Through a wide-ranging international collection of papers, this volume provides theoretical and historical insights into the development and application of phenomenological sociology and ethnomethodology and offers detailed examples of research into social phenomena from these standpoints. All the articles in this volume join together to testify to the enormous efficacy and potential of both phenomenological sociology and ethnomethodology.
Paul Ricoeur was one of the foremost interpreters and translators of Edmund Husserl's philosophy. These nine essays present Ricoeur's interpretation of the most important of Husserl's writings, with emphasis on his philosophy of consciousness rather than his work in logic. In Ricoeur's philosophy, phenomenology and existentialism came of age and these essays provide an introduction to the Husserlian elements which most heavily influenced his own philosophical position.
In the first part of this essay it is contended that Schutz''s project is best called the philosophical theory of the cultural sciences; in the last parts it is shown that he offers satisfactory rudiments of a theory of the historical sciences except where the differentia specifica of those sciences is concerned. The central part is devoted to women''s liberation as a case of contemporary history in relation to which Schutz''s thought about the historical sciences needs correction.
This essay starts by outlining what the author considers to be the three general properties of the phenomenological approach. This approach is then taken to the question of what an academic discipline is and how one becomes a member of a discipline, with some positive and negative aspects that can develop considered. Demonstrating how phenomenological questions can be asked and answered, this approach invites attempts to confirm, correct and extend the account through more reflective analysis. Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology, Volume (...) 10, Edition 2, October 2010: 5-9. (shrink)
How modern economics is a social rather than historical cultural science, how it can produce adequate accounts in scientific constructs about common-sense constructs, can relate objectivistic accounts to subjective interpretations, how it can be theoretical, and how it hypothesizes marginal utility is all expounded in relation to Schutz’s theory of science, especially what he calls “postulates.”.
This essay explores the roots of social constructionism in the work of Alfred Schutz, the teacher of Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann and, beyond Schutz, Edmund Husserl. It is described how pregiven things are logically formed and then ideal types or constructs with content are also constituted about them. Schutz begins in the egological perspective but goes beyond that to the intersubjective perspective to show how the world of everyday life has constructs received from predecessors as well as contemporaries and (...) shared by in-groups. Common-sense constructs are constituted like cultural-scientific ones. Motivation in everyday life and the role of the ordinary vernacular in their transmission is shown. An analysis then focuses on how constructs have recently been received and/or reinforced by political election polling in the latest USA presidential election. These constructs involve results in percentages that can be understood qualitatively for Democrats and Republicans divided into gender groups, generations, races, regions, and by education, income or social class, religion. This account can be considered reflective, descriptive, and culture-appreciative and thus phenomenological. Similar constructing no doubt occurs in other industrialized countries and affects so-called common sense. Deeper understanding than this analysis reaches is called for at the end of this essay. (shrink)
Cairns presents a plausible two-part, step by step, approach seemingly developed in Husserl’s “workshop” to transcendental phenomenology that is independent of culture and history, refines a concept of knowledge and its references to worldly things, encounters a difficulty, and resolves it through recognition of a non-worldly apodictic core of consciousness distinct from being in the real temporal, spatial, and causal world.
