Results for 'Lotteries'

693 found
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  1.  13
    Lotteries, Knowledge, and Rational Belief: Essays on the Lottery Paradox.Igor Douven (ed.) - 2020 - New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.
    We talk and think about our beliefs both in a categorical and in a graded way. How do the two kinds of belief hang together? The most straightforward answer is that we believe something categorically if we believe it to a high enough degree. But this seemingly obvious, near-platitudinous claim is known to give rise to a paradox commonly known as the 'lottery paradox' – at least when it is coupled with some further seeming near-platitudes about belief. How to resolve (...)
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  2. Lotteries and Prefaces.Matthew A. Benton - 2017 - In Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism. New York: Routledge. pp. 168-176.
    The lottery and preface paradoxes pose puzzles in epistemology concerning how to think about the norms of reasonable or permissible belief. Contextualists in epistemology have focused on knowledge ascriptions, attempting to capture a set of judgments about knowledge ascriptions and denials in a variety of contexts (including those involving lottery beliefs and the principles of closure). This article surveys some contextualist approaches to handling issues raised by the lottery and preface, while also considering some of the difficulties encountered by those (...)
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  3. Lotteries, Knowledge, and Practical Reasoning.Rachel McKinnon - 2011 - Logos and Episteme 2 (2):225-231.
    This paper addresses an argument offered by John Hawthorne gainst the propriety of an agent’s using propositions she does not know as premises in practical reasoning. I will argue that there are a number of potential structural confounds in Hawthorne’s use of his main example, a case of practical reasoning about a lottery. By drawing these confounds out more explicitly, we can get a better sense of how to make appropriate use of such examples in theorizing about norms, knowledge, and (...)
     
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  4. The Lottery Paradox Generalized?Jake Chandler - 2010 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (3):667-679.
    In a recent article, Douven and Williamson offer both (i) a rebuttal of various recent suggested sufficient conditions for rational acceptability and (ii) an alleged ‘generalization’ of this rebuttal, which, they claim, tells against a much broader class of potential suggestions. However, not only is the result mentioned in (ii) not a generalization of the findings referred to in (i), but in contrast to the latter, it fails to have the probative force advertised. Their paper does however, if unwittingly, bring (...)
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  5. The Lottery Paradox, Epistemic Justification and Permissibility.Thomas Kroedel - 2012 - Analysis 72 (1):57-60.
    The lottery paradox can be solved if epistemic justification is assumed to be a species of permissibility. Given this assumption, the starting point of the paradox can be formulated as the claim that, for each lottery ticket, I am permitted to believe that it will lose. This claim is ambiguous between two readings, depending on the scope of ‘permitted’. On one reading, the claim is false; on another, it is true, but, owing to the general failure of permissibility to agglomerate, (...)
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  6. Lotteries, Knowledge, and Irrelevant Alternatives.Rachel Mckinnon - 2013 - Dialogue 52 (3):523-549.
    The lottery paradox plays an important role in arguments for various norms of assertion. Why is it that, prior to information on the results of a draw, assertions such as, “My ticket lost,” seem inappropriate? This paper is composed of two projects. First, I articulate a number of problems arising from Timothy Williamson’s analysis of the lottery paradox. Second, I propose a relevant alternatives theory, which I call the Non-Destabilizing Alternatives Theory , that better explains the pathology of asserting lottery (...)
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  7. The Lottery: A Paradox Regained And Resolved.R. Weintraub - 2001 - Synthese 129 (3):439-449.
    The lottery paradox shows seemingly plausible principles of rational acceptance to be incompatible. It has been argued that we shouldn’t be concerned by this clash, since the concept of (categorical) belief is otiose, to be supplanted by a quantitative notion of partial belief, in terms of which the paradox cannot even be formulated. I reject this eliminativist view of belief, arguing that the ordinary concept of (categorical) belief has a useful function which the quantitative notion does not serve. I then (...)
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  8. Lotteries and Justification.Christoph Kelp - 2017 - Synthese 194 (4):1233-1244.
    The lottery paradox shows that the following three individually highly plausible theses are jointly incompatible: highly probable propositions are justifiably believable, justified believability is closed under conjunction introduction, known contradictions are not justifiably believable. This paper argues that a satisfactory solution to the lottery paradox must reject as versions of the paradox can be generated without appeal to either or and proposes a new solution to the paradox in terms of a novel account of justified believability.
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  9.  51
    Lotteries and the Close Shave Principle.John Collins - 2006 - In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Aspects of Knowing. Elsevier Science. pp. 83.
  10.  8
    Unnatural Lotteries and Diversity in Philosophy.Claudia Card - 2008 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 82 (2):85 - 99.
