Armed reprisals are the limited use of military force in response to unlawful actions perpetrated against states. Historically, reprisals provided a military remedy for states that had been wronged by another state without having to resort to all-out war in order to counter or deter such wrongful actions. While reprisals are broadly believed to have been outlawed by the UN Charter, states continue to routinely undertake such self-help measures. As part of the roundtable, “The Ethics of Limited Strikes,” this (...) essay examines the doctrine of armed reprisals in light of recent instances of states using force “short of war” in this manner. We argue that the ban on reprisals has been largely ignored by states, and that recent attempts to apply the laws of armed conflict to the cyber domain are further weakening this prohibition. We conclude that this is a potentially dangerous development that lowers the bar for resorting to military force, risking escalation and thereby further destabilizing the international system. (shrink)

Training on the Law of armed conflict employs different rationales to motivate soldiers and to induce their compliance with LOAC rules. Of these, none is as controversial, or as potentially...

My critical commentary focuses on Victor Tadros’ analysis of accountability for violations of the (revised) laws of armed conflict (LOAC) that he lays out (Tadr.

This book explores topical issues in military ethics by according peace a central role within an interdisciplinary framework. Whilst war and peace have traditionally been viewed through the lens of philosophical enquiry, political issues and theological ideas - as well as common sense - have also influenced people's understanding of armed conflicts with regards to both the moral issues they raise and the policies and actions they require. Comprised of fourteen essays on the role and application of peace, the (...) book places emphasis on it's philosophical, moral, theological, technological, and practical implications. Starting with an overview of Kantian perspectives on peace, it moves to discussions of the Just War debates, religious conceptualizations of peace, and the role of peace in modern war technology and cyber-security. Finally concluding with discussions of the psychological and medical impacts of war and peace on both the individual and the larger society, this collection offers a contribution to the field and will be of interest to a wide audience. Chapters 4, 6 and 10 of this book are available open access under a CC BY 4.0 license at link.springer.com. (shrink)

Cyber warfare is becoming a new reality with new battles fought everyday on virtual battlefields. For a century and a half, International Humanitarian Law has been a sentry for victims of wars guaranteeing their legal protection from the calamities of war, trying hard to respond to Clausewitz’s “chameleon of war”. Cyber conflict marks new chameleon’s colour together with the unmanned aerial vehicles, autonomic battle systems and other technologies deployed on battlefields. However, it would be greatly erroneous to claim that (...) the International Humanitarian Law may not apply to the new phenomena just because it is caused by the advanced technology. Even if the Geneva Conventions of 1949 are already sixty years old, the International Humanitarian Law in itself has at minimum customary response mechanism, granting, in a spirit of Marten’s clause, protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from dictates of public conscience (Protocol I). Notwithstanding, some more complicated fundamental issues also have to be addressed: how the use of cybernetic weapons and means may affect the classic notion of armed conflict? How it can be interpreted in the light of new technologies, i.e. can we still rely on a classic understanding of weapon’s kinetic effect as the main element, or shall we embrace effectsbased “Schmitt’s criteria”. If it so happens, will it make an act without apparent damage to a person/property equal to military hostilities, required by the armed conflict notion and justify the real-life response to it. The effective or overall control tests were used for the attribution of non-state actor’s activity to the state party of an armed conflict but these tests might not meet its purpose in the virtual battlefield of loose networks and open-source communities. If the concept of armed conflict is treated more flexibly, other changes (including issues of attribution) may follow, as well. Perhaps this is the way how the combatant institute will evolve. With classic combatant’s criteria impossible to apply on virtual battlefields, one of the options would be to elaborate concepts of “constant combat function” and “direct participation in hostilities” more precisely, as well as to reconsider state’s affiliation requirements. (shrink)

The re-examination of the classification of modern armed conflicts is done through the analysis of humanitarian law and the available data on armed conflicts, by combining the legal, political and ethical dimensions of war and the statistical indicators of modern conflicts.The author answers the questions about: Defining the conflict according to the various philosophical, social and legal criteria with the cultural, legal and political basis of the war and the corresponding reasons for the occurrence and prolongation of (...) the conflicts; and the main trends of the conflicts through the numerous presences of the conflicts on the global scene, the number of victims, the regional displacement of the conflicts and the role of the Islamic State.In the analysis of the conflicts, the complexity of the modern conflicts through the expanded categories of victims and combatants, as well as the need for the protection of the victims, are emphasized.Hence the research touches on the issue of the applicability of the legal and illegal combatant categories and the corresponding immunity that follows them.Researching the trends of modern armed conflicts cannot avoid the ethical dimensions surrounding the category of child soldiers. From a methodological point of view, the problem of determining precise statistics for the indirectly killed civilians, who continue to represent the largest category, remains unsolved. (shrink)

Environmental protection in times of armed conflicts, irrespective internal or international, is rarely considered as a prioritized concern. Due to the concept of state sovereignty, this is especially problematic when examining interaction of warfare and environmental protection in non-international hostilities. Not only it is challenging to find any exhaustive and explicit legal provisions regulating the matter, but this issue has also been forgotten by international legal scholars. Therefore, in this article the author reviews written and customary norms laid down (...) in documents of various branches of international law, such as international humanitarian law, human rights law, environmental law and international criminal law, which directly or by way of interpretation may favour environmental protection in times of internal armed conflict. This is to be done in order to gather information about the sufficiency of legal framework on preservation of the environment in times of noninternational armed conflicts. After doing this research, a few possible means to improve current legal framework are suggested. The author suggests to impose civil liability, enact new comprehensive document, initiate changes in international criminal law and other. (shrink)

Proposals by the San Francisco Police Department (SFPD) to use bomb disposal robots for deadly force against humans have met with widespread condemnation. Media coverage of the furore has tended, incorrectly, to conflate these robots with autonomous weapon systems (AWS), the AI-based weapons used in armed conflict. These two types of systems should be treated as distinct since they have different sets of social, ethical, and legal implications. However, the conflation does raise a pressing question: what _if_ the (...) SFPD had proposed using AWS for law enforcement purposes? This article argues that current debate on AWS takes place within a ‘killing paradigm’ that leaves us ill-placed to understand the implications of using autonomous force outside of armed conflict. This is because ‘lethality’ is taken as the paradigmatic form of harm, meaning that other harms are understood in a way that is derivative of lethal harm. The article calls for more research on how other sorts of goods, such as freedom from domination, are imperilled by the use of autonomous force. The article also suggests that bringing research on AWS into dialogue with the sorts of concerns that have typically motivated political theory—e.g. power, coercion, the state—provides a fruitful starting point for addressing these issues. (shrink)

This book challenges the World Medical Associationâ (TM)s (WMA) International Code of Ethics statement in 2004, which declared that â ~medical ethics in armed conflict is identical to medical ethics in times of peaceâ (TM). This is achieved by examining the professional, ethical, and legal conflicts in British Military healthcare practice that occur in three distinct military environments. These are (i) the battlefield, (ii) the operational environment and (iii) the non-operational environment. As this conflict is exacerbated by (...) the need to achieve Operational Effectiveness, this book also explores the dual loyalty conflict that Military Health Care Professionals (MHCPs) encounter between following military orders and professional codes of practice. The method used to challenge the WMAâ (TM)s statement and explore these conflicts is the use of real-life problem-solving vignettes, which mirror actual ethical and professional conflicts and dilemmas that may occur in the three environments. The areas of law analysed similarly reflect the difficulties that MHCPs face when caring for the sick and wounded in violent locations when under attack. In particular, the book questions whether it is right for a MHCP to owe their patients a duty of care in hostile environments. This leads on to questioning if any MHCP could be protected by combat immunity where no duty of care is owed to fellow soldiers in the battlefield. The book also questions whether the standard of care should be variable in hostile environments. It also explores the dual loyalty conflict of a wounded senior officer refusing treatment from a junior officer. In addition, it examines the difficulties of a doctor maintaining patient confidentiality when a soldier refuses treatment for a psychological injury but wishes to redeploy to the battlefield. The book successfully challenges the WMAâ (TM)s statement. It also concludes by suggesting that neither a military-focused approach nor a professional healthcare-focused approach towards military healthcare is the best way to solve the dual loyalty conflict. (shrink)

Medical rules of eligibility permit severely injured Iraqi and Afghan nationals to receive care in Coalition medical facilities only if bed space is available and their injuries result directly from Coalition fire. The first rule favors Coalition soldiers over host-nation nationals and contradicts the principle of impartial, needs-based medical care. To justify preferential care for compatriots, wartime medicine invokes associative obligations of care that favor friends, family, and comrades-in-arms. Associative obligations have little place in peacetime medical care but significantly affect (...) wartime medicine. The second rule suggests liability for collateral harm that is unsupported by international law and military ethics. Absent liability, there are pragmatic reasons to offer medical care to injured local civilians if it quells resentment and cements support for Coalition forces. In contrast to peacetime medicine, military necessity and associative obligations outweigh distributive principles based on medical need during war. (shrink)

The dissertation deals with the questions surrounding the legal, ethical and strategic aspects of armed drones in warfare. This is a vast and complex field, however, one where there remains more conflict and debate than actual consensus. -/- One of the many themes addressed during the course of this research was an examination of the evolution of modern asymmetric transnational armed conflict. It is the opinion of the author that this phenomenon represents a “grey-zone”; an entirely (...) new paradigm of warfare. International terrorism has not been dealt with in a cohesive fashion. Any international prosecution of terrorism which has been conducted has been either “sectoral” adopting a piecemeal typological approach or has been carried out at the domestic level. -/- A novel approach to the problem, of sub-national actors with transnational reach, was proposed, by attributing certain groups with a new legal personality, that of “Stateless International Entities”, or “SIEs”. Those groups who possess, for all intents and purposes, the same attributes as those of States, could then be judged for their behavior before an international tribunal. Other important topics addressed in this research include an examination of important case law, targeted killing, autonomy, preemption versus prevention, imminence versus intent, the find, fix and finish paradigm, the impact of the media, and the role of the CIA, and finally, the flawed reasoning which adopts technology as a form of strategy. (shrink)

