11 found
Order:
See also
Laura Papish
George Washington University
  1.  30
    Kant on Evil, Self-Deception, and Moral Reform.Laura Papish - 2018 - Oxford University Press.
    Throughout his writings, and particularly in Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, Kant alludes to the idea that evil is connected to self-deceit, and while numerous commentators regard this as a highly attractive thesis, none have seriously explored it. Kant on Evil, Self-Deception, and Moral Reform addresses this crucial element of Kant's ethical theory. -/- Working with both Kant's core texts on ethics and materials less often cited within scholarship on Kant's practical philosophy (such as Kant's logic lectures), Papish (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  2.  37
    CAPS Psychology and the Empirical Adequacy of Aristotelian Virtue Ethics.Laura Papish - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (3):537-549.
    For the past decade and a half, Aristotelians have tried to counter the following criticism articulated by John Doris: if we look at personality and social psychology research, we must conclude that we generally neither have, nor have the capacity to develop, character traits of the kind envisioned by Aristotle and his followers. Some defenses of Aristotelian virtue ethics proceed by trying to insulate it from this challenge, while others have tried to dissipate the force of Doris's critique by showing (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  3.  76
    The Cultivation of Sensibility in Kant's Moral Philosophy.Laura Papish - 2007 - Kantian Review 12 (2):128-146.
    In his later moral writings Kant claims that we have a duty to cultivate certain aspects of our sensuous nature. This claim is surprising for three reasons. First, given Kant’s ‘incorporation thesis’ − which states that the only sensible states capable of determining our actions are those that we willingly introduce and integrate into our maxims − it would seem that the content of our inclinations is morally irrelevant. Second, the exclusivity between the passivity that is characteristic of sensibility and (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  4.  27
    Kant’s Revised Account of the Non-Moral Imperatives of Practical Reason.Laura Papish - 2018 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5.
    Two generalizations can be made regarding Kant’s account of imperatives of skill and prudence. First, Groundwork 4:412-420 remains the locus classicus for reconstructions of Kant’s view. Second, it is widely agreed that Kant’s treatment of these imperatives is confusing, incomplete, and lacking the requisite argumentation. I agree that Groundwork 4:412-420 lacks a clear and defensible account of imperatives of skill and prudence. But while many think this spells trouble for Kant’s theory of non-moral practical imperatives more generally, and that Kant (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  5.  1
    Expansionist Interpretations of Radical Evil.Laura Papish - 2018 - In Violetta L. Waibel, Margit Ruffing & David Wagner (eds.), Natur Und Freiheit. Akten des Xii. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses. De Gruyter. pp. 2021-2028.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  6.  48
    Kant on the Independence of the Moral Law From Sensibility.Laura Papish - 2015 - Kantian Review 20 (1):77-98.
    There are several senses in which Kant’s moral law is independent of sensibility. This paper is devoted mainly to Kant’s account of ‘physical conditions independence’, or the idea that the moral law can compel us to pursue ends that might be impossible to realize empirically. Since this idea has gotten little attention from commentators, this paper addresses both its textual basis in Kant’s writings and its overall philosophical viability.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  7.  39
    Aristotle on Common Perception.Laura Papish - 2014 - Apeiron 47 (3):342-55.
    In his account of human perception in De Anima, Aristotle focuses on characterizing special perception and its objects. This focus, however, comes at a price, as Aristotle neglects to explain why incidental and common objects should also be called objects of perception. My goal is to reconstruct on Aristotle’s behalf a plausible account of why the commons can rightly be called objects of perception.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8.  51
    Moral Feeling and Moral Conversion in Kant's "Religion".Laura Papish - 2013 - Idealistic Studies 43 (1-2):11 - 26.
    Kant’s account of moral feeling is continually disputed in the secondary literature. My goal is to focus on the Religion and make sense of moral feeling as it appears in this context. I argue that we can best understand moral feeling if we note its place in Kant’s concerns about the possibility of moral conversion. As Kant notes, if the new, morally upright man is of a different character than the man he used to be, then it remains unclear how (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9.  4
    Promoting Black (Social) Identity.Laura Papish - 2015 - Social Theory and Practice 41 (1):1-25.
  10.  14
    Rethinking Kant 5: Edited by Pablo Muchnik and Oliver Thorndike, Cambridge, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2018, Pp. 329, £64.99 , ISBN: 978-1-5275-0366-3.Laura Papish - 2019 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 27 (5):1055-1057.
    Volume 27, Issue 5, September 2019, Page 1055-1057.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11.  89
    The Changing Shape of Korsgaard’s Understanding of Constructivism.Laura Papish - 2011 - Journal of Value Inquiry 45 (4):451-463.
    The goal of the following paper is to consider the development and viability of Korsgaard’s latest work, Self-Constitution. More specifically, I show that we should understand this book as a response to difficulties with both Korsgaard’s argument in 1996’s The Sources of Normativity and Korsgaard’s earlier attempts to explain what marks the difference between realist and constructivist approaches to ethical theory. I begin by focusing primarily on her essay “Realism and Constructivism in Twentieth-Century Moral Philosophy.” Here I consider exactly how (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark