Exemption claims remain a tangled and divisive moral and legal issue both in academia and in the public sphere. In his book Exemptions: Necessary, Justified, or Misguided?, the constitutional scholar Kent Greenawalt zeros in on the vexed question of whether exemptions from rules of general applicability based on the conscientious convictions of individuals or groups are sometimes justified or prudent by discussing a wide range of cases drawn from the American jurisprudence. Although he does not engage in (...) a significant way with political and legal philosophy and comparative law, his contextualist and pragmatic approach is a powerful antidote against oversimplification and dogmatism with regard to exemption claims. Unsurprisingly, Greenawalt’s approach comes at times dangerously close to casuistry, and some of his analyses and normative recommendations would benefit from a firmer footing in moral principles and rational argumentation. In this review, I flesh out some of the strengths and limits of Greenawalt’s valuable book. (shrink)

Exemption claims remain a tangled and divisive moral and legal issue both in academia and in the public sphere. In his book Exemptions: Necessary, Justified, or Misguided?, the constitutional scholar Kent Greenawalt zeros in on the vexed question of whether exemptions from rules of general applicability based on the conscientious convictions of individuals or groups are sometimes justified or prudent by discussing a wide range of cases drawn from the American jurisprudence. Although he does not engage in (...) a significant way with political and legal philosophy and comparative law, his contextualist and pragmatic approach is a powerful antidote against oversimplification and dogmatism with regard to exemption claims. Unsurprisingly, Greenawalt’s approach comes at times dangerously close to casuistry, and some of his analyses and normative recommendations would benefit from a firmer footing in moral principles and rational argumentation. In this review, I flesh out some of the strengths and limits of Greenawalt’s valuable book. (shrink)

Critical congenital heart disease screening is rapidly becoming the standard of care in the United States after being added to the Recommended Uniform Screening Panel in 2011. Newborn screens typically do not require affirmative parental consent. In fact, most states allow parents to exempt their baby from receiving the required screen on the basis of religious or personally held beliefs. There are many ethical considerations implicated with allowing parents to exempt their child from newborn screening for CCHD. Considerations include the (...) treatment of religious exemptions in our current legal system, as well as medical and ethical principles in relation to the rights of infants. Although there are significant benefits to screening newborns for CCHD, when a parent refuses for religious or personal beliefs, in the case of CCHD screening, the parental decision should stand. (shrink)

Religious exemptions have a long history in American law, but have become especially controversial over the last several years. The essays in this volume address the moral and philosophical issues that the legal practice of religious exemptions often raises.

This paper provides an interpretation of the licensing provisions envisaged under the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 as a model for a rule and exemption-based procedural strategy for the adjudication of potential ethical controversies, and it offers an account of the liberal-democratic legitimacy of the procedure’s outcomes as well as of the legal procedure itself. Drawing on a novel articulation of the distinction between exceptions and exemptions, the paper argues that such a rule and exemption mechanism, while (...) not devoid of attractions, is not immune from the criticisms often levied against procedural approaches to the management of pluralism: it either has to fall back on substantive justification in ways that are not helpful when trying to arbitrate a moral controversy, or it appears justificatorily groundless. (shrink)

When generally applicable rules clash with one’s cultural, religious or moral commitments, should exemptions be granted? The debate on exemptions raises the question both of what it means to treat people equally and of what it means to protect diversity adequately. The objective of this paper is to defend the no-exemption argument and to make it a more attractive position for liberals. I first argue that exemptions violate the principle of equal treatment because they rely on distinctions (...) that cannot be neutrally justified. I then argue that diversity can be adequately accommodated if we use a more demanding interpretation of the justification of generally applicable rules. There should be no exemption to fully justified rules, but rules are only fully justified when the particular demands that they impose on individuals are justified, i.e. when they are either neutral or pass both a Necessity Test and a Sufficiency Test. When rules are not fully justified, they should be repealed or modified. Based on this focus on the demands of rules, equality can be reconciled with an adequate accommodation of diversity. (shrink)

