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George Berkeley (1685-1753) is the superstar of Irish Philosophy. He entered Trinity College, Dublin, in 1700 and became a fellow in 1707. In 1724 he resigned his Fellowship to become Dean of Derry, and in 1734 he was made Bishop of Cloyne. He settled in Oxford in 1752 and died the following year. The work of George Berkeley is marked by its diversity and range. His writings take in such topics as mathematics, psychology, politics, health, economics, deism and (...) education, as well as that with which he is most associated - philosophy. Whatever topic he dealt with, his grasp of the subject matter was always impressive and his criticisms of his contemporaries often acute. Among the most noteable of the British Empiricists, he took his starting point from Locke's new 'way of ideas', but he rejected abstract ideas and the possibility of real existence outside perception. It is for this doctrine that he is most known - that there is no such thing as matter, and that things are collections of ideas which can exist only in our minds and only for so long as they are perceived. This philosophy, summed up in his phrase 'to be is to be perceived', he termed 'immaterialism'. A.C. Fraser's collection includes a series of what were previously unpublished notes by Berkeley on all the main topics of his philosophy. This, the 1901 edition, was the first complete edition of his works. (shrink)

George Berkeley (1685-1753) is the superstar of Irish Philosophy. He entered Trinity College, Dublin, in 1700 and became a fellow in 1707. In 1724 he resigned his Fellowship to become Dean of Derry, and in 1734 he was made Bishop of Cloyne. He settled in Oxford in 1752 and died the following year. The work of George Berkeley is marked by its diversity and range. His writings take in such topics as mathematics, psychology, politics, health, economics, deism and (...) education, as well as that with which he is most associated - philosophy. Whatever topic he dealt with, his grasp of the subject matter was always impressive and his criticisms of his contemporaries often acute. Among the most noteable of the British Empiricists, he took his starting point from Locke's new 'way of ideas', but he rejected abstract ideas and the possibility of real existence outside perception. It is for this doctrine that he is most known - that there is no such thing as matter, and that things are collections of ideas which can exist only in our minds and only for so long as they are perceived. This philosophy, summed up in his phrase 'to be is to be perceived', he termed 'immaterialism'. A.C. Fraser's collection includes a series of what were previously unpublished notes by Berkeley on all the main topics of his philosophy. This, the 1901 edition, was the first complete edition of his works. (shrink)

Berkeley's philosophy has been much studied and discussed over the years, and a growing number of scholars have come to the realization that scientific and mathematical writings are an essential part of his philosophical enterprise. The aim of this volume is to present Berkeley's two most important scientific texts in a form which meets contemporary standards of scholarship while rendering them accessible to the modern reader. Although editions of both are contained in the fourth volume of the Works, (...) these lack adequate introductions and do not provide com plete and corrected texts. The present edition contains a complete and critically established text of both De Motu and The Analyst, in addi tion to a new translation of De Motu. The introductions and notes are designed to provide the background necessary for a full understanding of Berkeley's account of science and mathematics. Although these two texts are very different, they are united by a shared a concern with the work of Newton and Leibniz. Berkeley's De Motu deals extensively with Newton's Principia and Leibniz's Specimen Dynamicum, while The Analyst critiques both Leibnizian and Newto nian mathematics. Berkeley is commonly thought of as a successor to Locke or Malebranche, but as these works show he is also a successor to Newton and Leibniz. (shrink)

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

An Essay Concerning Human Understanding is a work by John Locke concerning the foundation of human knowledge and understanding. It first appeared in 1689 (although dated 1690) with the printed title An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding. He describes the mind at birth as a blank slate (tabula rasa, although he did not use those actual words) filled later through experience. The essay was one of the principal sources of empiricism in modern philosophy, and influenced many enlightenment philosophers, such as (...) David Hume and George Berkeley. (shrink)

