Are individuals responsible for the consequences of actions taken by their community? What about their community's inaction or its attitudes? In this innovative book, Larry May departs from the traditional Western view that moral responsibility is limited to the consequences of overt individual action. Drawing on the insights of Arendt, Jaspers, and Sartre, he argues that even when individuals are not direct participants, they share responsibility for various harms perpetrated by their communities.
Machine generated contents note: 1. Introduction: normative principles of jus post bellum; Part I. Retribution: 2. Grotius, sovereignty, and the indictment of Al Bashir; 3. Transitional justice and the Just War tradition; 4. War crimes trials during and after war; Part II. Reconciliation: 5. Reconciliation of warring parties; 6. Reconciliation and the rule of law; 7. Conflicting responsibilities to protect human rights; Part III. Rebuilding: 8. Responsibility to rebuild and collective responsibility; 9. Responsibility to rebuild as a limitation on initiating (...) war; Part IV. Restitution and Reparation: 10. Restitution and restoration in jus post bellum; 11. A Grotian account of reparations; Part V. Proportionality and the End of War: 12. Proportionality and the fog of war. (shrink)
Virginia Held, best known for her landmark book Rights and Goods, has made an indelible mark on the fields of ethics, feminist philosophy, and social and political thought. Her impact on a generation of feminist thinkers is unrivaled and she has been at the forfront of discussions about the way in which an ethic of care can affect social and political matters. These new essays by leading contemporary philosophers range over all of these areas. While each stands alone, the essays (...) together demonstrate the lasting value of Held's work to the field. Includes an afterword by Held. (shrink)
In this, the first major philosophical study of contingent pacifism, Larry May offers a new account of pacifism from within the Just War tradition. Written in a non-technical style, the book features real-life examples from contemporary wars and applies a variety of approaches ranging from traditional pacifism and human rights to international law and conscientious objection. May considers a variety of thinkers and theories, including Hugo Grotius, Kant, Socrates, Seneca on restraint, Tertullian on moral purity, Erasmus's arguments against just war, (...) and Hobbes's conception of public conscience. The guiding idea is that the possibility of a just war is conceded, but not at the current time or in the foreseeable future due to the nature of contemporary armed conflict and geopolitics - wars in the past are also unlikely to have been just wars. This volume will interest scholars and upper-level students of political philosophy, philosophy of law, and war studies. (shrink)
This best-selling text continues to fill an existing gap in the literature taught in applied ethics courses. As a growing number of courses that include the perspectives of diverse cultures are being added to the university curriculum, texts are needed that represent more multicultural and diverse histories and backgrounds. This new edition enhances gender coverage, as nearly half of the pieces are now authored by women. The new edition also increases the percentage of pieces written by those who come from (...) a non-Western background. It offers twelve up-to-date articles on human rights, environmental ethics, poverty, war and violence, gender, race, euthanasia, and abortion; all of these topics are addressed from Western and non-Western perspectives. (shrink)
The just war tradition began life, primarily in the writings of Augustine and other Church Fathers, as a reaction to pacifism. In my view, contemporary just war adherents should also see pacifism as their main rival. The key question of the just war tradition is how to justify war, given that war involves intentionally attacking or killing innocent people. And this justificatory enterprise is not an easy one. Today some theorists argue that some, but not all, soldiers are liable to (...) be attacked, especially those who fight in an unjust war. In this view, some of those who fight and kill in unjust wars should not be excused for following orders or even for their ignorance. Yet, it is often hard to tell if one is fighting in an unjust war, or whether military orders are unjust. I will argue that, especially in light of new work by just war adherents, the moral risks of participating in war are so high that pacifism, at least in its contingent form, should be seen as a reasonable option. The new versions of the just war doctrine bring us much closer to pacifism than their adherents would admit. (shrink)
Our primary focus is the concept of intimacy, especially in the context of adult American male relationships. We begin with an examination of comradeship, a nonintimate form of friendship, then develop an account of the nature and value of intimacy in friendship. We follow this with discussions of obstacles to intimacy and of Aristotle's views. In the final section, we discuss the process of men attaining intimacy.
