The general attributes of ecosystems are examined and a naturally occurring reference ecosystem is established, comparable with the isolated system of classical thermodynamics. Such an autonomous system with a stable, periodic input of energy is shown to assume certain structural characteristics that have an identifiable thermodynamic basis. Individual species tend to assume a state of least dissipation; this is most clearly evident in the dominant species (the species with the best integration of energy acquisition and conservation). It is concluded that (...) ecosystem structure results from the antagonistic interaction of two nearly equal forces. These forces have their origin in the Principle of Most Action (least dissipation or least entropy production) and the universal Principle of Least Action. Most action is contingent on the equipartitioning of the energy available, through uniform interaction of similar individuals. The trend to Least action is contingent on increased dissipation attained through increasing diversity and increasing complexity. These principles exhibit a basic asymmetry. Given the operation of these opposing principles over evolutionary time, it is argued that ecosystems originated in the vicinity of thermodynamic equilibrium through the resonant amplification of reversible fluctuations. On account of the basic asymmetry the system was able to evolve away from thermodynamic equilibrium provided that it remained within the vicinity of ergodynamic equilibrium (equilibrium maintained by internal work, where the opposing forces are equal and opposite).At the highest level of generalization there appear to be three principles operating: i) maximum association of free-energy and materials; ii) energy conservation (deceleration of the energy flow) through symmetric interaction and increased homogeneity; and iii) the principle of least action which induces acceleration of the energy flow through asymmetrical interaction. The opposition and asymmetry of the two forces give rise to natural selection and evolution. (shrink)

Just how foundational metaphor is to cultural understanding has been a matter of considerable debate, manifested in the question of whether cultural models are, at bottom, based on conceptual metaphors (Gibbs 1994; Lakoff 1993; Lakoff and Johnson 1999; Quinn 1991). This paper revisits this debate by examining a new set of metaphorical expressions involving proper names, which are widespread in Singapore society. These expressions indicate that Singaporeans tend to describe local entities in terms of American ones, thus reflecting what (...) might be called a cultural model of modernity. The paper shows that no conceptual metaphor can be plausibly said to ground this model. It then goes on to develop the other possibility: that the model is non-metaphorical and that the expressions are chosen because of their fit with the modernity model. (shrink)

Just how foundational metaphor is to cultural understanding has been a matter of considerable debate, manifested in the question of whether cultural models are, at bottom, based on conceptual metaphors (Gibbs 1994; Lakoff 1993; Lakoff and Johnson 1999; Quinn 1991). This paper revisits this debate by examining a new set of metaphorical expressions involving proper names, which are widespread in Singapore society. These expressions indicate that Singaporeans tend to describe local entities in terms of American ones, thus reflecting what (...) might be called a cultural model of modernity. The paper shows that no conceptual metaphor can be plausibly said to ground this model. It then goes on to develop the other possibility: that the model is non-metaphorical and that the expressions are chosen because of their fit with the modernity model. (shrink)

The revisionary approach to semantic paradox is commonly thought to have a somewhat uncomfortable corollary, viz. that, on pain of triviality, we cannot affirm that all valid arguments preserve truth (Beall2007, Beall2009, Field2008, Field2009). We show that the standard arguments for this conclusion all break down once (i) the structural rule of contraction is restricted and (ii) how the premises can be aggregated---so that they can be said to jointly entail a given conclusion---is appropriately understood. In addition, we briefly rehearse (...) some reasons for restricting structural contraction. (shrink)

Good reasoning can lead to success; bad reasoning can lead to catastrophe. Yet, it's not obvious how we reason, and why we make mistakes. This new book by one of the pioneers of the field, Philip Johnson-Laird, looks at the mental processes that underlie our reasoning. It provides the most accessible account yet of the science of reasoning.