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  11.  38
    Infinite Lotteries, Large and Small Sets.Luc Lauwers - 2017 - Synthese 194 (6):2203-2209.
    One result of this note is about the nonconstructivity of countably infinite lotteries: even if we impose very weak conditions on the assignment of probabilities to subsets of natural numbers we cannot prove the existence of such assignments constructively, i.e., without something such as the axiom of choice. This is a corollary to a more general theorem about large-small filters, a concept that extends the concept of free ultrafilters. The main theorem is that proving the existence of large-small filters (...)
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  12.  84
    The Lottery, the Preface, and Conditions on Permissible Belief.Thomas Kroedel - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (4):741–751.
    This paper defends the permissibility solution to the lottery paradox against an objection by Anna-Maria Asunta Eder. Eder argues that the permissibility solution should also be applicable to the preface paradox, but conflicts with a plausible principle about epistemic permissions when so applied. This paper replies by first criticizing Eder’s considerations in defense of her principle; in particular, it argues that the plausibility of her principle is to a large extent parasitic on the spurious plausibility of the principle of factual (...)
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  13.  21
    The Lottery Puzzle and Pritchard’s Safety Analysis of Knowledge.Mark Mcevoy - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Research 34:7-20.
    The safety analysis of knowledge, due to Duncan Pritchard, has it that for all contingent propositions, p, S knows that p iff S believes that p, p is true, and in most nearby worlds in which S forms his belief in the same way as in the actual world, S believes that p only if p is true. Among the other virtues claimed by Pritchard for this view is its supposed ability to solve a version of the lottery puzzle. In (...)
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  14. Lotteries And Contexts.Peter Baumann - 2004 - Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):415-428.
    There are many ordinary propositions we think we know. Almost every ordinary proposition entails some "lottery proposition" which we think we do not know but to which we assign a high probability of being true (for instance: “I will never be a multi-millionaire” entails “I will not win this lottery”). How is this possible - given that some closure principle is true? This problem, also known as “the Lottery puzzle”, has recently provoked a lot of discussion. In this paper I (...)
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  15.  42
    Lotteries, knowledge, and inconsistent belief: why you know your ticket will lose.Mylan Engel - 2021 - Synthese 198 (8):7891-7921.
    Suppose that I hold a ticket in a fair lottery and that I believe that my ticket will lose [L] on the basis of its extremely high probability of losing. What is the appropriate epistemic appraisal of me and my belief that L? Am I justified in believing that L? Do I know that L? While there is disagreement among epistemologists over whether or not I am justified in believing that L, there is widespread agreement that I do not know (...)
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  16.  13
    Lottery or Lootery?Gordon Giles - 1995 - Philosophy Now 14:5-8.
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  17. Lotteries, Probabilities, and Permissions.Clayton Littlejohn - 2012 - Logos and Episteme 3 (3):509-14.
    Thomas Kroedel argues that we can solve a version of the lottery paradox if we identify justified beliefs with permissible beliefs. Since permissions do not agglomerate, we might grant that someone could justifiably believe any ticket in a large and fair lottery is a loser without being permitted to believe that all the tickets will lose. I shall argue that Kroedel’s solution fails. While permissions do not agglomerate, we would have too many permissions if we characterized justified belief as sufficiently (...)
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  18. The Lottery Puzzle and Pritchard’s Safety Analysis of Knowledge.Mark Mcevoy - 2009 - Journal of Philosophical Research 34:7-20.
    Duncan Pritchard's version of the safety analysis of knowledge has it that for all contingent propositions, p, S knows that p iff S believes that p, p is true, and (the “safety principle”) in most nearby worlds in which S forms his belief in the same way as in the actual world, S believes that p only if p is true. Among the other virtues claimed by Pritchard for this view is its supposed ability to solve a version of the (...)
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  19.  51
    Ultralarge Lotteries: Analyzing the Lottery Paradox Using Non-Standard Analysis.Sylvia Wenmackers - 2013 - Journal of Applied Logic 11 (4):452-467.
    A popular way to relate probabilistic information to binary rational beliefs is the Lockean Thesis, which is usually formalized in terms of thresholds. This approach seems far from satisfactory: the value of the thresholds is not well-specified and the Lottery Paradox shows that the model violates the Conjunction Principle. We argue that the Lottery Paradox is a symptom of a more fundamental and general problem, shared by all threshold-models that attempt to put an exact border on something that is intrinsically (...)
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  20.  17
    The Lottery of Life and Moral Desert: An Empirical Investigation.Daniela Goya-Tocchetto, Matthew Echols & Jen Wright - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (8):1112-1127.
