11 found
Order:
  1.  46
    Moral Beliefs and Blameworthiness.Lloyd Fields - 1994 - Philosophy 69 (270):397 - 415.
    It is a commonly-held belief that ignorance excuses. But what of moral ignorance? Is a person blameless who acts from “false” moral principles? In this paper I shall try to show that such a person is blameworthy. I shall produce an argument that connects the acceptance of moral principles with character, character with moral responsibility, and moral responsibility with the justifiability of blame.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  2.  50
    Psychopathy, Other-Regarding Moral Beliefs, and Responsibility.Lloyd Fields - 1996 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (4):261-277.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Psychopathy, Other-Regarding Moral Beliefs, and ResponsibilityLloyd Fields (bio)AbstractIn this paper I seek to show that at least one kind of psychopath is incapable of forming other-regarding moral beliefs; hence that they cannot act for other-regarding moral reasons; and hence that they are not appropriate subjects for the assessment of either moral or legal responsibility. Various attempts to characterize psychopaths are considered and rejected, in particular the widely held view (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  3.  68
    Hume on Responsibility.Lloyd Fields - 1988 - Hume Studies 14 (1):161-175.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:161 HUME ON RESPONSIBILITY For Hume, to hold a person morally responsible for an action is morally to approve of him or to blame him in virtue of the action. Moreover, as he says in the Treatise of Human Nature, "approbation or blame... is nothing but a fainter and more imperceptible love or hatred." How must an action be related to a person in order for the person to (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  4. Parfit on personal identity and desert.Lloyd Fields - 1987 - Philosophical Quarterly 37 (October):432-41.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  5. Other people's experiences.Lloyd Fields - 1972 - Philosophical Quarterly 22 (January):29-43.
  6.  25
    A Moral Basis Of Excuses.Lloyd Fields - 1991 - International Journal of Applied Philosophy 6 (1):11-20.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7.  5
    A Moral Basis Of Excuses.Lloyd Fields - 1991 - International Journal of Applied Philosophy 6 (1):11-20.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8.  44
    Coercion and Moral Blameworthiness.Lloyd Fields - 2001 - International Journal of Applied Philosophy 15 (1):135-151.
    Some interpretations of the term “coercion” entail that a person who is coerced is morally entitled to do what she does. But there is a vague spectrum of uses of this term, in which one use shades into another. “Coercion” can legitimately be interpreted in a way according to which it is possible for a person who is coerced not to be morally entitled to do what she does and indeed to be blameworthy for her action. In order to distinguish (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9.  10
    Moral and Legal Responsibility.Lloyd Fields - 1987 - Cogito 1 (1):15-18.
  10.  3
    Commentary on "Sanity and Irresponsibility".Lloyd Fields - 1996 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (4):303-304.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Commentary on “Sanity and Irresponsibility”Lloyd Fields (bio)AbstractI make two criticisms of Wilson’s proposal to dispense with a loaded axiological criterion of sanity. First, Edwards’s axiological criterion of sanity, which Wilson accepts, involves the requirement of impartiality, which at least excludes some standards of right and wrong. Second, value pluralism applies only to morally acceptable forms of life and thus presupposes a standard of right and wrong. I conclude by (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11.  8
    Response to the Commentaries.Lloyd Fields - 1996 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (4):291-292.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Response to the CommentariesLloyd FieldsAbstractIn this response, I address three points raised in the commentaries: the question of whether there is a legitimate formal use of “moral,” the claim that a certain sort of affective capacity is required for acquiring the capacity to form other-regarding moral beliefs, and the problem of how to show that psychopaths lack the capacity to form other-regarding moral beliefs. I maintain that there is (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation