnig. Cette retenue et cette maîtrise témoignent de de la perspicacité de Siger qui a su précisément demeurer à l’intérieur de la limite conceptuelle où il lui est possible de se présenter non pas comme un critique manqué deThomas d’Aquin, mais comme un véritable philosophe capable de mettre sa position en parallèl avec celle thomasienne concernant l’homme pensant ou « cet homme-ci qui pense ». (shrink)

Sigieri di Brabante, maestro di filosofia presso la facoltà delle arti dell'università di Parigi, fu uno dei principali esponenti di quell'"aristotelismo radicale" che costituì uno dei principali obiettivi delle condanne del vescovo Étienne Tempier del 1270 e del 1277. Il De aeternitate mundi è la testimonianza di un corso tenuto da Sigieri nel 1272 sul problema se la specie umana sia stata creata nel tempo. Vengono qui esaminate sia in generale le tesi di Sigieri riguardo ai diversi argomenti affrontati, sia (...) nello specifico il problema della causazione per intermediari. Quest'ultimo tema rimanda non solo alle altre opere in cui Sigieri ha affrontato tali problematiche, ma anche ad una tradizione che trae le sue origini nella filosofia greca classica e si sviluppa nel medioevo latino e arabo. Segue la traduzione del testo di Sigieri, condotta sull'edizione critica curata da Bernardo Carlos Bazán. (shrink)

We offer a new outlook on the vexed question of the reference of natural-kind terms. Since Kripke and Putnam, there is a widespread assumption that natural-kind terms function just like proper names: they designate their referents directly and they are rigid designators: their reference is unchanged even in worlds in which the referent lacks some or all the properties associated with it in the actual world, and which are useful to us in identifying that referent. There have, however, been heated (...) debates about what should be taken as a natural-kind term. Some challenge the very existence of a separate category of natural-kind terms ; some their being directly referential ; some raise the possibility that direct reference extends to terms beyond those usually assumed to fall under the category, e.g. to ‘polemical’ terms. When these debates turn on the question of what natural kinds are, they take on a strong epistemological or metaphysical dimension. We think the issues can be clarified within the limits of the philosophy of language: by looking into what ranges of general terms are perceived by speakers as rigid designators of natural kinds. The first step to take is to ground the various kinds of semantic externalism in distinct brands of semantic deference. This we define as speakers’ being disposed to use words in line with the norms of their linguistic community and as consenting to being corrected when it is manifest that their use and understanding of a word does not match common practice. When those dispositions are present, speakers defer semantically to something beyond themselves. Here, our focus is on spotting the words for which speakers would defer not to the current usage of the word in the linguistic community, nor to the current experts of the field to which the word pertains, but ultimately to the very nature of the referent of the term. When speakers’ deference conforms to that pattern, we argue, that is evidence that indexical externalism provides the right metasemantic account of how the meaning of the word is determined. In other words, one can say that the word is treated like a natural-kind term. But how can patterns of deference be measured? In an ongoing survey, participants are confronted with conditions that may prompt them to revise certain classificatory statements, e.g. An emu is a bird. Each condition makes salient one of the targets we have identified for deference: the community usage, the experts, the ‘world as it is’. In the condition that seeks to tap into the latter kind of deference, participants are presented with a scenario in which future scientific discoveries result in excluding from the extension of a term certain members currently thought to fall under that extension, e.g. discoveries that require excluding certain species now thought to be birds from the Aves class. The scenario is such that it is clear that the ‘discoveries’ bring us closer to the actual essence, if there is one, of birds. Our reasoning is that, if participants significantly modify their statements in the light of that scenario, they can be taken to ‘defer’ to the nature of the referent, thus vindicating indexical externalism. We test if words not normally assumed to be natural-kind terms – for instance summer, contract or rape – exhibit patterns of deference similar to those for bird. If so, then there’s a case for an extension of indexical externalism beyond the usual set of terms. What would be shown in this way is that speakers have something like realist intuitions with respect to words whose meaning is usually taken to be purely conventional or polemical. We are at the pre-test stage for the survey. We cannot yet report on our results. We should, however, have initial results by March, which, we believe, will enrich the observations made by previous empirical studies. References: Braisby, N., Franks, B. & Hampton, J. 1996. Essentialism, word use, and concepts. Cognition 59, 247-74./Genone, J. & Lombrozo, T. 2012. Concept possession, experimental semantics, and hybrid theories of reference. Philosophical Psychology 25, 717-742./Häggqvist, S. & Wikforss, Å. 2015. Experimental semantics: the case of natural kind terms, in J. Haukioja, Experimental Philosophy of Language, London, Bloomsbury./Jylkkä, J., Railo, H. & Haukioja, J. 2009. Psychological essentialism and semantic externalism: Evidence for externalism in lay speakers’ language use. Philosophical Psychology 22, 37-60./Mallon, R., Machery, E., Nichols, S. & Stich, S. 2009. Against arguments from reference, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79, 332-356./ Marconi, D. 1997. Language, Speech, and Communication. Lexical Competence. Cambridge : MIT Press./Moravcsik, J. 2016. Meaning, Creativity, and the Partial Inscrutability of the Human Mind, 2nd ed. Stanford: CSLI./Schroeter, L. & Schroeter, F. 2014. Normative concepts: a connectedness model, Philosophers’ Imprint 14, 1-26./ Wikforss, Å. 2010. Are natural kind terms special?, in H. Beebee and N. Sabbarton-Leary, The Semantics and Metaphysics of Natural Kinds, New York, Routledge, 64-83. (shrink)