Responsible Robotics is about developing robots in ways that take their social implications into account, which includes conceptually framing robots and their role in the world accurately. We are now in the process of incorporating robots into our world and we are trying to figure out what to make of them and where to put them in our conceptual, physical, economic, legal, emotional and moral world. How humans think about robots, especially humanoid social robots, which elicit complex and sometimes disconcerting (...) reactions, is not predetermined. The animal–robot analogy is one of the most commonly used in attempting to frame interactions between humans and robots and it also tends to push in the direction of blurring the distinction between humans and machines. We argue that, despite some shared characteristics, when it comes to thinking about the moral status of humanoid robots, legal liability, and the impact of treatment of humanoid robots on how humans treat one another, analogies with animals are misleading. (shrink)

Monte Johnson examines one of the most controversial aspects of Aristiotle's natural philosophy: his teleology. Is teleology about causation or explanation? Does it exclude or obviate mechanism, determinism, or materialism? Is it focused on the good of individual organisms, or is god or man the ultimate end of all processes and entities? Is teleology restricted to living things, or does it apply to the cosmos as a whole? Does it identify objectively existent causes in the world, or is it (...) merely a heuristic for our understanding of other causal processes? Johnson argues that Aristotle's aporetic approach drives a middle course between these traditional oppositions, and avoids the dilemma, frequently urged against teleology, between backwards causation and anthropomorphism. Although these issues have been debated with extraordinary depth by Aristotle scholars, and touched upon by many in the wider philosophical and scientific community as well, there has been no comprehensive historical treatment of the issue. Aristotle is commonly considered the inventor of teleology, although the precise term originated in the eighteenth century. But if teleology means the use of ends and goals in natural science, then Aristotle was rather a critical innovator of teleological explanation. Teleological notions were widespread among his predecessors, but Aristotle rejected their conception of extrinsic causes such as mind or god as the primary causes for natural things. Aristotle's radical alternative was to assert nature itself as an internal principle of change and an end, and his teleological explanations focus on the intrinsic ends of natural substances - those ends that benefit the natural thing itself. Aristotle's use of ends was subsequently conflated with incompatible 'teleological' notions, including proofs for the existence of a providential or designer god, vitalism and animism, opposition to mechanism and non-teleological causation, and anthropocentrism. Johnson addresses these misconceptions through an elaboration of Aristotle's methodological statements, as well as an examination of the explanations actually offered in the scientific works. Reviewed in: Notre Dame Philosophical Review 2006.06.15; Bryn Mawr Classical Review 2006.08.37; Il-Sole – 24 Ore 6 Aug. 2006; Philosophy in Review 26 (2006): 360-2; Rhizai 3 (2006): 171-8; Journal of the History of Philosophy 45 (2007): 323-4; Ancient Philosophy 27 (2007): 191-200; Phronesis 52 (2007): 248-9; Isis 98 (2007): 375; Aestimatio 4 (2007) 146-152; The British Journal for the History of Science 41 (2008): 129-130. The European Legacy 14 (2009); La Cultura 47 (2009): 174-175; Sean M. Row, Teleology in Political Contexts: an assessment of Monte Ransome Johnson’s “Aristotle on Teleology”. (A thesis presented to the faculty of the college of arts and sciences of Ohio University, 2009.). (shrink)

Surveys Western literature and thought to reveal the evolution of the ideals of sincerity and authenticity.

Police killings of unarmed Black people have ignited a national and international response unlike any in decades. But differing from their civil rights-oriented predecessors, today’s activists do not think that the institutions and values of liberal democracy can eradicate structural racism. They draw instead on a Black radical tradition that, Terrence L. Johnson argues, derives its force from its unacknowledged ethical and religious dimensions. We Testify with Our Lives traces Black religion’s sustained influence from SNCC to the present, reconstructing (...) a radical lived ethics of freedom and justice. Johnson demonstrates that Black Power fundamentally contests liberalism’s abstract understanding of democracy, calling instead for new embodied frameworks to achieve human flourishing and dignity. Black bodies represent the primary form of resistance against violent and oppressive regimes of white supremacy and exploitation, and the individual and collective struggles of Black life bear witness to the dogged determination to cultivate beauty, rage, and joy. Considering the writings of Audre Lorde, Toni Cade Bambara, Stokely Carmichael, Martin Luther King Jr., Malcolm X, and James Baldwin, We Testify with Our Lives makes its case through a new narrative of the evolution of Black radicalism from the civil rights movement through the Movement for Black Lives. It forges new insights into Black Power’s vital contributions to debates on ethics, transnational politics, democracy, political solidarity, and freedom—and its potent resources for the ongoing struggle to build democratic possibilities for all. (shrink)

