It will be an essential resource for philosophers, mathematicians, computer scientists, linguists, or any scholar who finds connectives, and the conceptual issues surrounding them, to be a source of interest.This landmark work offers both ...
This paper recalls some applications of two-dimensional modal logic from the 1980s, including work on the logic of Actually and on a somewhat idealized version of the indicative/subjunctive distinction, as well as on absolute and relative necessity. There is some discussion of reactions this material has aroused in commentators since. We also survey related work by Leslie Tharp from roughly the same period.
Whether assent ("acceptance") and dissent ("rejection") are thought of as speech acts or as propositional attitudes, the leading idea of rejectivism is that a grasp of the distinction between them is prior to our understanding of negation as a sentence operator, this operator then being explicable as applying to A to yield something assent to which is tantamount to dissent from A. Widely thought to have been refuted by an argument of Frege's, rejectivism has undergone something of a revival in (...) recent years, especially in writings by Huw Price and Timothy Smiley. While agreeing that Frege's argument does not refute the position, we shall air some philosophical qualms about it in Section 5, after a thorough examination of the formal issues in Sections 1-4. This discussion draws on - and seeks to draw attention to - some pertinent work of Kent Bendall in the 1970s. (shrink)
Our object is to study the interaction between mereology and David Lewis’ theory of subject-matters, elaborating his observation that not every subject matter is of the form: how things stand with such-and-such a part of the world. After an informal introduction to this point in Section 1, we turn to a formal treatment of the partial orderings arising in the two areas – the part-whole relation, on the one hand, and the relation of refinement amongst partitions of the set of (...) worlds, on the other. We emphasize a certain duality, formulated in and in Section 2, between the corresponding lattice operations – mereological joins with partition-lattice meets, mereological meets with partition-lattice joins. Section 3 presents some issues that are raised by consideration of the informally familiar idea of logical subtraction. These include, in particular, a problem about the need for a notion of independence different from the usual logical notion going by that name. The apparatus of Section 2 promises to throw some light on this problem, as we indicate in Section 4. Section 5 ties up some loose ends and suggests an area in which further work would be desirable. (shrink)
Only propositional logics are at issue here. Such a logic is contra-classical in a superficial sense if it is not a sublogic of classical logic, and in a deeper sense, if there is no way of translating its connectives, the result of which translation gives a sublogic of classical logic. After some motivating examples, we investigate the incidence of contra-classicality (in the deeper sense) in various logical frameworks. In Sections 3 and 4 we will encounter, originally as an example of (...) what (in Section 2) we call a contra-classical modal logic, an unusual logic boasting a connective (" demi-negation" ) whose double application is equivalent to a single application of the negation connective. Pondering the example points the way to a general characterization of contra-classicality (Theorems 3.3 and 4.6). In an Appendix (Section 5), we look at one alternative to classical logic as the target for such translational assimilation, intuitionistic logic, calling logics which resist the assimilation, in this case, contra- intuitionistic. We will show that one such logic is classical logic itself, thereby strengthening a result of Wojcicki's to the effect that the consequence relation of classical logic cannot be faithfully embedded by any connective-by-connective translation into that of intuitionistic logic. (What the "faithfully" means here is that not only is the translation of anything provable in the 'source' logic.. (shrink)
The formula A (it is noncontingent whether A) is true at a point in a Kripke model just in case all points accessible to that point agree on the truth-value of A. We can think of -based modal logic as a special case of what we call the general modal logic of agreement, interpreted with the aid of models supporting a ternary relation, S, say, with OA (which we write instead of A to emphasize the generalization involved) true at a (...) point w just in case for all points x, y, with Swxy, x and y agree on the truth-value of A. The noncontingency interpretation is the special case in which Swxy if and only if Rwx and Rwy, where R is a traditional binary accessibility relation. Another application, related to work of Lewis and von Kutschera, allows us to think of OA as saying that A is entirely about a certain subject matter. (shrink)