    As John Rawls makes clear in A Theory of Justice, there is a popular and influential strand of political thought for which brute luck – that is, being lucky in the so-called “lottery of life” – ought to have no place in a theory of distributive justice. Yet the debate about luck, desert, and fairness in contemporary political philosophy has recently been rekindled by a handful of philosophers who claim that desert should play a bigger role in theories of distributive (...)
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  21.  72
    Lottery Dependent Utility: A Reexamination.Ulrich Schmidt - 2001 - Theory and Decision 50 (1):35-58.
    In order to accommodate empirically observed violations of the independence axiom of expected utility theory Becker and Sarin (1987) proposed their model of lottery dependent utility in which the utility of an outcome may depend on the lottery being evaluated. Although this dependence is intuitively very appealing and provides a simple functional form of the resulting decision criterion, lottery dependent utility has been nearly completely neglected in the recent literature on decision making under risk. The goal of this paper is (...)
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  22. What Lottery Problem for Reliabilism?Juan Comesaña - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (1):1-20.
    It can often be heard in the hallways, and occasionally read in print, that reliabilism runs into special trouble regarding lottery cases. My main aim in this paper is to argue that this is not so. Nevertheless, lottery cases do force us to pay close attention to the relation between justification and probability.
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  23.  31
    Does Lottery Advertising Exploit Disadvantaged and Vulnerable Markets?Harriet A. Stranahan - 2005 - Business Ethics Quarterly 15 (1):23-35.
    Is it unethical to advertise lotteries? Many citizens think that states should not be actively promoting and encouraging the public tospend hard-earned dollars on a bet that they are virtually guaranteed to lose. Perhaps more importantly, business ethicists are concerned that lottery advertising may be targeting the most vulnerable markets: households with the lowest income and education levels. If this were true, then it would increase the already disproportionately large burden of lottery taxes on the poor. Fortunately, our research (...)
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  24.  8
    Reliabilism, Lotteries, and Safaris.Mark V. McEvoy - 2018 - Philosophical Forum 49 (3):325-333.
    Lottery puzzles involve an ordinary piece of knowledge which seems to imply knowledge of a so-called “lottery proposition,” which itself seems unknown: I might be said to know that I won’t be going on safari next year. But if I were to win the lottery, I would go, and I don’t know that I won’t win the lottery. Examples can be multiplied. Thus we seem left either with the paradoxical position of knowing certain ordinary propositions, but failing to know the (...)
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  25.  12
    Lotteries and Religion.Martin Tyrrell - 1997 - Philosophy Now 19:21-23.
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  26. Lotteries and Miracles.Jordan Howard Sobel - 2009 - In Unknown Unknown (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion: Volume 2. Oxford University Press. pp. 275-316.
    (forthcoming in Oxford Readings in the Philosophy of Religion).
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  27. The Lottery Paradox, the No-Justification Account, and Taiwan.Kok Yong Lee - forthcoming - Episteme:1-20.
    To resolve the lottery paradox, the “no-justification account” proposes that one is not justified in believing that one's lottery ticket is a loser. The no-justification account commits to what I call “the Harman-style skepticism”. In reply, proponents of the no-justification account typically downplay the Harman-style skepticism. In this paper, I argue that the no-justification reply to the Harman-style skepticism is untenable. Moreover, I argue that the no-justification account is epistemically ad hoc. My arguments are based on a rather surprising finding (...)
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  28. Lotteries, Possibility and Skepticism.Daniel Immerman - 2015 - Skepsis: A Journal for Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Research 12:51-67.
  29.  83
    Three Puzzles About Lotteries.Julia Staffel - forthcoming - In Igor Douven (ed.), Lotteries, Knowledge, and Rational Belief. Cambridge University Press.
    In this article, I discuss three distinct but related puzzles involving lotteries: Kyburg’s lottery paradox, the statistical evidence problem, and the Harman-Vogel paradox. Kyburg’s lottery paradox is the following well-known problem: if we identify rational outright belief with a rational credence above a threshold, we seem to be forced to admit either that one can have inconsistent rational beliefs, or that one cannot rationally believe anything one is not certain of. The statistical evidence problem arises from the observation that (...)
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  30.  20
    Lottery- and Survey-Based Risk Attitudes Linked Through a Multichoice Elicitation Task.Giuseppe Attanasi, Nikolaos Georgantzís, Valentina Rotondi & Daria Vigani - 2018 - Theory and Decision 84 (3):341-372.
