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Lauren Ashwell
Bates College
  1. Gendered Slurs.Lauren Ashwell - 2016 - Social Theory and Practice 42 (2):228-239.
    Slurring language has had a lot of recent interest, but the focus has been almost exclusively on racial slurs. Gendered pejoratives, on the other hand—terms like “slut,” “bitch,” or “sissy”—do not fit into existing accounts of slurring terms, as these accounts require the existence of neutral correlates, which, I argue, these gendered pejoratives lack. Rather than showing that these terms are not slurs, I argue that this challenges the assumption that slurs must have neutral correlates, and so that a new (...)
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  2. Deep, Dark…or Transparent? Knowing Our Desires.Lauren Ashwell - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (1):245-256.
    The idea that introspection is transparent—that we know our minds by looking out to the world, not inwards towards some mental item—seems quite appealing when we think about belief. It seems that we know our beliefs by attending to their content; I know that I believe there is a café nearby by thinking about the streets near me, and not by thinking directly about my mind. Such an account is thought to have several advantages—for example, it is thought to avoid (...)
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  3. Superficial Dispositionalism.Lauren Ashwell - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (4):635-653.
    Dispositional ascriptions do not entail the counterfactuals we might expect, as interfering factors may be poised to prevent the disposition from manifesting in its very stimulus conditions. Such factors are commonly called finks and masks. It is thought, however, that finks and masks cannot be intrinsic to the disposition bearer; if an intrinsic property of the object would prevent a particular response in certain conditions, the object fails to have the corresponding disposition. I argue that we should accept intrinsic finks (...)
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  4.  79
    The Metaphysics of Desire and Dispositions.Lauren Ashwell - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (7):469-477.
    There seems to be some kind of close relationship between desires and behavioral dispositions. While a popular view about the nature of desire is that it essentially involves dispositions towards action, there do seem to be pressing objections to this view. However, recent work on dispositional properties potentially undermines some of the metaphysical assumptions that lie beneath these objections.
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  5.  87
    Slaves to Fashion?Lauren Ashwell & Rae Langton - 2011 - In Jessica Wolfendale & Jeanette Kennett (eds.), Fashion - Philosophy for Everyone: Thinking with Style. Blackwell. pp. 135--150.
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  6. Conflicts of Desire: Dispositions and the Metaphysics of Mind.Lauren Ashwell - 2017 - In Jonathan Jacobs (ed.), Causal Powes. pp. 167-176.
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  7.  44
    Possibilities of Misidentification.Lauren Ashwell - 2018 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 25 (3):161-164.
    We seem to have a special, seemingly direct, relationship to our own thoughts that we do not have to the thoughts of others; I can become aware of my thoughts in a way that I cannot become aware of yours: through introspection. Those who have delusions of thought-insertion, however, claim not only to be aware of another's thoughts, but to have another's thoughts in their own mind. These thoughts, of course, cannot actually be someone else's thoughts. However, if we take (...)
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  8.  81
    Review of Transparent Minds: A Study of Self-Knowledge, by Jordi Fernandez. [REVIEW]Lauren Ashwell - 2013 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 8.