Our aim in this paper is to clarify the distinctions and the relationships among several phenomena, each of which has certain characteristics of what is generally called “deference”. We distinguish linguistic deference, which concerns the use of language and the meaning of the words we use, from epistemic deference, which concerns our reasons and evidence for making the claims we make. In our in-depth study of linguistic deference, we distinguish two subcategories: default deference, and deliberate deference. We also discuss the (...) phenomenon of im-perfect mastery, often associated with deference, and which we show to be independent both of linguistic deference and of epistemic deference. If our analysis is correct, then some recent debates on deference can be shown to result from a failure to appreciate all the distinctions that we draw here. (shrink)

L’article présente d’abord les débats concernant les commentaires sur la Physique attribués à Siger de Brabant et considère ensuite la possibilité de lui attribuer celui que nous éditons ici. L’examen de critique interne essaie de dégager les doctrines fondamentales et de les comparer avec plusieurs textes de la même période. Les fortes ressemblances littéraires et doctrinales entre cet inédit et les œuvres de Siger de Brabant constituent la preuve que ce commentaire a bien été composé par ce dernier. Ce commentaire (...) apporte des éléments très importants contre l’hypothèse d’un changement doctrinal de Siger de Brabant. (shrink)

Dans les quelques paragraphes qu’il consacre à la comparaison entre la théologie révélée et la théologie philosophique, Siger de Brabant procède à de nombreux écarts par rapport au texte de Thomas d’Aquin qui lui sert de modèle. Cet article a pour but de montrer comment dans le même mouvement par lequel Siger reconnaît la supériorité de la théologie révélée sur plusieurs points, il en limite pourtant aussitôt, et assez strictement, le champ aussi bien du point de vue de la méthode (...) que du champ d’application. Ainsi, au-delà de l’accord de surface entre Siger et Thomas, il faut voir dans ce texte autant une défense de l’autonomie de la philosophie qu’une affirmation de sa supériorité pour tout ce qui peut être investigué par la raison humaine, un rejet donc, profond, du projet thomasien d’une théologie toute-puissante à laquelle sont subordonnées toutes les autres sciences.In the few paragraphs he dedicates to comparing revealed theology and philosophical theology, Siger of Brabant distances himself from the text of Thomas Aquinas which he uses as a model. This article aims to show how, in the same movement by which Siger acknowledges on many points the superiority of revealed theology, he nevertheless immediately limits its field, and this rather strictly, both from a methodological as well as a practical perspective. Thus, beyond the apparent agreement between Siger and Thomas, this text must be understood to be as much a defence of philosophy’s autonomy as an affirmation of its superiority with regard to everything which can be investigated by human reason; it is a deep rejection therefore of Thomas’ project of an all-powerful theology to which the other sciences are subordinated. (shrink)