As part of a roundtable on “Balancing Legal Norms, Moral Values, and National Interests,” this essay describes the humanitarian diplomacy of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) by comparing it conceptually with other forms of advocacy and illustrating it with the ICRC's recent experience in the Yemen crisis. Humanitarian diplomacy is examined as one particular way of balancing legal norms, moral values, and national interests in the pursuit of greater respect for international humanitarian law (IHL) and principled humanitarian (...) action in armed conflicts. The essay looks back to ancient history for archetypal forms of humanitarian advocacy in various cultural traditions. It then describes humanitarian diplomacy's practice of discreet diplomacy and confidential dialogue with all parties to a conflict, and compares its relatively “quiet” approach with the “loud” approach of outrage activism focused on “naming and shaming,” which tends to be the norm today. The essay argues that there is an important and complementary place for the ICRC's style of humanitarian diplomacy alongside other forms of advocacy even in the face of criticism that the ICRC is sometimes publicly silent about what it knows of atrocities and avoids naming and shaming. (shrink)

The law of armed conflict prevents the coerced extraction of information from Prisoners of War (PoWs). We claim, however, that the letter of that law involves too broad a concept of coercion. On a natural reading, there is a sense in which any extraction of information—by any method—is coercive. We respect the notion that PoWs ought not be treated poorly, but we argue “coercion” should not be understood so broadly. With respect to its use in international law, we (...) favor a moralized notion of “coercion,” as opposed to a non-moralized one. We explain what this means, and argue why this is a better reading of the law. We think a moralized notion of coercion is more intuitive, is more in line with both actual practice and the intent of the framers of international law, and has practical benefits as well. (shrink)

The revisionist critique of conventional just war theory has undoubtedly scored some important victories. Walzer’s elegantly unified defense of combatant legal equality and noncombatant immunity has been seriously undermined. This critical success has not, however, been matched by positive arguments, which when applied to the messy reality of war would deprive states and soldiers of the permission to fight wars that are plausibly thought to be justified. The appeal to law that is sought to resolve this objection by casting it (...) as a practical concern, a pragmatic worry about implementation, which while germane to debates over the laws of war, need not undermine our convictions in the fundamental principles the revisionists advocate. This response is inadequate. Revisionists have not shown that soldiers should obey the laws of war, in practice, when they conflict with their other moral reasons – our worries about application remain intact. Moreover, a theory of war that offers only an account of the laws of war, and a set of fundamental principles developed in abstraction from feasibility constraints, is radically incomplete. We need to know how to apply those fundamental principles, and whether, when applied, they lead to defensible conclusions. Only two options seem to remain. Perhaps the revisionists’ arguments for their chosen fundamental principles are sufficiently compelling that we should stick with them, and accept their troubling conclusions – in other words, accept pacifism. Alternatively, we need to revise our fundamental principles, so that when applied they yield conclusions that we can more confidently endorse. -/- Though it does not save the revisionist view from the responsibility dilemma and cognate objections, the appeal to law does raise an important, and previously inadequately theorized, question – or, rather, resurrects a neglected topic, discussed in depth by historical just war theorists such as Grotius and Vattel. There are good grounds for distinguishing the laws of war from the morality of war, and for adjusting the former to accommodate predictable noncompliance, that should not impact on our account of the latter. Nonetheless, I have argued that there are some profound moral insights underlying both combatant legal equality and noncombatant immunity: specifically, we cannot infer from a combatant’s side having not satisfied jus ad bellum that he may not justifiably use lethal force; and other things equal, it is more wrongful to harm a nonliable noncombatant than to harm a nonliable combatant. (shrink)

More than a quarter of the global population of two billion children live in Islamic countries; therefore, their protection is vital while a handful of them are suffering from lack of hygiene, education, and poverty. The current armed conflict in different ways also has an effect and seriously impacts children as victims and associates in armed groups. Organization of Islamic Conference as a collective voice of its 57 members, initiated a series of efforts in this regard. Islamic (...) texts and traditions show significant importance for child protection, but what has been done until today by OIC as a main intergovernmental Organization guided by Islamic principles, values and norms, is not sufficient. Covenant on the Rights of the Child in Islam is the first human rights binding document adopted by OIC as part of consecutive efforts of OIC to promote protection of children. Although it is regarded as an important step, its adequacy for protection of children affected by armed conflicts is under question. Furthermore, in comparison to International Humanitarian Law and Convention on the Rights of the Child, it does not reflect proportionately and further provisions for children affected, with regard to the extent and the dimensions of conflicts in Islamic countries. (shrink)