Mental retardation is an invented bureaucratic category, currently undergoing radical rethinking and likely renaming, that includes many who have biologically based brain disorders, but is itself determined on functional criteria that are purely arbitrary. People with MR are socially vulnerable and thus are more likely to be "naíve confessors," "naíve defendants," and "naíve offenders." That is most likely the rationale and justification for the Supreme Court's decision, in Atkins v. Virginia, to exempt the class from execution. Although the decision is (...) to be applauded as a step in a more humane direction, it is problematic to use an indirect, artificial, and insufficiently inclusive category to determine who should or should not be executed. Limited social intelligence is a characteristic of a wide range of brainbased syndromes and disorders, including many who fall above the upper IQ limit and, thus, are ineligible for the MR label and the legal protections associated with it. A more equitable, and logical, policy would be to extend execution exemption to all who demonstrate the same kinds of vulnerabilities, especially if they can be linked to some brain-based medical condition, regardless of whether one qualifies for the label of MR. (shrink)

Religious beliefs are often singled out for special treatment in secular liberal societies. Yet if a legal exemption is granted for a belief with a religious foundation, the question arises whether a similar, non‐religious moral belief must also be granted an exemption. I argue that common reasons for favoring religious over non‐religious beliefs fail to provide a convincing moral case for drawing a distinction of this nature. I focus on arguments concerning the role of religious beliefs in constituting an (...) individual's identity and the transcendental nature of religion, which lead me to consider in the final section the role of choice in religious belief. (shrink)

This book explores the transformational impact of new technological developments on legal practice. More specifically, it addresses knowledge management, communication, and e-discovery related technologies, and helps readers develop the project management and data analysis skills needed to effectively navigate the current, and future, landscapes. It studies the impact of current trends on business practices, as well as the ethical, procedural, and evidentiary concerns involved. Introducing novel interactive technologies as well as traditional content, the book reflects expertise from across the (...) legal industry, including practitioners, the bench, academia, and legal technology consultants. All of the contributing authors currently teach aspiring lawyers and/or paralegals and have identified a gap in the available instructional material. Rapid technology advances have radically changed the way we all live and work, and the legal profession is by no means exempt from the impact of these changes. In order to better assist their clients, and to better compete on the legal market, it is imperative for lawyers to understand the ethical, functional, and business consequences of new technologies on their respective practices. This book provides the necessary content by including legal technology texts, information about novel pedagogical technologies, helpful tools for managing legal technologies and IT staff, statistical methods, tips and checklists. (shrink)

Moral responsibility is a prerequisite for culpability. One can be morally responsible for φing without being culpable for it, but not vice versa. I agree with Andrew Simester on this, and agree that it is important to differentiate moral responsibility from culpability. That moral responsibility is a prerequisite for culpability is often taken to require sharply distinguishing excuses from what are called ‘exemptions’ (or to use the term Simester uses, ‘irresponsibility defences’) and treating exemptions as forming a category (...) of their own. I am not convinced that it does. In previous work, I have gone against the prevailing view by understanding the category of excuses to include what, on that view, are classified as exemptions. In this paper I reconsider this, delving deeper into the matter than I have in the past and drawing on Simester’s magisterial Fundamentals of Criminal Law to do so. I challenge the position that exemptions form a category of their own, distinct from excuses, and that infancy and insanity need to be understood as exemptions and not excuses. I argue that the category of exemptions, or “irresponsibility defenses,” is problematic, and that recognizing the distinction between culpability and moral responsibility and recognizing its importance does not commit one to excluding from the category of excuses infancy and insanity. Infancy and insanity are better seen as operating to exempt the agent altogether from moral responsibility only at the limit; more often, they operate to excuse, partially or fully. (shrink)

