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Laura Danón
National University of Córdoba
  1. Neo-Pragmatism, Primitive Intentionality and Animal Minds.Laura Danón - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (1):39-58.
    According to Hutto and Satne, 521–536, 2015), an “essential tension” plagues contemporary neo-Pragmatist accounts of mental contents: their explanation of the emergence and constitution of intentional mental contents is circular. After identifying the problem, they also propose a solution: what neo-Pragmatists need to do, to overcome circularity, is to appeal to a primitive content-free variety of intentionality, different from the full-blown intentionality of propositional attitudes. In this paper, I will argue that, in addition to the problem of circularity, there is (...)
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  2.  28
    Perceiving Mental States: Co-Presence and Constitution.Laura Danón & Daniel Kalpokas - 2017 - Filosofia Unisinos 18 (2).
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  3.  73
    Conceptos de sustancias y conceptos de propiedades en animales no humanos.Laura Danón - 2013 - Critica 45 (133):27-54.
    El presente trabajo tiene dos objetivos centrales. Primero caracterizaré una variante de pragmatismo conceptual según la cual algunos conceptos deben entenderse como habilidades para identificar sustancias e identificar propiedades del entorno, y mostraré que quien cuenta con esas dos habilidades satisface, en grados diversos en cada caso, distintos requisitos centrales para la posesión de conceptos. Posteriormente defenderé la viabilidad de extender este enfoque a los animales no humanos, apelando a evidencia empírica que indica que distintas especies son capaces de identificar (...)
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  4.  2
    Opacidad Referencial y Atribución Intencional a Animales Sin Lenguaje.Laura Danón - 2016 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 20 (2):143-164.
    In this paper I examine Davidson’s argument from referential opacity against the attribution of thoughts to non-linguistics animals. I will begin by reconstructing the strongest version of the argument — i.e., the one which is better suited to overcome the different objections that have been raised against it. Once that is done, I will also object this version arguing, in a nutshell, that the fact that non-human animals lack language does not preclude us from acquiring some knowledge of their mental (...)
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  5. Animal Beliefs: A Dispositional Proposal.Laura Danon - 2010 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 29 (2):39-53.
     
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  6.  18
    Atribuciones intencionales a animales sin lenguaje: aspectualidad y opacidad referencial.Laura Danón - 2013 - Areté. Revista de Filosofía 25 (1):27-48.
    “Intentional Attributions to Animals without Language: Aspectuality and Referential Opacity”. It is generally accepted that intentional attributions are referentially opaque. But, as it is also stressed in the literature, referential opacity introduces difficulties to those who defend the attribution of intentionalmental states to non-human animals. In this paper: i) I identify one of these difficulties –which I call the problem of nonsense –; ii) I offer an answer to that problem. In order to accomplish ii), I begin by examining which (...)
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  7.  32
    Creencias animales: una propuesta disposicionalista.Laura Danón - 2010 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 29 (2):39-53.
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  8.  9
    El Pensamiento Animal y Su Expresión Lingüística.Laura Danón - 2016 - Análisis Filosófico 36 (2):261-289.
    Nuestros intentos por hallar palabras que capturen de modo preciso los contenidos de los pensamientos de los animales suelen tropezar con dificultades persistentes. En este trabajo evaluaré dos explicaciones de este fenómeno discutidas por Beck : la explicación basada en el carácter poco familiar de los contenidos animales -que él rechaza- y la basada en diferencias de formato -que resulta su favorita-. En primer lugar, objetaré las razones por las cuales Beck descarta la explicación basada en el carácter poco familiar (...)
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    Perceiving Mental States: Co-Presence and Constitution.Laura Danón & Daniel Kalpokas - 2018 - Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy 57:29-34.
    Recently, some philosophers of mind have called the attention to the idea according to which we can perceive, in many cases, some mental states of others. In this paper we consider two recent proposals: the co-presence thesis and the hybrid model. We will examine the aforementioned alternatives and present some objections against both of them. Then, we will propose a way of integrating both accounts that allows us to avoid these objections. In a nutshell, our idea is that by perceiving (...)
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  10.  35
    Pushmi-Pullyu Representations and Mindreading in Chimpanzees.Laura Danón - 2016 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 9 (1):208-236.
    Lurz and Krachun propose a new experimental protocol designed to discriminate genuine mindreading animals from mere behavior-readers and to give evidence in favor of the claim that chimpanzees are capable of attributing internal goals to others. They suggest that chimpanzees' variety of "internal goal attribution" consists in attributing to others basic intentional representations, baptized by Millikan as "pushmi-pullyu representations". Now, Millikan distinguishes what I propose to call 'pure' PPs from more complex varieties of PPs, which allow their owners to respond (...)
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  11.  13
    The content of aliefs.Laura Danón - forthcoming - Synthese:1-18.
    In “Against alief”, Mandelbaum :197–211, 2013) argues that if aliefs—a sui generis kind of mental states originally posited by Gendler :634–663, 2008a; Mind Lang 23:552–585, 2008b; Analysis 72:799–811, 2012)—are to play the explanatory role that is usually ascribed to them, their contents must be propositionally structured. However, he contends, if aliefs have propositional contents, it is unclear what distinguishes them from beliefs. I find Mandelbaum’s arguments in favour of the idea that aliefs must have propositional contents to be compelling. However, (...)
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  12.  23
    Undetachable Concepts in Non-Human Animals.Laura Danón - 2018 - Philosophies 3 (2):14-0.
    In this paper, I would like to explore the idea that some non-human animals may be incapable of detaching or separating some of their concepts both from other concepts and from the larger thought contents that they are part of. This, in turn, will make it impossible for them to recombine these undetachable concepts with others in every admissible way. I will begin by distinguishing three different ways in which one concept may be undetachable from others, and I will show (...)
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