*North American Society for Social Philosophy (NASSP) Book Award 2019.* -/- *International Studies Association (ISA) - International Ethics Section Book Award 2021.* -/- Although military mores have relied primarily on just war theory, the ethic of cooperation in warfare (ECW)—between enemies even as they are trying to kill each other—is as central to the practice of warfare and to conceptualization of its morality. Neither game theory nor unilateral moral duties (God-given or otherwise) can explain the explicit language of cooperation in (...) developing and enforcing principles of military ethics and the law of armed conflict. -/- The ethic of cooperation is borne of various motivations: reciprocity, self-preservation, and efficiency, to be sure, but also a sense of warrior honor and concern with human rights. This shared morality can persist despite making it more difficult for one side or the other to win and, unfortunately, its well-meaning motivations often lead to unintended tragic consequences. -/- This book explores three manifestations of this significant yet overlooked ethic of cooperation in warfare: (1) for a “fair fight,” (2) to protect classes of individuals (e.g., non-combatants or prisoners of war), and (3) to end the war quickly. Such cooperation can take unexpected forms, from ad hoc decisions on the battlefield to institutionalization in international law, and is the source of some critical tensions in one of the most significant developments in warfare in recent years: namely, how to handle terrorism or other forms of warfare that lie outside the purview of international law. -/- Each type of ECW raises questions internal to that ethic, such as inconsistencies in the concept of “parity” across different weapons bans, contradictions within the warrior ethic that heavily influence—and therefore confuse—notions of the “fair fight,” the disconnect between what protections a person receives and his responsibility for the war (e.g., political leaders), or the limited decisiveness of outcomes generated by very short wars. -/- Their simultaneous application also generates significant tensions and raises questions about the proper relationship of ECW to the immediate goal of war itself, which is to win, and thus yield either a political settlement or a justicial decision. For example, the ECWs for a “fair fight” and to protect classes of individuals can make it harder to win the war, but even more concerning is that they can also kill more people, which in the latter case contravenes its very purpose. -/- Human history is in some ways the story of trying to concurrently wage and tame war, and the architecture of warfare itself is informed by the ECW, in particular: (a) the political nature of war, (b) the abdication from jus ad bellum judgments in order to concentrate on justice within war (jus in bello), and (c) the ways in which modern nation-states collude to define “legitimacy” in war. -/- The combination of these three features leave questions of justicial right and responsibility for war disturbingly unresolved, it also generates new challenges in a geopolitical context in which cooperative and non-cooperative (e.g. contemporary terrorism) forms of warfare clash. (shrink)

This Article examines the authority of states to settle individual private property claims in post–conflict negotiations towards settlement. We analyze this question by exploring the limits of states’ authority to take or limit private property rights for the public good. We argue that this authority rests on two cumulative justifications: the inclusion of the property owners among the public that stands to benefit from the public good, and their representation by the government that decides on the taking of the (...) property. In post–conflict settlement, the negotiating states may redistribute both private property and the public good between and within their respective communities. Their authority to redistribute continues to rests on the same justifications of inclusion and representation. Hence, their authority extends only to the redistribution of property of owners who are members of the respective communities that negotiate the agreement, and who are represented by a negotiating government. (shrink)

Attempts to simplify ethics in war by claiming exclusive legitimate authority for the law of armed conflict underestimate the moral complexities facing soldiers. Soldiers risk wrongdoing if they refuse moral guidance that can independently evaluate their legal permissions. State soldiers need to know when to object to a legal duty to fight; nonstate fighters need to know when to disregard legal prohibitions against fighting. And both might sometimes best discharge their moral duties by following a bespoke rule departing (...) from noncombatant immunity in a principled way that has been designed for a particular conflict by an authoritative leadership. (shrink)

Book Review: Ahmed Al Dawoody, The Islamic Law of War - Justifications and Regulations -.

This book examines recent developments in sources of public international law, such as treaties and custom operating among nations in their mutual relations, as well as developments in some of the primary rules of law international institutions created by these processes. It finds that public international law has become increasingly dysfunctional in dealing with some of the primary problems facing the world community, such as the maintenance of international peace and security, violations of international human rights and the law of (...) armed conflict, arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, and international environmental issues, and that international law and international institutions face a problematic future. It concludes, however, that all is not lost. There are possible alternative futures for international law and legal process, but choosing among them will require the world community making hard choices. (shrink)

Colombia is the second country with the highest number of internally displaced persons. In the last 10 years, more than 400,000 young people carry, in their life experiences, the title of victims. The psychological and social circumstances that determine the lives of displaced young people in the world are not unknown. Fear, the poor resources for social adaptation available to them, and the possible reproduction of the cycle of violence, represent psychosocial risk factors in the young and displaced population. In (...) this context, the Victims Law in Colombia stipulated various measures of repairment, including Relocation and Return provided the conditions of voluntariness, security, and dignity are present. A hypothesis that well-being will be better in the returnees was set, since they would strengthen the social support networks between neighbors and other victims in their old spaces of life. To test the hypothesis, the scales of Psychological Well-being, Social Well-being, the Satisfaction with Life Scale, and the Psychosocial Trauma Scale were applied to young returnees and relocated in Colombia. The Exploratory and Confirmatory Factor Analysis was performed to extract the general measure of well-being and psychosocial trauma followed by the comparison between the groups. Significance, power, and effect size indicators were obtained, and finally, the partial correlation between the groups was made in relation to psychosocial trauma and well-being. Results showed that returnees have greater well-being and clearer indicators, with respect to that of relocated. In addition, the well-being of returnees has fewer trauma factors, who in turn are quasi-moderated by the situation of return or relocation. (shrink)

The Laws of Armed Conflict require that war crimes be attributed to individuals who can be held responsible and be punished. Yet assigning responsibility for the actions of Lethal Autonomous Weapon...