Tekst został napisany najprawdopodobniej w roku 1668. Podstawą przekładu są jego dwie edycje: Kennetha Dewhursta, zamieszczona przezeń w monografii Thomas Sydenham. His Life and Original Writings, University and California Press, Berkeley–Los Angeles 1966, s. 85–93 oraz bardziej szczegółowa transkrypcja dokonana przez Jonathana Craiga Walmsleya i zamieszczona w rozprawie doktorskiej John Locke’s Natural Philosophy, opublikowanej elektronicznie: https://core.ac.uk/download/files/99/74250.pdf. Powodem umieszczenia przez Dewhursta tekstu Anatomii w książce poświęconej Sydenhamowi był brak pewności co do jej autorstwa; choć pierwotnie badacz ten przypisał go (...) Locke’owi, po pewnym czasie zmienił zdanie, uznając, że autorem był jednak Sydenham. Powodem był m.in. fakt, że pierwszy akapit napisany został ręką Sydenhama, co skłoniło Dewhursta do przypuszczenia, że rola Locke’a sprowadzała się jedynie do pełnienia obowiązków sekretarza znanego angielskiego lekarza. O autorstwie Sydenhama miała świadczyć także zbieżność poglądów zawartych w tekście z treścią jego Observationes Medicae. Ustalenia te podważyli ostatnio Peter Anstey i John Burrows, którzy analizując źródła i wykorzystując narzędzia statystyczne, rozstrzygnęli – należy sądzić, że ostatecznie – sprawę autorstwa Anatomii na korzyść Locke’a ). (shrink)

In the Essay Locke argues abstract ideas within the framework of the descriptivist theory of reference. For him, abstract ideas are, in many cases, conceptual ideas that play the role of “descriptions” or “descriptive contents,” determining general terms’ referents. In contrast, in the introduction of the Principles, Berkeley denies Lockean abstract ideas adamantly from an imagistic point of view, and he offers his own theory of reference seemingly consisting of referring expressions and their referents alone. However, interestingly, he (...) mentions a general term’s “definition” and suggests that it determines the scope of the term’s referents. For example, he takes up the definition of a triangle as “a plain Surface comprehended by three right Lines” and suggests that just as Locke’s general idea of a triangle does, the definition determines the referents of the general term “triangle.” His definition reminds us of the fact that as Descartes grasps the content of the general idea of a triangle as “a figure enclosed by three lines,” so Locke grasps the abstract idea of a triangle as “a Figure including a Space between three Lines,” and so on. That is, since Berkeley is an imagist, he does not acknowledge Locke’s conceptual abstract ideas as “ideas,” but although he verbally denies “abstract ideas,” his theory of reference also actually has the same descriptivist framework consisting of referring expressions, their descriptive contents, and their referents. Thus, we understand the real reason why Berkeley’s criticism of Locke seems beside the point. (shrink)

This volume includes the major works of the British Empiricists, philosophers who sought to derive all knowledge from experience. All essays are complete except that of Locke, which Professor Richard Taylor of Brown University has skillfully abridged.

Volume VI in Doubleday's Modern Studies in Philosophy series. Martin is responsible for the ten Locke essays, Armstrong for the twelve on Berkeley. The essays on Locke are by Ryle, Yolton, Jackson, Barnes, Bennett, Flew, Monson, Macpherson, and Ryan. The last three cover Locke's political philosophy while the others inevitably concern themselves with Locke's psychology and epistemology. The Berkeley essays are by Broad, Luce, Grave, Marc-Wogau, Cummins, Mabbott, Bennett, Furlong, Beardsley, Thomson, and Popper. Popper's (...) essay is on "Berkeley as Precursor of Mach and Einstein." As with Locke, the other topics are predictable, though a total of three essays are devoted to the role of "God" in Berkeley's philosophy. An index and a short bibliography are appended.--E. A. R. (shrink)

Many believe that George Berkeley and, subsequently, David Hume offer devastating arguments against John Locke's theory of abstract ideas. It is the purpose of this paper to clarify the attacks given a close reading of Locke. It will be shown that many of the arguments of Berkeley and Hume are of a straw man nature and, moreover, that some of their conclusions are actually in accord with Locke.

The paper discusses Berkeley's classical critique of Locke's theory of generating concepts by abstraction, rebuts it, and shows that endorses Lockean abstractionism concerning the formation of empirical concepts.