The Japanese Medical Act section 21 states that doctors must report unnatural deaths to the police, even though the term “unnatural death” is not defined by law. However, many doctors are reluctant to report potential therapeutic deaths . The Japanese Society of Legal Medicine has submitted guidelines for unnatural death, including PTD. These define a PTD as an unexpected death, the cause of which is unknown, but which is potentially related to medical practice. Such deaths are “reportable” to the (...) coroner in the UK. In this study, we addressed the question of whether physicians would report each of eight hypothetical PTDs. Although the clinical societies declare that doctors must report deaths due to gross negligence, 60% of the participants said that they would not report gross negligence involving an overdose in cases where they had obtained informed consent or had provided an explanation after the death occurred. This can be accounted for by the mistaken belief on the part of the participants that obtaining informed consent exempts Japanese physicians from the duty of reporting PTDs. The attitude of Japanese physicians is caused by the death investigation system, which is designed to discover whether a crime has been committed rather than focusing on the cause of death. Accordingly, the Japanese Government has decided to commission a pilot study from an independent organisation in which medical specialists will investigate PTDs in order to prevent deaths occurring as a result of gross negligence. (shrink)

Drawing on Brown and Fraser’s (in: Giles, Scherer (eds) Social markers in speech, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 33–62, 1979) framework for the analysis of communicative situations and Fuentes Rodríguez’s (Lingüística pragmática y Análisis del discurso, Arco Libros, Madrid, 2000; in Estudios de Lingüística: Investigaciones lingüísticas en el siglo XXI, 2009. https://doi.org/10.14198/ELUA2009.Anexo3.04 ) model of pragmatic analysis, this paper examines three home-made recordings featuring some of the members of the terrorist cell responsible for the 2017 vehicle-ramming attacks in Barcelona and (...) Cambrils weighted as evidence during the trial held between November 2020 and May 2021 in the Spanish National High Court. The aim of this qualitative analysis is to test whether the linguistic evidence available supports the allegation that the participation in these recordings by one of the accused, Mohamed Houli Chemlal, had been planned by his interlocutors. Results show, first, that the exchanges analyzed present features indicative of both spontaneity and (limited) planification. Second, that Houli makes key contributions to the unfolding of the interactions shown in the recordings and that he does so in a cooperative and apparently relaxed manner, which could at best provide only partial support to his allegations. It is claimed that forensic linguistic analysis can generate valuable insights within terrorism-related legal proceedings. (shrink)

Legal and philosophical theories of religious exemptions have primarily understood them as a means toward one or more moral ends: protecting rights and securing equality, primarily. But exemptions also serve an under-theorized stabilizing function in resolving conflicts between law and belief. In this paper, I argue that these conflicts pose a challenge to public justification, and ipso facto to political stability. I then show how religious exemptions can support stability by ameliorating these conflicts, and elaborate parameters (...) for identifying those exemptions most likely to achieve this stability-enhancing effect. (shrink)

Legal and philosophical theories of religious exemptions have primarily understood them as a means toward one or more moral ends: protecting rights and securing equality, primarily. But exemptions also serve an under-theorized stabilizing function in resolving conflicts between law and belief. In this paper, I argue that these conflicts pose a challenge to public justification, and ipso facto to political stability. I then show how religious exemptions can support stability by ameliorating these conflicts, and elaborate parameters (...) for identifying those exemptions most likely to achieve this stability-enhancing effect. (shrink)

This article considers the four eyewitness threshold for zinā’ in Islamic criminal law. In some Muslim-majority countries where zinā’ remains an offence, judiciaries have by-passed the threshold by accepting singular confessions from male fornicators or, otherwise, inferring fornication from pregnancy outside of marriage. As a result, a disproportionate number of women have been prosecuted, convicted, and even punished for zinā’. I assert that the four-eyewitness threshold allows for an alternative way to view zinā’ that can result in a different set (...) of consequences. If the threshold is taken seriously such that it becomes the only evidentiary basis upon which a zinā’ conviction can be entered, it will create an effective or de facto exemption where alleged perpetrators can never be convicted, except in the rarest cases where four independent eyewitnesses can be corralled. If adopted, this approach would provide a principled basis to reject opportunistic confessions that deflect punishment to accused female fornicators. And as an ‘internal’ solution that arises within the framework of the sharī’a, a de facto exemption approach is more likely to be perceived as legitimate when compared with proposed solutions that find their basis in international human rights legal instruments. (shrink)