Now, twenty years later, this collection of fifteenessays brings her work into dialogue with those philosophical views that are at center stage today-- in critical theory, communitarianism, virtue theory, and feminism.
The categories of "civilian" or "soldier,” “combatant" or “noncombatant,” are thought to be stable. Yet, the case of the naked soldier taking a bath challenges such stability in a way that illustrates the serious conceptual and normative problems with identifying such social groups.
We criticize the following views: only the rapist is responsible since only he committed the act; no one is responsible since rape is a biological response to stimuli; everyone is responsible since men and women contribute to the rape culture; and patriarchy is responsible but no person or group. We then argue that, in some societies, men are collectively responsible for rape since most benefit from rape and most are similar to the rapist.
The idea of due process of law is recognised as the cornerstone of domestic legal systems, and in this book Larry May makes a powerful case for its extension to international law. Focussing on the procedural rights deriving from Magna Carta, such as the rights of habeas corpus and nonrefoulement, he examines the legal rights of detainees, whether at Guantanamo or in refugee camps. He offers a conceptual and normative account of due process within a general system of global justice, (...) and argues that due process should be recognised as jus cogens, as universally binding in international law. His vivid and compelling study will be of interest to a wide range of readers in political philosophy, political theory, and the theory and practice of international law. (shrink)
The Rwandan genocide of 1994 occurred due to widespread complicity. I will argue that complicity can be the basis for legal liability, even for criminal liability, if two conditions are met. First, the person’s actions or inactions must be causally efficacious at least in the sense that had the person not committed these actions or inactions the harm would have been made significantly less likely to occur. Second, the person must know that her actions or inactions risk contributing to a (...) harmful enterprise, and must intend that these actions or inactions risk making this contribution. But it is not part of this analysis that the defendant must intend the harmful result. I explore the boundaries between legal and moral complicity and end with a discussion of how the analysis defended in the paper affects such questions as how many people in Rwanda should be prosecuted for the genocide which occurred due to widespread complicity. (shrink)
Three medical ethicists take varied and often opposing stands on the ethical, social, and political issues that arise when religious and medical practices conflict. The interchange focuses on the tensions between the belief systems, institutional practices, and health-related decisions of Christian Scientists and those of a secularized medically oriented, broader society.
Larry May argues that the best way to understand war crimes is as crimes against humanness rather than as violations of justice. He shows that in a deeply pluralistic world, we need to understand the rules of war as the collective responsibility of states that send their citizens into harm's way, as the embodiment of humanity, and as the chief way for soldiers to retain a sense of honour on the battlefield. Throughout, May demonstrates that the principle of humanness is (...) the cornerstone of international humanitarian law, and is itself the basis of the traditional principles of discrimination, necessity, and proportionality. He draws extensively on the older Just War tradition to assess recent cases from the International Tribunal for Yugoslavia as well as examples of atrocities from the archives of the International Committee of the Red Cross. (shrink)
Universal Human Rights brings new clarity to the important and highly contested concept of universal human rights. This collection of essays explores the foundations of universal human rights in four sections devoted to their nature, application, enforcement, and limits, concluding that shared rights help to constitute a universal human community, which supports local customs and separate state sovereignty. The eleven contributors to this volume demonstrate from their very different perspectives how human rights can help to bring moral order to an (...) otherwise divided world. (shrink)
This book was the first booklength treatment of the philosophical foundations of international criminal law. The focus is on the moral, legal, and political questions that arise when individuals who commit collective crimes, such as crimes against humanity, are held accountable by international criminal tribunals. These tribunals challenge one of the most sacred prerogatives of states - sovereignty - and breaches to this sovereignty can be justified in limited circumstances, following what the author calls a minimalist account of the justification (...) of international prosecution. Written in a clear and accessible style, this book should appeal to anyone with an interest in international law, political philosophy, international relations, and human rights theory. (shrink)
