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  1. Why Do Species Matter?Lilly-Marlene Russow - 1981 - Environmental Ethics 3 (2):101-112.
    One seldom-noted consequence of most recent arguments for “animal rights” or against “speciesism” is their inability to provide a justification for differential treatment on the basis of species membership, even in cases of rare or endangered species. I defend the claim that arguments about the moral status of individual animals inadequately deal with this issue, and go on, with the help of several test cases, to reject three traditional analyses of our alleged obligation to protect endangered species. I conclude (a) (...)
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  2.  31
    Brains in Vats and the Internalist Perspective.James Stephens & Lilly-Marlene Russow - 1985 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63 (2):205 – 212.
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  3.  52
    Stich on the Foundations of Cognitive Psychology.Lilly-Marlene Russow - 1987 - Synthese 70 (March):401-413.
  4. The Elusive Self: A Review of the View From. [REVIEW]Lilly-Marlene Russow - 1987 - Behaviorism 15 (1):73-82.
     
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  5.  35
    Simple Ideas and Resemblance.Lilly-Marlene Russow - 1980 - Philosophical Quarterly 30 (121):342-350.
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  6.  9
    Ecosystem Health: An Objective Evaluation?Lilly-Marlene Russow - 1995 - Environmental Values 4 (4):363 - 369.
    Some ecologists and philosophers have tried to develop a concept of ecosystem health that would support a more 'objective' means of evaluating an ecosystem. I argue (following Dale Jamieson) that the concept of health is itself too subjective to justify such an attempt, and then suggest that part of the problem is that the goal of achieving greater objectivity is itself unclear. I analyse and evaluate three different ways of drawing the distinction between subjective and objective evaluations as a first (...)
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  7.  39
    Some Recent Work on Imagination.Lilly-Marlene Russow - 1978 - American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (January):57-66.
    This article tries to provide an overview of work on imagination in the last twenty years. The discussion section examines such areas as arguments for and against mental images, The problem of reference in imagination, And theories of imagination such as those formulated by dennett, Hannay, Scruton, And others; I also outline some related questions (e.G., Imaginability) which seem closely tied to questions about imagination itself. There is also an extensive bibliography concentrating on works which appeared between 1957 and 1977.
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  8.  40
    Towards a Theory of Imagination.Lilly-Marlene Russow - 1980 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 18 (3):353-370.
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  9.  5
    Animals in the Original Position.Lilly-Marlene Russow - 1992 - Between the Species 8 (4):10.
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  10.  20
    The Concept of Truth in Hume's Treatise.Lilly-Marlene Russow - 1981 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 19 (2):217-228.
  11.  28
    Symposium Papers, Comments and an Abstract: Merleau-Ponty and the Myth of Bodily Intentionality.Lilly-Marlene Russow - 1988 - Noûs 22 (1):35-47.
  12. Merleau-Ponty and the Myth of Bodily Intentionality.Lilly-Marlene Russow - 1988 - Noûs 22:35-47.
    I argue that, while merleau-ponty succeeds in justifying the claim that certain human intentional states essentially involve an embodied subject, one cannot justifiably assert the further claim that this sort of bodily intentionality involves a radically different account of what makes the state intentional. contrary to some currently popular interpretations, i argue that merleau-ponty's account of bodily intentionality requires the use of concepts and representations.
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  13.  18
    Heidegger and the Problem of Being-With.Lilly-Marlene Russow - 1980 - Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):127-141.
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  14.  16
    Animals and Why They Matter.Lilly-Marlene Russow - 1985 - Environmental Ethics 7 (2):171-175.
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  15.  5
    Regan on Inherent Value.Lilly-Marlene Russow - 1988 - Between the Species 4 (1):12.
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  16.  1
    Towards a Theory of Imagination.Lilly-Marlene Russow - 1980 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 18 (3):353-369.
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  17.  1
    The Concept of Truth in Hume’s Treatise.Lilly-Marlene Russow - 1981 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 19 (2):217-228.
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  18.  8
    Audi on Mental Images.Lilly-Marlene Russow - 1980 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 23 (September):353-356.
    In an article entitled ?The Ontological Status of Mental Images?, Robert Audi rejects the view presented in Hannay's Mental Images: A Defence, and proposes ?the property account of imaging? as an alternative. Some of the strengths and weaknesses of Audi's proposal are discussed, and a more detailed and specific version of the property account offered; it is suggested that imaging ? should be described as entertaining the thought that if one were looking at (or smelling, touching, hearing, etc.) x, things (...)
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  19. Your Use of the JSTOR Archive Indicates Your Acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, Available At.Lilly-Marlene Russow - 1982 - Behaviorism 10 (1):55-63.
     
