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Leo Townsend [8]Leo Charles Townsend [1]
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Leo Townsend
University of Vienna
Leo Townsend
University of Oslo
  1.  14
    Group with Minds of Their Own Making.Leo Townsend - forthcoming - Journal of Social Philosophy.
    According Philip Pettit, suitably organised groups not only possess ‘minds of their own’ but can also ‘make up their minds’ and 'speak for themselves'--where these two capacities enable them to perform as conversable subjects or 'persons'. In this paper I critically examine Pettit's case for group personhood. My first step is to reconstruct his account, explaining first how he understands the two capacities he considers central to personhood – the capacity to ‘make up one’s mind’, and the capacity to ‘speak (...)
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  2.  24
    Group Assertion and Group Silencing.Leo Townsend - forthcoming - Language & Communication.
    Jennifer Lackey (2018) has developed an account of the primary form of group assertion, according to which groups assert when a suitably authorized spokesperson speaks for the group. In this paper I pose a challenge for Lackey's account, arguing that her account obscures the phenomenon of group silencing. This is because, in contrast to alternative approaches that view assertions (and speech acts generally) as social acts, Lackey's account implies that speakers can successfully assert regardless of how their utterances are taken (...)
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  3.  48
    Is It Rational to Trust?Jeremy Wanderer & Leo Townsend - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (1):1-14.
  4.  41
    Joint Commitment and Collective Belief.Leo Townsend - 2015 - Phenomenology and Mind 9 (9):46-53.
    According to Margaret Gilbert, two or more people collectively believe that p if and only if they are jointly committed to believe that p as a body. But the way she construes joint commitment in her account – as a commitment of and by the several parties to “doing something as a body” – encourages the thought that the phenomenon accounted for is not that of genuine belief. I explain why this concern arises and explore a different way of construing (...)
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  5.  21
    Social Ontology: Collective Intentionality and Group Agents. [REVIEW]Leo Townsend - 2015 - Journal of Social Ontology 1 (1):183–187.
  6.  43
    Essays in Collective Epistemology Edited by Jennifer Lackey, Ed. [REVIEW]Leo Townsend - 2016 - Analysis 76 (1):105-108.
  7.  47
    Being and Becoming in the Theory of Group Agency.Leo Townsend - 2013 - Abstracta 7 (1).
    Article Title: ‘Being and Becoming in the Theory of Group Agency’This paper explores a bootstrapping puzzle which appears to afflict Philip Pettit’s theory of group agency. Pettit claims that the corporate persons recognised by his theory come about when a set of individuals ‘gets its act together’ by undertaking to reason at the collective level. But this is puzzling, because it is hard to see how the step such a collective must take to become a group agent – the collectivisation (...)
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  8.  17
    Margaret Gilbert, Joint Commitment How We Make the Social World. Reviewed By. [REVIEW]Leo Townsend - 2015 - Philosophy in Review 35 (3):140-142.