There is a difference between the direct and the indirect encountering of things. The emphasis in the history of phenomenology, as in the rest of modern philosophy, has been on direct encountering. But at least in industrialized societies, there is acquaintance with vastly more things through indirect encountering. A clarification of what encountering is in general will first be attempted, some traditional doctrines will be objected to, and then the difference between direct and indirect encountering will be explored. The goal (...) is a modest phenomenological investigation that invites the reader to verify, correct, and extend it. Terminology, genre, and the secondary emphasis on thetic or positional components of believing, valuing, and willing are central to the reflective analysis. (shrink)
Phenomenology of the Cultural Disciplines is an interdisciplinary study, reflecting the recent emergence of various particular forms of `phenomenological philosophy of ...'. Included are such fields as psychology, social sciences and history, as well as environmental philosophy, ethnic studies, religion and even more practical disciplines, such as medicine, psychiatry, politics, and technology. The Introduction provides a way of understanding how these various developments are integrated. On the basis of a Husserlian notion of culture, it proposes a generic concept of `cultural (...) disciplines' (which is broader than but inclusive of `human sciences') which subsumes the more specific concepts of `cultural sciences', `axiotic disciplines' (e.g. architecture), and `practical disciplines'. (shrink)
The essay reviews how phenomenological psychology can draw on Edmund Husserl's transcendental phenomenology in order to clarify the foundations of the cultural sciences and then explicates the theory of this psychology implicit in Schutz's oeuvre. Max Weber has shown that all phenomena of the socio-cultural world originate in social interaction and can be referred to it. According to him, it is the central task of sociology to understand the meaning which the actor bestows on his action. But what is action, (...) what is meaning, and how is the understanding of such meaning by a fellow-man possible, be he a partner of the social interaction, or merely an observer in everyday life, or a social scientist? I submit that any attempt to answer these questions leads immediately to questions with which Husserl was concerned and which he has to a certain extent solved. (shrink)
After a review of his revisions of Husserl's methodology, Cairns's new version of the procedure of Abbauor unbuilding is followed from the Objective world down to the primordial world and then from there down to the phantom world within which sensa fields can be analyzed. Then the abstractive epochēs by which lower strata were reached are successively relaxed in the Aufbau or upbuilding procedure and, most interestingly, the sense “psychophysical thing” originally constituted within primordial automaticity is found to be transferred (...) automatically and with presumptive certainty to everything in the Objective world. Any differences between “animate” and “inanimate” things are only constituted at a higher level and pertain then to culture and not nature. (shrink)
El reconocimiento de tendencias fenomenológicas en varias docenas de disciplinas fuera de la filosofía plantea la pregunta acerca del modo como puede de-finirse la fenomenología en general antes de la especificación según la disciplina particular. A continuación, tras un ensayo de respuesta a esta pregunta, se ofre-cerán algunas observaciones relativas a los posibles beneficios para la fenomeno-logía filosófica de los encuentros interdisciplinarios.Recognition of phenomenological tendencies in several dozen disciplines beyond philosophy raises the question of how phenomenology in general might be (...) defined prior to specification in terms of the agendas of the particular disciplines. After an attempt at an answer to this question, some observations concerning the possible benefits of interdisciplinary encounters, especially for philosophical philoso-phy, are offered. (shrink)
A Personal Introduction LESTER EMBREE 'I feel I have been living many fairy tales on this trip.' Sam IJsseling Some people probably still believe that phenomenology is about particular events individually felt.
After addressing the question of whether Aron Gurwitsch (1901–1973) even had a theory of psychology, which is not obvious unless one collates the many dispersed remarks, a well-documented exposition of that theory is offered that clarifies the data, categories, field, methods, and topics of the versions of psychology he advocated.
This essay has two parts. In the first, Husserl's account of categorial forming and Schutz's account of common-sense constructs are used to sketch an interpretationist theory of culture. In the second part, the question is raised of whether that theory is adequate to account for cultural phenomena and the negative answer is supported with a sketch of the pre-conceptual constitution of intrinsic and extrinsic values and uses in valuational and volitional processes of secondary passivity. This stratum below thinking and concepts (...) is called "basic culture" and the full appreciation of this stratum is a counter to naturalism as well as the starting point for approaching problematics such as ethnicity, gender, and the environment in the perspective of the constitutive phenomenology of culture. (shrink)
Schutz not only adapted Max Weber’s “ideal types” but also Edmund Husserl’s prepredicative “types,” which must have been “empirical types,” in hiswork. With care, these terms can be kept distinct. The former term refers to concepts used in common-sense thinking as well as cultural science, while the latterrefers to vague material universals or eidē. This essay studies how “type” is used in these two different ways by Schutz after he had read Husserl’s Erfahrung undUrteil by 1940.
With some remarks on what I have personally contributed, this essay sketches the origins of the posthumous eff ort by which Schutz’s thought, which could have been forgotten, has become well-known internationally through the dedicated work in the United States, Germany, and Japan of a modest number of named students and followers in successive generations as well as his widow Ilse ans daughter Evelyn. How his thought connects with phenomenology, sociology, social psychology, and the theory of the cultural sciences is (...) touched on. Besides references to the two biographies and the annual, Schutzian Research, counts of editions of translations into a dozen languages and then lists of the Schutz Memorial Lectures, the archives in Germany, Japan, and the United States, the Werkausgabe, and the many conferences focused on Schutz are off ered. This is to make the case that the International Alfred Schutz Circle for Phenomenology and Interpretive Social Science is long overdue. (shrink)