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  20.  8
    The Mundane Matter of the Mental Language J. Christopher Maloney New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989, Xxvii + 274 P., US$39.50. [REVIEW]Lilly-Marlene Russow - 1992 - Dialogue 31 (01):150-.
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  21.  2
    What Do Animals Care About?Lilly-Marlene Russow - 1995 - Between the Species 11 (1):4.
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  22.  2
    Reply: Rawls: Rejecting Utilitarianism and Animals.Lilly-Marlene Russow - 1992 - Between the Species 8 (4):12.
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  23.  2
    Commentary: How Can We Have Compassion Towards Animals?Lilly-Marlene Russow - 1993 - Between the Species 9 (2):4.
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  24.  1
    Evaluating Animal Research.Lilly-Marlene Russow - 1986 - Between the Species 2 (4):11.
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  25.  1
    Reply.Lilly-Marlene Russow - unknown
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  26.  2
    Ii. Audi on Mental Images.Lilly-Marlene Russow - 1980 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 23 (3):353 – 356.
    In an article entitled ?The Ontological Status of Mental Images?, Robert Audi rejects the view presented in Hannay's Mental Images: A Defence, and proposes ?the property account of imaging? as an alternative. Some of the strengths and weaknesses of Audi's proposal are discussed, and a more detailed and specific version of the property account offered; it is suggested that imaging ? should be described as entertaining the thought that if one were looking at (or smelling, touching, hearing, etc.) x, things (...)
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  27. A Xenotransplantation Protocol.Mark J. Hanson, Lilly-Marlene Russow & Charles R. McCarthy - 1999 - Hastings Center Report 29 (6):22.
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  28. Animals and Why They Matter. [REVIEW]Lilly-Marlene Russow - 1985 - Environmental Ethics 7 (2):171-175.
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  29. Institutional Animal Care and Use Committees (IACUCS).Lilly-Marlene Russow - 1998 - In Marc Bekoff & Carron A. Meaney (eds.), Encyclopedia of Animal Rights and Animal Welfare. Greenwood Press. pp. 204--206.
     
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  30. It's Not Like That to Be a Bat.Lilly-Marlene Russow - 1982 - Behaviorism 10 (1):55-63.
  31. It's Not Like That to Be a Bat.Lilly-Marlene Russow - 1982 - Behavior and Philosophy 10 (1):55.
     
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  32. Response: Language and Thought.Lilly-Marlene Russow - 1996 - Between the Species 12 (1):11.
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  33. The Elusive Self. [REVIEW]Lilly-Marlene Russow - 1987 - Behavior and Philosophy 15 (1):73.
     
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  34. "The Mundane Matter of the Mental Language", by J. Christopher Maloney. [REVIEW]Lilly-Marlene Russow - 1992 - Dialogue 31:150.
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  35. Why Do Species Matter?Lilly-Marlene Russow - 1981 - Environmental Ethics 3 (2):101-112.
    One seldom-noted consequence of most recent arguments for “animal rights” or against “speciesism” is their inability to provide a justification for differential treatment on the basis of species membership, even in cases of rare or endangered species. I defend the claim that arguments about the moral status of individual animals inadequately deal with this issue, and go on, with the help of several test cases, to reject three traditional analyses of our alleged obligation to protect endangered species. I conclude that (...)
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