This is cassette 12, concerned with more connexions between late medieval and early modern thought. The first writer we will look at is George Berkeley, who criticised Locke's theory of abstract ideas and put forward his own theory of universality.

Recent interpretations of Locke's primary/secondary quality distinction have tended to emphasize Locke's relationship to the corpuscularian science of his time, especially to that of Boyle. Although this trend may have corrected the unfortunate tendency to view Locke in isolation from his scientific contemporaries, it nevertheless has resulted in some over- simplifications and distortions of Locke's general enterprise. As everyone now agrees, Locke was attempting to provide a philosophical foundation for English corpuscularianism and one must therefore (...) look not only at the current scientific hypotheses but also at the nature of the philosophical foundation Locke was attempting to erect. In particular, Locke made an attempt, based on epistemological principles, to give a philosophical justification of atomistic corpuscularianism. Moreover, he was not content to give this justification post hoc—the epistemological foundation was prior to, and determined the framework for, the details of the correct scientific theory. Locke's epistemology made legitimate an atomistic theory, one making crucial use of the notion of solidity in the definition of the elementary particles, although it did not prejudge the details of this theory. (shrink)

Ao defender, nos Princípios matemáticos de filosofia natural, a existência de uma força de gravitação universal, Newton desencadeou uma onda de dúvidas e objeções filosóficas. Suas próprias declarações sobre a natureza da gravitação não são facilmente interpretáveis como formando um conjunto consistente de opiniões. Por um lado, logo após fornecer as três definições de "quantidades de forças centrípetas" (Defs. 6-8), Newton observa que está tratando tais forças "matematicamente", sem se pronunciar sobre sua realidade física. Mas, por outro lado, no Escólio (...) Geral inserido no final da segunda edição do livro, Newton diz que foi capaz de "explicar" vários fenômenos de movimento por meio da força de gravidade - que ele mostrou ser um tipo de força centrípeta -, embora não tivesse ainda conseguido explicar a causa dessa força. Uma interpretação plausível dessas últimas afirmações é que Newton acreditava que pôde inferir, a partir dos fenômenos, a existência da força de gravidade, enquanto agente causal real de certos movimentos, mas que ainda não havia tido sucesso em descobrir a causa dessa causa. O objetivo principal do presente artigo não é aprofundar a análise histórica das declarações de Newton, mas examinar como essa questão se insere no debate mais geral sobre o estatuto epistemológico das hipóteses científicas que transcendem a experiência imediata. Segundo a posição defendida, entre muitos outros, por John Locke, tais hipóteses devem ser interpretadas como tentativas legítimas de descrever aspectos inobserváveis da realidade. Em contraste com isso, no caso específico das hipóteses sobre forças - de gravitação ou quaisquer outras -, George Berkeley argumentou vigorosamente a favor de sua interpretação como meros artifícios teóricos úteis às "demonstrações matemáticas" na ciência da mecânica. Ao longo da análise das vantagens e desvantagens filosóficas dessas posições opostas, indica-se aqui que, embora a interpretação realista pareça fazer mais justiça ao desenvolvimento real da física após os Princípios matemáticos, a interpretação instrumentalista de Berkeley tem o mérito filosófico inegável de representar uma adesão mais firme ao empirismo, que é, de um modo ou de outro, valorizado por ambas as partes envolvidas na disputa sobre a natureza da gravitação. Newton's defence, in the Principia, of the existence of a universal force of gravity immediately gave rise to a wave of philosophical doubts and objections. His own remarks on the nature of gravitation are not easily amenable of a consistent, uniform interpretation. This paper begins by reviewing briefly these remarks. Its primary objective is, however, to examine how this important scientific issue contributed to demarcate two main epistemological positions on the status of scientific hypotheses transcending immediate experience. In Newton's time, two exponents of these positions were, respectively, Locke and Berkeley. Intriguingly, Newton fuelled both the Berkeleyan, instrumentalist interpretation, and the Lockean, realist interpretation. On the one hand, immediately after offering the definitions of "quantities of centripetal forces" (Definitions 6-8), he warned that he was treating these forces "mathematically", without pronouncing on its physical status. This remark lends support to Berkeley's anti-realist interpretation of forces, as Berkeley himself was keen to point out. But in the General Scholium, at the end of the book, Newton declared that he could "explain" certain important phenomena of motion by the force of gravity, although he had not yet been able to explain the cause of this force, adding, famously, that he would "feign no