Why do we grant religious exemptions? Many distinguished scholars and judges have been drawn to the idea that conscience is entitled to special protection, because a person in its grip cannot obey the law without betraying his deepest, most identity-defining commitments. The weakness of this justification is shown by philosopher Harry Frankfurt's account of what he calls “volitional necessity,” which clarifies the structure of the argument that invocations of conscience imply. Frankfurt shows that a person can be bound in (...) this way by allegiances that there is no reason to respect; volitional necessity can arise from anything at all that a person cares about. Conscience is thus a poor basis for claims upon other people. Accommodation must rather depend on some idea of the value of religion. (shrink)

The emergence of a global industry of digital health platforms operated by Big Tech corporations, and its growing entanglements with academic and pharmaceutical research networks, raise pressing questions on the capacity of current data governance models, regulatory and legal frameworks to safeguard the sustainability of the health research ecosystem. In this article, we direct our attention toward the challenges faced by the European General Data Protection Regulation in regulating the potentially disruptive engagement of Big Tech platforms in health research. (...) The General Data Protection Regulation upholds a rather flexible regime for scientific research through a number of derogations to otherwise stricter data protection requirements, while providing a very broad interpretation of the notion of “scientific research”. Precisely the breadth of these exemptions combined with the ample scope of this notion could provide unintended leeway to the health data processing activities of Big Tech platforms, which have not been immune from carrying out privacy-infringing and socially disruptive practices in the health domain. We thus discuss further finer-grained demarcations to be traced within the broadly construed notion of scientific research, geared to implementing use-based data governance frameworks that distinguish health research activities that should benefit from a facilitated data protection regime from those that should not. We conclude that a “re-purposing” of big data governance approaches in health research is needed if European nations are to promote research activities within a framework of high safeguards for both individual citizens and society. (shrink)

Many religious freedom laws provide exemptions to persons who refuse to comply with certain laws on religious grounds. But these exemptions are increasingly used (by claimants and others) to advance political goals. For example, religious freedom lawsuits helped to undermine the Affordable Care Act’s guarantee of coverage for contraceptives. And the recent Masterpiece Cakeshop case was part of a broader effort to protest the right to same-sex marriage. This paper argues that the state should not grant religious (...) class='Hi'>exemptions when they are used to advance political goals. A religious exemption creates a legal inequality between citizens that can only be justified if the protection is not used politically. As such, the state should ensure that laws providing religious exemptions are written, interpreted, and enforced so as to prevent their political misuse. (shrink)

I investigate the normative and conceptual account of the relationship between public recognition and dignitarian, or egalitarian, commitments. I do so through addressing the normative dispute, sparked by legal cases such as Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission and Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, as to whether there are dignitarian grounds for rejecting religious exemptions to antidiscrimination laws. I argue that there are such grounds. Specifically, I argue that, if granted, such exemptions would inflict dignitary (...) harms against LGBTQ individuals by denying them the public recognition necessary for reliably sustaining civic self-respect. Such exemptions would deny this recognition in two distinct ways. First, such exemptions would institutionalize humiliation of LGBTQ individuals as market actors. Second, such exemptions would condition market access for LGBTQ individuals on unequal terms. Through making this argument, I hope to make three primary, and related, contributions: I introduce a concept of civic self-respect; I argue that the normative import of public recognition is grounded in the good of civic self-respect; and I rely on this normative framework to show how religious exemptions to public accommodations laws inflict dignitary harms. My argument is relevant to both political philosophers and legal scholars grappling with questions of why public recognition matters and what it demands. (shrink)

Under the Canadian labour laws that govern workplace safety, wage, and other work conditions, ‘family’ workers are not covered by the law under special rules for agriculture. Among other legal exclusions, the family farm exclusion contributes to a dearth of basic work, health, and safety standards in the sector, despite the commercialization and industrialization of family farming activities. Through a focus on Alberta, Canada—where farm labour rules have only applied to agriculture since 2016—this article explores the family exclusion in (...) relation to family farming experiences with work and risk, based on interviews with farm operators, their family members, and farm employees in Alberta. While some participants continued to press for exemptions for farms from labour rules under the rationale that there is intrinsic safety within families, the findings also reveal how other participants have begun questioning this rationale, despite their overall support for the family farm exemption in Alberta. Using the lens of legal geography and critical perspectives on the family, we argue that the family is a significant but under-examined dynamic in the legal regimes governing farm labour and agricultural safety and health. Together, the law and dominant narratives about family farming treat farm operations as hyper-private domains, where operators have disproportionate power to dispose of their own work and the work of others how they wish. These legal geographies of hyper-privacy contribute to the indecent work conditions that characterize farm labour systems in Alberta and other jurisdictions. (shrink)