The partitions of a given set stand in a well known one-to-onecorrespondence with the equivalence relations on that set. We askwhether anything analogous to partitions can be found which correspondin a like manner to the similarity relations (reflexive, symmetricrelations) on a set, and show that (what we call) decompositions – of acertain kind – play this role. A key ingredient in the discussion is akind of closure relation (analogous to the consequence relationsconsidered in formal logic) having nothing especially to do (...) with thesimilarity issue, and we devote a final section to highlighting some ofits properties. (shrink)
Jean-Yves Béziau (‘Classical Negation can be Expressed by One of its Halves’, Logic Journal of the IGPL 7 (1999), 145–151) has given an especially clear example of a phenomenon he considers a sufficiently puzzling to call the ‘paradox of translation’: the existence of pairs of logics, one logic being strictly weaker than another and yet such that the stronger logic can be embedded within it under a faithful translation. We elaborate on Béziau’s example, which concerns classical negation, as well as (...) giving some additional background (especially from intuitionistic logic) to the example. Our interest is more on the logical exploration of the phenomenon Béziau’s case exemplifies than on the question of whether that phenomenon is (even prima facie ) paradoxical, though in Section 5 we do approach the latter question – somewhat obliquely – by considering an analogous phenomenon which it is hard to find puzzling. (shrink)
This paper assembles examples and considerations bearing on such questions as the following. Are statements to the effect that someone is too young (for instance) or that someone is old enough always to be understood in terms of someone's being too young or too old for such-and-such-for example, for them to join a particular organization? And when a 'such-and-such' has been specified, is it always at least tacitly modal in force-in the case just given, too young or old enough to (...) be able to join the organization? These questions are explored by means of a critical examination of the (affirmative) answers given to them by Eric Nelson in a 1980 paper on the subject, with part of the intention being to rescue Nelson's thoughtful discussion from the oblivion into which it appears to have fallen, judging by more recent contributions on the subject by semanticists. (shrink)
Exegesis, analysis and discussion of an argument deployed by Dana Scott in his 1973 paper ‘Background to Formalization’, rovide an ideal setting for getting clear about some subtleties in the apparently simple idea of conservative extension. There, Scott claimed in respect of two fundamental principles concerning implication that any generalized consequence relation respecting these principles is always extended conservatively by some similarly fundamental principles concerning conjunction and disjunction. This claim appears on the face of it to conflict with cases in (...) the literature in which adding principles governing conjunction or disjunction or both provides a non-conservative extension of the logic to which they are added, even if that logic does satisfy the intuitionistic conditions on implication. We explore the extent to which such cases can be transformed into counterexamples to Scott’s claim. Once one part of this claim is suitably disambiguated, we find no conflict after all, though we also find that Scott occasionally understates what the argument he provides in support of this claim actually establishes. The main goal, apart from getting straight about Scott’s argument, is to give an airing to various issues and distinctions in the general area of conservativity of extensions; as a side benefit, some semantic light will be thrown on a fragmentary intermediate logic of R. A. Bull, which A. N. Prior showed to be extended non-conservatively by the addition of conjunction, governed by the usual axioms. We will see exactly why, despite appearances, this is not a counterexample to Scott’s claim. (shrink)
The logic of 'elsewhere,' i.e., of a sentence operator interpretable as attaching to a formula to yield a formula true at a point in a Kripke model just in case the first formula is true at all other points in the model, has been applied in settings in which the points in question represent spatial positions, as well as in the case in which they represent moments of time. This logic is applied here to the alethic modal case, in which (...) the points are thought of as possible worlds, with the suggestion that its deployment clarifies aspects of a position explored by John Divers under the name 'modal agnosticism.' In particular, it makes available a logic whose Halldén incompleteness explicitly registers the agnostic element of the position - its neutrality as between modal realism and modal anti-realism. (shrink)
We discuss aspects of the logic of negation bearing on an issue raised by Jean-Yves Béziau, recalled in §1. Contrary- and subcontrary-forming operators are introduced in §2, which examines some of their logical behaviour, leading on naturally to a consideration in §3 of dual intuitionistic negation (as well as implication), and some further operators related to intuitionistic negation. In §4, a historical explanation is suggested as to why some of these negation-related connectives have attracted more attention than others. The remaining (...) sections (§§5, 6) briefly address a question about a certain notion of global contrariety and the provision of Kripke semantics for the various operators in play in our discussion. (shrink)
