This article examines the ways in which Adam Smith and G. W. F Hegel conceptualize the identity of workers in a market economy. Although both see human beings as shaped in and through social rela- tionships, the relation between the worker and his work is seen in different ways. For Smith, workers “have” human capital, while for Hegel workers “are” brewers, butchers or bakers;; their profession is part of their identity. This conceptual difference, which is reflected in different “varieties of (...) capitalism” today, shows that not only degrees, but also kinds of embeddedness need to be taken into account in discussions of the relation between individual and society. (shrink)

This study investigates the connection between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate reputation among the public using fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA). To examine complex processes underlying the reactions of this influential stakeholder group, hypotheses are drawn from the category diagnosticity approach. Thereby, a psychological model of perceived (im)morality is transferred to the CSR context. In line with these hypotheses, positive/negative CSR activities influence reputation in the expected directions (H1a, b), while the effects of specific configurations of CSR activities (...) reveal an asymmetry suggesting a negativity bias (H2). Further analyses confirm that positive effects require a consistent positive performance regarding prior reputations (H3a) and the aggregated CSR activities of several previous years (H3b, c). Moreover, the relevant patterns vary between industries (H4). The present study thus contributes to CSR research by investigating a powerful but hitherto understudied stakeholder group through a category diagnosticity lens combined with a configurational approach to analysis. (shrink)

I denne studien undersøkes hvilke moralske utfordringer norske politistudenter oftest møter i «praksisåret». Utfordringene identifiseres gjennom en analyse av 208 hjemmeeksamener i yrkesetikk fra avgangsstudentene ved Politihøgskolen i Oslo, hvor utfordringene beskrives gjennom kombinasjoner av hvilke verdier som står sentralt, hvilke personer som er involvert og hvilke typer oppdragene oppstår i. Funnene eksemplifiseres og settes i forhold til sentrale politivitenskapelige diskusjoner. Til slutt diskuteres hvordan studentene best kan forberedes på disse utfordringene. Nøkkelord: etikk, yrkesetikk, anvendt etikk, politi, utdanning English summary: (...) What moral challenges are Norwegian police students encountering during their practice period? This article examines what moral challenges Norwegian police students encounter during their practice period. The challenges are identified through an analysis of the experiences described in the professional ethics home exams of 208 graduates at the Norwegian Police University College in Oslo. From our analysis, paradigmatic challenges are constructed based on the combinations of values, persons and mission types typically highlighted in the exams. These challenges are then discussed in light of central topics in police science. Finally, we discuss briefly how police students can be best prepared for meeting these moral challenges. (shrink)

In this paper, we attempt to de-naturalize the prevailing economistic imaginary of work that Max Weber and later commentators described as ‘protestant work ethic,’ epitomized in the figure of homo economicus. We do so by contrasting it with the imaginary of skillful work that can be found in vignettes about artisans in the Zhuangzi. We argue that there are interesting contrasts between these views concerning 1) direct goal achievement vs. indirect goal achievement through the cultivation of skills; 2) the hierarchization (...) of mental versus physical dimensions of work; 3) the crafting of non-dominating relationships between the working subject, their object, and their instruments of work, which leads to questions about the sustainability of these relationships; and 4) the relationship between work and well-being, which the Daoist texts conceptualize in a much more holistic, but also more presentist way than Western economic rationality. We conclude by pointing out the relevance of these differences for several contemporary debates about work, by denaturalizing a dominant imaginary of work, by distinguishing different forms of work, by suggesting a different relation between work and nature, and by raising questions about the desirability of the automation of work. (shrink)

The chapter provides an overview of Hegel's account of the market in his chapter on "civil society.