Chacun d'entre nous fait partie du monde, certes. Mais, au-delà de son évidence, quelle est la signification d'une telle formule? Comment faisons-nous partie du monde? Comment sommes-nous reliés à tout ce qui n'est pas nous : les autres, le reste de la nature, le cosmos? Lionel Naccache répond à cette énigme intemporelle à partir d'une approche mathématique fondée sur la distinction entre ensembles discrets et ensembles continus : alors qu'un élément, qui fait partie d'un ensemble discret, reste séparé des (...) autres éléments par des frontières tranchées, ces frontières disparaissent dans un ensemble continu. La question devient alors : sommes-nous reliés au reste du monde par des liens continus ou par des liens discrets? Muni de cette boussole, Lionel Naccache nous propose une odyssée passionnante et pleine de gai savoir éclectique qui nous entraîne de la psychologie de la subjectivité vers les sciences du cerveau et de la conscience, les origines et l'évolution des idées mathématiques et la philosophie politique. Au bout du voyage, Lionel Naccache formule une nouvelle éthique pour le XXIe siècle"--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

In this classic work, L.D. Barnett delves into the ancient Indian science of Brahma-knowledge. Drawing from sources that predate the Vedas, Barnett presents a detailed study of the cosmology and spirituality of the Brahma tradition, exploring the nature of the universe, the workings of the human mind, and the path to enlightenment. This insightful and beautifully written book is a must-read for anyone interested in the spiritual traditions of India. This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, (...) and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the "public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

This book presents an approach to spirituality based on direct personal experience of the sacred. Using the language and insights of depth psychology, Corbett outlines the intimate relationship between spiritual experience and the psychology of the individual, unveiling the seamless continuity between the personal and transpersonal dimensions of the psyche. His discussion runs the gamut of spiritual concerns, from the problem of evil to the riddle of pain and suffering. Drawing upon his psychotherapeutic practice as well as on the experiences (...) of characters from our religious heritage, Corbett explores the various portals through which the sacred presents itself to us: dreams, visions, nature, the body, relationships, psychopathology, and creative work. Referring extensively to Jung's writings on religion, but also to contemporary psychoanalytic theory, Corbett gives form to the new spirituality that is emerging alongside the world's great religious traditions. For those seeking alternative forms of spirituality beyond the Judeo-Christian tradition, this volume will be a useful guide on the journey. (shrink)

This edited volume represents a unique addition to the available literature on animal ethics, animal studies, and neuroethics. Its goal is to expand discussions on animal ethics and neuroethics by weaving together different threads: philosophy of mind and animal minds, neuroscientific study of animal minds, and animal ethics. Neuroethical questions concerning animals’ moral status, animal minds and consciousness, animal pain, and the adequacy of animal models for neuropsychiatric disease have long been topics of debate in philosophy and ethics, and more (...) recently also in neuroscientific research. The book presents a transdisciplinary blend of voices, underscoring different perspectives on the broad questions of how neuroscience can contribute to our understanding of nonhuman minds, and on debates over the moral status of nonhuman animals. All chapters were written by outstanding scholars in philosophy, neuroscience, animal behavior, biology, neuroethics, and bioethics, and cover a range of issues and species/taxa. Given its scope, the book will appeal to scientists and students interested in the debate on animal ethics, while also offering an important resource for future researchers. Chapter 13 of this book is available open access under a CC BY 4.0 license at link.springer.com. (shrink)

En affirmant que "tout philosophe a deux philosophies : la sienne et celle de Spinoza", Bergson exprime avant tout que le philosophe se doit de rompre avec une pensée dogmatique qui n'a plus lieu d'être et que Spinoza incarne tout particulièrement. Le spinozisme manifeste la pente de l'intelligence lorsqu'elle suit sa logique propre sans être rectifiée par le recours à l'expérience. Or, c'est cette démarche systématique que la philosophie doit désormais abandonner. Bergson est néanmoins hanté par la pensée de Spinoza (...) et le rapport qu'il entretient avec lui, en particulier dans ses cours au Collège de France, met en évidence un lien bien plus complexe et subtil qu'un simple rapport d'opposition. Contre la tendance à la clôture et à la systématicité, Bergson va alors privilégier chez Spinoza la tendance à l'ouverture et au mysticisme. En mettant en lumière cet aspect, cet ouvrage montre la sympathie intellectuelle qui réunit ces penseurs autour des notions de joie et de liberté. C'est pourquoi la figure du Christ va constituer un modèle non seulement éthique mais ontologique. Le terme de mysticisme, chez ces deux auteurs, ne désigne ni le refus de l'expérience ni celui des sciences positives mais renvoie à un rationalisme élargi jusqu'à l'amour du réel."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