The phrase ‘autoepistemic logic’ was introduced in Moore  to refer to a study inspired in large part by criticisms in Stalnaker  of a particular nonmonotonic logic proposed by McDermott and Doyle.1 Very informative discussions for those who have not encountered this area are provided by Moore  and the wide-ranging survey article Konolige , and the scant remarks in the present introductory section do not pretend to serve in place of those treatments as summaries of the field. A (...) good deal of the material omitted here pertains to the specifically nonmonotonic nature of autoepistemic logic as standardly developed, but as we shall urge, there is from one point of view nothing distinctively nonmonotonic about the basic motivating ideas of the subject. (shrink)
Matthew Spinks  introduces implicative BCSK-algebras, expanding implicative BCK-algebras with an additional binary operation. Subdirectly irreducible implicative BCSK-algebras can be viewed as flat posets with two operations coinciding only in the 1- and 2-element cases, each, in the latter case, giving the two-valued implication truth-function. We introduce the resulting logic (for the general case) in terms of matrix methodology in §1, showing how to reformulate the matrix semantics as a Kripke-style possible worlds semantics, thereby displaying the distinction between the two (...) implications in the more familiar language of modal logic. In §§2 and 3 we study, from this perspective, the fragments obtained by taking the two implications separately, and – after a digression (in §4) on the intuitionistic analogue of the material in §3 – consider them together in §5, closing with a discussion in §6 of issues in the theory of logical rules. Some material is treated in three appendices to prevent §§1–6 from becoming overly distended. (shrink)
We explore a relation we call 'anticipation' between formulas, where A anticipates B (according to some logic) just in case B is a consequence (according to that logic, presumed to support some distinguished implicational connective →) of the formula A → B. We are especially interested in the case in which the logic is intuitionistic (propositional) logic and are much concerned with an extension of that logic with a new connective, written as "a", governed by rules which guarantee that for (...) any formula B, aB is the (logically) strongest formula anticipating B. The investigation of this new logic, which we call ILa, will confront us on several occasions with some of the finer points in the theory of rules and with issues in the philosophy of logic arising from the proposed explication of the existence of a connective (with prescribed logical behaviour) in terms of the conservative extension of a favoured logic by the addition of such a connective. Other points of interest include the provision of a Kripke semantics with respect to which ILa is demonstrably sound, deployed to establish certain unprovability results as well as to forge connections with C. Rauszer's logic of dual intuitionistic negation and dual intuitionistic implication, and the isolation of two relations (between formulas), head-implication and head-linkage, which, though trivial in the setting of classical logic, are of considerable significance in the intuitionistic context. (shrink)
A sentence mentioning an object can be regarded as saying any one of several things about that object, without thereby being ambiguous. Some of the (logical) repercussions of this commonplace observation are recorded, and some critical discussion is provided of views which would appear to go against it.
Impossible worlds are regarded with understandable suspicion by most philosophers. Here we are concerned with a modal argument which might seem to show that acknowledging their existence, or more particularly, the existence of some hypothetical (we do not say “possible”) world in which everything was the case, would have drastic effects, forcing us to conclude that everything is indeed the case—and not just in the hypothesized world in question. The argument is inspired by a metaphysical (rather than modal-logical) argument of (...) Paul Kabay’s which would have us accept this unpalatable conclusion, though its details bear a closer resemblance to a line of thought developed by Jc Beall, in response to which Graham Priest has made some philosophical moves which are echoed in our diagnosis of what goes wrong with the present modal argument. Logical points of some interest independent of the main issue arise along the way. (shrink)
In a paper on the logical work of the Jains, Graham Priest considers a consequence relation, semantically characterized, which has a natural analogue in modal logic. Here we give a syntactic/axiomatic description of the modal formulas which are consequences of the empty set by this relation, which is to say: those formulas which are, for every model, true at some point in that model.