This paper discusses global reserve currencies from the perspective of structural global justice. Drawing on notions of structural justice and background justice, it suggests that the structures of global finance, by creating positions of privilege and disadvantage, can lead to injustices both with regard to distributive outcomes and with regard to domination. While the role of the dollar and Euro as global reserve currencies are not the only factors that contribute to these structural injustices, they need to be taken into (...) account to fully grasp the dynamics of global finance. They also have an impact on other mechanisms, such as sovereign debt, capital flows, and the governance of international financial institutions. The paper’s arguments support the claim that one cannot conceptualize global justice as justice between independent states. Rather, the global monetary regime constitutes a case of “background injustice” (Ronzoni 2009). (shrink)

This paper discusses the phenomenon of misleading about “the game you are in.” Individuals who mislead others in this way draw on the fact that we rely on social norms for regulating the levels of alertness, openness, and trust we use in different epistemic situations. By pretending to be in a certain game with a certain epistemic situation, they can entice others to reveal information or to exhibit low levels of alertness, thereby acting against their own interests. I delineate this (...) phenomenon from direct lies and acts of misleading by implication, and discuss some variations of it. I then ask why and under what conditions it is morally wrong to mislead others about the game they are in. I distinguish three normative angles for understanding the phenomenon: deontological constraints, free-riding on a shared cultural infrastructure, and implicit discrimination against outsiders and atypical candidates. I conclude by briefly discussing some practical implications. (shrink)

When organizations solve collective action problems or realize values, they do so by means of institutions. These are commonly regarded as self-stabilizing. Yet, they can also be subject to endogenous processes of decay, or so we argue. We explain this in terms of psychological and cultural processes, which can change even if the formal structures remain unchanged. One key implication is that the extent to which norms, values, and ideals motivate individuals to comply with institutions is limited.

This article makes a positive case for an ethnographic sensibility in political theory. Drawing on published ethnographies and original fieldwork, it argues that an ethnographic sensibility can contribute to normative reflection in five distinct ways. It can help uncover the nature of situated normative demands (epistemic argument); diagnose obstacles encountered when responding to these demands (diagnostic argument); evaluate practices and institutions against a given set of values (evaluative argument); probe, question and refine our understanding of values (valuational argument); and uncover (...) underlying social ontologies (ontological argument). The contribution of ethnography to normative theory is distinguished from that of other forms of empirical research, and the dangers of perspectival absorption, bias and particularism are addressed. (shrink)

(argues for the relevance of considerations of justice for how philosophers cite).

The world of wage labour seems to have become a soulless machine, an engine of social and environmental destruction. Employees seem to be nothing but 'cogs' in this system - but is this true? Located at the intersection of political theory, moral philosophy, and business ethics, this book questions the picture of the world of work as a 'system'. Hierarchical organizations, both in the public and in the private sphere, have specific features of their own. This does not mean, however, (...) that they cannot leave room for moral responsibility, and maybe even human flourishing. Drawing on detailed empirical case studies, Lisa Herzog analyses the nature of organizations from a normative perspective: their rule-bound character, the ways in which they deal with divided knowledge, and organizational cultures and their relation to morality. The volume examines how individual agency and organizational structures would have to mesh to avoid common moral pitfalls and develops the notion of 'transformational agency', which refers to a critical, creative way of engaging with one's organizational role while remaining committed to basic moral norms. The volume goes on to explore the political and institutional changes that would be required to re-embed organizations into a just society. Whether we submit to 'the system' or try to reclaim it, Herzog argues, is a question of eminent political importance in our globalized world. (shrink)

The legitimacy of putting public activities – such as providing education and welfare, but also running prisons or providing military services – into the hands of private companies is hotly contested. In The Privatized State, Chiara Cordelli puts forward an original argument, from a Kantian perspective, for why it is problematic: it replaces the omnilateral will of all citizens, which is realized through public institutions, with the unilateral will of agents to whom these activities have been delegated. While adding an (...) important dimension to the debate, I am not fully convinced that private institutions always fail to realize the omnilateral will, and that this is the only, or always most central, normative problem of privatization. Instead, many concrete cases of privatization seem normatively overdetermined in their wrongness. Nonetheless, Cordelli’s brilliant discussion invites us to rethink these phenomena from an important angle and helps us to better understand what an ideal civil service would look like. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie Jahrgang: 66 Heft: 3 Seiten: 383-386.

