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Lotem Elber-Dorozko
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
  1. Integrating computation into the mechanistic hierarchy in the cognitive and neural sciences.Lotem Elber-Dorozko & Oron Shagrir - 2019 - Synthese 199 (Suppl 1):43-66.
    It is generally accepted that, in the cognitive and neural sciences, there are both computational and mechanistic explanations. We ask how computational explanations can integrate into the mechanistic hierarchy. The problem stems from the fact that implementation and mechanistic relations have different forms. The implementation relation, from the states of an abstract computational system to the physical, implementing states is a homomorphism mapping relation. The mechanistic relation, however, is that of part/whole; the explaining features in a mechanistic explanation are the (...)
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    Scientists Invent New Hypotheses, Do Brains?Nir Fresco & Lotem Elber-Dorozko - 2024 - Cognitive Science 48 (1):e13400.
    How are new Bayesian hypotheses generated within the framework of predictive processing? This explanatory framework purports to provide a unified, systematic explanation of cognition by appealing to Bayes rule and hierarchical Bayesian machinery alone. Given that the generation of new hypotheses is fundamental to Bayesian inference, the predictive processing framework faces an important challenge in this regard. By examining several cognitive‐level and neurobiological architecture‐inspired models of hypothesis generation, we argue that there is an essential difference between the two types of (...)
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    Manipulation is key: on why non-mechanistic explanations in the cognitive sciences also describe relations of manipulation and control.Lotem Elber-Dorozko - 2018 - Synthese 195 (12):5319-5337.
    A popular view presents explanations in the cognitive sciences as causal or mechanistic and argues that an important feature of such explanations is that they allow us to manipulate and control the explanandum phenomena. Nonetheless, whether there can be explanations in the cognitive sciences that are neither causal nor mechanistic is still under debate. Another prominent view suggests that both causal and non-causal relations of counterfactual dependence can be explanatory, but this view is open to the criticism that it is (...)
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    Do Retinal Neurons Also Represent Somatosensory Inputs? On Why Neuronal Responses Are Not Sufficient to Determine What Neurons Do.Lotem Elber-Dorozko & Yonatan Loewenstein - 2023 - Cognitive Science 47 (4):e13265.
    How does neuronal activity give rise to cognitive capacities? To address this question, neuroscientists hypothesize about what neurons “represent,” “encode,” or “compute,” and test these hypotheses empirically. This process is similar to the assessment of hypotheses in other fields of science and as such is subject to the same limitations and difficulties that have been discussed at length by philosophers of science. In this paper, we highlight an additional difficulty in the process of empirical assessment of hypotheses that is unique (...)
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