Recently, an improvement in respect of simplicity was found by Rohan French over extant translations faithfully embedding the smallest congruential modal logic (E) in the smallest normal modal logic (K). After some preliminaries, we explore the possibility of further simplifying the translation, with various negative findings (but no positive solution). This line of inquiry leads, via a consideration of one candidate simpler translation whose status was left open earlier, to isolating the concept of a minimally congruential context. This amounts, roughly (...) speaking, to a context exhibiting no logical properties beyond those following from its being congruential (i.e., from its yielding provably equivalent results when provably equivalent formulas are inserted into the context). On investigation, it turns out that a context inducing a translation embedding E faithfully in K need not be minimally congruential in K. Several related minimality conditions are noted in passing, some of them of considerable interest in their own right (in particular, minimal normality). The paper is exploratory, raising more questions than it settles; it ends with a list of open problems. (shrink)
Given a 1-ary sentence operator , we describe L - another 1-ary operator - as as a left inverse of in a given logic if in that logic every formula is provably equivalent to L. Similarly R is a right inverse of if is always provably equivalent to R. We investigate the behaviour of left and right inverses for taken as the operator of various normal modal logics, paying particular attention to the conditions under which these logics are conservatively extended (...) by the addition of such inverses, as well as to the question of when, in such extensions, the inverses behave as normal modal operators in their own right. (shrink)
After an introduction to set the stage, we consider some variations on the reasoning behind Curry's Paradox arising against the background of classical propositional logic and of BCI logic and one of its extensions, in the latter case treating the "paradoxicality" as a matter of nonconservative extension rather than outright inconsistency. A question about the relation of this extension and a differently described (though possibly identical) logic intermediate between BCI and BCK is raised in a final section, which closes with (...) a handful of questions left unanswered by our discussion. (shrink)
We recapitulate some basic details of the system of implicative BCSK logic, which has two primitive binary implicational connectives, and which can be viewed as a certain fragment of the modal logic S5. From this modal perspective we review some results according to which the pure sublogic in either of these connectives is an exact replica of the material implication fragment of classical propositional logic. In Sections 3 and 5 we show that for the pure logic of one of these (...) implicational connectives two-in general distinct-consequence relations definable in the Kripke semantics for modal logic turn out to coincide, though this is not so for the pure logic of the other connective, and that there is an intimate relation between formulas constructed by means of the former connective and the local consequence relation. Between these discussions Section 4 examines some of the replacement-of-equivalents properties of the two connectives, relative to these consequence relations, and Section 6 closes with some observations about the metaphor of identical twins as applied to such pairs of connectives. (shrink)
Section 1 recalls a point noted by A. N. Prior forty years ago: that a certain formula in the language of a purely implicational intermediate logic investigated by R. A. Bull is unprovable in that logic but provable in the extension of the logic by the usual axioms for conjunction, once this connective is added to the language. Section 2 reminds us that every formula is interdeducible with (i.e. added to intuitionistic logic, yields the same intermediate logic as) some conjunction-free (...) formula. Thus it would seem that any detour going via formulas with conjunction can be avoided, which raises a puzzle: how is this consistent with the point from Section 1? Sections 3 and 4 raise and discuss this puzzle. In fact, the puzzle turns out on closer inspection not to be so puzzling after all, but it does serve as a convenient centrepiece around which to organize a discussion of the phenomenon illustrated by the Bull?Prior example. Section 5 notes that Prior's observation can be extended to the case of the result of adding disjunction to Bull's logic, while Section 6 includes some further remarks aimed at diagnosing one source of possible residual puzzlement. A subtext of our discussion?spanning several of the notes?is that this work by Bull and Prior has been overlooked, their results having to be rediscovered, by many algebraists and logicians in more recent years. (shrink)
We explore in an experimental spirit the prospects for extending classical propositional logic with a new operator P intended to be interpreted when prefixed to a formula as saying that formula in question is at least partly true. The paradigm case of something which is, in the sense envisaged, false though still "partly" true is a conjunction one of whose conjuncts is false while the other is true. Ideally, we should like such a logic to extend classical logic - or (...) any fragment thereof under consideration - conservatively, to be closed under uniform substitution (of arbitrary formulas for sentence letters or propositional variables), and to allow the substitutivity of provably equivalent formulas salva provabilitate. To varying degrees, we experience some difficulties only with this last ('congruentiality') desideratum in the two four-valued logics we end up giving our most extended consideration to. (shrink)