Motivation crowding out can lead to a reduction of ‘higher’ virtues, such as altruism or public spirit, in market contexts. This article discusses the role of virtue in the moral and economic theory of Adam Smith. It argues that because Smith’s account of commercial society is based on ‘lower’ virtue, ‘higher’ virtue has a precarious place in it; this phenomenon is structurally similar to motivation crowding out. The article analyzes and systematizes the ways in which Smith builds on ‘contrivances of (...) nature’ in order to solve the problems of limited self-command and limited knowledge. As recent research has shown, a clear separation of different social spheres can help to reduce the risk of motivation crowding out and preserve a place for ‘higher virtue’ in commercial society. The conclusion reflects on the performative power of economics, arguing that the one-sided focus on models of ‘economic man’ should be embedded in a larger context. (shrink)

This essay analyses the role of different forms of trust in the context of financial markets. It argues that rather than being caused by a lack of trust, the financial crisis of 2007 can be characterized by a shift from personal trust, with its normative and epistemic implications, towards too much “systemic trust”. Through a process of legalization and formalization, loans became standardized, and lenders relied not on the trustworthiness of borrowers, but on their legal claims and the ability of (...) markets to evaluate these correctly. As recent research in social philosophy and legal studies shows, however, markets built on “systemic trust” run into paradoxes, both with regard to their epistemic features and with regard to their ability to deal with the fundamental uncertainty of the future. This fact raises serious questions about the epistemic control of complex market systems, and about the justice of institutional structures in which only some people’s or organization’s trust pays off, while other people’s trust is betrayed. (shrink)

This chapter discusses central strands of the modern social contract tradition. Distinguishing between moral and political theories on the one hand and contractualist and contractarian theories on the other, it presents one example of each of the ensuing categories: Gauthier’s moral contractarianism, Buchanan’s political contractarianism, Scanlon’s moral contractualism, and Rawls’ political contractualism. In the conclusion, strengths and weaknesses of social contract theories are discussed.

Markets allow for the processing of decentralized information through the price mechanism. But in addition, many markets rely on other mechanisms in markets, or non-market institutions, that provide and manage other forms of knowledge. Within national economies, these institutions form an ‘epistemic infrastructure’ for markets. In global markets, in contrast, this epistemic infrastructure is very patchy, undermining the preconditions for morally responsible agency. New technologies might help to improve the epistemic infrastructure of global markets, but they require conceptualizing knowledge not (...) only as a tradable good, but also as a precondition of morally responsible agency. (shrink)

It is not clear what the intellectual history of the last 200 years would have looked like without the philosophy of G.W.F. Hegel, but it is clear that it would have looked different. His vast intellectual system was taken up by thinkers from left to right, and from very different philosophical schools. This volume brings together accessible, concise essays from leading scholars that present important currents of Hegelian thought in different European countries, including pre-revolutionary Russia, from the 19th to the (...) 21st century. It unites a range of very different forms of (Non-Marxian) Hegelianisms and Anti-Hegelianisms, showing similarities as well as differences. Embedding them in their cultural and intellectual contexts, it demonstrates the various encounters between philosophy, politics and personal lives that Hegel's philosophy inspired. (shrink)

“Home office” has become a reality for many employees. What is normatively at stake in this shift in the geography of work, given the various forms of structural injustice in our societies? Drawing on the normative criteria of employee well-being and protection from harm, autonomy, non-discrimination, environmental impact, and the role of workplaces as spaces of social encounters, I defend two claims: First, decisions about where individuals work need to be proceduralized on a fair basis, giving employees a voice. Second, (...) giving up the workplace requires a broader discussion about alternatives spaces for social integration. (shrink)

Journal of Political Philosophy, EarlyView.

Inventing the Market explores two paradigms of the market in the thought of Adam Smith and G.W.F. Hegel, bridging the gap between economics and philosophy, it shows that both disciplines can profit from a broader, more historically situated ...

How can the harm caused by waves of fake news or derogatory speech on social media be minimized without unduly limiting freedom of expression? I draw on an eighteenth-century debate for thinking about this problem: Hume and Smith present two different models of the transmission of emotions and ideas. Empathetic processes are causal, almost automatic processes; sympathy, in contrast, means putting oneself into the other person’s position and critically evaluating how one should react. I use this distinction to argue that (...) the architectural logic of social media should be improved to prevent cumulative harms and to facilitate sympathetic processes. (shrink)

