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Liam P. Dempsey
Kwantlen Polytechnic University
  1. Stressing the Flesh: In Defense of Strong Embodied Cognition.Liam P. Dempsey & Itay Shani - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):590-617.
    In a recent paper, Andy Clark (2008) has argued that the literature on embodied cognition reveals a tension between two prominent strands within this movement. On the one hand, there are those who endorse what Clark refers to as body-centrism, a view which emphasizes the special contribution made by the body to a creature’s mental life. Among other things, body centrism implies that significant differences in embodiment translate into significant differences in cognition and consciousness. On the other hand, there are (...)
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  2.  50
    Thinking-Matter Then and Now: The Evolution of Mind-Body Dualism.Liam P. Dempsey - 2009 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 26 (1):43 - 61.
    Since the seventeenth century, mind-body dualism has undergone an evolution, both in its metaphysics and its supporting arguments. In particular, debates in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England prepared the way for the fall of substance dualism—the view that the human mind is an immaterial substance capable of independent existence—and the rise of a much less radical property dualism. The evolution from the faltering plausibility of substance dualism to the growing appeal of property dualism depended on at least two factors. On the (...)
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  3.  63
    Three Misconceptions Concerning Strong Embodiment.Liam P. Dempsey & Itay Shani - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (4):827-849.
    The strong embodied mind thesis holds that the particular details of one’s embodiment shape the phenomenological and cognitive nature of one’s mind. On the face of it, this is an attractive thesis. Yet strong embodiment faces a number of challenges. In particular, there are three prominent misconceptions about the scope and nature of strong embodiment: 1) that it violates the supposed multiple realizability of mentality; 2) that it cannot accommodate mental representation; and 3) that it is inconsistent with the extended (...)
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  4.  86
    The Side Left Untouched: Panpsychism, Embodiment, and the Explanatory Gap.Liam P. Dempsey - 2013 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (3-4):3-4.
    This paper considers Galen Strawson's recent defence of panpsychism. Strawson's account has a number of attractive features: it proffers an unflappable commitment to the reality of conscious experience, adduces a relatively novel and constructive appeal to the explanatory gap, and presents a picture which is in certain respects consistent with Herbert Feigl's version of mind-brain identity theory, what I call twofold-access theory. Strawson is right that the experiential and physical are not irreconcilable, for at least some physical phenomena have an (...)
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  5.  52
    ‘A Compound Wholly Mortal’1: Locke and Newton on the Metaphysics of (Personal) Immortality.Liam P. Dempsey - 2011 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 19 (2):241-264.
    In this paper I consider a cluster of positions which depart from the immortalist and dualist anthropologies of Rene Descartes and Henry More. In particular, I argue that John Locke and Isaac Newton are attracted to a monistic mind-body metaphysics, which while resisting neat characterization, occupies a conceptual space distinct from the dualism of the immortalists, on the one hand, and thoroughgoing materialism of Thomas Hobbes, on the other. They propound a sort of property monism: mind and body are distinct, (...)
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  6.  31
    Newtonian Idealism: Matter, Perception, and the Divine Will.Liam P. Dempsey - 2014 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (1):86-112.
    This paper investigates Isaac Newton's rather unique account of God's relation to matter. According to this account, corpuscles depend on a substantially omnipresent God endowing quantities of objective space with the qualities of shape, solidity, the unfaltering tendency to move in accord with certain laws, and—significantly—the power to interact with created minds. I argue that there are important similarities and differences between Newton's account of matter and Berkeley's idealism. And while the role played by the divine will might at first (...)
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  7.  27
    Conscious Experience, Reduction and Identity: Many Explanatory Gaps, One Solution.Liam P. Dempsey - 2004 - Philosophical Psychology 17 (2):225-245.
    This paper considers the so-called explanatory gap between brain activity and conscious experience. A number of different, though closely related, explanatory gaps are distinguished and a monistic account of conscious experience, a version of Herbert Feigl’s “twofold-access theory,” is advocated as a solution to the problems they are taken to pose for physicalist accounts of mind. Although twofold-access theory is a version of the mind-body identity thesis, it in no way “eliminates” conscious experience; rather, it provides a parsimonious and explanatorily (...)
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  8. An Early'sensation-Based'argument for Dualism.Liam P. Dempsey - 2010 - Locke Studies 10:159-177.
    This paper considers a seventeenth century argument for (substance) dualism propounded by Cambridge Platonist Ralph Cudworth that appeals to the nature of secondary qualities or sensations. I argue that, despite the widespread acceptance of the primary/secondary quality distinction, this argument is relatively unique for its time since seventeenth century arguments for dualism generally appeal, not to sensory qualities, but to thought, language, rationality, and volition. Indeed, for many, sensations are the most embodied of mental phenomena. I draw points of comparison (...)
     
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  9.  88
    Conscious Experience, Reduction and Identity: Many Gaps, One Solution.Liam P. Dempsey - 2004 - Philosophical Psychology 17 (2):225-246.
    This paper considers the so-called explanatory gap between brain activity and conscious experience. A number of different, though closely related, explanatory gaps are distinguished and a monistic account of conscious experience, a version of Herbert Feigl's "dual-access theory," is advocated as a solution to the problems they are taken to pose for physicalist accounts of mind. Although dual-access theory is a version of the mind-body identity thesis, it in no way "eliminates" conscious experience; rather, it provides a parsimonious and explanatorily (...)
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  10.  42
    John Locke, ‘Hobbist’: Of Sleeping Souls and Thinking Matter.Liam P. Dempsey - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (4):454-476.
    In this paper, I consider Isaac Newton’s fevered accusation that John Locke is a ‘Hobbist.’ I suggest a number of ways in which Locke’s account of the mind–body relation could plausibly be construed as Hobbesian. Whereas Newton conceives of the human mind as an immaterial substance and venerates it as a finite image of the Divine Mind, I argue that Locke utterly deflates the religious, ethical, and metaphysical significance of an immaterial soul. Even stronger, I contend that there is good (...)
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  11.  40
    Consciousness, Supervenience, and Identity: Marras and Kim on the Efficacy of Conscious Experience.Liam P. Dempsey - 2012 - Dialogue 51 (3):373-395.
    In this paper, I argue that while supervenience accounts of mental causation in general have difficulty avoiding epiphenomenalism, the situation is particularly bad in the case of conscious experiences since the function-realizer relation, arguably present in the case of intentional properties, does not obtain, and thus, the metaphysical link between supervenient and subvenient properties is absent. I contend, however, that the identification of experiential types with their neural correlates dispels the spectre epiphenomenalism, squares nicely both with the phenomenology of embodiment (...)
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  12. Roger Woolhouse, Locke: A Biography Reviewed By.Liam P. Dempsey - 2009 - Philosophy in Review 29 (4):301-304.
     
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  13. Alexander Batthyany and Avshalom Elitzur, Eds. Mind and its Place in the World: Non-Reductionist Approaches to the Ontology of Consciousness Reviewed By.Liam P. Dempsey - 2008 - Philosophy in Review 28 (4):240-243.
  14. Roger Woolhouse, Locke: A Biography.Liam P. Dempsey - 2009 - Philosophy in Review 29 (4):301.
     
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