1.  28
    Executive Compensation and Corporate Fraud in China.Martin J. Conyon & Lerong He - 2016 - Journal of Business Ethics 134 (4):669-691.
    This study investigates the relation between CEO compensation and corporate fraud in China. We document a significantly negative correlation between CEO compensation and corporate fraud using data on publicly traded firms between 2005 and 2010. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that firms penalize CEOs for fraud by lowering their pay. We also find that CEO compensation is lower in firms that commit more severe frauds. Panel data fixed effects and propensity score methods are used to demonstrate these effects. (...)
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  2.  31
    Monitoring Costs, Managerial Ethics and Corporate Governance: A Modeling Approach. [REVIEW]Lerong He & Shih-Jen Kathy Ho - 2011 - Journal of Business Ethics 99 (4):623 - 635.
    This article evaluates effectiveness and costs of external regulation, in particular the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) in restricting managerial malfeasance and safeguarding shareholder interests. It discusses the role of managerial ethics as an alternative corporate governance mechanism to protect shareholder value. This article builds a mathematical model to illustrate shareholders' choices of best corporate governance mechanisms, taking into account the influence of managerial ethics, effectiveness and costs of monitoring. We suggest that the best corporate governance design and the optimal (...)
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  3.  15
    Does Industry Regulation Matter? New Evidence on Audit Committees and Earnings Management.Lerong He & Rong Yang - 2014 - Journal of Business Ethics 123 (4):573-589.
    This paper investigates the moderating role of industry regulation on the effectiveness of audit committees in restricting earnings management. Using comprehensive panel data of S&P 1500 firms between 2003 and 2007, we find that the proportion of CEO directors on an audit committee is positively associated with earnings management in unregulated industries, while this association is significantly weaker in regulated industries. Further, the proportion of financial experts on an audit committee is negatively associated with earnings management. Our results also indicate (...)
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