The arrival of “big data” promises new degrees of precision in understanding human behavior. Could it also allow drawing a finer line between “choice” and “circumstances”? In a culture in which individual responsibility continues to be celebrated, this raises questions about new opportunities for institutional design with a stronger focus on individual responsibility. But what is it that can be learned from big data? In this paper I argue that we should not expect a “god’s eye view” on choice versus (...) circumstances from big data. “Responsibility” is a social construct that depends on the logic of different social situations, as well as our epistemic access to certain counterfactuals (e.g., whether an agent “could have acted differently”). It is this epistemic dimension that changes with the arrival of big data. But while this might help overcome some epistemic barriers, it might also create new problems, e.g., because of polluted and hence biased data. This is not just a theoretical problem; it is directly connected to the regulation of insurance. The new developments force us to directly confront questions about mutualist versus solidaristic forms of insurance, and more generally about how much weight to ascribe to individual responsibility, given all we know about unequal background circumstances. (shrink)

Many political theorists think about how to make societies more just. In recent years, with interests shifting from principles to their institutional realization, there has been much debate about feasibility and the role it should play in theorizing. What has been underexplored, however, is how feasibility depends on the attitudes and perceptions of individuals, not only with regard to their own behaviour, but also with regard to the behaviour of others. This can create coordination problems, which can be described as (...) “feasibility gridlocks”. These problems are interesting from a normative perspective, not only because they arguably play an important role for the feasibility of institutions, but also because they contain a normative element themselves: individual might be willing to cooperate in order change the “feasibility frontier” Political ideals and the feasibility frontier. Econ Philos), but only if others are also willing to do their bit, which contains a judgment about the fair distribution of burdens. Beliefs about the selfish nature of human beings, however, can make feasibility gridlocks more likely. This is why what I call, for the sake of brevity, “economic ideology”, i.e. an account of human nature as fundamentally self-interested, can be harmful. Finding a way out of such equilibriums therefore is an important task for political theorists and social reformers. (shrink)

Joseph Heath argues that we should reject the idea of a ‘just wage’ because market prices are supposed to signal scarcities and thereby to promote overall efficiency, rather than reward contributions. This argument overlooks the degree to which markets are institutionally, socially, and culturally embedded. Their outcomes are hardly ever ‘pure’ market outcomes, but the result of complex interactions of economic and other factors, including various forms of power. Instead of rejecting moral intuitions about wage justice as misguided, we can (...) often understand them as pointing towards questions about the embeddedness of markets, or lack thereof. At least in some cases, changes in the framework of markets can both increase efficiency and get us closer to conventional notions of fair wages, e.g. when gender discrimination is reduced. Thus, while an abstract notion of a ‘just wage’ remains problematic, we can and should recognize that some wages are unjust. (shrink)

This paper discusses, in a comparative perspective, the two institutions in Hegel’s account civil society in the Philosophy of Right that aim at ‘taming’ the free market: the police and the corporations. It argues that although Hegel claims to have taken up the insights of the economists of his day, he has done so in a rather limited way, and he remains sceptical about many of the ‘laws’ formulated by economists. In order to derive such laws, economists reduce individual preferences (...) to a few categories and take these to be constant. This methodology implies that in order to tame the market the framework of rules and incentives needs to be changed – this is also the model of the Hegelian police. With regard to the corporations, however, Hegel takes on a sociological perspective and asks how the individuals’ preferences are actually formed. His theory of the corporations can be read as a theory about the social spaces in which people’s ethos is formed, which not only influences their behaviour in the market, but also prepares the ground for the political ethos of the state. I argue that these two ways of looking at economic phenomena, and the ensuing suggestions for how to curb the negative effects of the free market, have parallels in contemporary discussions about economic ethics. In order to find solutions for the problems of today’s capitalism, it is worth focussing not only on the economic perspective of the police, but also on the sociological perspective of the corporations. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss the power of corporations as epistemic agents. Corporations need to hold certain forms of knowledge in order to develop and produce goods and services. Intellectual property is meant to incentivize them to do so, in ways that orient their activities towards the public good. However, corporations often use their knowledge strategically, not only within markets, but also in the processes that set the rules for markets. I discuss various historical examples, including the so-called “tobacco strategy” (...) of creating doubt about scientific evidence, and argue that as long as corporations are set up as profit-oriented entities, it is a dangerous strategy to provide them with too much epistemic power. I suggest various policies for reigning in this form of corporate power, for example regulations on PR activities. I then turn to the power of digital corporations, which is based on their collection and analysis of data. These kinds of companies, and the technologies they use, make the control of corporations as epistemic agents all the more urgent for democratic societies. (shrink)