The authors of this article apply systemic and comparative methods in order to discuss the key criteria of hardship as a legal institute, i.e. a fundamental alteration of the contractual equilibrium. The authors focus on modern regulations, such as those established in the Principles of International Commercial Contracts and other international contract restatements. The UNIDROIT Principles and other legal instruments usually quite abstractly define the criterion of fundamental alteration; thus further input is necessary in order to reveal the (...) more precise requirements of hardship. The authors of this article provide such an input by conducting a comparative research of the most prominent legal doctrine and case law. (shrink)

This is the fourth volume of a series entitled `Current Legal Issues' that are published each Summer as a sister volume to `Current Legal Problems'. The interaction of religious practice and the law raises a number of difficult and fascinating issues. What exactly do we mean by religious faith? To what extent are the Courts competent to pass judgement on disputes arising within religious organisations? Are some religious faiths more legitimate than others? Should the law grant special privileges (...) to religious believers? - for example exemption from provisions in human rights legislation which would otherwise restrict their activities. (shrink)

Does multiculturalism imply that certain cultural minorities – nomos groups, whose cultural conceptions extend in important ways into views about the law – should have forms of legal autonomy that go beyond normal multicultural accommodations such as exemptions and special protection? In other words: should we allow «minority jurisdictions» for multicultural reasons and give certain minorities powers of legislation and adjudication on certain issues? The paper sketches how one might arrive at such a conclusion given some standard multicultural (...) reasoning, and then proceeds by examining eight key rejoinders to such a proposal. None of these rejoinders provide by themselves knockdown arguments against extending multicultural rights to forms of legal autonomy, but together they do provide a basis for some skepticism about the cogency and desirability of at least more ambitious forms of legal autonomy for cultural minorities within a liberal framework. (shrink)

En tant que mineures juridiques, les femmes romaines sont normalement exclues des privilèges politiques tel que le droit de vote, tout comme elles sont exemptes des devoirs des citoyens (armée ou charges fiscales). Les femmes bénéficiaient cependant pleinement des privilèges garantis par le droit civil. Et bien que leur prise de parole dans des contextes politiques relève de l’exceptionnel, les lieux d’exercice de la citoyenneté leur étaient accessibles. C’est dans la religion publique que le terme civis Romana apparaît finalement. De (...) cette étude, il résulte que la citoyenne romaine existait bel et bien, et que cette citoyenneté se rapprochait de la civitas sine suffragio. La société romaine reposait avant tout sur des inégalités et une hiérarchie omniprésentes : entre les hommes citoyens de plein droit, entre eux et les citoyens sans suffrage, et entre citoyens et femmes citoyennes. Cependant, tous pouvaient expérimenter une forme de citoyenneté à travers des actes civiques. (shrink)

This article examines a legal dispute over the ownership of nine bondservants between a Buddhist monastery and two monks and a nun, focusing on the legal apparatus and practices in Dunhuang when it was under Tibetan control. During the Tang, eminent monks of the Buddhist clergy petitioned for exemptions from public courts in order to restrict trials of ordained Buddhists at alternative venues. Such petitions were declined, granted, or revoked by different Tang emperors. This case study demonstrates (...) that ordained Buddhists on this Sino-Tibetan frontier affiliated with the Buddhist clergy in Dunhuang did not enjoy this privilege. Instead of being shielded from public attention, two Buddhist monks and a nun successfully litigated against a Buddhist monastery in a public court. (shrink)