    We analyze the results from three different risk attitude elicitation methods. First, the broadly used test by Holt and Laury, HL, second, the lottery-panel task by Sabater-Grande and Georgantzis, SG, and third, responses to a survey question on self-assessment of general attitude towards risk. The first and the second task are implemented with real monetary incentives, while the third concerns all domains in life in general. Like in previous studies, the correlation of decisions across tasks is low and usually statistically (...)
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  31.  22
    Lotteries, Possible Worlds, and Probability.Maura Priest - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (5):2097-2118.
    A necessary criterion of Duncan Pritchard’s Anti-luck Virtue Epistemology is his safety condition. A believer cannot know p unless her belief is safe. Her belief is safe only if p could not have easily been false. But “easily” is not to be understood probabilistically. The chance that p is false might be extremely low and yet p remains unsafe. This is what happens, Pritchard argues, in lottery examples and explains why knowledge is not a function of the probabilistic strength of (...)
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  32. Infinite Lotteries, Perfectly Thin Darts and Infinitesimals.Alexander R. Pruss - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):81-89.
    One of the problems that Bayesian regularity, the thesis that all contingent propositions should be given probabilities strictly between zero and one, faces is the possibility of random processes that randomly and uniformly choose a number between zero and one. According to classical probability theory, the probability that such a process picks a particular number in the range is zero, but of course any number in the range can indeed be picked. There is a solution to this particular problem on (...)
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  33.  88
    A Lottery Paradox for Counterfactuals Without Agglomeration.Hannes Leitgeb - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (3):605-636.
    We will present a new lottery-style paradox on counterfactuals and chance. The upshot will be: combining natural assumptions on the truth values of ordinary counterfactuals, the conditional chances of possible but non-actual events, the manner in which and relate to each other, and a fragment of the logic of counterfactuals leads to disaster. In contrast with the usual lottery-style paradoxes, logical closure under conjunction—that is, in this case, the rule of Agglomeration of counterfactuals—will not play a role in the derivation (...)
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  34.  55
    Inductive Knowledge and Lotteries: Could One Explain Both ‘Safely’?Haicheng Zhao & Peter Baumann - 2021 - Ratio 34 (2):118-126.
    Safety accounts of knowledge claim, roughly, that knowledge that p requires that one's belief that p could not have easily been false. Such accounts have been very popular in recent epistemology. However, one serious problem safety accounts have to confront is to explain why certain lottery‐related beliefs are not knowledge, without excluding obvious instances of inductive knowledge. We argue that the significance of this objection has hitherto been underappreciated by proponents of safety. We discuss Duncan Pritchard's recent solution to the (...)
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  35.  11
    Weighted Lotteries and the Allocation of Scarce Medications for Covid‐19.Lynn A. Jansen & Steven Wall - 2021 - Hastings Center Report 51 (1):39-46.
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  36.  16
    Lotteries, Knowledge, and Practical Reasoning.Rhys McKinnon - 2011 - Logos and Episteme 2 (2):225-231.
    This paper addresses an argument offered by John Hawthorne against the propriety of an agent’s using propositions she does not know as premises in practical reasoning. I will argue that there are a number of potential structural confounds in Hawthorne’s use of his main example, a case of practical reasoning about a lottery. By drawing these confounds out more explicitly, we can get a better sense of how to make appropriate use of such examples in theorizing about norms, knowledge, and (...)
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  37.  44
    Lotteries, Quasi-Lotteries, and Scepticism.Eugene Mills - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2):335 - 352.
    I seem to know that I won't experience spaceflight but also that if I win the lottery, then I will take a flight into space. Suppose I competently deduce from these propositions that I won't win the lottery. Competent deduction from known premises seems to yield knowledge of the deduced conclusion. So it seems that I know that I won't win the lottery; but it also seems clear that I don't know this, despite the minuscule probability of my winning (if (...)
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  38.  10
    Unweighted Lotteries and Compounding Injustice: Reply to Schmidt Et Al.Alex James Miller Tate - 2022 - Journal of Medical Ethics 48 (2):131-132.
    I argue that Schmidt et al, while correctly diagnosing the serious racial inequity in current ventilator rationing procedures, misidentify a corresponding racial inequity issue in alternative ‘unweighted lottery’ procedures. Unweighted lottery procedures do not ‘compound’ prior structural injustices. However, Schmidt et al do gesture towards a real problem with unweighted lotteries that previous advocates of lottery-based allocation procedures, myself included, have previously overlooked. On the basis that there are independent reasons to prefer lottery-based allocation of scarce lifesaving healthcare resources, (...)
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  39.  41
    The Lottery Preparation.Joel David Hamkins - 2000 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 101 (2-3):103-146.