The book offers insights on whether international law can shape the politics of the Security Council and, conversely, the extent to which the latter contribute to the development of international law. By providing a systematic analysis of the quantity and quality of international legal instruments referred to in the text of resolutions, the book reconstructs patterns of the Security Council's behavioural regularities and assesses them against the provisions of the United Nations Charter, which establishes its mandate. The analysis is divided (...) into three periods - the origins and Cold War period, post-Cold War period and the twenty-first century - and assesses the resolutions passed in each period by thematic category. The book argues that while international law plays an important role in shaping the politics of the Security Council, the Council's resolutions do not contribute significantly to the development of international law. (shrink)

Efforts to ban Autonomous Weapon Systems were both unsuccessful and controversial. Simultaneously the need to address the detrimental aspects of AWS development and proliferation continues to grow in scope and urgency. The article presents several regulatory solutions capable of addressing the issue while simultaneously respecting the requirements of military necessity and so attracting a broad consensus. Two much stricter solutions – regional AWS bans and adoption of a no first use policy – are also presented as fallback strategies in case (...) achieving AWS’ compliance with the Laws of Armed Conflict proved elusive. Together, the solutions presented form an outline of a flexible regulatory strategy able to adjust to different technological outcomes and providing a sensible compromise to solve the current deadlock on the AWS issue. (shrink)

Rapid technological change is resulting in the development of ever increasingly capable autonomous weapon systems. As they become more sophisticated, the calls for developing restrictions on their use, up to and including their complete prohibition, are growing. Not unlike the call for restrictions on the sale and use of drones, most proposed restrictions are well-intentioned but are often ill-informed, with a high likelihood of degrading national security and putting additional lives at risk. Employed by experienced operators well-versed in the (...) class='Hi'>laws of armed conflict, autonomous weapons can advance the objectives of those who would prohibit their use. This essay takes an operational perspective to examine the role that autonomous weapon systems can play while complying with the laws of armed conflict. With responsible design and incorporation of applicable control measures, autonomous weapons will be able not just to comply but also to enhance the ethical use of force. This essay contends that efforts by the international community to use international legal means and/or institutions to over-regulate or even ban lethal autonomous weapons are counterproductive. It considers and describes the end-game results of the use of autonomous weapons in enhancing the application of both international law and human ethical values. (shrink)

The trend toward the “humanization” of international law reflects a greater emphasis on individuals rather than simply states as objects of concern. The advance of human rights law (HRL) has been an important impetus for this trend. Some observers suggest that humanization can be furthered even more by applying HRL rather than international humanitarian law (IHL) to hostilities between states and nonstate armed groups, unless a state explicitly declares that it is engaged in an armed conflict. This (...) essay argues, however, that a court should not defer to a state's characterization of hostilities, but should base its analysis on whether hostilities meet the criteria for an armed conflict. Applying HRL to hostilities that effectively are an armed conflict but not acknowledged as such risks diluting the legitimacy and normative force of HRL. On the one hand, if a court applies conventional stringent HRL standards, this body of law may be seen as unrealistic and is likely to be ignored. On the other hand, a court that adapts HRL standards to armed conflict may need to take a consequentialist approach at odds with HRL's deontological foundations. Clearly differentiating between HRL and IHL may thus best promote the humanization of warfare. (shrink)

Along with the Strait of Malacca and the Singapore Straits, the Strait of Hormuz is arguably the most important bottleneck in international navigation because a large part of the global oil production needs to be shipped through this passage, which is only a few kilometers wide. In the context of the dispute about Iran’s nuclear program and new sanctions, Iran has threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz for international shipping, effectively cutting off many Western countries from important oil imports. (...) In this article, the legality of such action as well as the legality of the mere threat to close the Strait of Hormuz are investigated. In addition to the International Law of the Sea, general rules of international law and the international law of armed conflict are taken into consideration. Particular emphasis is put on the sovereignty of other states, which is infringed upon by such threats on the part of the Iranian leadership. First, the question has to be answered whether a passage through these waters would be transit passage through a Strait or normal passage through the coastal state’s territorial sea. The authors of the article conclude that the regime of transit passage applies qua lex specialis, as far as the part of the Strait of Hormuz, which is included in Iran’s territorial waters, is concerned. The next step is to ask the question whether preventing such a passage as well as threatening to prevent such a passage are permissible for Iran. In this context, the potential abuse of otherwise permitted traffic separation schemes is highlighted. Traffic separation schemes are of particular importance in narrow but highly frequented bodies of water, such as the Strait of Hormuz. In addition, the contemporary Iranian state practice has received some attention. One issue to be considered in more detail is the requirement that foreign warships receive authorization from the coastal state prior to entry into the territorial sea. This approach might be incompatible with the right to innocent passage under both the Law of the Sea Convention and customary international law, as there is no clear legal source, which provides for this requirement. Finally, the authors look at the question of the legality of the mere threat to close the Strait of Hormuz as opposed to actually closing the Strait. The sovereignty of other states may be affected to such an extent that such threats already amount to a violation of international law. In light of the historic precedents during the Iran-Iraq War, these threats should not be dismissed lightly. Iran would be well advised to refrain from such rhetoric. (shrink)

The laws of armed conflict draw a sharp distinction between combatants and civilians. According to the principle of discrimination, intentionally attacking civi.