L’objectif, éminemment politique, de cet ouvrage est de proposer pour 2012 une alternative aux programmes court-termistes et consensuels qui pourraient être développés par les candidats lors de la campagne officielle pour les élections présidentielles. Il vise à offrir une perspective de long terme de ce à quoi la société pourrait ressembler d’ici trente à cinquante ans si nous prenons un véritable virage écologique et humain et si nous opérons un changement concret de paradigme. Si, ces dernières années, un grand nombre (...) d’ouvrages et de films ont dénoncé les pires crises que traverse l’humanité, si d’autres se sont évertués à mettre en lumière des alternatives, force est de constater que très peu se sont attelés à la tâche d’offrir une vision articulée, écologique et positive de l’avenir. Loin des “yaka-fokon” et des déclarations d’intention pleines de bonne volonté, cet ouvrage met en lumière des solutions qui ont fait leur preuve, à petite comme à grande échelle, dans la plupart des domaines de la société. Pour chaque thématique, une personnalité “experte”, ayant développé une vision du sujet - voire souvent conduit ou observé une expérimentation -, propose en quelques pages des voies de transition concrètes, ainsi que les moyens à disposition de tous, qu’ils soient citoyens, élus ou entrepreneurs, pour les mettre en action. Chacune de ces propositions s’appuie sur un “cas pratique” : un exemple concluant mené à l’échelle d’un territoire européen (canton, département, région...). Au-delà d’une simple compilation, ces propositions sont mises en relation comme un véritable projet de société. (shrink)

Tout a commencé comme une enquête classique, avec l'espoir de déterminer ce que le nom " contemporain " dit de notre rapport au temps, à l'histoire, à l'espace. Mais très vite des myriades de données, parfois contradictoires, se sont imposées. Un véritable brouhaha. On aurait pu les ignorer, faire comme si elles n'existaient pas, et tenter de construire une fiction unitaire qui aurait prétendu dire la totalité de notre identité historique. C'eut été se méprendre sur la dynamique profonde que traduit (...) le nom contemporain. Elle se déploie ainsi : la représentation moderne du monde est débordée de toutes parts par une multiplicité qu'elle ne peut plus contenir, et qui la fait apparaître pour ce qu'elle est : un imaginaire, une illusion ; imaginaire de la distinction, de la séparation, alors que le contemporain propose, lui, un imaginaire marqué par l'indistinction, la déhiérarchisation, la globalisation. Toutes les histoires documentées dans cet essai retrouvent ce mouvement. Ainsi des espaces publics de l'art qui voient la fin du dispositifinstitution musée d'art moderne au profit des centres d'art contemporain et évoquent par là une manière différente d'habiter le monde. Ainsi du très grand nombre qui ne se laisse plus discipliner dans les concepts politiques hérités de la modernité. D'autres émergent (multitude, publics), prenant mieux en compte la double poussée de la massification et de la différenciation. Ainsi de la production du savoir qui se décentre et s'horizontalise. Ainsi du temps vécu comme une concordance de temporalités à l'ère hypermédiatique. Ainsi de l'imaginaire littéraire, emblématique de la modernité et lié au support-livre, qui intègre un plus vaste régime de publication. Ainsi de la pensée du monde qui est désormais une pensée des mondes. En six stations qui sont autant de mots-clés du contemporain (exposition, médias, controverses, publication, institutionnalisation, archéologie), cet essai s'attache à décrire les transformations actuelles des formes culturelles et des visions de l'histoire. (shrink)