Beheld in terms of international law, its subjects such as states, governments or international organizations always communicate with each other based on the spirit of the provisions of the field of international law.In the framework of the breaches, respectively the deliberate violation of these provisions, is the case of the so-called "Gulenists", where all the links of the system under which the extradition matter is built upon, are exempted.Our country will keep this stain for a long time, while in the (...) archives of justice it will be treated as a case that should not have happened, always based on the commitment to the strict implementation of the provisions of the field of international law that our state has always had. At least they should have been held accountable, even criminally; hence, such cases to have never been repeated in our country.The lack of criminal accountability of the actors-senior state officials directly implicated in this case has left scars in our system, which at that moment is widely considered as a delayed system, while at an instant the whole commitment in this direction is shaken.This stain could have been avoided post festum - even in the circumstances when it happened, that is, even in the situation when all the political actors had been implicated in this case.In this regard, whilst analyzing the provisions we can assume that despite the deficiencies and continuously looking at the volume of legal provisions of this law, yet, we can consider that our system in this area has advanced and has ongoing initiatives to improve this system to the extent that could meet the requirements in relation to the dynamics of social and international relations. (shrink)

The presented study raises the issue of contribution payers in the field of social insurance, in particular based on the Covid-19 pandemic. Searching for ways of supporting was determined by the deterioration of the financial condition of entrepreneurs as payers of contributions. In 2020, there were no instruments or mechanisms to support entrepreneurs in a lockdown situation, which implied the need to build such tools and the legal environment for SMEs practically from the beginning. The Social Insurance Institution (ZUS) (...) was entrusted with the role of a stabilizer, consisting in servicing entrepreneurs as part of subsequent editions of the Anti-Crisis Shield. During the announcement of the COVID-19 pandemic, ZUS used the following forms of support for contribution payers: exemption from the obligation to pay contributions, postponement of the payment of contributions and payment of contributions in installments. The research question concerned the enforcement of the law and respect for the basic rights of entrepreneurs in the scope of the support used. In order to solve the research task legal interpretation were used in the work. The author’s considerations lead to the conclusion that forms of support used in connection with the Covid-19 pandemic turned out to be effective and may be used in the future in emergency situations. An important science contribution of the article results from the combination of the selected legal and economic aspects. (shrink)

Influenza mandates in health care institutions are recommended by professional associations as an effective way to prevent the contraction of influenza by patients from health care workers. Health care institutions with such mandates must operate within civil rights frameworks. A recent set of cases against health care institutions with influenza mandates reveals the liabilities posed by federal law that protects employees from religious discrimination. This article examines this legal framework and draws important lessons from this litigation for health care (...) institutions. We argue counterintuitively that providing religious exemptions from influenza mandates may expose health care institutions to more liability than not providing a formal exemption. (shrink)

One of the major objectives in a democratic state is ensuring health security of the citizens including combating epidemic diseases. The subject matter of this article is the presentation and analysis of legal regulations regarding preventive vaccination in Poland, in particular the aspect of imposing a legal obligation and restricting parents’ right to express consent for medical intervention. The reflections made herein are aimed at finding an answer to the question whether the adopted legal solutions are admissible (...) in a democratic state with regard to ensuring health security. The purpose of the analysis is also to assess whether the abovementioned legal regulations have been formulated in a clear way and do not raise interpretation doubts and, consequently, whether they are comprehensible to the parents obliged to comply with them. As it follows from analysis of the legal provisions, parents must not refuse to subject a child to obligatory preventive vaccination and their consent is not required by law, both as regards the medical qualifying examination to exclude contraindications to performing vaccination and the vaccination itself. It is a legal obligation, from which exemption is only possible on grounds of certain medical conditions that would render vaccination inadvisable. The legal provisions that concern obligatory preventive vaccination in Poland, including in particular those referring to its enforceability, have not been formulated in a way that is sufficiently comprehensible to parents who are under the obligation of complying with them, irrespective of the fact that the language of the provisions of law should be clear and raise no interpretative doubts. In a democratic state the protection of public health against epidemic hazards justifies the implementation of legal solutions that restrict an individual’s freedom of self-determination, thus limiting the right of patients or their statutory representatives to grant or refuse consent for a medical intervention in the form of preventive vaccination – the purpose of this legal solution being to prioritize the safeguarding of state health security. It is vitally important to engage in a social dialogue with the purpose of convincing the public of the need for vaccination, its significance and its implementation for the better good. (shrink)

