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Laura Frances Callahan
University of Notre Dame
  1. Moral Testimony: A Re-Conceived Understanding Explanation.Laura Frances Callahan - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (272):437-459.
    Why is there a felt asymmetry between cases in which agents defer to testifiers for certain moral beliefs, and cases in which agents defer on many other matters? One explanation influential in the literature is that having understanding of a proposition is both in tension with acquiring belief in the proposition by deferring to another's testimony and distinctively important when it comes to moral propositions, as compared with what we might think of as many ‘garden variety’ facts. My project in (...)
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  2.  65
    Religious Faith and Intellectual Virtue.Laura Frances Callahan & Timothy O'Connor (eds.) - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
    Is religious faith consistent with being an intellectually virtuous thinker? In seeking to answer this question, one quickly finds others, each of which has been the focus of recent renewed attention by epistemologists: What is it to be an intellectually virtuous thinker? Must all reasonable belief be grounded in public evidence? Under what circumstances is a person rationally justified in believing something on trust, on the testimony of another, or because of the conclusions drawn by an intellectual authority? Can it (...)
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  3.  55
    Epistemic Existentialism.Laura Frances Callahan - forthcoming - Episteme:1-16.
    Subjectivist permissivism is a prima facie attractive view. That is, it's plausible to think that what's rational for people to believe on the basis of their evidence can vary if they have different frameworks or sets of epistemic standards. In this paper, I introduce an epistemic existentialist form of subjectivist permissivism, which I argue can better address “the arbitrariness objection” to subjectivist permissivism in general. According to the epistemic existentialist, it's not just that what's rational to believe on the basis (...)
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    Moral Reasons Not to Breastfeed: A Response to Woollard and Porter.Laura Frances Callahan - 2019 - Journal of Medical Ethics 45 (3):213-214.
    Woollard and Porter argue that mothers have no moral duty to breastfeed their babies. Rather, mothers simply have moral reason(s) to breastfeed, stemming from the benefits of breast feeding for babies. According to Woollard and Porter, doing what one has moral reason to do is often supererogatory, not obligatory. I agree that mothers have no moral duty to breastfeed. However, it is misleading to suggest that mothers in general have moral reason to breastfeed and to liken not breastfeeding to not (...)
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  5.  28
    Humility for Everyone: A No-Distraction Account.Laura Frances Callahan - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
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    Jonathan L. Kvanvig, Faith and Humility.Laura Frances Callahan - 2019 - Ethics 130 (1):124-129.
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    Motherhood and the Moral Load.Laura Frances Callahan - 2021 - Think 20 (58):55-68.
    Many of the decisions mothers face are morally intense. They're experienced as highly morally significant, and they are also often very morally complex, meaning that there aren't black-and-white, obvious answers to questions about what one morally may or must do. For example, I suggest that breastfeeding is complex in this way, despite a good deal of cultural pressure in favour of trying to do it. Acknowledging many of the decisions of motherhood as complex or as ‘grey areas’ is accurate, and (...)
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  8. Moral Testimony.Laura Frances Callahan - 2020 - In Miranda Fricker, Peter Graham, David Henderson & Nikolaj J. Pedersen (eds.), The Routledge handbook of social epistemology. New York, NY, USA: pp. 123-134.
  9. On the Problem of Paradise.Laura Frances Callahan - 2016 - Faith and Philosophy 33 (2):129-141.
    Matthew Benton, John Hawthorne, and Yoaav Isaacs (BHI) claim that evil must be evidence against God’s existence, because the absence of evil would be (presumably excellent) evidence for it. Their argument is obviously valid on standard Bayesian epistemology. But in addition to raising a few reasons one might doubt its premise, I here highlight the rather misleading meaning, in BHI’s argument, of evil’s being evidence against God. BHI seek to establish that if one learned simply “that there was evil,” perhaps (...)
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    Perception, Discrimination, and Knowledge.Laura Frances Callahan - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):39-53.
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  11. Skill and Knowledge.Ernest Sosa & Laura Frances Callahan - 2021 - In Ellen Fridland & Carlotta Pavese (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Skill and Expertise. London: Routledge. pp. 146-156.
     
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