The possibilities of unconscious perception and unconscious bias prompt parallel debates about unconscious mental content. This chapter argues that claims within these debates alleging the existence of unconscious content are made fraught by ambiguity and confusion with respect to the two central concepts they involve: consciousness and content. Borrowing conceptual resources from the debate about unconscious perception, the chapter distills the two conceptual puzzles concerning each of these notions and establishes philosophical strategies for their resolution. It then argues that empirical (...) evidence for unconscious bias falls victim to these same puzzles, but that progress can be made by adopting similar philosophical strategies. Throughout, the chapter highlights paths forward in both debates, illustrates how they serve as fruitful domains in which to study the relationship between philosophy and empirical science, and uses their combined study to further understanding of a general theory of unconscious content. (shrink)

_Skepticism and Cognitivism_ addresses the fundamental question of epistemology: Is knowledge possible? It approaches this query with an evaluation of the skeptical tradition in Western philosophy, analyzing thinkers who have claimed that we can know nothing. After an introductory chapter lays out the central issues, chapter 2 focuses on the classical skeptics of the Academic and Pyrrhonistic schools and then on the skepticism of David Hume. Chapters 3 through 5 are devoted to contemporary defenders of skepticism—Keith Lehrer, Arne Næss, and (...) Peter Unger. In chapter 6, author Oliver A. Johnson dons the mantle of skeptic himself and develops and adds theories to the skeptical arsenal. He closes with an examination of the relationship between skepticism and cognitivism, reaching and defending conclusions on the nature and extent of possible human knowledge. (shrink)

The need for ethical naturalism -- Moral problem-solving as an empirical inquiry -- Where are our values bred? : sources of moral norms -- Intuitive processes of moral cognition -- Moral deliberation as cognition, imagination, and feeling -- The nature of "reasonable" moral deliberation -- There is no moral faculty -- Moral fundamentalism is immoral -- The making of a moral self.

Is there any moral obligation to improve oneself, to foster and develop various capacities in oneself? From a broadly Kantian point of view, Self-Improvement defends the view that there is such an obligation and that it is an obligation that each person owes to him or herself. The defence addresses a range of arguments philosophers have mobilized against this idea, including the argument that it is impossible to owe anything to yourself, and the view that an obligation to improve onself (...) is overly 'moralistic'. Robert N. Johnson argues against Kantian universalization arguments for the duty of self-improvement, as well as arguments that bottom out in a supposed value humanity has. At the same time, he defends a position based on the notion that self- and other-respecting agents would, under the right circumstances, accept the principle of self-improvement and would leave it up to each to be the person to whom this duty is owed. (shrink)

Transform your yoga practice into a force for creating social change with this concise, eloquent guide to social justice tools and skills. Skill in Action asks you to explore the deeply transformational practice of yoga as a way to become an agent of social change and work toward a just world. Through yoga practices and philosophy, this book explores liberation for ourselves and others, while asking us to engage in our own agency-whether that manifests as activism, volunteer work, or changing (...) our relationships with others and ourselves. To provide a strong foundation to begin this work, Michelle Cassandra Johnson clearly defines power and privilege, oppression, liberation, and suffering, and invites you to make changes in your life that promote equality and freedom for all. Each chapter ends with a breathwork, asana, meditation, or interpersonal relational practice to help you incorporate this wisdom into your daily life. Each of the practices extend beyond the individual to offer resources and tools to shift institutional policies and procedures in a culture that has left all of us negatively impacted by white supremacy and social inequity. We must awaken to the injustice and suffering of marginalized communities, and we must use our voices and actions toward the liberation of all people. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:‘Race’ has long searched for a stable, suitable idea, with no consensus on a master meaning in sight. What I call deflationary pluralism about the existence of race recognizes that various meanings may be true as far as they go but avoids murky disputes over whether there are races in some sense. Once we have rejected the notion that racial essences yield innate cognitive differences, there is little point to arguing over the race idea. In its place, I propose the (...) idea of socioancestry, which jettisons racial thinking yet recognizes the social dynamics of color. For example, Black Americans, many of whom have traceable non-African ancestry, constitute an Africa-identified, socioancestrally black subgroup. ‘Race’ talk is not needed to sustain legitimate color-conscious approaches to social identity and social justice. Long-standing fixation on the race idea has obscured the simple truth that visible continental ancestry is the root of the social reality of color consciousness. (shrink)