The evaluation of labour markets and of particular jobs ought to be sensitive to a plurality of benefits and burdens of work. We use the term 'the goods of work' to refer to those benefits of work that cannot be obtained in exchange for money and that can be enjoyed mostly or exclusively in the context of work. Drawing on empirical research and various philosophical traditions of thinking about work we identify four goods of work: 1) attaining various types of (...) excellence; 2) making a social contribution; 3) experiencing community; and 4) gaining social recognition. Our account of the goods of work can be read as unpacking the ways in which work can be meaningful. The distribution of the goods of work is a concern of justice for two conjoint reasons: First, they are part of the conception of the good of a large number of individuals. Second, in societies without an unconditional income and in which most people are not independently wealthy, paid work is non-optional and workers have few, if any, occasions to realize these goods outside their job. Taking into account the plurality of the goods of work and their importance for justice challenges the theoretical and political status quo, which focuses mostly on justice with regard to the distribution of income. We defend this account against the libertarian challenge that a free labour market gives individuals sufficient options to realise the goods of work important to them, and discuss the challenge from state neutrality. In the conclusion, we hint towards possible implications for today’s labour markets. (shrink)

The paper develops a responsibility-based account of professional ethics in banking. From this perspective, bankers have duties not only toward clients—the traditional focus of professional ethics—but also regarding the prevention of systemic harms to whole societies. When trying to fulfill these duties, bankers have to meet three challenges: epistemic challenges, motivational challenges, and a coordination challenge. These challenges can best be met by a combination of regulation and ethics that aligns responsibilities, recognition, and incentives and creates what Parsons has called (...) “integrated situations”. Professional associations play an important role for this purpose, especially as spaces in which peer recognition is earned. But financial incentives equally need to be brought in line, for example, through deferred bonuses or claw backs. Such measures can create a new culture of accountability in banking. (shrink)

In many Western capitalist economies, private indebtedness is pervasive, but it has received little attention from political philosophers. Economic theory emphasizes the liberating potential of debt contracts, but its picture is based on assumptions that do not always hold, especially when there is a background of structural injustice. Private debt contracts are likely to miss their liberating potential if there is deception or lack of information, if there is insufficient access to (regular forms of) credit, or if credit is overly (...) expensive. Markets for private debt can be mechanisms of structural injustice: rather than playing a neutral role, they reinforce injustices, because the failures of debt to be liberating disproportionately hit individuals in disadvantaged positions. By individualizing what are in fact structural problems, private debt can contribute to stigmatization, social exclusion and oppression. What is at stake, from a perspective of structural justice, is not only the distribution of income, but also the distribution of risk. The problems of private debt markets therefore require political attention. In addition to fighting the structural injustices that form the background condititions of private debt, it is also worth addressing private debt markets themselves. (shrink)

This volume brings together leading scholars from political theory, law, and economics in order to discuss the relationship between financial markets and justice, and invites us to rethink the place and role of financial markets in our societies.

Do individuals have moral duties to fulfil all the demands of their jobs? In this paper, we discuss how to understand such ‘occupational duties’ and their normative bases, with a specific focus on duties that go beyond contractually agreed upon duties. Against views that reduce occupational duties to contractual duties, we argue that they often have greater moral weight, based on skills, roles, and the duty of social cooperation. We discuss what it would take to make sure that individuals are (...) not unfairly overburdened by such occupational duties, distinguishing between choice conditions (voluntariness, availability of alternatives, full information) and conditions concerning the role and the social structures within which such duties are embedded (feasible role design, existence of support structures, employee voice). These conditions, however, are not fulfilled for many existing jobs, especially for jobs typically occupied by structurally disadvantaged groups such as women or ethnic minorities. This leads to a dilemma between the claims of those who depend on the occupational duties to be fulfilled, and the rights of those who hold these occupations and are unfairly overburdened. We conclude by arguing for the need for structural reform to dissolve this dilemma. (shrink)

Authors like Iris Young and Philip Pettit have come up with proposals for theorizing ‘structural injustice’ and social relations marred by ‘domination’. These authors provide conceptual tools for f...