    The lottery preparation, a new general kind of Laver preparation, works uniformly with supercompact cardinals, strongly compact cardinals, strong cardinals, measurable cardinals, or what have you. And like the Laver preparation, the lottery preparation makes these cardinals indestructible by various kinds of further forcing. A supercompact cardinal κ, for example, becomes fully indestructible by <κ-directed closed forcing; a strong cardinal κ becomes indestructible by κ-strategically closed forcing; and a strongly compact cardinal κ becomes indestructible by, among others, the forcing to (...)
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  40. The Lottery Paradox.Igor Douven (ed.) - forthcoming - Cambridge University Press.
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  41. The Lottery Problem.Igor Douven (ed.) - forthcoming - Cambridge University Press.
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  42. Status, Lotteries and Inequality¤.Gary Becker - unknown
    For several centuries, economists, sociologists, and philosophers have been concerned with the magnitude and e¤ects of inequality. Economists have concentrated on inequality in income and wealth, and have linked this inequality to social welfare, aggregate savings and investment, economic development, and other issues. They have explained the observed degree of inequality by the e¤ect of random shocks, inherited position, and inequality..
     
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  43. Lotteries and Miracles.Jordan Howard Sobel - 2010 - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 2 (1).
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  44.  64
    Lottery Pricing Under Time Pressure.Pavlo R. Blavatskyy & Wolfgang R. Köhler - 2011 - Theory and Decision 70 (4):431-445.
    This article investigates how subjects determine minimum selling prices for lotteries. We design an experiment where subjects have at every moment an incentive to state their minimum selling price and to adjust the price, if they believe that the price that they stated initially was not optimal. We observe frequent and sizeable price adjustments. We find that random pricing models cannot explain the observed price patterns. We show that earlier prices contain information about future price adjustments. We propose a (...)
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  45.  48
    Lottery-Dependent Utility Via Stochastic Benchmarking.Paola Modesti - 2003 - Theory and Decision 55 (1):45-57.
    The possibility to interpret expected and nonexpected utility theories in purely probabilistic terms has been recently investigated. Such interpretation proposes as guideline for the Decision Maker the comparison of random variables through their probability to outperform a stochastic benchmark. We apply this type of analysis to the model of Becker and Sarin, showing that their utility functional may be seen as the probability that an opportune random variable, depending on the one to be evaluated, does not outperform a non-random benchmark. (...)
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  46. The Lottery Paradox, Knowledge, and Rationality.Dana K. Nelkin - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (3):373-409.
    Jim buys a ticket in a million-ticket lottery. He knows it is a fair lottery, but, given the odds, he believes he will lose. When the winning ticket is chosen, it is not his. Did he know his ticket would lose? It seems that he did not. After all, if he knew his ticket would lose, why would he have bought it? Further, if he knew his ticket would lose, then, given that his ticket is no different in its chances (...)
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  47. Ultralarge and Infinite Lotteries.Sylvia Wenmackers - 2012 - In B. Van Kerkhove, T. Libert, G. Vanpaemel & P. Marage (eds.), Logic, Philosophy and History of Science in Belgium II (Proceedings of the Young Researchers Days 2010). Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van België voor Wetenschappen en Kunsten.
    By exploiting the parallels between large, yet finite lotteries on the one hand and countably infinite lotteries on the other, we gain insights in the foundations of probability theory as well as in epistemology. We solve the 'adding problems' that occur in these two contexts using a similar strategy, based on non-standard analysis.
     
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  48.  47
    Survival Lotteries Reconsidered.Gerhard Øverland - 2007 - Bioethics 21 (7):355–363.
  49. Knowledge Attributions and Lottery Cases: A Review and New Evidence.John Turri - forthcoming - In Igor Douven (ed.), The lottery problem. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
    I review recent empirical findings on knowledge attributions in lottery cases and report a new experiment that advances our understanding of the topic. The main novel finding is that people deny knowledge in lottery cases because of an underlying qualitative difference in how they process probabilistic information. “Outside” information is generic and pertains to a base rate within a population. “Inside” information is specific and pertains to a particular item’s propensity. When an agent receives information that 99% of all lottery (...)
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  50.  67
    Lottery Semantics: A Compositional Semantics for Probabilistic First-Order Logic with Imperfect Information.Pietro Galliani & Allen L. Mann - 2013 - Studia Logica 101 (2):293-322.
    We present a compositional semantics for first-order logic with imperfect information that is equivalent to Sevenster and Sandu’s equilibrium semantics (under which the truth value of a sentence in a finite model is equal to the minimax value of its semantic game). Our semantics is a generalization of an earlier semantics developed by the first author that was based on behavioral strategies, rather than mixed strategies.
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