A Personal Introduction LESTEREMBREE 'I feel I have been living many fairy tales on this trip.' Sam IJsseling Some people probably still believe that phenomenology is about particular events individually felt.
Phenomenology of the Cultural Disciplines is an interdisciplinary study, reflecting the recent emergence of various particular forms of `phenomenological philosophy of ...'. Included are such fields as psychology, social sciences and history, as well as environmental philosophy, ethnic studies, religion and even more practical disciplines, such as medicine, psychiatry, politics, and technology. The Introduction provides a way of understanding how these various developments are integrated. On the basis of a Husserlian notion of culture, it proposes a generic concept of `cultural (...) disciplines' (which is broader than but inclusive of `human sciences') which subsumes the more specific concepts of `cultural sciences', `axiotic disciplines' (e.g. architecture), and `practical disciplines'. (shrink)
Technology does not belong to the province of just one philosophical school, or even to philosophy itself. It is complex and deep enough to transcend the bounds of any one method of research and of any particular set of philosophical presuppositions.
He who sees everywhere only nature, nature in the sense of, and, as it were, through the eyes of, natural science, is precisely blind to the spiritual sphere, the special domain of the human sciences. Such a one does not see persons and does not see the Objects which depend for their sense upon personal performances, i.e., Objects of “culture.” (IV: 191).
This text assumes that reflection on the environment requires consideration of the role of technology and that reflection on technology cannot responsibly omit considering the environment. Furthermore, reflection on the environment-as-encountered and technology-as-encountered and the correlative types of encountering cannot stop before facing the problems justifying action and valuing as well as cognition. Eleven reflective analyses are included and it is hoped that discussion of them in small groups will not only foster deeper insight into these issues but also greater (...) skill at phenomenological investigation, i.e., reflective analysis. (shrink)
Vallentyne 2010 and Zwolinski 2008 are internet encyclopaedia articles on “libertarianism” which include various serious faults. Vallentyne 2010 has the following ones. It does not properly explain mainstream libertarianism or consider criticisms of it. Instead, it mainly discusses self-ownership and natural-resource egalitarianism. Every aspect of the alleged “strict sense” of “libertarianism” is dubi ous, at best. So- called “left - libertarianism” is not made sense of as any kind of liberty-based libertarianism. Problems arise because self-ownership is assumed to be libertarian (...) without an explicit theory of libertarian liberty. The replies to “five impor tant objections to full self- ownership” are confused and mistaken; both as regards philosophical analysis and as regards empirical assumptions. The long discussion about various ways to “Appropriate Natural Resources” is rendered muddled and barren by the lack of a clear libertarian theory of liberty, the mere presumption of some form of egalitarianism, and the inclusion of various non-libertarian criteria. The remaining sections are largely uninformed by any relevant libertarian literature. It reaches a justificationist conclusion that cites mistaken welfare concerns and ignores the productivity of free markets. Zwolinski 2008 shares some errors with Vallentyne 2010, but also includes the following ones. It is even less clear about what libertarian liberty is. It fails to understand that libertarianism (private-property anarchy and, possibly, minarchy) is a subset of classical liberalism. It asserts that libertarianism is about “the proper role of government.” It assumes (illogical) justificationist/foundationalist epistemology and does not mention critical-rationalist libertarianism. It eventually faults justificationism and unwittingly assumes something approaching critical rationalism. Finally, it embraces John Rawls’s “overlapping consensus” as a “justification” (i.e., defence) of libertarianism in ignorance of the similar position in Lester 1996 and 2000. (shrink)
In this article, the author takes a reflective look at the past, present and future of phenomenology in a kind of Presidential ‘state of the science’ approach. The Encyclopedia of Phenomenology acts as the authoritative positional backdrop for this ground-breaking paper. Embree isolates several recognizable ‘stages’ in the development of phenomenology, and ponders whether its current growth (and permutations) is not leading us into a new stage. If so, this has implications for the way phenomenologically oriented scholars and philosophers (...) approach their discipline. Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology , Volume1, Edition 1 April 2001. (shrink)
Through a wide-ranging international collection of papers, this volume provides theoretical and historical insights into the development and application of phenomenological sociology and ethnomethodology and offers detailed examples of research into social phenomena from these standpoints. All the articles in this volume join together to testify to the enormous efficacy and potential of both phenomenological sociology and ethnomethodology.
In the first part of this essay it is contended that Schutz''s project is best called the philosophical theory of the cultural sciences; in the last parts it is shown that he offers satisfactory rudiments of a theory of the historical sciences except where the differentia specifica of those sciences is concerned. The central part is devoted to women''s liberation as a case of contemporary history in relation to which Schutz''s thought about the historical sciences needs correction.
This essay starts by outlining what the author considers to be the three general properties of the phenomenological approach. This approach is then taken to the question of what an academic discipline is and how one becomes a member of a discipline, with some positive and negative aspects that can develop considered. Demonstrating how phenomenological questions can be asked and answered, this approach invites attempts to confirm, correct and extend the account through more reflective analysis. Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology, Volume (...) 10, Edition 2, October 2010: 5-9. (shrink)
How modern economics is a social rather than historical cultural science, how it can produce adequate accounts in scientific constructs about common-sense constructs, can relate objectivistic accounts to subjective interpretations, how it can be theoretical, and how it hypothesizes marginal utility is all expounded in relation to Schutz’s theory of science, especially what he calls “postulates.”.
This essay explores the roots of social constructionism in the work of Alfred Schutz, the teacher of Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann and, beyond Schutz, Edmund Husserl. It is described how pregiven things are logically formed and then ideal types or constructs with content are also constituted about them. Schutz begins in the egological perspective but goes beyond that to the intersubjective perspective to show how the world of everyday life has constructs received from predecessors as well as contemporaries and (...) shared by in-groups. Common-sense constructs are constituted like cultural-scientific ones. Motivation in everyday life and the role of the ordinary vernacular in their transmission is shown. An analysis then focuses on how constructs have recently been received and/or reinforced by political election polling in the latest USA presidential election. These constructs involve results in percentages that can be understood qualitatively for Democrats and Republicans divided into gender groups, generations, races, regions, and by education, income or social class, religion. This account can be considered reflective, descriptive, and culture-appreciative and thus phenomenological. Similar constructing no doubt occurs in other industrialized countries and affects so-called common sense. Deeper understanding than this analysis reaches is called for at the end of this essay. (shrink)
Cairns presents a plausible two-part, step by step, approach seemingly developed in Husserl’s “workshop” to transcendental phenomenology that is independent of culture and history, refines a concept of knowledge and its references to worldly things, encounters a difficulty, and resolves it through recognition of a non-worldly apodictic core of consciousness distinct from being in the real temporal, spatial, and causal world.