L’abbaye du Mont-César a célébré lors de diverses manifestations religieuses et culturelles le premier centenaire de sa fondation. C’est le 13 avril 1899 que des moines, venus de l’abbaye de Maredsous, prenaient possession de la première aile d’un nouveau monastère bénédictin, édifié sur une butte historique, au nord de la ville de Louvain. Autrefois s’y était dressé, face à la ville, un château des ducs de Brabant. Nul doute que la proximité de l’université de Louvain avec ses multiples facultés n’ait (...) largement contribué à cette fondation bénédictine. (shrink)

La Universidad de París en la Europa de finales del siglo XIII fue centro de acaloradas discusiones acerca del alma del hombre. La cuestión del alma es el punto doctrinal central y se muestra decisivo porque en la resolución de este único punto puede verse el trasfondo antropológico y metafísico de toda una cosmovisión filosófica e incluso teológica del universo. Una de las más problemáticas cuestiones que se plantearon acerca del alma es el problema de la unidad del intelecto para (...) todos los hombres. Parecería contradictorio pensar que todos los hombres piensan con un único intelecto, pero a su vez suena absurdo afirmar que un principio espiritual, inmaterial, se una a un cuerpo por un tiempo determinado para luego separarse. Ambas posiciones surgen de la consideración de nuevos textos llegados a las manos de los pensadores parisinos a través de autores árabes: los textos del De anima de Aristóteles. (shrink)

Que la théorie de la « double vérité » n'a jamais été soutenue par les aristotéliciens radicaux du moyen âge est une certitude déjà acquise par les historiens. Le terme même d' « averroïstes » par lequel on les identifiait a été sérieusement mis en cause. Pourtant, il est évident que les maîtres és arts de Paris, dans la deuxième moitié du XIIIe siécle, ont éprouvé des difficultés considérables à mettre en harmonie les vérités de foi et les conclusions du (...) raisonnement philosophique. Comment se posait ce conflit et quelle voie de réconciliation ont-ils cherchée? Deux ouvrages récents nous donnent l'occasion de reprendre ce problème qui a fait déjà couler beaucoup d'encre dans l'historiographie du XXe siècle. Il s'agit de la monographie monumentale de M. Van Steenberghen sur Siger de Brabant et l'étude fondamentale de M.R. Hissette sur la condamnation de 1277. (shrink)

Introducción a la lectura del De aeternitate mundi El De aetemitate de Siger es un texto polémico, origen y parte de diversos equívocos producidos en un escenario de importantes contiendas doctrinales y profundos cambias históricos. Como introducción a su lectura intentaré caracterizar muy brevemente algunos de dichos equívocos y después, aun más brevemente, las líneas generales de la contienda en la que se encuadran. Al fin, expondré sinteticamente los criterios adaptados para la traducción, agregando en último término uma bibliografia básica (...) organizada por temas. Ya en el título encontramos un primer equívoco, porque no se trata de um Tractatus, como lo conoce la tradición, sino de una Reportatio, es decir, uma versión escrita basada en una exposición oral. Un segundo equívoco se encuentra también en el título. El escrito no trata de la eternidad del mundo sino de otro tema, mucho más acatado: la eternidad de la especie humana. Esto podría parecer una diferencia menor, pero no lo es: este texto le valieron a Siger la acusación de herejía y la consecuente reclusión en la corte papal donde fue asesinado. Dicha herejía consistia en negar, siguiendo rigurosamente la filosofia aristotélica, el carácter creado del mundo, negación que ninguna lectura atenta podrá encontrar en este escrito. El lector encontrará en cambio el tratamiento de un tema puntual en un detallado trabajo erudito, conciso, claro y sagaz que desarrolla sólo uno de los modos de producción de los seres expuestos por Aristóteles en Metafísica Z, VII. Por lo que la acusación, más allá de los fines que persiguiera en su momento, constituye uma clara tergiversación de los términos en que este escrito plantea el problema. (shrink)

Response to two papers by Philippe De Brabanter in the symposium on *Truth-Conditional Pragmatics* (OUP 2010).

