In this paper we argue that the formalisms for decoherence originally devised to deal just with closed or open systems can be subsumed under a general conceptual framework, in such a way that they cooperate in the understanding of the same physical phenomenon. This new perspective dissolves certain conceptual difficulties of the einselection program but, at the same time, shows that the openness of the quantum system is not the essential ingredient for decoherence. †To contact the authors, please write to: (...) Mario Castagnino, CONICET-IAFE, Universidad Nacional de Buenos Aires, Casilla de Correos 67, Sucursal 28, 1428 Buenos Aires, Argentina; Roberto Laura, IFIR-Universidad Nacional de Rosario, Av. Pellegrini 250, 2000 Rosario, Argentina; Olimpia Lombardi, CONICET-Universidad Nacional de Buenos Aires, C. Larralde 3440, 6°D, 1430, Buenos Aires; e-mail: olimpiafilo@arnet.com.ar. (shrink)
Henrich et al. propose that humans are genetically equipped with learning mechanisms that enable them to acquire the preferences and beliefs related to economic prosocial behaviors. In addition to their cross-cultural data, they cite developmental evidence in support of this theory. We challenge Henrich et al.'s interpretation of the developmental data in a discussion of recent work which suggests that preferences for altruism and fairness may have an innate basis.
(1985). The Philosophical Foundations of Medical Education* Educational Philosophy and Theory: Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 29-43. doi: 10.1111/j.1469-5812.1985.tb00027.x.
The burden of this piece is to draw together into a coherent whole the somewhat diverse strands of Israel Scheffler's thought on the philosophy of religion. Extrapolating from personal discussions with Professor Scheffler, various of his books, articles, and other unpublished materials authored and kindly provided by him, I contend that he adumbrates a post-empiricist rendering of religious belief which masterfully avoids some philosophical problems, while unwittingly giving rise to others. Committed to the view that the methodology of science â (...) in one or other of its more acceptable guises â provides the most reliable measure of the content and structure of reality. Scheffler is bound conceptually to redefine Jewish belief in such a way that the traditional conflict between religion and science never emerges. Consistent with this end, he is concerned to divest traditional Judaism of its metaphysical garb, so that what remains are simply the matters of living to which religion ought properly on his view address itself. The Bible is thus reconceptualized as a piece of rich literature, of no real difference in logical kind to any other piece of rich literature, except that it defines uniquely, along with the Torah and other relevant Jewish literature, the history of the particular community whose perception of human values and meaningfulness forms the core of what it is to be Jewish. (shrink)
The authors of this book show that the failure of public health arises, not from a failure of contemporary medicine, but from a failure of the philosophical assumptions upon which it rests. They suggest an alternative approach to health care that derives from a ecological and holistic philosophy of nature.
In his recent book The Idea of Justice, Amartya Sen suggests that political philosophy should move beyond the dominant, Rawls-inspired, methodological paradigm – what Sen calls ‘transcendental institutionalism’ – towards a more practically oriented approach to justice: ‘realization-focused comparison’. In this article, I argue that Sen's call for a paradigm shift in thinking about justice is unwarranted. I show that his criticisms of the Rawlsian approach are either based on misunderstandings, or correct but of little consequence, and conclude that the (...) Rawlsian approach already delivers much of what Sen himself wants from a theory of justice. (shrink)
In this paper, I defend brain death as a criterion for determining death against objections raised by Don Marquis, Michael Nair-Collins, Doyen Nguyen, and Laura Specker Sullivan. I argue that any definition of death for beings like us relies on some sortal concept by which we are individuated and identified and that the choice of that concept in a practical context is not determined by strictly biological considerations but involves metaphysical, moral, social, and cultural considerations. This view supports acceptance (...) of a more pluralistic legal definition of death as well as acceptance of brain death as death. (shrink)
This conversation between Laura Mulvey and Roberta Sassatelli offers a historical reconstruction of Mulvey’s work, from her famous essay ‘Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema’ to her most recent reflections on male gaze, film technology and visual culture. The conversation initially deals with the socio-cultural context in which the ‘Visual Pleasure...’ essay was produced by outlining a number of possible theoretical parallelisms with other scholars, from Foucault to Barthes to Goffman. Then, on the basis of Mulvey’s latest book, Death 24× (...) a Second, and of a variety of contemporary examples, the emphasis is on the relative shift in Mulvey’s work from gender to time and visual technology. Finally, the conversation focuses on the concept of ‘gendered scopic regime’ and the potential re-articulation of the male gaze through the technological re-direction and control of the visual. (shrink)
