10 found
Order:
See also
Lisa Miracchi
University of Pennsylvania
  1. Competence to Know.Lisa Miracchi - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):29-56.
    I argue against traditional virtue epistemology on which knowledge is a success due to a competence to believe truly, by revealing an in-principle problem with the traditional virtue epistemologist’s explanation of Gettier cases. The argument eliminates one of the last plausible explanation of Gettier cases, and so of knowledge, in terms of non-factive mental states and non-mental conditions. I then I develop and defend a different kind of virtue epistemology, on which knowledge is an exercise of a competence to know. (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   41 citations  
  2. Perception First.Lisa Miracchi - 2017 - Journal of Philosophy 114 (12):629-677.
    I develop a new account of perception on which it is metaphysically and explanatorily prior to illusion, hallucination, and perceptual experience. I argue that this view can rival the mainstream experience-first representationalist approach in explanatory power by using competences as a key theoretical tool: it can help to explain the nature of perception, how illusion and hallucination depend on it, and how cognitive science can help to explain in virtue of what we perceive. According to the Competence View, perception is (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  3. Competent Perspectives and the New Evil Demon Problem.Lisa Miracchi - forthcoming - In Julien Dutant (ed.), The New Evil Demon: New Essays on Knowledge, Justification and Rationality. Oxford University PRess.
    I extend my direct virtue epistemology to explain how a knowledge-first framework can account for two kinds of positive epistemic standing, one tracked by externalists, who claim that the virtuous duplicate lacks justification, the other tracked by internalists, who claim that the virtuous duplicate has justification, and moreover that such justification is not enjoyed by the vicious duplicate. It also explains what these kinds of epistemic standing have to do with each other. I argue that all justified beliefs are good (...)
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  4.  60
    A Competence Framework for Artificial Intelligence Research.Lisa Miracchi - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (5):588-633.
    ABSTRACTWhile over the last few decades AI research has largely focused on building tools and applications, recent technological developments have prompted a resurgence of interest in building a genuinely intelligent artificial agent – one that has a mind in the same sense that humans and animals do. In this paper, I offer a theoretical and methodological framework for this project of investigating “artificial minded intelligence” that can help to unify existing approaches and provide new avenues for research. I first outline (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  5. Knowledge Is All You Need.Lisa Miracchi - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):353-378.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  6.  64
    Perspectival Externalism Is the Antidote to Radical Skepticism.Lisa Miracchi - 2017 - Episteme 14 (3):363-379.
    ABSTRACTHilary Putnam provides an anti-skeptical argument motivated by semantic externalism. He argues that our best theorizing about what it takes to experience, think, and so on, entails that the world is much as we take it to be. This fact eliminates the possibility of radical skeptical scenarios, where from our perspective everything seems as it does in the actual case, but we are widely and systematically mistaken. I think that this approach is generally correct, and that it is the most (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  7.  12
    A case for integrative epistemology.Lisa Miracchi - forthcoming - Synthese:1-19.
    Western analytic epistemology is undergoing an upheaval: the importance of social justice concerns is becoming increasingly recognized. Many of us want epistemology to reflect our lived experiences, and to do real work for us on issues that matter. Motivated by these concerns, researchers are increasingly focusing on ameliorating our epistemic concepts: finding ones that contribute to social justice. At the same time, however, many epistemologists claim that their project is purely metaphysical and thus value-neutral: epistemology is just about the truth, (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8.  54
    Generative Explanation in Cognitive Science and the Hard Problem of Consciousness.Lisa Miracchi - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):267-291.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  9.  28
    Epistemic Agency and the Generality Problem.Lisa Miracchi - 2017 - Philosophical Topics 45 (1):107-120.
    I present and motivate a new solution to the generality problem for reliabilism. I suggest that we shift our focus from process-types that can be characterized independently of a subject’s epistemic concerns to process-types that play important roles in the life of the epistemic agent. Once we do so, a simple, promising solution suggests itself: the C-Typing Thesis. According to the C-Typing Thesis, how an epistemic agent forms her degree of confidence in a believed proposition determines the epistemically relevant type (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  10.  36
    When Evidence Isn't Enough: Suspension, Evidentialism, and Knowledge-First Virtue Epistemology.Lisa Miracchi - 2019 - Episteme 16 (4):413-437.
    I motivate and develop a novel account of the epistemic assessability of suspension as a development of my knowledge-first, virtue-epistemological research program. First, I extend an argument of Ernest Sosa's for the claim that evidentialism cannot adequately account for the epistemic assessability of suspension. This includes a kind of knowledge-first evidentialism of the sort advocated by Timothy Williamson. I agree with Sosa that the reasons why evidentialism fails motivate a virtue-epistemological approach, but argue that my knowledge-first account is preferable to (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark