The present article is an edition of the Pathologia (1706), a Latin manuscript on the passions by Anthony Ashley Cooper, the third Earl of Shaftesbury (1671-1713). There are two parts, i) an introduction with commentary (http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01916599.2012.679795), and ii) an edition of the Latin text with an English translation (http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01916599.2012.679796) . The Pathologia treats of a series of topics concerning moral psychology, ethics and philology, presenting a reconstruction of the Stoic theory of the emotions that is closely modelled on Cicero and (...) Diogenes Lærtius. It contains a most detailed typology of the passions and affections as well as an analysis of a series of psychological connections, for example between admiration and pride. On the basis of his reconstruction of Stoic moral psychology and ethics, Shaftesbury argues that in one of his phases, Horace should be interpreted as a Stoic rather than as an Epicurean. The translation and the commentary draw attention to the relations between the Pathologia and Shaftesbury's English writings, most importantly Miscellaneous Reflections and the Inquiry Concerning Virtue, or Merit, which sheds light on several features of Shaftesbury's relation to Stoicism. (shrink)

Like Anthony Ashley Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury, his subject, Michael Gill is concerned with his readers’ preconceptions. He comments on the fiction of an Ethiopian suddenly displaced from hi...

Cet article montre qu'il est faux de considérer le scepticisme mitigé que présente Hume dans la section 12 de l' Enquête sur l'entendement humain comme un scepticisme modéré. Afin d'établir ce point, l'argument principal est qu'il existe un rapport de causalité par lequel l'affect que laissent derrière eux les doutes pyrrhoniens est en grande partie responsable de la production du scepticisme mitigé. Cet affect n'est pas la mélancolie paralysante dont parle le Traité de la nature humaine , mais ce qui (...) motive le sceptique à être prudent parce qu'il est sensible à la fragilité des facultés qu'il a radicalement éprouvée dans l'exercice des doutes outrés. Le scepticisme mitigé n'est pas un oubli, mais, au contraire, une mémoire du scepticisme excessif. (shrink)

Quelles sont les opinions spéculatives de John Locke sur la nature de l’esprit et des idées et sur les conditions métaphysiques de la pensée et de la conscience? Faut-il en rester à la vision traditionnelle d’un Locke qui reste agnostique à propos de telles questions, au prétexte que leur traitement excède la méthode adoptée dans l’ Essai? Philippe Hamou a affronté ce problème et a entrepris de réévaluer la philosophie de l’esprit lockienne, dans une série de travaux qui illustrent l’intérêt (...) contemporain pour la métaphysique qui convient à cette épistémologie. La présente discussion situe la contribution de P. Hamou au sein des études récentes et propose quelques objections. (shrink)

The present article is an edition of the Pathologia (1706), a Latin manuscript on the passions by Anthony Ashley Cooper, the third Earl of Shaftesbury (1671–1713). There are two parts, i) an introduction with commentary (http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01916599.2012.679795), and ii) an edition of the Latin text with an English translation (http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01916599.2012.679796) . The Pathologia treats of a series of topics concerning moral psychology, ethics and philology, presenting a reconstruction of the Stoic theory of the emotions that is closely modelled on Cicero and (...) Diogenes Lærtius. It contains a most detailed typology of the passions and affections as well as an analysis of a series of psychological connections, for example between admiration and pride. On the basis of his reconstruction of Stoic moral psychology and ethics, Shaftesbury argues that in one of his phases, Horace should be interpreted as a Stoic rather than as an Epicurean. The translation and the commentary draw attention to the relations between the Pathologia and Shaftesbury's English writings, most importantly Miscellaneous Reflections and the Inquiry Concerning Virtue, or Merit, which sheds light on several features of Shaftesbury's relation to Stoicism. (shrink)

This chapter set outs the variety of eighteenth-century approaches to the relations between language and thought, beginning with post-Lockean debates focused on the status of abstract general ideas, and ending with anti-empiricist Scottish philosophy at the end of the century. The empiricist theory of signs, notably in George Berkeley, is one important dimension of the discussions: ‘Ideas’ are centre stage, although they do not exhaust the empiricist furniture of the mind. There is also a different philosophical trend illustrated by neglected (...) figures, which may be termed Platonic, and which affects eighteenth-century philosophical conceptions of language. The project of conjectural histories of language and views about the connections between linguistic skills and the social nature of human beings are also covered. (shrink)

This article examines and discusses the presuppositions behind the answer that Paul Ricœur brought to the question “What is practical reason?” in a series of studies that led to the “little ethics” of Oneself as Another . The conception defended by Ricœur is presented as a sort of reconciliation, or composition, of Aristotelian ethics and Kantian morality. Two problems in particular are raised: the first is raised by the questionable nature of Ricœur’s interpretation of the positions that he synthesizes; the (...) second concerns the model - dialectic or eclectic – of this synthesis. (shrink)