In C. S. Lewis’s Christian Apologetics: Pro and Con, I took the con in a debate with Victor Reppert about the soundness of Lewis’s famous “argument from reason.” Reppert then extended his argument in an article for Philosophia Christi; this article is my reply. I show that Reppert’s argument fails for three reasons. (1) It “loads the die” by falsely assuming that naturalism, by definition, can't include mental causation "on the basic level." (I provide multiple examples of naturalist theories of (...) mind that do exactly that). (2) Physical processes can reliably produce true beliefs. And (3) reasoning isn’t necessarily mental. (shrink)

In 1984, Harvard University asked Italo Calvino to deliver the next Charles Eliot Norton Lectures. After working obsessively for a year, Calvino died the day before he was to travel to Boston. Fortunately, Calvino had already written out all but one of the six planned lectures, which were framed as meditations on Lucretius. These are the titles of the five completed lectures: (1) “Lightness,” (2) “Quickness,” (3) “Exactitude,” (4) “Visibility,” (5) “Multiplicity.” The last lecture - worked out but unwritten - (...) was entitled: (6) “Consistency.” These are the names of concepts that fill Deleuze’s oeuvre. Our essay follows the structure of Calvino’s lectures - each section corresponding to each of Calvino’s titles - in order to offer one take on minor ethics. As the title of Calvino’s lectures is Six Memos for the Next Millennium, we now begin A Memorandum for Past Millennia. (shrink)

The lexicon of religion has been widely used in the context of the social and cultural transformations associated with the ‘digital revolution’, whether in metaphoric or in realistic terms. The study of digital magic/magic in digital times, the other side of the coin of the Sacred 2.0, is still in its infancy. Yet, references to magic are made frequently in reflections about the rapid development of the digitalisation of society and culture, and they deserve more in-depth study. This paper tackles (...) the issue of magic in and of new technologies, including artificial intelligence devices. After a broad outline of the presence of magic in the digital ecosystem, this paper will focus on the lexical surface and semantic references to ‘magical thinking’, explore the underlying reasons for such references and unveil the regimes of existence for magic. Finally, the paper questions the role of language in the construction of a ‘digital magic’ and the transformations of the semantic category of magic as seen through the prism of a cultural revolution, that of the digitalisation of societies. (shrink)

We hope to show that the overall protreptic plan of Aristotle's ethical writings is based on the plan he used in his published work Protrepticus (Exhortation to Philosophy), by highlighting those passages that primarily offer hortatory or protreptic motivation rather than dialectical argumentation and analysis, and by illustrating several ways that Aristotle adapts certain arguments and examples from his Protrepticus. In this essay we confine our attention to the books definitely attributable to the Nicomachean Ethics (thus excluding the common books).

Building on recent work, I present sequent systems for the non-classical logics LP, K3, and FDE with two main virtues. First, derivations closely resemble those in standard Gentzen-style systems. Second, the systems can be obtained by reformulating a classical system using nonstandard sequent structure and simply removing certain structural rules (relatives of exchange and contraction). I clarify two senses in which these logics count as “substructural.”.

Development of the shapes of living organisms and their parts is a field of science in which there are no generally accepted theoretical principles. What form these principles are likely to take, when they emerge, is a subject in which there is a wide gulf of disagreement between physical scientists and experimental biologists. This book contains both an extensive philosophical commentary on this dichotomy in views and an exposition of the type of theory most favoured by physical scientists. In this (...) theory living form is a manifestation of the dynamics of chemical change and physical transport or other physics of spatial communication. The reaction-diffusion theory, as initiated by Turing in 1952 and since elaborated by Prigogine and by Gierer and Meinhardt among others, is discussed in detail at a level that requires a good knowledge of a first course in calculus, but no more than that. The great growth of molecular biology has tended to overshadow the increase in our understanding of the nature of these kinetic processes. This book seeks to reawaken interest in dynamics in the hope that a better balance between the importance of things and the importance of actions may emerge in the biology of the 21st century. (shrink)

