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Leland F. Saunders
Seattle Pacific University
  1.  97
    Reason and Emotion, Not Reason or Emotion in Moral Judgment.Leland F. Saunders - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations (3):1-16.
    One of the central questions in both metaethics and empirical moral psychology is whether moral judgments are the products of reason or emotions. This way of putting the question relies on an overly simplified view of reason and emotion as two fully independent cognitive faculties whose causal contributions to moral judgment can be cleanly separated. However, there is a significant body of evidence in the cognitive sciences that seriously undercuts this conception of reason and emotion, and supports the view that (...)
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  2. What is Moral Reasoning?Leland F. Saunders - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology (1):1-20.
    What role does moral reasoning play in moral judgment? More specifically, what causal role does moral reasoning have in the production of moral judgments? Recently, many philosophers and psychologists have attempted to answer this question by drawing on empirical data. However, these attempts fall short because there has been no sustained attention to the question of what moral reasoning is. This paper addresses this problem, by providing a general account of moral reasoning in terms of a capacity, and suggests how (...)
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    Reason and Intuition in the Moral Life: A Dual-Process Account of Moral Justification.Leland F. Saunders - 2009 - In Jonathan Evans & Keith Frankish (eds.), In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond. Oxford University Press. pp. 335--354.
    This chapter explores how morality can be rational if moral intuitions are resistant to rational reflection. There are two parts to this question. The normative problem is whether there is a model of moral justification which can show that morality is a rational enterprise given the facts of moral dumbfounding. Appealing to the model of reflective equilibrium for the rational justification of moral intuitions solves this problem. Reflective equilibrium views the rational justification of morality as a back-and-forth balancing between moral (...)
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    Virtues as Reasons Structures.Leland F. Saunders - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (9):2785-2804.
    There is a certain kind of tension in recent accounts of the role of reasons in virtue ethics between two plausible claims that pull in different directions. First, that virtues are the central normative notion in virtue ethics; and second, that virtue is a kind of responsiveness to reasons: that reasons explain both what it is to act from virtue, and what the virtues are. I argue that this is a serious tension and necessitates a different account of the relationship (...)
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    Peter Singer and Christian Ethics: Beyond Polarization, Written by Charles C. Camosy. [REVIEW]Leland F. Saunders - 2015 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 12 (3):347-350.
    A review of Charles Camosy's book, Peter Singer and Christian Ethics: Beyond Polarization.
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