This book analyzes emergency legislations formed in response to terrorism. In recognition that different countries, with different legal traditions, have different solutions, it adopts a comparative point of view. The countries profiled include America, France, Israel, Poland, Germany and United Kingdom. The goal is not to offer judgment on one response or the other. Rather, the contributors offer a comprehensive and thoughtful examination of the entire concept. In the process, they draw attention to the inadaptability of traditional legal and philosophical (...) categories in a new and changing political world. The contributors first criticize the idea of these legislations. They then go on to develop different models to respond to these crises. They build a general analytical framework by answering such questions as: What is an emergency legislation? What kinds of emergencies justify laws of this nature? Why is contemporary terrorism such a specific emergency justifying new laws? Using legal and philosophical reflections, this study looks at how we are changing society. Coverage also provides historical experiences of emergency legislations to further illustrate this point. In the end, readers will gain insight into the long-term consequences of these legislations and how they modify the very work of the rule of law. (shrink)

The laws are not silent in war, but what should they say? What is the moral function of the law of armed conflict? Should the law protect civilians who do not fight but help those who do? Should the law protect soldiers who perform non-combat functions or who may be safely captured? How certain should a soldier be that an individual is a combatant rather than a civilian before using lethal force? What risks should soldiers take on (...) themselves to avoid harming civilians? When do inaccurate weapons become unlawfully indiscriminate? When does 'collateral damage' to civilians become unlawfully disproportionate? Should civilians lose their legal rights by serving, voluntarily or involuntarily, as human shields? Finally, when should killing civilians constitute a war crime? These are the questions that Law and Morality at War answers, contributing to a cutting-edge international debate. Drawing on the concepts and methods of contemporary moral and legal philosophy, the book develops a normative framework within which the laws of war and international criminal law can be evaluated, criticized, and reformed. While several philosophical works critically examine the moral status of civilians and combatants, this book fills a gap, offering both an account of the laws of war and war crimes, and proposing how the law could be improved from a moral point of view. (shrink)

The experiences of multinational engagements in Kosovo in the late 1990s, and then more recently Afghanistan from 2001 and Iraq from 2003, have led to a political debate about the linkage between legality and legitimacy. At the heart of contemporary political and academic discourses about war are questions about the scope and content of the law of armed conflict. Considerably less attention has been given to another mode of regulating warfare, namely Rules of Engagement (ROE), despite their operational (...) significance. This article seeks to begin to bridge this knowledge gap by examining ROE as a means to achieving greater legal accountability for the use of force against civilians. To that end, the article aims to do two things: first, to use examples from the US and the multinational context to develop a typology of the various issues that might affect ROE adversely in a legal accountability perspective, either as a background context or through the deployment and use of ROE itself; and second, to look at ways of rearticulating ROE, setting them on a path toward a more standardized and judicialized form of accountability. (shrink)

This paper aims to explore whether there are any legal limits to the use of force, in particular when force is used for political reasons. How plausible is it to expect people to limit their options when they feel that what they’re doing paves the way towards paradise? In this light, much of the law of armed conflict would seem to be inadequate, based as much of it is on the premise that force is non-political. To the extent (...) then that limits are conceivable, these may stem from the individual morality of those engaged in battle rather than from any grand legal designs. (shrink)

This article asks how military ethics should respond to adversaries deliberately conducting hostilities below the threshold of war. Three options are considered: a novel, limited force paradigm; an expanded hostilities paradigm, i.e., within the law of armed conflict; and an international law enforcement paradigm derived primarily from human rights law. None is problem-free. Mindful of under-deployed classic just war reasoning arguments for discrimination between vices opposed to peace, this article argues against an expanded hostilities paradigm and shows that (...) the retributive, ‘equilibrium of justice’ test used sometimes to support such an expansion is necessary but not sufficient. It explains the need for further examination of whether/how Aquinas and his interpreters can/should conceive of actions under the paradigm of war occurring against non-state actors. (shrink)

Presently, there is armed conflict in Darfur, Sudan. Armed conflict has adversely affected the social, economic and educational development of Darfur, Sudan. Purpose of this study is to know the impact of armed conflict on managerial behavior of the principals of secondary schools in Darfur, Sudan. In this study, the impact of armed conflict on performance of the secondary school principals was analyzed in perspective of their managerial behavior. Based on the findings (...) of the study significant impact of armed conflict was found on the managerial behavior of the principals. It was found that principals coordinated with the staff in activities of the school but were frightened and unable to perform their administrative and managerial duties freely and independently. There was communication gap between the principals, teachers and parents. The principals did not possess the skills to maintain school budget & finance properly. It was concluded that the principals need administrative and managerial training. Government of Sudan may establish academies of Educational Administration & Management to impart training to the principals of secondary schools and to take steps to control the existing armed conflict. (shrink)

While there are many legal textbooks on the laws of armed conflict and academic works on ethical issues in international relations, this is the first text on the relevance of legal and normative issues in military practice. It covers the entire spectrum of military operations and is written with military deicision-makers particularly in mind.

Starting from 2009, national courts of the EU Member States for the first time gained a “real” right to request the EU Court of Justice for preliminary rulings in asylum matters. First judgments of this Court demonstrate equivocal tendencies: some are blaming the Court for incompetence in asylum matters, others believe that the adoption of authoritative decisions at the European level will assist in developing consistent practice of applying asylum law in the European Union, something that failed at international level (...) due to absence of a single authoritative body to provide guidance on interpretation and application of the 1951 Refugee Convention. Considering that the judgments of the EU Court are part of the EU law, the Member States should develop their national asylum law with due regard being taken to those judgments. By the beginning of 2012, the Court has issued eight judgments on the interpretation of various problematic issues of EU asylum law. This Article analyses the jurisprudence of the EU Court in asylum cases, related to the granting of refugee status and subsidiary protection. It also provides a critical evaluation of those judgments. The main objective of the Article is to familiarise the relevant Lithuanian institutions and lawyers with the first judgments of the EU Court in asylum cases and encourage discussions concerning the application of rules established by the Court in the Lithuanian context. Due to limited size, this Article presents the analysis of two EU Court judgments adopted on interpretation of the 2004 Qualification Directive: Elgafaji v. The Netherlands (2009) dealing with granting of subsidiary protection, and Abdulla and others v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland (2010), dealing with cessation of refugee status. The value of those judgments first of all lies in the guidance they provided to the Member States on such concepts as: protection in a situation of an armed conflict, agents of protection, effectiveness of protection; as well as determination of a relationship between refugee status and subsidiary protection, relationship of the Qualification Directive with the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), also cessation of protection. Elgafaji decision, while quite liberal with regard to persons seeking international protection, is not so liberally applied in the Member States’ practice and does not in itself guarantee positive outcome of the application of a concrete individual fleeing from an armed conflict, or a liberal approach to granting subsidiary protection in the Member States. Based on Elgafaji judgment it is clear that: Art. 15(b) of the Qualification Directive correspond to Art. 3 ECHR, while Art. 15(c) provides additional protection and in that it expands the Member States’ obligations beyond the ECHR to provide protection to persons fleeing in situations of armed conflict. While not every person arriving from an armed conflict situation would automatically fall under the granting of subsidiary protection, in certain exceptional situations indiscriminate violence may amount to individual threat without invoking personal circumstances. The EU Court departed from the individualisation requirement applied by the European Court of Human Rights in Art. 3 cases and did not also rely on international humanitarian law, by introducing a “sliding scale” formula for establishing an individual threat in armed conflict situation instead. This formula addressed the alleged internal discrepancy between “individual threat” and “indiscriminate violence”. The Abdulla decision brought in the human rights and law enforcement perspectives to the interpretation of cessation clauses, however it represents a rather superficial approach in the context of the analysed concepts (e.g. towards effectiveness of protection provided by the multinational armed forces) and is likely to be incompatible with the latest legislative trends in the EU asylum instruments (e.g. determination of refugee status and subsidiary protection by means of a single procedure) and the recent jurisprudence under the ECHR (e.g. failure to ensure a minimum standard of living may violate the ECHR). (shrink)

In a significant early case, the ICTY commented: “The essence of the whole corpus of international humanitarian law as well as human rights law lies in the protection of the human dignity of every person…. The general principle of respect for human dignity is . . . the very raison d'être of international humanitarian law and human rights law.” Is it true that international humanitarian law and international human rights law share the same “essence,” and that essence is the general (...) principle of respect for human dignity? Is it true that, in the words of Charles Beitz, humanitarian law is “perhaps better described as the law of ‘human rights in armed conflicts’”? To answer yes, I argue, amounts to a reinterpretation of IHL that drifts far from its history. This reinterpretation is what I label human rights thinking . In its origins, IHL was not designed to protect human dignity, but to reduce human suffering; it was a form of disaster relief. Human rights law, by contrast, originated as a blueprint for the kind of peacetime societies that would no longer plunge the world into what the UN Charter calls the “untold sorrow” of war. Nevertheless, law changes. Perhaps the nature of IHL has evolved over time in the direction of human rights thinking, and should evolve that way. That is the view I defend-–with some qualifications-–in the final sections of this essay. First, I explore the very different genealogies of IHL and human rights law, and explain how human rights thinking migrated into IHL. I attribute the migration to international criminal law, military occupations, and reactions to the U.S. war on terrorism. In the final sections, I explore two ways human rights thinking can be pursued in wars. One of them, I will argue, overplays and overestimates what human rights thinking can accomplish. It does so by, in effect, willing away fundamental differences between war and peace. The other is an approach that I have defended for more than three decades. It consists, at bottom, of taking a civilian’s-eye view of the disasters of war and reading the law accordingly-–recognizing, one might say, that Mother Courage and her children matter just as much to the law of war as Henry V and his band of brothers. (shrink)

In the context of military medical care, Eisenstein and colleagues have introduced the notion ‘left of bang intervention in trauma’, which refers to interventions administered before trauma to reduce morbidity and mortality after injury. This paper responds to Eisenstein and colleagues’ ethical analysis of such interventions, highlighting the difficulty in distinguishing between purely prophylactic and enhancing interventions. This response also addresses legal issues that arise from left of bang interventions under human rights law and the law of armed (...) class='Hi'>conflict, in particular the questions as to whether the consent of service members would need to be obtained and whether the adversary would as a consequence be authorised to resort to more injurious weapons. (shrink)

This article challenges the tendency exhibited in arguments by Michael Ignatieff, Jeremy Waldron, and others to treat the Law of Armed Conflict as the only valid moral frame of reference for guiding armed rebels with just cause. To succeed, normative language and principles must reflect not only the wrongs of ‘terrorism’ and war crimes, but also the rights of legitimate rebels. However, these do not always correspond to the legal privileges of combatants. Rebels are often unlikely to (...) gain belligerent recognition and might sometimes have strong moral reasons to exceed the rights of regular combatants. Where this gives rise to tensions between morality and the LOAC, a decision is needed to determine which to follow. Setting aside the idea of suppressing just war theory altogether in favour of a more purely regulatory approach to war and reforming law in the direct light of moral theory, I question the attempt by Waldron to argue that moral weight of the legal conventions at the heart of the LOAC trump any moral reasons there might be for breaching them. Even if non-combatant immunity is, as Waldron suggests, a deadly serious convention, I argue that war is justified only if pursued for the sake of deadly serious causes which may even be serious enough to oblige agents to break the law. A political theory of the ethics of war is needed to mediate between the moral and legal in such cases where they cannot be reconciled directly. (shrink)