We consider interpretable topological spaces and topological groups in a p-adically closed field K. We identify a special class of “admissible topologies” with topological tameness properties like generic continuity, similar to the topology on definable subsets of Kn. We show that every interpretable set has at least one admissible topology, and that every interpretable group has a unique admissible group topology. We then consider definable compactness (in the sense of Fornasiero) on interpretable groups. We show that an interpretable group is (...) definably compact if and only if it has finitely satisfiable generics (fsg), generalizing an earlier result on definable groups. As a consequence, we see that fsg is a definable property in definable families of interpretable groups, and that any fsg interpretable group defined over Qp is definably isomorphic to a definable group. (shrink)

Deflationists about truth seek to undermine debates about the nature of truth by arguing that the truth predicate is merely a device that allows us to express a certain kind of generality. I argue that a parallel approach is available in the case of logical consequence. Just as deflationism about truth offers an alternative to accounts of truth's nature in terms of correspondence or justification, deflationism about consequence promises an alternative to model-theoretic or proof-theoretic accounts of consequence's nature. I then (...) argue, against considerations put forward by Field and Beall, that Curry's paradox no more rules out deflationism about consequence than the liar paradox rules out deflationism about truth. (shrink)

Based on specific documentary evidence, historian Lionel Jensen reveals how 16th- and 17th-century Western missionaries used translations of the ancient RU ...

Much recent work on Kant's argument that the Categorical Imperative is the fundamental principle of morality has focused on the gap in that argument between the conclusion that rational agents conform to laws that apply to every rational agent, and the requirement contained in the Universal Law of Nature formula.1 While it seems plausible – even trivial– that a rational agent, insofar as she is a rational agent, conforms to whatever laws there are that are valid for all rational agents, (...) there does not appear to be any obvious route from this seemingly trivial claim to the controversial and substantive principle of acting only on maxims that one can at the same time rationally will every rational agent to act on.2 In what follows, I argue that the connection between rational agency and mere conformity to universally valid laws is not as trivial as it may seem. Many readers, I suspect, assume that Kant makes the trivial claim about rational agency because rational agency is rational, and being rational requires conforming to those laws that apply to all rational beings. For instance, this assumption is implicit in Onora O'Neill claim that "the interest of a Kantian universality test is that it aims to ground an ethical theory on notions of consistency and rationality rather than upon considerations of desire and preference."3 But, as I contend in what follows, the requirement to conform to laws valid for all rational agents is based on the fact that rational agency is, not rational, but agency. Indeed, the arguments leading to the first formulation of the Categorical Imperative rely on the idea of rational willing as a kind of causation in order to show this. And, as it turns out, the claim that the concept of causation contains the idea of conformity to universally valid laws is not a trivial claim. (shrink)

Innocence is a notion that can prove controversial. Claims of innocence typically support not imposing burdens on the innocent when their conduct is relevantly unobjectionable. This paper examines innocence in the context of violent conflict between states or groups. Many thinkers about the morality of such violence want to establish a principle that would protect innocent civilians. Yet the common view in just war theory does not affirm the moral innocence of civilians. Similarly, the common view that soldiers have an (...) equal right to kill does not affirm their equal moral culpability. (shrink)

Now that mankind has created the capability of destroying itself through nuclear technology, is it still possible to think in terms of a "just war"? Johnson argues that it is, and in the context of specific case studies he offers moral guidelines for addressing such major contemporary problems as terrorist activity in a foreign country, an individual’s conscientious objection to military service, and an American defense policy that requires development of weapons that may be morally employed in case of (...) need. "Remarkable.... A thoughtful and even profound book, which can be warmly recommended."—Adam Roberts, _New Society_ __ "[A] wise, prudential, and moral thesis.... A most important book, one that all Americans who can should read."—George Armstrong Kelly, _Political Science Quarterly_ __ "At its heart, _Can Modern War be Just? _Is a challenge to the common assumption that any modern war must be total—an unrestrained, spasmodic release of one’s entire destructive capacity against the whole of the enemy’s population."—Richard Allen, _Journal of Religious Ethics_ __ "Johnson... seriously attempt[s] to balance principles and respect facts. For this he is to be praised."—Gary Jason, _Chronicles of Culture_ __ "Johnson’s application of just war doctrine to the hardest problems of contemporary warfare is both morally sensitive and intellectually bold. Readers will sometimes disagree with his arguments, but they will be forced to think hard, and they will learn what it is to work within a moral tradition."—Michael Walzer. (shrink)