What does a Utilitarian mean by happiness when he says that it is the good? Specifically, pleasure. But how many different kinds of experiences are included under this term? It appears that as the word was used by Bentham, and indeed by almost all other hedonists, it had so wide an extension that it included all experiences not properly termed "unhappiness." Partly, however, because of the identification of happiness with pleasure and the absence of pain, and partly because of a (...) failure to emphasize by frequent explanation the difference between the meanings of terms as used by hedonists and the same terms in common usage, there has existed at all times a disposition to assume that hedonists intended a narrower meaning than they actually did. Even in hedonistic writings there has been a tendency to make a distinction between the usages accorded "pleasure" and "happiness," the former as used more frequently to refer to pleasures of the moment, and the latter to a long continued state of felicific feeling; or a distinction is made between "pleasure" as used when referring to happiness which has an immediately obvious physiological origin and "happiness" to felicific feeling of all types. Nevertheless, the terms are not used consistently in this way, and on the whole it would be better to think of "pleasure" and "happiness" as interchangeable in the writings of Jeremy Bentham and many others. (shrink)

Das allgemeine Prinzip der „Relativität der Begriffe” — vom Verfasser a. a. O. dargelegt — behauptet, dass ein und dieselbe Situation der Wirklichkeit auf verschiedene Weisen beschrieben werden kann, die sprachlich und begrifflich zwar verschieden sein mögen, doch grundsätzlich die gleichen bleiben. Die verbalen oder begrifflichen Unterschiede führen uns zu der falschen Annahme, dass den Elementen, welchen im Denken oder im sprachlichen Ausdruck weniger Bedeutung zugemessen wird, auch weniger Bedeuten in Wirklichkeit zukommen, oder dass sie weniger real sind.Die bedeutendste Anwendung (...) dieser Lehre auf die Biologie betrifft die Interpretation des „Individuellen”. Soll man das Individuum als eine Einheit verstehen, oder kommt der Begriff der Einheit einerseits den Teilen zu, wie z. B. Zellen, Molekülen und Atomen, oder andererseits höheren und synthetischen Einheiten wie z.B. Klassen, Arten, dem „élan vital”, u.s.w. ? Alle diese drei Ansichten haben etwas für sich, doch stehen auch jeder entscheidende Gegengründe gegenüber, so dass die einzig-mögliche Schlussfolgerung die Annahme der Begriffsrelativität ist. Jeder der drei Standpunkte ist nur in so weit wahr, als er etwas Positives beibringt, falsch jedoch solange er nur die beiden andern leugnet.Le principe de la relativité des concepts, ayant une application générale dans toutes: parties de la philosophie et de la science, est développé ailleurs par l'auteur. Ce principe propose qu'une situation quelconque peut être discutée dans plusieurs manières, se différant entre elles dans le choix des mots ou des concepts, tout en étant au fond indentiques. Les differences linguistiques ou conceptuelles nous mènent à l'assomption fausse que les éléments moins importants dans la pensée ou dans le langage sont moins importants dans la nature, ou même que ces éléments sont moins réels.En biologie, ce principe a une importance notable en ce qui concerne l'interprétation de l'individu. Doit-on entendre par l'individu les cellules, les molécules, les atomes, et les autres éléments qui le composent; ou bien l'individu même; ou encore doit-on oublier et l'individu et les éléments qui le composent, et baser sa philosophie sur les entités synthétiques telles que les espèces, les genres, et l'élan vital ? Chacune de ces trois opinions a des considérations en sa faveur; mais chacune d'elles se bute à des objections plus considérables encore qui l'empêchent d'être acceptée. La seule conclusion qui semble être possible est l'adoption du principe de la relativité des concepts, et l'assomption que chaque manière d'envisager l'individu est valide tant qu'elle a quelque chose de positif à dire; chaque manière est fausse quand elle nie Ja validité des autres points de vue. (shrink)

Every man experiences dreams and imaginations, the nature of which is admittedly subjective. It is perfectly possible for me to propose that this same lack of objectivity may characterize all experience. I may conceive that I am a god making the world for my own amusement, being real beyond the reality of this my dream. But this imagined god-head is merely the dream of an idle moment, for I cannot seriously suppose that were I to dream I would dream in (...) exactly this way. Had I the making of this world, it would be a braver, better world than it is. Braver? Better? On second thought, I am not so sure. I would want it to be a better world, but could I make it a better world? Could I spin from my imagination the grandeur and beauty of the universe of stars, the wealth and complexity of the invisibly minute, the beauties of nature, the truths of mathematics, the harmonies of music, the world of meaning everywhere? Could I? I doubt it. For I fail to understand even trivial things: I find myself failing even in unimportant projects. And if I fail in these, the least parts of my universe, could I so ably create the whole? There are, thus, two ways in which this doctrine fails to do more than amuse me for the moment. Did I create this dream, I would aim higher and achieve less. (shrink)

A passing remark may at times be a clearer indication of basic conceptions or misconceptions than a well-pondered dissertation, and the present article had its inception in a passing remark of Professor Dewey's, to the effect that no man has as yet seen an atom, although it is quite possible that atoms might be observed in the future.

Descartes' place in history, by L. J. Lafleur.--A central ambiguity in Descartes, by S. Rosen.--Doubt, common sense and affirmation in Descartes and Hume, by H. J. Allen.--Some remarks on logic and the cogito, by R. N. Beck.--The cogito, an ambiguous performance, by J. B. Wilbur.--The modalities of Descartes' proofs for the existence of God, by B. Magnus.--Descartes and the phenomenological problem of the embodiment of consciousness, by J. M. Edie.--The person and his body: critique of existentialist responses to Descartes, by (...) P. A. Bertocci. (shrink)