hypotheses" about this issue. A natural, realist interpretation of this statement is that Newton believed that he could infer, from the phenomena, the existence of gravity, as a real, causal physical agent, but that he had not yet succeeded in discovering the cause of this cause. In discussing the shortcomings and advantages of these opposing views, we indicate that although the realist interpretation appears to do more justice to the actual development of physics after the Principia, Berkeley's interpretation has the philosophical merit of representing a firmer adherence to empiricism, a position valued, in one way or another, by all parties involved in the dispute on the nature of gravitation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:John Locke and the Eighteenth-Century Divine by Alan P.F. SellKathy SquadritoAlan P.F. Sell. John Locke and the Eighteenth-Century Divine. Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1997. Pp. xi + 444. Cloth, $75.00.Professor Sell’s goal is to discern the impact of Locke’s thought upon the later divines; Sell’s scope is the seventeenth century through the nineteenth century. Most of the text is a detailed descriptive account of (...) various scholars’ reactions to Locke’s epistemology, metaphysics, and views concerning religion. Sell focuses on the question of the relative authority of scripture, reason and revelation. He contends that Locke’s epistemological and political positions are intimately bound up with his Christian faith, that as a conservative empiricist, Locke is “much more the rationalist than he has sometimes been painted” (48). The important question bequeathed by Locke to Christian apologetics is: “can the epistemological starting point be redeemed for Christian apologetic use or is it not viable at all?” (12). Sell addresses this question throughout the following chapters: “Ideas, Knowledge and Truth”; “Reason, Revelation, Faith and Scripture”; “Morality and Liberty”; “Toleration and Government”; and “Christian Doctrine”.Sell notes Locke’s roots in Calvinism, his appreciation of Arminian doctrine and his friendship with a number of prominent Latitudinarians. He argues that most criticisms of Locke’s Reasonableness of Christianity are misguided. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Locke was charged with scepticism, deism, Socinianism and materialism. Sell presents the objections of numerous scholars, notably Bishop Stillingfleet, William Carroll, John Norris, Richard Bentley, Henry Lee, Richard Price, Bishop Berkeley, and Samuel Johnson. He also covers the views of Locke’s defenders, including Anthony Collins, Catharine Cockburn and Samuel Bold.The reader might be disappointed with Sell’s short presentation of an inordinate number of Lockean critics; there is little analysis or discussion of the merits of the particular objections cited. He does offer an analysis of the general charges against Locke, but rarely quotes Locke sufficiently to justify his conclusion that Locke was not a deist, sceptic, or materialist. Sell simply takes Locke’s word for it. This book is best taken as an excellent reference guide.Sell contends that in spite of Locke’s friendship with deists such as Collins, Locke’s Reasonableness of the Christian Religion was written to dissolve the deist prejudice against Christianity. He dismisses the charge of deism because: (1) Locke argues for revelation and against natural religion, (2) Locke’s God possesses the traditional attributes assigned to him (power, omniscience, providence), (3) Locke grounds morality not exclusively in natural law, as did deists, but in the gospel, (4) the anti-materialist thrust of Book IV, Chapter X of the Essay, and (5) Locke’s argument that there can be truths of revelation which are above reason. Sell concludes that the “main problem posed to Locke by the deists was that of guilt by association” (209), in other words Locke’s work was misused for political reasons.Sell considers the charge of Socinianism more serious than that of deism. Socinianism is defined by its denial of the Trinity, and by the claims that there cannot be an innate idea of God, that there is no original corruption deriving from Adam, that the wicked will not suffer eternal torments, and that some bodies are not raised at general resurrection. Despite Locke’s agreement with most Socinian claims, Sell claims that [End Page 631] Locke cannot be pinned down on the issue of the Trinity. There is no question, he says, that “the Locke of 1662 affirmed both the doctrine of the Trinity and the human divine nature of Christ, whilst recognizing that the human mind could not explain how these things could be so; there is no question that especially from the 1690’s onwards he was actively reviewing the matter; there is no hard evidence that he ever repudiated the doctrine.” (214)According to Stillingfleet, Locke’s sensationalism and his proposal that matter might be capable of thought undermine Christian faith. Sell does not find this charge convincing. He defends Locke’s distinction between “the man” and “the person,” stressing that Locke claims a high degree of probability that the... (shrink)