Was there such a person as Lewis Carroll? An affirmative answer is suggested by the thought that Lewis Carroll was Charles Dodgson, and since there was certainly such a person as Charles Dodgson, there was such a person as Lewis Carroll. A negative answer is suggested by the thought that in arguing thus, the two names ‘Lewis Carroll’ and ‘Charles Dodgson’ are being inappropriately treated as though they were completely on a par: a pseudonym is, after all, a false or (...) fictitious name. Perhaps we should say instead that there was really no such person as Lewis Carroll, but that when Charles Dodgson published under that name, he was pretending that there was, and further, pretending that the works in question formed part of the literary output of this pretendedly real individual. Whether or not this is correct for the case of ‘Lewis Carroll’, I will be suggesting that an account of this second style–a fictionalist account, for short–is appropriate for at least a good many pseudonyms. We shall get to reasons why it might nonetheless not be especially appropriate in the present case in due course: one advantage of the ‘Lewis Carroll’/‘Charles Dodgson’ example, such qualms notwithstanding, is that everyone is familiar not only with both names but with which of them is the pseudonym. Another is that, as we shall have occasion to observe below, Dodgson himself had some interesting views on this particular case of pseudonymy. (shrink)
We recapitulate (Section 1) some basic details of the system of implicative BCSK logic, which has two primitive binary implicational connectives, and which can be viewed as a certain fragment of the modal logic S5. From this modal perspective we review (Section 2) some results according to which the pure sublogic in either of these connectives (i.e., each considered without the other) is an exact replica of the material implication fragment of classical propositional logic. In Sections 3 and 5 we (...) show that for the pure logic of one of these implicational connectives two-in general distinct-consequence relations (global and local) definable in the Kripke semantics for modal logic turn out to coincide, though this is not so for the pure logic of the other connective, and that there is an intimate relation between formulas constructed by means of the former connective and the local consequence relation. (Corollary 5.8. This, as we show in an Appendix, is connected to the fact that the 'propositional operations' associated with both of our implicational connectives are close to being what R. Quackenbush has called pattern functions.) Between these discussions Section 4 examines some of the replacement-of-equivalents properties of the two connectives, relative to these consequence relations, and Section 6 closes with some observations about the metaphor of identical twins as applied to such pairs of connectives. (shrink)
Sections 1 and 2 respectively raise and settle the question of whether, if an affirmative modality collapses (reduces to the null modality, that is) in a normal modal logic, then all modalities of the same length collapse in that logic, while Section 3 considers some special cases of an analogous phenomenon for congruential modal logics, closing with a general question about collapsing modalities in this broader range of logics.
After some motivating remarks in Section 1, in Section 2 we show how to replace an axiomatic basis for any one of a broad range of sentential logics having finitely many axiom schemes and Modus Ponens as the sole proper rule, by a basis with the same axiom schemes and finitely many one-premiss rules. Section 3 mentions some questions arising from this replacement procedure , explores another such procedure, and discusses some aspects of the consequence relations associated with the different (...) axiomatizations in play. Several open problems are mentioned. An appendix briefly treats the issue of a similar ‘at most one-premiss rules’ reformulation of proof systems with sequent-to-sequent rules. (shrink)
If a certain semantic relation (which we call 'local consequence') is allowed to guide expectations about which rules are derivable from other rules, these expectations will not always be fulfilled, as we illustrate. An alternative semantic criterion (based on a relation we call 'global consequence'), suggested by work of J.W. Garson, turns out to provide a much better - indeed a perfectly accurate - guide to derivability.
We study a multiple-succedent sequent calculus with both of the structural rules Left Weakening and Left Contraction but neither of their counterparts on the right, for possible application to the treatment of multiplicative disjunction against the background of intuitionistic logic. We find that, as Hirokawa dramatically showed in a 1996 paper with respect to the rules for implication, the rules for this connective render derivable some new structural rules, even though, unlike the rules for implication, these rules are what we (...) call ipsilateral: applying such a rule does not make any formula change sides—from the left to the right of the sequent separator or vice versa. Some possibilities for a semantic characterization of the resulting logic are also explored. The paper concludes with three open questions. (shrink)