Le but de cette étude est de proposer une interprétation des relations entre les concepts de subjectivité et de système dans le stoïcisme impérial, afin d'évaluer les modifications que le perfectionnisme contemporain, qui prétend s'en autoriser, inflige à cette conception. On commence par reconstituer une doctrine stoïcienne du soi, à partir de Marc Aurèle et de l'enseignement d'Épictète, et de leur lecture par Shaftesbury. Cela permet de montrer les écarts, sciemment assumés par Shaftesbury, par rapport à la doctrine lockienne du (...) self. Enfin, certaines réticences contemporaines à parler de « soi » de manière substantivée, voire à user de la notion de « subjectivité » dans l'étude du stoïcisme, sont discutées. (shrink)

Le probleme theologico-politique comprend une diversite de questions qui trouvent cependant leur unite dans la necessite, ou la contrainte, dont la philosophie dans son histoire ne s'est pas defaite: celle de se confronter au religieux, a l'ecclesial et au theologique. Cette confrontation du philosophique et du religieux emprunte plusieurs voies, selon qu'il s'agit pour la philosophie d'examiner la fondation religieuse du politique et plus generalement les relations du pouvoir et du sacre, ou bien de recommander ou de contester l'usage politique (...) du religieux, ou encore d'affirmer la liberte de la croyance contre toute censure. Les etudes ici reunies portent sur les pythagoriciens, Thomas d'Aquin, Jacques 1er d'Angleterre, Milton, Spinoza, Bayle, Toland, Hume, Kant et Rosenzweig, et proposent une perspective traversiere sur les transformations d'une question qui, tout en etant encore la notre, est indissociable d'une histoire. (shrink)

"Leo Strauss: une bibliographie / Jean-Pierre Delange"--P. [279]-316.

Un istoric al noţiunii de societate civilă va considera, fără îndoială, absurdă tentativa mea de a retrasa formarea conceptului în sânul teoriei contractualiste moderne, şi aceasta din doua motive. In primul rând, pentru că în filozofia politică a secolelor XVII-XVIII expresia "societatea civilă" este încă perfect sinonimă cu "comunitate politică". Apoi, pentru că sensul contemporan al expresiei se dezvoltă în afara tradiţiei contractualiste, în particular în scoala scoţiană, care, de la Hume la Smith şi Ferguson, respinge ideea de contract fondator (...) ca pe o ficţiune de filozof. Pe scurt, susţinătorii contractualismului nu vorbeau despre societatea civilă în sensul contemporan când utilizau aceasta expresie, iar inventatorii societăţii civile în sens contemporan erau adversari ai contractualismului. (shrink)

The opposition between community and society set out by Collingwood in hisNew Leviathan(1942) should be compared with the distinction betweenGemeinschaftandGesellschaftthat Tönnies had introduced in 1887. The debate on ideal types of social organizations apparently pertains to «pure sociology» and was continued by Durkheim and Weber. However, Collingwood's use of this distinction may be construed as an attack on the very idea of sociology in the name of the primacy of rational will.

O artigo analisa os usos e figuras do senso comum na filosofia britânica do século XVIII, de Shaftesbury a Reid. Essa noção, longe de exprimir uma recusa da filosofia, serve para definir o estatuto dos argumentos e conceitos que compõem o discurso filosófico.

The book covers a long period of the history of British moral philosophy, from the Cam-bridge Platonists to Hume, through Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. The choice of authors, which leaves aside such major figures as Adam Smith and Reid, is justified by the focus on the issue of the relationships between morality and human nature. Hume is the end of the story insofar as he liberates moral theory from a normative conception of human nature so that, contrary to his predecessors, he (...) suggests that ‘good’ is not synonymous with ‘natural’ in the sense that ‘evil’ would be synonymous with ‘unnatural’. Gill’s survey of the British moralists terminates with Hume because it purposes to characterize the “Copernican” inversion carried out by Hume as the result of a gradual shift from an initially “Ptolemaic” position: drawing on Hutcheson’s account of moral judgment, Hume ascribes to psychological states that which traditional moral philosophy used to attribute to the nature of things. Hume goes further than either Shaftesbury or Hutcheson, since he transforms moral philosophy into a theoretical or “metaphysical” undertaking. (shrink)

L'article s'intéresse au statut ontologique des objets de l'éducation et défend à ce propos une thèse réaliste. On esquisse une typologie des compétences et des objets. Les objets de l'éducation dépendent des objets de la science (au sens large) sans leur être identiques. La notion de transposition didactique est critiquée.

This paper, at the crossroads of practical and epistemological questions, puts forward a non-standard approach to the study of a set of trust phenomena (trust, trustworthiness, distrust, self-trust, self-distrust…) and their interconnectedness. Two paradigmatic approaches to trust – harmonic and disharmonic – are unpacked and shown to be complementary. In contexts where the harmonic view applies, trust phenomena are mutually reinforcing. When the disharmonic view is appropriate, instead, they counterbalance one another. An analysis of Augustine’s De fide rerum quae non (...) videntur helps introducing the former. Each view carries its own conception of the role of institutions in trust. For the harmonic approach, institutions are contexts that reinforce trust silently, whereas for the disharmonic view they are salient objects of trust. The need for an over-arching articulation of these limited views is further highlighted by appeal to another distinction, between background and decision-based forms of trust. This paves the way to what is here termed a metaharmonic theory of trust, a theory sensitive to the difference between the contexts where trust phenomena reinforce or counterbalance one another. (shrink)

Costuma-se dizer que a filososfia moral de Hutcheson seria tributária daquela de Shaftesbury, a ponto mesmo de ser um prolongamento do pensamento moral do filósofo inglês. O artigo busca mostrar que essa é uma visão simplista, examinando para tanto o conceito de desinteresse em Hutcheson.

La leçon de la main de Thomas Reid (1710-1796) qui est ici traduite et présentée date de ses années d’enseignement dans la chaire de philosophie morale à Glasgow. Elle consiste en la discussion intransigeante de la « théorie » du titulaire précédent, Adam Smith (1723-1790). Le « système de la sympathie » exposé dans The theory of moral sentiments est l’objet de plusieurs objections, puisées dans l’arsenal que Reid emploie dans son attaque générale contre toutes les formes de sentimentalisme moral (...) qui s’appuient unilatéralement sur la composante affective des évaluations. Le texte montre que Francis Hutcheson et David Hume n’étaient pas les seules cibles de cette critique et met en lumière certaines difficultés et certaines audaces de la « théorie de la morale » d’Adam Smith. (shrink)

O texto pretende fazer uma exposição panorâmica das principais concepções de história do espírito dos filósofos britânicos, desde Locke até os autores do final do século XVIII. A partir daí pretende-se mostrar que a unidade entre esses filósofos é apenas aparente. Pois, apesar das semelhanças, as diferenças que há entre as concepções e orientações metodológicas destes autores são suficientes para atestar que estamos diante projetos filosóficos muito distintos. The aim of this paper is to present a comprehensive outlook of the (...) conceptions of history of mind proposed by the british philosophers from Locke to the end of the XVIII century. It aims to show that, despite the seeming resemblances, the differences among those conceptions are sufficient to enable us to identify different philosophical projects. (shrink)

En s'appuyant surtout sur l'Essay on Philosophical Method (1933) et sur The New Leviathan (1942), cet article expose les principaux arguments qu'a employés R. G. Collingwood contre le recours au sens commun qu'opérait G. E. Moore. Selon The New Leviathan, le recours au sens commun comme à une protection contre le scepticisme ou l'idéalisme conduit à la « persécution des scientifiques » et à l'« obscurantisme ». On peut tenir ce point de vue pour exagéré. Toutefois, si l'on examine la (...) construction de l'argument du sens commun, la pertinence de la critique de Collingwood apparaît. Cela n'empêche pas Collingwood d'utiliser la notion de sens commun, compris comme un ensemble de croyances fondamentales. Il n'y a aucune contradiction en l'espèce, pourvu qu'on distingue la notion du sens commun de l'argument du sens commun. (shrink)

According to Thomas Reid, powers of will and powers of understanding are distinguishable in thought, but conjoined in practice. This paper examines the claim that there is no inert intelligence, the operations of the understanding involving some degree of activity. The question is: whose activity? For it is clear that a great deal of our mental activity is not in our power. We need to distinguish between a weak and a strong sense of ‘power’, and consider our dependence ‘upon God (...) and the laws of nature’ in our mental exertions. (shrink)

L’article expose et discute l’interprétation de l’immatérialisme de Berkeley par James Frederick Ferrier. Dans deux articles denses , contre l’historiographie reidienne dominante, celui-ci rejette la thèse selon laquelle Berkeley souscrit à la méthode des idées et par là aux principes élémentaires du représentationnalisme. Loin de défendre l’idéalisme subjectif, Berkeley adhère à une forme de réalisme direct. Dans les Institutes of Metaphysic , Ferrier va plus loin et se sert du « maître argument » de Berkeley pour risquer ses propres thèses (...) métaphysiques.The paper sets out and discusses James Frederick Ferrier’s interpretation of Berkeley’s immaterialism. In two dense papers , against the prevailing Reidean historiography, Ferrier rejects the claim that Berkeley subscribes to the way of ideas and thus to the basis tenets of representationalism. Far from defending subjective idealism, Berkeley holds some form of direct realism. In his Institutes of Metaphysic , Ferrier goes further and draws on Berkeley’s master argument to venture his own metaphysical views. (shrink)

L’œuvre de Francis Hutcheson, irlandais d’origine et écossais d’adoption, constitue une étape essentielle entre la première formation de la doctrine du sens moral et le développement de la philosophie morale dans l’Université écossaise. Hutcheson modernise le « moral sense » en ne le concevant plus comme le moyen d’une maîtrise de soi (selon...