Ambient assisted living technologies are increasingly presented and sold as essential smart additions to daily life and home environments that will radically transform the healthcare and wellness markets of the future. An ethical approach and a thorough understanding of all ethics in surveillance/monitoring architectures are therefore pressing. AAL poses many ethical challenges raising questions that will affect immediate acceptance and long-term usage. Furthermore, ethical issues emerge from social inequalities and their potential exacerbation by AAL, accentuating the existing access gap between (...) high-income countries and low and middle-income countries. Legal aspects mainly refer to the adherence to existing legal frameworks and cover issues related to product safety, data protection, cybersecurity, intellectual property, and access to data by public, private, and government bodies. Successful privacy-friendly AAL applications are needed, as the pressure to bring Internet of Things devices and ones equipped with artificial intelligence quickly to market cannot overlook the fact that the environments in which AAL will operate are mostly private. The social issues focus on the impact of AAL technologies before and after their adoption. Future AAL technologies need to consider all aspects of equality such as gender, race, age and social disadvantages and avoid increasing loneliness and isolation among, e.g. older and frail people. Finally, the current power asymmetries between the target and general populations should not be underestimated nor should the discrepant needs and motivations of the target group and those developing and deploying AAL systems. Whilst AAL technologies provide promising solutions for the health and social care challenges, they are not exempt from ethical, legal and social issues. A set of ELSI guidelines is needed to integrate these factors at the research and development stage. (shrink)

Hospitals long ago shed their role as alms houses for the poor. What vestiges remain of the early American hospital are the tax-exempt, nonprofit hospital form and a general perception that hospitals, as charitable institutions, owe a duty to their communities. The appropriateness of the nonprofit hospital tax exemption has long been debated, and many theories have been advanced to justify the tax exemption of nonprofit hospitals. In a growing number of jurisdictions, however, state and local authorities have gone beyond (...) the theoretical debate and are challenging the tax exemption of their nonprofit hospitals. For various reasons, efforts are afoot to capture greater community benefit from nonprofit hospitals.At the heart of such challenges is the debate over the nature and extent of the duty charitable institutions owe to their communities. A demand is growing for nonprofit hospitals to earn their tax exemptions by benefiting their communities in concrete ways. Some have been stripped of their tax-exempt status by local authorities or pressured to make payments in lieu of taxes. A number of states have recently implemented initiatives in an attempt to make hospitals more accountable for their community benefits. Many hospitals are responding to this heightened scrutiny in a proactive way, by voluntarily documenting community benefits. A number of nonprofit hospitals and hospital associations are cooperating with—or even sponsoring—state legislation in this area. (shrink)

Hospitals long ago shed their role as alms houses for the poor. What vestiges remain of the early American hospital are the tax-exempt, nonprofit hospital form and a general perception that hospitals, as charitable institutions, owe a duty to their communities. The appropriateness of the nonprofit hospital tax exemption has long been debated, and many theories have been advanced to justify the tax exemption of nonprofit hospitals. In a growing number of jurisdictions, however, state and local authorities have gone beyond (...) the theoretical debate and are challenging the tax exemption of their nonprofit hospitals. For various reasons, efforts are afoot to capture greater community benefit from nonprofit hospitals.At the heart of such challenges is the debate over the nature and extent of the duty charitable institutions owe to their communities. A demand is growing for nonprofit hospitals to earn their tax exemptions by benefiting their communities in concrete ways. Some have been stripped of their tax-exempt status by local authorities or pressured to make payments in lieu of taxes. A number of states have recently implemented initiatives in an attempt to make hospitals more accountable for their community benefits. Many hospitals are responding to this heightened scrutiny in a proactive way, by voluntarily documenting community benefits. A number of nonprofit hospitals and hospital associations are cooperating with—or even sponsoring—state legislation in this area. (shrink)