This chapter revisits three key disagreements between Locke and Berkeley. The disagreements relate to abstraction, the idea of substance, and the status of the primary/secondary quality distinction. The goal of the chapter is to show that these disagreements are rooted in a more fundamental disagreement over the nature of ideas. For Berkeley, ideas are tied very closely to perceptual content. Locke adopts a less restrictive account of the nature of ideas. On his view, ideas are responsible (...) for both perceptual content and non-perceptual mental content. Recognizing this allows for the following analysis of their disputes. Berkeley often appeals to introspection to suggest that we do not have some particular idea. But Locke’s arguments that we have a particular idea often appeal to the functional role the idea has in our cognitive economy rather than to facts about our immediate phenomenology. (shrink)

John Locke thought that the clearest idea of active power derives from observing the mind's command over its ideas and limbs; observing the transfer of motion in impact also gives us an idea of active power. Berkeley denied this latter claim: the (related) idea of causation is derived exclusively from the experience of willing ideas, of volitional activity; the concept of causality has no legitimate extension beyond spirits and their volitions. The malleability of empiricist theories of meaning, whether (...) in the eighteenth or twentieth century, enables Berkeley and Hume to advance opposing, empiricist theories of causation. Demonstrative knowledge is possible where "nominal" and "real" essences coincide. Empiricism about meaning did have a deep impact on Hume. This chapter discusses the role of empiricism about meaning in Berkeley. Berkeley subscribed to a Cartesian metaphysics of mind. Berkeley's Cartesian theory of mind is set within an occasionalist metaphysics. (shrink)

This chapter examines the influence of Locke in eighteenth-century British philosophy. It argues that a good deal of eighteenth-century British philosophy can be seen, without manifest distortion, as a single sequence of thought, one that developed in response to questions raised in and by Locke’s philosophy. The chapter traces that sequence across several areas of thought, paying particular attention to debates about the nature of ideas, thinking matter, personal identity, the soul, morality, the relations of church and state, (...) toleration, and the place of Christianity in the polity. It distinguishes some of the roles played by Locke in eighteenth-century philosophy and emphasizes the range of contrasting uses to which he was put by his successors, from Berkeley, Hume, Smith, and Reid, to Toland, Tindal, and Priestley. In doing so it shows the continuing importance of Locke to any adequate understanding British philosophy in the eighteenth century. (shrink)

This is a new revised version of Dr. Laslett's standard edition of Two Treatises. First published in 1960, and based on an analysis of the whole body of Locke's publications, writings, and papers. The Introduction and text have been revised to incorporate references to recent scholarship since the second edition and the bibliography has been updated.

In his post-1720 works, Berkeley focuses his comments about Descartes on mechanism and about Locke on general abstract ideas. He warns against using metaphysical principles to explain observed regularities, and he extends his account to include spiritual substances (including God). Indeed, by calling a substance a spirit, he emphasizes how a person is simply the will that ideas be differentiated and associated in a certain way, not some <i>thing</i> that engages in differentiation. In this sense, a substance cannot (...) be conceived apart from its activity. (shrink)

Is shame dead? With personal information made so widely available, an eroding public/private distinction, and a therapeutic turn in public discourse, many seem to think so. People across the political spectrum have criticized these developments and sought to resurrect shame in order to protect privacy and invigorate democratic politics. Democracy and the Death of Shame reads the fear that 'shame is dead' as an expression of anxiety about the social disturbance endemic to democratic politics. Far from an essential supplement to (...) democracy, the recurring call to 'bring back shame' and other civilizing mores is a disciplinary reaction to the work of democratic citizens who extend the meaning of political equality into social realms. Rereadings from the ancient Cynics to the mid-twentieth century challenge the view that shame is dead and show how shame, as a politically charged idea, is disavowed, invoked, and negotiated in moments of democratic struggle. (shrink)