Children are the real victims of world hunger: at least 70% of the malnourished people of the world are children. By best estimates forty thousand children a day die of starvation (FAO 1989: 5). Children do not have the ability to forage for themselves, and their nutritional needs are exceptionally high. Hence, they are unable to survive for long on their own, especially in lean times. Moreover, they are especially susceptible to diseases and conditions which are the staple of undernourished (...) people: simple infections and simple diarrhea (UNICEF 1993: 22). Unless others provide adequate food, water, and care, children will suffer and die (WHO 1974: 677, 679). This fact must frame any moral discussions of the problem. And so it does — at least pre-philosophically. When most of us first see pictures of seriously undernourished children, we want to help them, we have a sense of responsibility to them, we feel sympathy toward them (Hume 1978: 368-71). Even those who think we needn't or shouldn't help the starving take this initial response seriously: they go to great pains to show that this sympathetic response should be constrained. They typically claim that assisting the hungry will demand too much of us, or that assistance would be useless and probably detrimental. The efforts of objectors to undermine this natural sympathetic reaction would be pointless unless they saw its psychological force. We want to explain and bolster this sympathetic reaction — this conviction that those of us in a position to help are responsible to the.. (shrink)
The principle of discrimination (or distinction, as it is sometimes called in legal circles) requires that soldiers treat civilians differently from fellow soldiers, generally not attacking the former except in extreme situations. The Geneva Conventions call for a clear separation of people into two camps: those who are protected from assault, including army medical personnel, injured soldiers, prisoners of war, and civilians on the one hand, and soldiers actively engaged in hostilities on the other hand. Since the Middle Ages, it (...) has been common to differentiate these people into two large groups, although there has not been wide agreement about which of the following groups were the most salient: civilians versus soldiers; noncombatants versus combatants; or the innocent versus the non-innocent (the guilty). In this chapter, I will argue that the principle of discrimination or distinction is most plausibly defended as an extension of the principle of humane treatment, and only on that basis is it to be seen as providing a nonutilitarian basis for deciding how to act during war. (shrink)
Corporate property rights present an interesting challenge to the liberal conception of property rights, for it is unclear that the self-respect of individuals is promoted by the existence of a system of property rights for corporations. I argue that it is difficult even to identify who the individuals are who are the owners of large corporations, and why these individuals should be given the same claims, protections and immunities as other property rights holders since the liabilities of corporate property rights (...) holders are not the same as of those, for instance, who own their own homes. In this paper I first try to understand who it is who owns the large corporation. Secondly, I show that the limited liability of these corporate property owners makes the justification of corporate property rights quite difficult, from the classical liberal perspective. I end with a few brief remarks on changes in legal policy which would be consistent with my arguments on the nature and justification of corporate property rights. (shrink)
Despite the fact that torture of prisoners has been condemned by every major document in international law, it has seemed to some, especially those in the Bush Administration, that terrorism creates a special case for how prisoners are to be treated. The prisoner may belong to a “cell” of those who have committed themselves to the use of tactics that risk horrible consequences for many innocent people. The prisoner may have information about future attacks on civilian populations that could, if (...) learned, be instrumental in the prevention of these attacks. Nonetheless, I will argue that normally even suspected international terrorists should be treated humanely in that they are not subject to torture when captured and imprisoned. Our humanity demands as much.I will ask what it is about humanity that might restrict or prohibit the use of torture and other forms of physical coercion in the treatment of prisoners. I will attempt to explain why torture has been so roundly condemned and yet why torture, especially in ticking time-bomb cases, has been seen as justifiable. In section 1, I argue that humane treatment should be seen as the centerpiece of international humanitarian law. In section 2, I discuss a 1999 case from Israel concerning soldiers who committed torture to obtain information from suspected terrorists in the Occupied Territories. In section 3, I discuss how the principle of proportionality complicates the picture, and end with some conclusions about what restrictions should be recognized in times of war, concerning what are sometimes called “the laws of humanity.”. (shrink)