As of Volume 9 (1994/95) John Benjamins Publishing Company is the official publisher of the Belgian Journal of Linguistics, the annual publication of the Linguistic Society of Belgium. Each volume is topical and includes selected papers from the international meetings organised by the LSB.

Human communication is multi-modal. It is an empirical fact that many of our acts of communication exploit a variety of means to make our communicative intentions recognisable. Scholars readily distinguish between verbal and non-verbal means of communication, and very often they deal with them separately. So it is that a great number of semanticists and pragmaticists give verbal communication preferential treatment. The non-verbal aspects of an act of communication are treated as if they were not underlain by communicative intentions. They (...) are “relegated” to mere aspects of the context. However, several schools of thoughts have a different take on the issue. Thus psychologists or semioticians of gesture have shown how intricately gestures and speech are related in utterances. And, in a different area of the theoretical landscape, so-called “Relevance Theorists” have made the same point. Thus, Robyn Carston writes that “the domain of pragmatics is a natural class of environmental phenomena, that of ostensive stimuli; verbal utterances are the central case, but not the only one, and they themselves are frequently accompanied by other ostensive gestures of the face, hands, voice etc, all of which have to be interpreted together if one is to correctly infer what is being communicated”. This position rests on the assumption that there is a single “pragmatic system” or module at work in the interpretation of “ostensive stimuli”. When it comes to interpreting verbal stimuli, the same mechanisms and resources are used as when it comes to processing non-verbal ones. If there is no distinct “linguistic pragmatic system”, then the scholar who studies communication should not favour the verbal at the expense of the non-verbal. In this paper, I want to make a contribution to the study of multi-modal messages by considering a type of utterances that mix the verbal with the non-verbal in such a way that a piece of non-linguistic communication seems to stand in for a linguistic constituent which remains unrealised. Here is a real-life example : I didn't see the [IMITATION OF FRIGHTENING GRUMPINESS] woman today; will she be back this week? The square-bracketed string in small capitals is meant to capture the facial expressions and gestures performed in the conversational setting. What is intriguing here is that this instance of ostensive mimicry does not come as a mere complement to some linguistic stimulus; it appears to take the place of that stimulus. I shall try to show that a linguistic analysis can indeed be offered for cases like – though, I believe, without succumbing to the pro-linguistic bias that Carston warns against. I will, however, argue against an ellipsis-based account : the structure of sentence does not contain an unrealised adjective phrase. Instead, I shall defend a ‘syntactic-recruitment' account. (shrink)

Are there “social kinds” the way there are “natural kinds”? Are social sciences likely to hit upon “essences” the way natural sciences do? Or are all social phenomena purely theoretical constructs? Questions about whether there are natural kinds, what exactly they are and which kinds of phenomena they cover have been the object of heated epistemological and metaphysical debates. We think the issues can be clarified within the limits of the philosophy of language: by looking into what ranges of general (...) terms are perceived by speakers as rigid designators of natural kinds. The first step to take is to ground the various kinds of semantic externalism in distinct brands of semantic deference. Our focus is on spotting the words for which speakers would defer not to the current usage of the word in the linguistic community, nor to the current experts of the field to which the word pertains, but ultimately to the very nature of the referent of the term. When speakers’ deference conforms to that pattern, we argue, that is evidence that indexical externalism provides the right metasemantic account of how the meaning of the word is determined; the word is treated like a natural-kind term. But how can patterns of deference be measured? In an ongoing survey, which shows a kinship with work by Braisby et al., Jylkkä et al., and Genone & Lombrozo, we confront participants with conditions that may prompt them to revise certain classificatory statements. Each condition makes salient one of the targets we have identified for deference: the community usage, the experts, the ‘world as it is’. In the condition that seeks to tap into the latter kind of deference, participants are presented with a scenario in which future scientific discoveries result in excluding from the extension of a term certain members currently thought to fall under that extension. Our reasoning is that, if participants significantly modify their statements in the light of that scenario, they can be taken to ‘defer’ to the nature of the referent, thus vindicating indexical externalism. We test if words not normally assumed to be natural-kind terms, including terms for social phenomena, exhibit patterns of deference similar to those for natural-kind terms. If so, speakers have something like realist intuitions with respect to words whose meaning is usually taken to be purely conventional or polemical, and there’s therefore a case for an extension of indexical externalism beyond its usual boundaries. Braisby, N., Franks, B. & Hampton, J. 1996. Essentialism, word use, and concepts. Cognition 59, 247-74./Genone, J. & Lombrozo, T. 2012. Concept possession, experimental semantics, and hybrid theories of reference. Philosophical Psychology 25, 717-742./Jylkkä, J., Railo, H. & Haukioja, J. 2009. Psychological essentialism and semantic externalism: Evidence for externalism in lay speakers’ language use. Philosophical Psychology 22, 37-60./Schwarz, S. 1983. Reply to Kornblith and Nelson. The Southern Journal of Philosophy 21, 475-481. (shrink)