Ever since humankind raised its head toward the heavens in search of universal understanding and spiritual fulfilment, wars, pogroms, persecution, prejudice, and contempt have been the means of resolving the many and varied disagreements that have arisen over matters religious. In his Letter Concerning Toleration, Locke offers a compelling plea for freedom of conscience and religious expression. He outlines the limits of social and political incursion into the realm of personal belief or non-belief, discusses the dangers of mixing church (...) and state, and strikes hard at those who would use the power of the state to fulfil religious or political goals. Rational persuasion is always to be encouraged in the hope that wayward souls may find a moral direction in life, but the use of force in such matters is unwarranted and unacceptable. Locke also addresses the question of denominational infighting and relations among the major religions. Talk of heresy and schism should be set aside in favour of understanding and co-operation to achieve mutually desirable social ends. (shrink)

The thoughts of three philosophers on three topics: meaning, causality, and objectivity, are the focus of this study.

Translation and Edition of George Berkeley's "Notebooks".

Berkeley's Principles: Expanded and Explained includes the entire classical text of the Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge in bold font, a running commentary blended seamlessly into the text in regular font and analytic summaries of each section. The commentary is like a professor on hand to guide the reader through every line of the daunting prose and every move in the intricate argumentation. The unique design helps students learn how to read and engage with one of modern (...) philosophy's most important and exciting classics. (shrink)

Excerpt from Locke, Berkeley, Hume Vernunft und Natur gegen Bücherweisheit und Bialek tik, Sachkenntnis gegen Wortwissen. Gemeinsam ist ihnen auch das Ziel einer vorurteilsfreien, selbständigen, mit den Ergebnissen der nenerblühten Naturwissenschaft in Ein klang stehenden Erkenntnis der Welt und des Menschen, so wenig auch beide tatsachlioh imstande sein mochten, sich von Anfang an von den Fesseln der Überlieferung gänzlich frei zu machen. Gemeinsam ist ihnen ferner das Suchen nach einem neuen Weg zu diesem neuen Ziele: die Besinnung auf (...) eine allseitig brauchbare und erfolg versprechende Methode der Philosophie und Wissenschaft uberhaupt. Gemeinsam endlich, daß sich ihnen dieses methodologische Problem alsbald zu einer umfassenderen erkenntnistheoretischen Fragestellung erweitert. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

In treating of Locke, Berkeley and Hume we are dealing with what has been commonly regarded as the greatest age of British philosophy.

Locke was once supposed to have argued that since the colours, sounds, odours, and other ‘secondary’ qualities things appear to have can vary greatly according to the state and position of the observer, it follows that our ideas of the ‘secondary’ qualities of things do not ‘resemble’ anything existing in the objects themselves. And Berkeley has been credited with the obvious objection that similar facts about the ‘relativity’ of our perception of ‘primary’ qualities show that they do not (...) ‘resemble’ anything existing in the objects either, so that both ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ qualities exist only ‘in the mind’. The falsity of this view of Locke has been amply demonstrated in recent years, but no corresponding revision has been made in what remains the standard interpretation of Berkeley's criticisms of Locke. His objections therefore appear to be based on misunderstanding and to be irrelevant to what is now seen to be Locke's actual view and his reasons for holding it. I think this account of Berkeley, like the old view of Locke, is a purely fictional chapter in the history of philosophy, and in this paper I try to show that Berkeley's criticisms involve no misunderstanding and amount to a direct denial of the view Locke actually held. (shrink)

First published in 1713, this work was designed as a vivid and persuasive presentation of the remarkable picture of reality that Berkeley had first presented two years earlier in his Principles of Human Knowledge. His central claim there, as here, was that physical things consist of nothing but ideas in minds--that the world is not material but mental. Berkeley uses this thesis as the ground for a new argument for the existence of God, and the dialogue form enables (...) him to raise and respond to many of the natural objections to his position. The text printed in this volume is that of the 1734 edition of the Dialogues. (shrink)