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  1.  50
    The Many as One: Integrity and Group Choice in Paradoxical Cases.Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager - 2004 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 32 (3):249-276.
  2.  11
    Handbook of Legal Reasoning and Argumentation.Colin Aitken, Amalia Amaya, Kevin D. Ashley, Carla Bagnoli, Giorgio Bongiovanni, Bartosz Brożek, Cristiano Castelfranchi, Samuele Chilovi, Marcello Di Bello, Jaap Hage, Kenneth Einar Himma, Lewis A. Kornhauser, Emiliano Lorini, Fabrizio Macagno, Andrei Marmor, J. J. Moreso, Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco, Antonino Rotolo, Giovanni Sartor, Burkhard Schafer, Chiara Valentini, Bart Verheij, Douglas Walton & Wojciech Załuski (eds.) - 2018 - Springer Verlag.
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  3.  10
    Just Lotteries.Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager - 1988 - Social Science Information 27 (4):483-516.
  4.  7
    The Limits of Obligation.Lewis A. Kornhauser - 1984 - Noûs 18 (2):374-378.
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  5.  12
    Aggregate Rationality in Adjudication and Legislation.Lewis A. Kornhauser - 2008 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 7 (1):5-27.
    Analyses of complex entities such as bureaucracies, courts, legislatures, and firms typically personify them. A strong conception of personification requires that these entities have rational interests, rational beliefs, and rational normative judgments. On one account of personification, such personified rationality should be aggregate rationality : the interests, beliefs, and normative judgments should depend only on the interests, beliefs, and judgments of the individuals who constitute the complex entity. I argue that aggregate rationality is too strong a normative requirement to impose (...)
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  6. A World Apart? An Essay on the Autonomy of the Law.Lewis A. Kornhauser - 1998 - Law and Economics Programme, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto.
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  7.  1
    Choosing Ends and Choosing Means: Teleological Reasoning in Law.Lewis A. Kornhauser - 2018 - In Colin Aitken, Amalia Amaya, Kevin D. Ashley, Carla Bagnoli, Giorgio Bongiovanni, Bartosz Brożek, Cristiano Castelfranchi, Samuele Chilovi, Marcello Di Bello, Jaap Hage, Kenneth Einar Himma, Lewis A. Kornhauser, Emiliano Lorini, Fabrizio Macagno, Andrei Marmor, J. J. Moreso, Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco, Antonino Rotolo, Giovanni Sartor, Burkhard Schafer, Chiara Valentini, Bart Verheij, Douglas Walton & Wojciech Załuski (eds.), Handbook of Legal Reasoning and Argumentation. Springer Verlag. pp. 387-412.
    This essay investigates consequentialist reasoning in law. It begins with a brief exposition of the structure of consequentialist reasoning. It then turns to the role of consequentialist reasoning in two aspects of legal decision-making. Legal officials must reason both about ends and about the choice of means to achieve those ends. Legal instrumentalism, however, takes many forms, and different forms identify different officials to engage in the task of reasoning consequentially to choose means. The essay then considers the difficulties posed (...)
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  8.  2
    Economic Logic and Legal Logic.Lewis A. Kornhauser - 2018 - In Colin Aitken, Amalia Amaya, Kevin D. Ashley, Carla Bagnoli, Giorgio Bongiovanni, Bartosz Brożek, Cristiano Castelfranchi, Samuele Chilovi, Marcello Di Bello, Jaap Hage, Kenneth Einar Himma, Lewis A. Kornhauser, Emiliano Lorini, Fabrizio Macagno, Andrei Marmor, J. J. Moreso, Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco, Antonino Rotolo, Giovanni Sartor, Burkhard Schafer, Chiara Valentini, Bart Verheij, Douglas Walton & Wojciech Załuski (eds.), Handbook of Legal Reasoning and Argumentation. Springer Verlag. pp. 711-745.
    This essay disentangles the complex relations between economic logic and legal logic. It distinguishes economic logic as a social process from economic logic as economic reasoning; economic reasoning to explain behavior from economic reasoning to evaluate behavioral outcomes; and legal reasoning in judicial contexts from legal reasoning in other contexts such as legislation and legal enforcement or compliance. It then argues first that economic logic as the logic of social processes deepens our understanding of how law develops and how it (...)
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  9.  9
    Economic Rationality in the Analysis of Legal Rules and Institutions.Lewis A. Kornhauser - 2005 - In Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory. Blackwell. pp. 67--79.
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  10.  4
    Interest, Commitment, and Obligation: How Law Influences Behavior.Lewis A. Kornhauser - 1998 - In Bryant G. Garth & Austin Sarat (eds.), Justice and Power in Sociolegal Studies. American Bar Foundation. pp. 1--208.
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  11. Notes on the Logic of Legal Change.Lewis A. Kornhauser - 1996 - In David Braybrooke (ed.), Social Rules. Westview.
     
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  12. Three Roles for a Theory of Behavior in a Theory of Law.Lewis A. Kornhauser - 2000 - Rechtstheorie 31 (2):197-252.
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  13.  5
    Virtue and Self-Interest in the Design of Constitutional Institutions.Lewis A. Kornhauser - 2002 - Theoretical Inquiries in Law 3 (1).
    Constitutional political economy addresses four questions: the causal question: What explains the constitutional institutions we observe? the consequential question: What consequences do constitutional institutional have? the ideal question: What constitutional institutions does justice require? and the design question: What constitutional institutions are best for a polity given the constraints imposed by its current situation? Answers to the ideal and design questions require a theory of behavior that predicts how individuals will behave within constitutional institutions. Analysts usually assume that this theory (...)
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