Many theists of a traditional bent have been bothered by the apparent tension between God's essential omnipotence and his essential moral goodness. Nelson Pike draws attention to the conflict between these two attributes in his article ‘Omnipotence and God's Ability to Sin’, and there have been many attempts to respond to it since that time. Most of these responses argue that the essential omnipotence and essential goodness of God are not logically incompatible, so that the traditional conception of God is (...) not incoherent; I think the arguments have been largely successful. However, some theists have found the typical responses to Pike less than convincing, and are tempted to surrender the claim that God has moral perfection essentially in favour of the more modest claim that God is morally perfect in the actual world though in some possible worlds God is morally defective. I argue in this paper that this fall-back position is incoherent. More accurately, I argue that a necessary being who is essentially omniscient and essentially omnipotent cannot be contingently morally perfect or contingently morally defective. Any such being is either essentially good or essentially evil. Since the latter alternative seems unattractive, I argue that theists should embrace the essential moral perfection of God. (shrink)
El ámbito de los estudios kantianos y, más concretamente, la evaluación del lugar que la antropología ocupa en la arquitectónica del criticismo se verá decididamente beneficiado por esta nueva aportación que la investigadora italiana Laura Anna Macor, investigadora de la Universidad de Padua, dedica al estudio de la influencia ejercida por la filosofía crítica de Kant en el primer Idealismo alemán. El lector interesado en el volumen que reseñamos encontrará ulteriores fuentes de esclarecimiento sobre el objeto de investigación, a (...) saber, la compleja y ambigua relación entre antropología y moral en la primera recepción del criticismo, en otros trabajos de la misma Autora2, que contribuyen a definir una figura, que aquí se propone identificar con una elipse (2010, p. 17 y 163), cuyos focos estarían ocupados respectivamente por la fundamentación kantiana de la moral y por el discurso antropológico revitalizado por J. G. Sulzer y sus discípulos en Württemberg y, posteriormente, por F. Schiller en Turingia, elipse cuyo contorno termina de dibujar este volumen publicado en 2011. (shrink)
This essay is a response to the comments and critique of Laura Purdy to my earlier paper "Re-Fusing Nature/Nurture" (1983, 621-632). In it I re-emphasize that the traditional nature/nurture dichotomy is based upon an unacceptable ontology and briefly note the type of metaphysic that would serve as a more appropriate basis.
Le présent ouvrage est la deuxième édition, revue et augmentée, de Parole onascoltate. Le donne e la costruzione dello Stato-nazione in Italia e in Francia. 1789-1860, préface de Ginevra Conti Odorisio, Roma, Editori Riunti, 1994. Fruit d'une recherche franco-italienne sur les relations entre les femmes et la politique au XIXe siècle (Christiane Veauvy, chargée de recherches au CNRS, a donné un enseignement sur les saint-simoniennes dans le séminaire universitaire de Laura Pisano, pro..
Laura Valentini’s Justice in a Globalized World presents, with admirable clarity, a new, hybrid conception of global justice that builds on insights from both cosmopolitans and statists, especially their relational variants. Relational cosmopolitans generally argue that substantial economic cooperation and interdependence (i.e., the relevant economic relations) trigger robust obligations of distributive justice. They then argue that, as a matter of fact, these relations obtain globally in virtue of intensifying global trade, capital flows, and labor migration. Thus, relational cosmopolitans conclude (...) that obligations of distributive justice directly apply to the global economic order. Relational statists, by contrast, argue that obligations of distributive justice are trigged by coercive, political relations. Furthermore, these coercive relations only obtain—and can only be justified—within a state. As a consequence, the global order is a ‘secondary site’ of justice that ought to be con. (shrink)
Upshot: Gabriele Chiari and the late Maria Laura Nuzzo’s new book, Constructivist Psychotherapy: A Narrative Hermeneutic Approach, is a?densely packed little tome that marks the most fully developed effort so far to present a model of personal construct psychotherapy that theoretically incorporates aspects of radical constructivism, narrative psychology, and social constructionism. The theoretically inclined will not be disappointed.
En este trabajo cuestiono las razones que ofrecen David Miller y Laura Valentini para afirmar que el deber de reducir la desigualdad dentro del propio Estado tiene prioridad sobre el deber de reducir la pobreza extrema global. Según Miller, los deberes globales, a diferencia de los domésticos, no pueden legítimamente hacerse cumplir mediante la fuerza, y por esa razón son meros deberes humanitarios que tienen menor peso que los deberes domésticos, que son deberes de justicia. Según Valentini, el deber (...) de reducir la desigualdad doméstica tiene prioridad sobre los deberes humanitarios globales porque el primero es un deber de no dañar, mientras que los segundos son meros deberes de ayudar. El problema principal de ambas propuestas consiste en que fallan en su intento de mostrar que los deberes de reducir la pobreza extrema global no son también deberes de justicia. In this article I question David Miller and Laura Valentini's reasons to claim that duties to reduce inequalities inside the State should be prioritized over duties to reduce extreme global poverty. According to Miller, global duties, unlike domestic ones, cannot be legitimately enforced, and they are therefore mere humanitarian duties that weigh less than domestic duties, which are duties of justice. According to Valentini, domestic duties should be prioritized over global humanitarian duties because the former are duties not to harm, while the latter are mere duties to help. I argue that both views fail in their attempt to show that duties to reduce extreme global poverty are not duties ofjustice too. (shrink)
This essay is a discussion of the radio talk show host Dr. Laura Schlessinger. It is an assessment of the moral advice that she dispenses her radio show, and kinds of criticisms to which she has been subjected.