We sketch several variants of so-called “semantic externalism”, which we take to be prototypically embodied by Wittgenstein, Kripke and Burge respectively. Then, drawing inspiration from Putnam, we show how aspects of these different kinds of semantic externalism can be articulated with each other in the case of natural kind terms, and we suggest that this analysis could be extended to a larger set of words. When that is done, we turn to the core part of the paper, which consists in (...) a thorough discussion of the forms of “semantic deference” that can plausibly be associated with each brand of externalism. We suggest that the debates over the kinds of semantic externalism characteristic of different kinds of words can be clarified by investigating the kind of semantic deference they call for. (shrink)

Most writers working on simultaneous use and mention assume a distinction between mixed quotation and scare quoting. The consensus is that MQ affects truth-conditions. Hence, many writers regard MQ as a semantic phenomenon. There is no such consensus about ScQ. On the face of it, there is a clear difference between: Alice said that life “is difficult to understand”. Several ‘groupies' followed the band on their tour. The words quoted in are attributed to Alice, and would seem false if Alice (...) had not uttered them. No such intuition is available for. This induces Cappelen & Lepore, leading writers in the field, to regard as a blend of Direct and Indirect Discourse and to propose the following semantic analysis : there is an utterance u such that Alice said u and u samesays “Life is difficult to understand” and u sametokens “is difficult to understand”. As for, they regard the impact of the quotation in it as being entirely pragmatic. I show, however, that there is no principled distinction between MQ and ScQ. The main points are: speech attribution to Alice in is defeasible; there are cases of simultaneous use and mention without “say” which are semantically relevant ; there is apparent MQ with reporting verbs that pose a problem because they cannot govern Direct Speech reports. Hence, it is illegitimate to appeal to the sametokening predicate in logical form. These examples that ‘refuse' to fall neatly under MQ or ScQ seal the fate of Cappelen & Lepore's account. To conclude, I discuss Benbaji's fully semantic theory. Benbaji adopts Cappelen & Lepore's views on MQ. But he also proposes a semantic account of ScQ. One option for him is to give up the Cappelen & Lepore story and extend his views on ScQ to all instances of simultaneous use and mention. I show, however, that this too fails. Therefore, in the end, only a pragmatic account of simultaneous use and mention remains as a viable option. (shrink)

This book, "Utterance Interpretation and Cognitive Models", is a collection of papers that stems from the conference of the same name held at the Free University of Brussels in June 2006. Our main objective is to reconcile armchair theorising about the semantics-pragmatics interface with hypotheses about cognitive architecture. For that reason, the papers in the collection place some of the hottest questions in contemporary philosophy of language within the scope of a psychologically plausible theory of human communication. The collection is (...) articulated into three parts. The first concerns the cognitive counterparts of lexical meanings. The second explores the links between moods and forces. The third looks at the epistemological status of semantic theory from the point of view of human psychology. (shrink)

This paper deals with the reference of quotations. Several positions can be discerned in the literature: 1. Quotations do not refer; 2. Quotations only refer to types or classes; 3. Quotations can refer to a variety of objects. Although I believe the third position to be the most sensible one, I show that it cannot be taken for granted and that arguments proving it to be correct are hard to come by.