In Why Tolerate Religion?, Brian Leiter argues against the special legal status of religion, claiming that religion should not be the only ground for exemptions to the law and that this form of protection should be, in principle, available for the claims of secular conscience as well. However, in the last chapter of his book, he objects to a universal regime of exemptions for both religious and secular claims of conscience, highlighting the practical and moral flaws associated (...) with it. We believe that Leiter identifies a genuine and important contemporary legal and philosophical problem. We find much to admire in his reasoning. However, we raise questions about two claims that are crucial for his argument. The first claim is that it is not religion as such, but conscience that deserves toleration and respect. The second claim is that respect for religion and conscience demands ‘principled toleration’ but does not entail stronger policies of legal exemptions. Against the first claim, we argue that Leiter does not successfully distinguish religious belief from secular conscience and morality; and he does not explain why secular conscience deserves respect. Against the second claim, we argue that the most promising theories of legal exemptions are not classical theories of liberal toleration. (shrink)

This paper provides an economic justification for the exemption from liability for omissions in torts and for the exceptions to this exemption. It interprets the differential treatment of acts and omissions under tort law as a proxy for a more fundamental distinction between harms caused by multiple injurers, where each one can single-handedly prevent the harm, and harms caused by a single injurer. Since the overall cost to which a group of injurers is exposed is constant, attributing liability to many (...) injurers reduces the part each has to pay and, consequently, reduces each one’s incentives to take precautions. Broad exemption from liability for omissions is a way of carving a simple, practical rule to distinguish between the typical cases in which an agent can be easily selected and provided with sufficient incentives and cases in which there is a serious problem of dilution of liability. The exceptions to the rule exempting from liability for omissions are explained in terms of efficiency. The imposition of liability for omissions depends on the ability to identify a salient agent, i.e., to single out one or few liable agents and differentiate their role from that of others. Tort law designs three types of "salience rules." It either creates salience directly, or it can exploit salience created "naturally," or it can induce injurers to create salience voluntarily. (shrink)

To date, both the United States federal government and twenty-one individual states have passed Religious Freedom Restoration Acts that aim to protect religious persons from having their sincere beliefs substantially burdened by governmental interests. RFRAs accomplish this by offering a three-pronged exemption test for religious objectors that is satisfied only when (1) an objector has a sincere belief that is being substantially burdened; (2) the government has a very good reason (e.g., health or safety) to interfere; and (3) there is (...) a reasonable alternative to serve the compelling interest. Legal balancing tests like those found in RFRA are content neutral insofar as they sideline the belief-content of conscientious objections as irrelevant when determining the permissibility of granting legal accommodations. However, some theorists worry that this legal picture may be backward: perhaps balancing tests should be content non-neutral given the usual features of conscientious objections. For example, Yossi Nehushtan contends that, contrary to their typical codification, religious conscience beliefs seem undeserving of special legal accommodations because they possess uniquely strong empirical and theoretical ties to intolerance. Thus, the illiberally intolerant content of these conscientious objections might actually give the state a reason to refuse to grant legal exemptions. In this paper, I offer a cursory defense of content neutrality with respect to balancing tests like those found in RFRA. To begin, I outline Nehushtan’s argument for content non-neutrality. The cornerstone of his argument is that illiberal intolerance is intolerable such that conscientious objections that are based upon illiberally intolerant values provide the state with strong, normally prevailing reason not to grant an exemption. I argue that, even when the illiberally intolerant content of one’s conscience constitutes a weighty and relevant factor in determining the permissibility of granting a legal exemption, there remain significant problems. It is difficult, for example, to determine which views are illiberally intolerant and difficult to say whether illiberally intolerant views can effectively serve as the principled demarcating line in balancing tests. To conclude, I offer several cursory arguments in favor of adopting content-neutral approaches without necessarily making a comprehensive case. By drawing on the work of Amy Sepinwall, Nadia Sawicki, and Nathan Chapman, I show that content-neutral approaches can help to safeguard robust protections for conscience by permitting atypical exercises of conscience, protect minority thoughts and practices from being coercively supplanted by majoritarian understandings of morality, appropriately maintain the skepticism and humility that we owe each other as compatriots in a pluralistic society, and allow the kind of justifiable civil disobedience that has an important place in political history among other things. (shrink)

"Law week soccer competition: 16-19 May 2005." Ethos: Official Publication of the Law Society of the Australian Capital Territory, (198), pp. 25.