道德修养是否必须以物质富裕为前提? 抑或物质贫困反而是历练并检验道德修养的必要条件? 先秦儒家对此表达了两种看似矛盾的观点,我们可以将此解读为早期儒家的“富德两难”问题.对此问题可以提出四种可能的解决方案,即分别主张:(一)上述两种观点一对一错;(二)物质富裕与物质贫困 分别对应不同德性;(三)物质价值与道德价值相互独立;(四)上述矛盾命题分别针对着不同而说教对象.然而,这四种处理方案,各有其文本解释与学理上的局限性.区分个人和社会两种视角,一方面强调个人在道德选择上 肩负着无法推卸的责任,另一方面从统计科学的角度看待社会整体道德水平与物质贫富之间的正相关关系,或为解释物质富裕与道德修养关系问题的有效思路.

What is the viewpoint regarding the emotional lives of sages in the Zhuangzi 莊子? There are two conflicting positions in current scholarship: sages have emotions, and sages are without emotions. In this essay, we introduce these positions with their corresponding textual support and show that they are not satisfactory accounts. Specifically, we point out that the conflict arises as scholars adopt a static model of emotions. Thus, we propose that a better way to understand the emotional lives of sages is (...) to adopt a dynamic model of emotions characterized by the process of forgetting. Through the discussion of such a dynamic process, we show how conflicting textual evidence can be integrated into this dynamic process and, at the same time, be read consistently. Ultimately, we argue that the ideal emotional lives of sages in the Zhuangzi adopt a dynamic model of emotions characterized by the vacillation of activity of the mind between the state with and without emotions. (shrink)

The surface grammar of reports such as ‘I have a pain in my leg’ suggests that pains are objects which are spatially located in parts of the body. We show that the parallel construction is not available in Mandarin. Further, four philosophically important grammatical features of such reports cannot be reproduced. This suggests that arguments and puzzles surrounding such reports may be tracking artefacts of English, rather than philosophically significant features of the world.

Philosophers disagree about what the folk concept of pain is. This paper criticises existing theories of the folk concept of pain, i.e. the mental view, the bodily view, and the recently proposed polyeidic view. It puts forward an alternative proposal – the polysemy view – according to which pain terms like “sore,” “ache” and “hurt” are polysemous, where one sense refers to a mental state and another a bodily state, and the type of polysemy at issue reflects two distinct but (...) related concepts of pain. Implications with respect to issues in philosophy of pain are also drawn. (shrink)

In The Specter of Materialism Petrus Liu examines what "materialism" means for progressive queer theory and Marxist approaches to China's postsocialist economy. Liu recasts the history of queer theory in light of the Beijing Consensus, arguing that North American queer theory's inability to sustain a materialist analysis is the result of its positioning of the United States, rather than China, as the focal point of contemporary global capitalism. Analyzing relations of gender and sexuality that have been reconfigured by China's global (...) capitalist accumulation-such as dagongmei (female migrant laborers in China's export-oriented sunbelt) and money boys (rural-to-urban sex workers)-Liu argues for a materialist queer theory that positions China at the center. (shrink)

Against a backcloth of philosophical debates on science and technology, and in particular the viewpoints of Karl Marx, this three-volume set proposes to reconsider science and technology and explores how the philosophy of science and technology responds to scientific and technological evolutions and an ever-changing world. The first volume analyses Marx's reconsideration of science and technology in five parts: its positioning, its historical practice, alienation of science and technology, and its relationship with productivity and human liberty. In the second volume, (...) viewpoints and problems of scientism and anti-scientism are discussed, covering topics such as instrumental reason, scientific optimism and pessimism, irrationalism and the deconstruction of scientism. The final volume discusses complementary value choices, the loss and awakening of scientific culture and reveals a vison for a liberal and open world of science and technology. The volumes will appeal to scholars and students interested in Marxist philosophy, the philosophy of science and technology and topics related to scientific culture. (shrink)

The problem of consciousness has been an issue in philosophy of mind for decades, and in recent years panpsychism and panprotopsychism have gained attention among philosophers who are still dedicated to finding a complete explanation of consciousness. In this dissertation, I criticize panpsychism and panprotopsychism by examining their metaphysical plausibility and their epistemic prospects. Concerning the metaphysical plausibility of panpsychism and panprotopsychism, I explain the “combination problem” of panpsychism and criticize several major accounts of panpsychism and panprotopsychism that aim at (...) solving this problem, including Seager’s panpsychist infusionism, Goff’s phenomenal bonding proposal, and Coleman’s panqualityism. I also examine the proposal of motivating panpsychism and panprotopsychism by drawing support from the integrated information theory (IIT) of consciousness. I argue that this proposal to merge panpsychism or panprotopsychism with IIT does not work. Concerning the epistemic prospect of panpsychism and panprotopsychism, I raise concerns about whether panpsychism and panprotopsychism can guide a fruitful research program about the nature of consciousness. First, I argue that a theory based on Russellian Monism would not have a promising epistemic prospect. I compare Russellian Monism to Thomistic Hylomorphism and argue that Russellian Monism faces similar epistemic challenges that plagued Thomistic Hylomorphism. Since most theories of contemporary panpsychism and panprotopsychism rely on the metaphysical framework of Russellian Monism, the challenges to Russellian Monism also undermine the epistemic prospects of panpsychism and panprotopsychism. Second, I challenge the epistemic prospects of panpsychism and panprotopsychism by examining if there can be a viable method to study the consciousness of micro-level entities. After revisiting the reasoning process that guided the study of atoms, I argue that studying micro-level facts requires “analogies” that compare micro-level facts with macro-level models. Then I argue that an analogy that fits the need of panpsychism or panprotopsychism is hard to achieve, because we have no macro-level models to be compared to the hypothesized systems of micro-level consciousness. (shrink)

Representationalism is a philosophical position which reduces all phenomenal conscious states to intentional states. However, starting from the phenomenal consciousness, the phenomenal intentionality theory provides an explanation of all sorts of intentionality. Against Michael Shim's interpretation, I argue that, although Hussserl's phenomenology is certainly considered as an antipode of strong representationalism, Husserl does not stand in opposition the weak representationalists, because Husserl maintains an essential connection between the senses of noemata and the hyletic data. In addition, Husserl's phenomenology is also (...) consistent with the phenomenal theory of intentionality. According to him, statically and genetically, all non-phenomenal intentional states take a recourse to phenomenal intentional states and eventually to sensual perceptions. (shrink)

本书收录了刘文英先生1978年到2004年发表的论文及未刊稿53篇,文章主题分为"天论新诠""时空纵横谈""科学史话""意识观与认识论""梦的解析""原始思维探秘"等专题.

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Business Ethics in Applied Ethics

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