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  1.  26
    Explanatory Judgment, Moral Offense and Value-Free Science.Matteo Colombo, Leandra Bucher & Yoel Inbar - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (4):743-763.
    A popular view in philosophy of science contends that scientific reasoning is objective to the extent that the appraisal of scientific hypotheses is not influenced by moral, political, economic, or social values, but only by the available evidence. A large body of results in the psychology of motivated-reasoning has put pressure on the empirical adequacy of this view. The present study extends this body of results by providing direct evidence that the moral offensiveness of a scientific hypothesis biases explanatory judgment (...)
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  2.  82
    Construction and Revision of Spatial Mental Models Under High Task Demand.Jelica Nejasmic, Leandra Bucher, Paul D. Thorn & Markus Knauff - 2014 - In Paul Bello, Marcello Guarini, Marjorie McShane & Brian Scassellati (eds.), Proceedings of the 36th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society. pp. 1066-72.
    Individuals often revise their beliefs when confronted with contradicting evidence. Belief revision in the spatial domain can be regarded as variation of initially constructed spatial mental models. Construction and revision usually follow distinct cognitive principles. The present study examines whether principles of revisions which follow constructions under high task demands differ from principles applied after less demanding constructions. We manipulated the task demands for model constructions by means of the continuity with which a spatial model was constructed. We administered tasks (...)
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  3.  28
    Spatial Reasoning as Verbal Reasoning.Antje Krumnack, Leandra Bucher, Jelica Nejasmic & Markus Knauff - 2010 - In S. Ohlsson & R. Catrambone (eds.), Proceedings of the 32nd Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society.
  4.  29
    Minimality Criteria in Spatial Belief Revision.Leandra Bucher & Paul D. Thorn - 2014 - In Paul Bello, Marcello Guarini, Marjorie McShane & Brian Scassellati (eds.), Proceedings of the 36th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Cognitive Science Society. pp. 1952-8.
    Agents typically revise their beliefs when confronted with evidence that contradicts those beliefs, selecting from a number of possible revisions sufficient to reestablish consistency. In cases where an individual’s beliefs concern spatial relations, belief revision has been fruitfully treated as a decision about which features of an initially constructed spatial mental model to modify. A normative claim about belief revision maintains that agents should prefer minimal belief revisions. Yet recent studies have rebutted the preceding claim, where minimality is understood to (...)
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