This paper critically explores the growing assertiveness with which liberalism has approached questions of the just use of force since 9/11. The liberal position rests upon broad claims about the centrality of human rights concerns to considerations of the justice of war. The claim is that a liberal-cosmopolitan respect for human rights forces us to reconsider the conservative, generally prohibitive, position on the use of force defended by traditional just war theory and enshrined in international law. This argument is has (...) been most fully developed by Allen Buchanan in several important books and papers and it is Buchanan’s position that forms the basis for the critique of the assertive cosmopolitan attitude to the use of force that is offered in this article. The paper shows that both the just war tradition and those who theorize the ethics of the law of armed conflict have taken the moral and political reality of human rights seriously (in a manner that directly addresses Buchanan’s core argument) but that there remain compelling reasons to defend a conservative approach to the use of force. (shrink)

Civilian Immunity (‘Immunity’) is the legal and moral protection that civilians enjoy against the effects of hostilities under the laws of armed conflict and according to the ethics of killing in war. Immunity specifies different permissibility conditions fordirectly targeting civilianson the one hand, and forharming civilians incidentallyon the other hand. Immunity is standardly defended by appeal to the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE). We show that Immunity's prohibitive stance towards targeting civilians directly, and its more permissive stance (...) towards harming them incidentally, can be defended without appealing to the DDE if agents suffer fromoverconfidence. Overconfidence is a cognitive bias that affects agents who are required to make decisions in the presence of significant uncertainty. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is briefly to present a case for the principle of reparation as a new jus in bello principle for just humanitarian intervention. The article is divided into three sections. In “Restorative Justice and Civilian Protection”, I investigate the idea of restorative justice in order to consider whether or not it can complement the shortcomings of the just war tradition in civilian protection. In “The Legal Framework on Reparation: Its Scope and Limitations”, I examine the scope (...) of the law of armed conflict on reparatory measures in order to consider whether and how ideas of and measures for restorative justice might be incorporated in the jus in bello framework for military humanitarian intervention. In “The Issue of Civilian Victims: A Case for Reparation”, I explore the implications of reparatory measures for victims in order to suggest that these measures are not only beneficial to civilian victims but also imperative to be taken by the interveners if they undertake military intervention within the jus in bello framework and claim its moral justifiability. (shrink)

A classic objection to autonomous weapon systems (AWS) is that these could create so-called responsibility gaps, where it is unclear who should be held responsible in the event that an AWS were to violate some portion of the law of armed conflict (LOAC). However, those who raise this objection generally do so presenting it as a problem for AWS as a whole class of weapons. Yet there exists a rather wide range of systems that can be counted as (...) “autonomous weapon systems”, and so the objection is too broad. In this article I present a taxonomic approach to the objection, examining a number of systems that would count as AWS under the prevalent definitions provided by the United States Department of Defense and the International Committee of the Red Cross, and I show that for virtually all such systems there is a clear locus of responsibility which presents itself as soon as one focuses on specific systems, rather than general notions of AWS. In developing these points, I also suggest a method for dealing with near-future types of AWS which may be thought to create situations where responsibility gaps can still arise. The main purpose of the arguments is, however, not to show that responsibility gaps do not exist or can be closed where they do exist. Rather, it is to highlight that any arguments surrounding AWS must be made with reference to specific weapon platforms imbued with specific abilities, subject to specific limitations, and deployed to specific times and places for specific purposes. More succinctly, the arguments show that we cannot and should not aim to treat AWS as if all of these shared all morally relevant features, but instead on a case-by-case basis. Thus, we must contend with the realities of weapons development and deployment, and tailor our arguments and conclusions to those realities, and with an eye to what facts obtain for particular systems fulfilling particular combat roles. (shrink)

The Australian Army has adopted “respect” as a new addition to the existing trio of values, “courage, initiative and teamwork.” This article explores what respect may mean as an army value. The significance of respect surrounding two incidents involving Australian Defence Force personnel while on duty in Afghanistan is considered. The first is the so-called “green on blue” attack by an Afghan National Army soldier killing three Australian soldiers on 29 August 2012. The second concerns allegations of mutilation of suspected (...) Afghan insurgents’ corpses by soldiers attached to an Australian Special Forces Unit on 28 April 2013. The incidents have resulted in internal military investigations: in the second incident, with a view to possible prosecution for breach of the law of armed conflict and related disciplinary offences; and in the case of the green on blue attack, leading to a civilian coronial inquest. This article discusses the training and modelling of behaviour required to instil such a value as respect. (shrink)

Unmanned systems in military applications will often play a role in determining the success or failure of combat missions and thus in determining who lives and dies in times of war. Designers of UMS must therefore consider ethical, as well as operational, requirements and limits when developing UMS. I group the ethical issues involved in UMS design under two broad headings, Building Safe Systems and Designing for the Law of Armed Conflict, and identify and discuss a number of (...) issues under each of these headings. As well as identifying issues, I offer some analysis of their implications and how they might be addressed. (shrink)