Debates about justice in political philosophy often ask which distributive end state is normatively desirable. The economic mechanisms that generate the ‘pie’ that is to be distributed are usually left unexplored. Mark R. Reiff’s new book, in contrast, asks what justice means within economic processes, and how changes in the framework of the economy could lead to more justice, including justice in the distributive sense. As such, Reiff’s account is in a line with other recent accounts such as Dietsch’s discussion (...) of competition and its effects on distribution, or the debates about property-owning democracy ; these are all attempts to open up the ‘black box’ of markets, as Dietsch puts it, and to think about justice before or while the pie is being baked.Reiff returns to an age-old idea: the idea of a just price, which he revives by developing a highly original account of exploitation as the use of intolerably unfair prices. Al .. (shrink)

This article analyses a hitherto neglected problem at the transition from ideal to non‐ideal theory: the problem of knowledge. Ideal theories often make idealising assumptions about the availability of knowledge, for example knowledge of social scientific facts. This can lead to problems when this knowledge turns out not to be available at the non‐ideal level. Knowledge can be unavailable in a number of ways: in principle, for practical reasons, or because there are normative reasons not to use it. This can (...) make it necessary to revise ideal theories, because the principle of ‘ought implies can’ rules out certain theories, at least insofar as they are understood as action‐guiding. I discuss a number of examples and argue that there are two tendencies that will increase the relevance of this problem in the future: the availability of large amounts of sensitive data whose use is problematic from a normative point of view, and the increasing complexity of an interrelated world that makes it harder to predict the effects of institutional changes. To address these issues, philosophers need to cooperate with social scientists and philosophers of the social sciences. Normative theorising can then be understood as one step in a long process that includes thinkers from different disciplines. Ideal theory can respond to many of the charges raised against it if it is understood along these lines and if it takes the problem of knowledge and its implications seriously. (shrink)

This article presents the most important strands of the philosophical debate about markets. It offers some distinctions between the concept of markets and related concepts, as well as a brief outline of historical positions vis-à-vis markets. The main focus is on presenting the most common arguments for and against markets, and on analyzing the ways in which markets are related to other social institutions. In the concluding section questions about markets are connected to two related themes, methodological questions in economics (...) and the topics of business ethics and corporate social responsibility. (shrink)

Democratic societies need media that uphold journalistic standards of truthfulness and objectivity. But sensationalism has always been a temptation for journalists, and given the intense competition between news outlets, especially in the online world, there is pressure on them to ‘chase the clicks’. The article analyzes the incentive structures for journalists – focusing on the harmfulness of sensationalist framing as an example – and the challenges of establishing shared standards in a highly competitive online environment. Drawing on concepts and arguments (...) from business ethics, it argues that the structure of this problem points to the need for an ‘ethics of sportsmanship’ that upholds journalistic standards despite competitive pressures. But the specific role and nature of the media imply that there can be no once‐and‐for‐all solution. Instead, there is a need for reflexivity, that is, for an ongoing dialogue about journalistic standards and the role of media in democratic societies. (shrink)

Der Beitrag diskutiert den Zusammenhang von Anerkennung und Ökonomie, indem zunächst auf Adam Smiths anerkennungstheoretische Deutung menschlichen Eigeninteresses eingegangen wird, die in der späteren ökonomischen Theoriebildung jedoch verlorengegangen ist. Anschließend werden Stränge der aktuelleren Wirtschaftstheorie, die Anklänge an Anerkennungsthemen haben, sowie Axel Honneths Diskussion von Märkten aus der Perspektive sozialer Freiheit dargestellt.

Nach einer allgemeinen Hinführung zu den Themen „Markt“ und „Wettbewerb“ und deren normativen Dimension wird eine Reihe von wirtschaftsethischen Fragestellungen diskutiert: die deutschsprachige Debatte über den „Ort“ der Moral im Markt sowie verschiedene angelsächsische Debatten, die eine differenzierte Sicht auf die Problematik von Moral unter Bedingungen des Wettbewerbs erlauben. Abschließend wird argumentiert, dass sich in Situationen, in denen Wettbewerb die Erfüllung moralischer Pflichten erschwert, die Pflichten der Marktteilnehmer*innen hin zu kollektiven Pflichten verschieben, diese Umstände gemeinsam zu ändern.